大方廣佛華嚴經疏 21.16
大方廣佛華嚴經疏 21.16
- Language
- Classical Chinese
21.16
第六勤觀理事同無差別,離身心相,故名精進。十頌總相顯佛此德。前即無差之差,此乃差之無差。二章相接,顯非即離亦互相成。十頌分二:初一約法雙標、後九就喻雙釋。今初也。初句標其所知五類之法皆無有差,餘三句對人以顯,次句揀非餘境,下半唯佛究盡。後九釋中,前五釋所知、後四釋能知。前中,初四正釋、後一遣疑。前中皆上半喻,下半法無差,所由在於末句。然其能喻不離諸法,取其所易喻其所難耳。一體色無別喻,此喻為總。喻雖是一,法合有二,該橫豎故。豎約理事交徹。法者事也,非法理也,色即空故。亦可法真法也,非法妄法也。取文雖異,義旨乃同。謂如金之黃色與金體斤兩性無差別,隨取互收。合中,金是所依,喻其真法;色是能依,喻妄非法。以妄無體攬真而起,則真無不隱,唯妄現也;以真體實,妄無不盡,唯真現也。是則無體之妄不異體實之真,故云無有異也。亦同《密嚴》「如金與指環,展轉無差別。」橫者,異法相望。法者,可軌之法也。非法者,不可軌之法也。又法謂有法,非法謂無故。《中論》釋法不生非法,云有不生無故。體性無異者,謂同如故。然前義正順於喻,後義乃順標中。諸法之言,要由初義性相無差,方得顯於後義事事無差。若但用後義,未顯相全同性,那得顯於事事同於一性?第二偈假名不實喻。以真奪俗,是故無差。攬緣成眾生,即虛非眾生。所遣既無,能遣安有?故俱無實。以喻諸法皆無實義,並從緣故。若以正報為眾生,依報非眾生,乃全是所喻,非實之相尚難顯了。三三世互無喻,喻無相故無別。謂若未來有過去者,應名過去,何名未來?故知定無過現之相。文舉一隅,應反餘二。諸法無相如彼互無,此以差別喻無差別。四四相非實喻,喻無性故無差別。生等四相,離所相法無別自性。一切諸法,離所依理無別自性。此以相無,喻於性無。後遣疑者,疑云:若都無別,云何見有性相等殊?故此釋云:亦如涅槃,體離有無、百非斯絕,而強立名字曰餘無餘。諸法亦然,真俗並虛,分別成異。若離分別,則無一切境界之相。第二四偈喻能知者,皆展轉遣疑。初偈疑云:既有分別,則有能知。故釋云:離所數物,無能數數。既所知無性,何有能知?無知之知是真了法。次復疑云:若依向喻,能數喻能知。能知雖無,所知猶有故,復用能數法以喻所知,智慧差別以喻能知。反覆相遣顯無差理,謂一上加一名之為二,乃至百千皆是諸一,由能數智作百千解故。晉譯中第三句云皆悉是本數,今譯明一多相待故無體性,喻彼妄想於無性中計為有無耳。次又疑云:都無能所,何名佛智?故釋云:能所雙亡,佛智斯顯。故所知妄法如世成壞,能知真智湛若虛空。尚不初成,況當有敗?如〈出現品〉。又權智照俗同世成壞,權即是實,如不離空。末偈疑云:佛智既等,應用何殊?釋云:隨心妄取,佛無異相。又謂常無常,如各取空;佛智雙非,如空無別。
Sixth, because one diligently contemplates that noumenon and phenomena are identically without distinction and is free from the marks of body and mind, it is named "Forest of Diligence (Vīryavana)." The ten verses generally reveal this virtue of the Buddha. The preceding [section] was the distinction within non-distinction, whereas this is the non-distinction within distinction. The two sections connect, showing that they are neither identical nor separate and also mutually complete each other. The ten verses are divided into two: the first generally poses both in terms of phenomena; the subsequent nine explain both with reference to analogies. Now, the first: the first line indicates that the five categories of phenomena that are known are all without distinction; the remaining three lines reveal it with respect to persons; the next line singles it out as not being the realm of others; the latter half [indicates that] only the Buddha fathoms it completely. Among the subsequent nine explanatory [verses], the first five explain the known, and the latter four explain the knower. In the former, the first four are the direct explanation, and the last one dispels doubts. In the former, all the first halves are analogies and the latter halves are the non-distinction of phenomena; the reason lies in the final lines. However, the analogies presented are not apart from phenomena; it merely takes what is easy to illustrate what is difficult. First, the analogy of the non-difference between the substance and color [of gold]: this analogy is general. Although the analogy is one, the application to phenomena has two [aspects], because it encompasses the vertical and the horizontal. Vertically, it concerns the mutual interpenetration of noumenon and phenomena. "Phenomena" are events (shi); "non-phenomena" are noumenon (li), because form is emptiness. Alternatively, "phenomena" may be true phenomena, and "non-phenomena" false phenomena. Although the wording adopted differs, the doctrinal import is identical. This means that just as the yellow color of gold and the weight of the gold's substance have no difference in nature, whichever is taken, they mutually subsume one another. In the application, the gold is the support, illustrating the true Dharma; the color is that which is supported, illustrating the false non-dharma. Because the false has no substance of its own and arises by gathering the true, then the true is entirely hidden and only the false appears; because the substance of the true is real, the false is entirely exhausted and only the true appears. Therefore, the false without substance is not different from the true whose substance is real; thus it says "there is no difference." It is also like the *Ghanavyūha-sūtra*: "Like gold and a finger ring, there is universally no difference between them." Horizontally, it compares different phenomena with one another. "Dharma" means that which can serve as a model; "non-dharma" means that which cannot serve as a model. Furthermore, "dharma" refers to existent dharmas, while "non-dharma" refers to non-existence; hence the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, explaining that dharmas do not give rise to non-dharmas, says that being does not give rise to non-being. That their essence and nature are not different means they are identical in their suchness. However, the former meaning directly accords with the analogy, while the latter meaning accords with the phrase "all dharmas" in the initial proposition. Only by means of the initial meaning of the non-distinction between nature and marks can one reveal the latter meaning of the non-distinction among all phenomena. If one were only to use the latter meaning, without revealing that marks are completely identical with the nature, how could one reveal that all phenomena are identical with the one nature? The second verse is the analogy of conventional names being non-real. By using the ultimate to supplant the conventional, there is therefore no distinction. Gathering conditions forms a sentient being; thus, being empty, it is not a sentient being. Since that which is dispelled does not exist, how could that which dispels exist? Therefore, neither is real. This is used to illustrate that all phenomena are without real meaning, because they all arise from conditions. If one were to take direct retribution as sentient beings and dependent retribution as non-sentient beings, that would entirely be what is illustrated, and the mark of non-reality would still be difficult to make clear. Third is the analogy of the mutual non-existence of the three time periods, which illustrates that because they lack marks, they have no distinction. That is to say, if the future contained the past, it should be called the past; why call it the future? Therefore, we know there are definitely no marks of the past and present. The text raises one corner; one should deduce the other two. All phenomena are without marks just as these are mutually non-existent; this uses distinction to illustrate non-distinction. Fourth is the analogy of the four characteristics being non-real, which illustrates that because they lack self-nature, there is no distinction. The four characteristics of arising and the like have no separate self-nature apart from the dharmas characterized. All phenomena have no separate self-nature apart from the noumenon on which they rely. This uses the absence of marks to illustrate the absence of nature. As for dispelling doubts afterwards: a doubt asks: "If they are completely without distinction, why is it seen that there are differences such as nature and marks?" Therefore, this explanation says: It is also like nirvāṇa, whose substance is free from being and non-being and cuts off the hundred negations, yet names are arbitrarily established, called "with remainder" and "without remainder." All phenomena are also like this: the ultimate and the conventional are both empty, and conceptual discrimination creates distinction. If one is free from discrimination, then there are no marks of any objective realm whatsoever. The second group of four verses illustrating the knower all consecutively dispel doubts. In the first verse, the doubt asks: "Since there is discrimination, there must be a knower." Therefore, the explanation says: Apart from the things counted, there is no number that can count them. Since the known has no self-nature, how could there be a knower? The knowing of non-knowing is the true comprehension of dharmas. Next, a doubt arises again: "If we follow the previous analogy, the ability to count illustrates the knower. Although the knower does not exist, the known still exists." Therefore, he again uses the dharmas that can count to illustrate the known, and the distinctions of wisdom to illustrate the knower. Mutually dispelling each other back and forth, he reveals the principle of non-distinction: adding one to one is called two, up to hundreds of thousands, all of which are just multiple ones, because the wisdom that can count generates the understanding of hundreds of thousands. The third line in the Jin translation says: "All are completely the fundamental number." The present translation clarifies that because the one and the many are mutually dependent, they lack self-nature, illustrating how false thoughts conceptualize existence and non-existence within that which lacks self-nature. Next, another doubt asks: "If both subject and object are completely absent, what is called the Buddha's wisdom?" Therefore, the explanation says: When subject and object are both extinguished, the Buddha's wisdom is thereby manifested. Therefore, the false dharmas that are known are like the formation and decay of the world, while the true wisdom that can know is serene like empty space. It is not even initially formed, so how could it have ruin?—as in the "Chapter on Arising." Furthermore, expedient wisdom illuminating the conventional is identical with the world's formation and decay, and the expedient is precisely the real, just as it is not apart from emptiness. The final verse doubts: "Since the Buddha's wisdom is equal, why do its applications differ?" The explanation says: Falsely grasped according to the mind, the Buddha has no distinct marks. Furthermore, regarding permanence and impermanence, it is like each grasping space; the Buddha's wisdom is free from both, just as space has no distinction.
Translations (1)
- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation