大方廣佛華嚴經疏 24.12.4

24.12.4

三俱句者，身盡故有邊，我不異故無邊。 四俱非句者，亦以我存身盡，見上有過，故立此句。 謂身盡故非無邊，我存故非有邊，既皆邪見，故不答之。 若欲破者，初之二句墮無後世過，謂有邊則與陰同盡、無邊則是今身，故皆無後世。 無後世者，修道苦行為何益耶？ 第三句亦有邊無邊者，若身盡我存，身我為一為異？ 一則不應有盡不盡，異則離蘊何相知有我耶？ 若謂捨人生天，人分猶在天分更增，則半天半人，故皆不可。 第四句非有邊未免於無、非無邊未免於有，云何於此強分別耶？ 二常等四句。 約過去者，過去世我即是今我，名之為常。 若常，即有大過，破壞因果涅槃等故。 若謂我今始生，名為無常。 若爾，我是作法，亦墮無因，無因則亦無涅槃等。 第三見上二過，便謂我常身無常。 離身何處有我？ 又成上二過。 第四謂我不異故非無常，身有異故非常。 破同第三句。 又《中論》云「一切法空故，何有邊無邊及常等見。 」餘義廣如彼論。 三如來滅後等四句，釋有二義：一明如來者非是佛也。 如即相似，來謂從前際來。 謂一有執云：如從前世來生此間，去向後世亦復如是，故云如來滅後有，謂如前際來時有故。 此由計我異陰故。 二云：如從前世來此間，死後斷滅，故云如來滅後無，謂不如來時去故。 此計陰我一故。 三由計我有麁細故，謂麁我與身俱盡故云不如去，細我異陰不同滅故、亦如來時而去故，云如來滅後亦有亦無。 四云我如虛空，體無來去故。 晉經云如來滅後如去不如去等，此則通望三世以辨。 若依《中論》，附涅槃起四句，如來即佛也。 順此經文，亦是外道自立己師而為如來。 有謂如來滅後定有不變，或謂入無餘依同於太虛，或謂法有應無，或謂約應非有、約法非無。 以其四句皆成戲論，不見如來寂滅相，故亦為邪見。 此則權小之徒未能免也。 《瑜伽》八十七云「依二道理如實隨觀，俱不可記如來滅後若有若無。 所以者何？ 且依勝義，彼不可得，況其滅後或有或無。 若依世俗，為於諸行假立如來？ 為於涅槃？ 若於諸行，如來滅後無有一行流轉可得，爾時何處假立如來？ 既無如來，何有無等？ 若於涅槃，涅槃唯是無行所顯，絕諸戲論。 自內所證絕戲論故，施設為有，不應道理。 亦復不應施設非有，勿當損毀施設妙有寂靜涅槃。 」又此涅槃極難知故、最微細故，說名甚深。 種種非一，諸行煩惱斷所顯故，說名廣大。 現量比量及正教量所不量故，說名無量。 四我及眾生有無等四句，此並雙立眾生即是五蘊，非約總主，有即定有，定有著常； 無即定無，定無著斷。 三遠上二過，雙立有無，即墮相違。 四避此相違，立俱非句，又成戲論。 然此四句，亦有單計我有所無、所有我無，亦不離初之二句。 又合上成第三，互奪成第四，亦不出初之二句。 第二門明三乘凡聖數之多少者，以橫無邊，故不可記也。 第三門竪無際故不可記也。 有人答問，云有初佛言自然悟，引獺祭天亦為應機，寧加置記？ 若有初佛，如來應知，則可說名。 言何法者？ 染淨等一切法也。 第四門徵世間所從，有六句：初二句問眾生及蘊世間、次四句約器世間，以外道計眾生有最初生故。 或謂從冥諦中來，還至冥故。 或謂世界皆微塵成，謂至妙之色常恒不變，聚則為身器、散則成微塵故。 此皆邪見之源，故不應答。 有情世間不言成壞者，《瑜伽》云「有情望器有五不同：一謂器界生死共因所生，有情生死但由不共故，是因不同。 二謂器有除斷，有情流轉不斷故，是時不同。 三謂三災壞不壞故，名法不同。 四謂器界因無永斷，有情不爾，名斷不同。 五謂器則斷而復續，有情斷已無續，名續不同。 」以斯義故，略無成壞也。 第五約生死初後際，唯有二句。 問：初際無始，聖教所明。 生死有終，豈非正理？ 答：略有三義。

As for the third, the both-proposition: because the body ends, it has an end; because the self is not different [from the body], it is endless. As for the fourth, the neither-proposition: this proposition is also established because, [grasping that] the self persists while the body ends, one sees errors in the propositions above. That is to say, because the body ends it is not endless, and because the self persists it is not finite; since these are both wrong views, [the Buddha] does not answer them. If one wishes to refute them: the first two propositions fall into the fault of [denying] future lifetimes; that is, if it has an end, it ends together with the aggregates, and if it is endless, it is just this present body; thus in both cases there is no future lifetime. If there is no future lifetime, what benefit is there in cultivating the path and practicing austerities? Regarding the third proposition, 'both finite and endless': if the body ends and the self persists, are the body and the self one or different? If they are one, then it should not be that one ends while the other does not; if they are different, apart from the aggregates by what mark can the existence of a self be known? If it is claimed that when relinquishing human form to be born in heaven, the human portion still remains while the heavenly portion increases, this would mean being half god and half human; therefore neither is tenable. Regarding the fourth proposition: 'not finite' does not escape non-existence, and 'not endless' does not escape existence; how can one arbitrarily make conceptual distinctions concerning this? Second, the four propositions concerning permanence and so on: regarding the past, if the self of past lifetimes is identical to the present self, it is termed 'permanent'. If it is permanent, there are great faults, for this destroys cause and effect, nirvāṇa, and the like. If it is claimed that my self has only now been born, it is termed 'impermanent'. If so, the self is a produced entity and also falls into being causeless; if it is causeless, there is likewise no nirvāṇa and so forth. The third proposition, seeing the two faults above, then asserts that the self is permanent while the body is impermanent. Apart from the body, where is there a self? This again incurs the above two faults. The fourth asserts that because the self is not different, it is not impermanent, and because the body has differences, it is not permanent. The refutation is the same as that for the third proposition. Furthermore, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: 'Because all dharmas are empty, how could there be views of finitude, endlessness, permanence, and the like?' The remaining points are as extensively treated in that treatise. Third, regarding the four propositions on 'the Tathāgata after extinction' and so forth, the explanation has two meanings: first, explaining that 'Tathāgata' here does not refer to the Buddha. Ru (tathā) means 'similarity', and lai (āgata) means 'coming from the past limit'. That is, one person grasps: just as one comes from a past lifetime to be born here, departing to a future lifetime is also like this; hence it is said that 'the Tathāgata exists after extinction', meaning that it exists just as when it came from the past limit. This is due to positing a self that is different from the aggregates. The second view states: just as one comes here from a past lifetime, after death there is annihilation; hence it is said that 'the Tathāgata does not exist after extinction', meaning that it does not go as it came. This is due to positing that the aggregates and the self are one. The third view: because of positing coarse and subtle selves, one says that because the coarse self ends together with the body, it does not depart as it came, and because the subtle self is different from the aggregates and does not perish together with them, it also departs as it came; hence it is said that 'the Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after extinction'. The fourth view states: the self is like space, its essence having neither coming nor going. The Jin dynasty sūtra says: 'the Tathāgata after extinction departs as it came, does not depart as it came', and so forth; this is explained by taking all three times into perspective. If one relies on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, the four propositions are framed based on nirvāṇa, where 'Tathāgata' refers to the Buddha. In accordance with the text of this sūtra, it is also that non-Buddhists set up their own teachers as 'tathāgata'. Some assert that after extinction the Tathāgata definitely exists and is unchanging; some assert that entering the [nirvāṇa] without remainder is identical to empty space; some assert that the Dharma-[body] exists while the response-[body] does not; some assert that in terms of the response[-body] it does not exist, while in terms of the Dharma[-body] it is not non-existent. Because all four propositions constitute conceptual proliferation and do not perceive the quiescent mark of the Tathāgata, they are also wrong views. In this, those of the provisional and Hinayana teachings have not yet been able to avoid it. Fascicle eighty-seven of the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'Observing in accordance with reality on the basis of two rationales, it is in both cases unexplainable whether the Tathāgata exists or does not exist after extinction. Why is this? First, based on the ultimate truth, that [Tathāgata] is ungraspable, much less whether it exists or does not exist after extinction. If based on the conventional: is the Tathāgata designated conventionally upon conditioned formations, or upon nirvāṇa? If upon conditioned formations, after the Tathāgata's extinction not a single conditioned formation can be found in transmigration; at that time, upon what could the Tathāgata be conventionally designated? Since there is no Tathāgata, how could there be existence, non-existence, and so on? If upon nirvāṇa, nirvāṇa is revealed solely by the absence of conditioned formations, cut off from all conceptual proliferation. Because that which is internally realized cuts off conceptual proliferation, designating it as existent is not in accord with reason. Nor should it be designated as non-existent, lest one disparage the quiescent nirvāṇa that is designated as wondrous existence.' Furthermore, because this nirvāṇa is exceedingly difficult to know and most subtle, it is called 'profound'. Because it is revealed by the cessation of diverse and non-singular conditioned formations and defilements, it is called 'vast'. Because it cannot be measured by direct perception, inference, or valid scripture, it is called 'immeasurable'. Fourth, the four propositions on the existence or non-existence of the self and sentient beings: these both jointly establish that 'sentient beings' are just the five aggregates, not referring to an overarching master; 'existing' means definitively existing, and definitive existence clings to permanence; 'not existing' means definitively not existing, and definitive non-existence clings to annihilation. The third, seeking to avoid the above two faults, posits both existence and non-existence, thus falling into contradiction. The fourth, evading this contradiction, posits the neither-proposition, which again becomes conceptual proliferation. However, among these four propositions, there are also singular graspings that 'the self exists and what belongs to it does not', or 'what belongs to it exists and the self does not', which also do not depart from the first two propositions. Moreover, combining the above forms the third, and mutual negation forms the fourth, which also do not go beyond the first two propositions. The second section, explaining the quantity of the ordinary and noble beings of the three vehicles: because it is horizontally boundless, it cannot be recorded. The third section: because it is vertically without limit, it cannot be recorded. Someone in answering a question said that there was an original Buddha who awakened spontaneously, citing an otter offering sacrifices to heaven as also responding to capacities; why should one further leave it unrecorded? If there were an original Buddha, the Tathāgata should know it and could state the name. What is meant by 'what dharmas'? All dharmas, defiled, pure, and so forth. The fourth section, inquiring into the origins of the world, has six propositions: the first two propositions ask about sentient beings and the world of aggregates; the next four propositions concern the receptacle world, because non-Buddhists posit that sentient beings have a primal birth. Or they assert that they come from the primordial darkness (prakṛti) and return to darkness. Or they assert that the worlds are all composed of atoms, meaning that the most wondrous form is permanent and unchanging, aggregating to form bodies and receptacles, and dispersing to become atoms. These are all sources of wrong views, and therefore should not be answered. The reason why the world of sentient beings does not speak of formation and disintegration is that the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'Sentient beings, when compared to the receptacle [world], have five differences: first, the receptacle realm's saṃsāra is produced by shared causes, whereas the saṃsāra of sentient beings is produced solely by unshared causes; this is the difference in causes. Second, the receptacle [world] has interruption and cessation, whereas the transmigration of sentient beings is uninterrupted; this is the difference in time. Third, regarding destruction and non-destruction by the three disasters; this is called the difference in nature. Fourth, the causes of the receptacle realm are never permanently severed, whereas sentient beings are not like this; this is called the difference in severance. Fifth, the receptacle [world] is severed and then resumes, whereas once sentient beings are severed there is no resumption; this is called the difference in resumption.' For these reasons, formation and disintegration are omitted. The fifth, concerning the initial and final limits of saṃsāra, has only two propositions. Question: That the initial limit has no beginning is made clear by the holy teachings. That saṃsāra has an end—how could that not be correct principle? Answer: Briefly, there are three points.