大方廣佛華嚴經疏 3.9

3.9

第六宗趣通別者，語之所尚曰宗、宗之所歸曰趣，先明其通、後顯於別。前中通論一代佛教，諸部異計各是一宗，謂十八本二各不同故，以義相從更復合之。然隋朝大衍法師，總立四宗：一因緣宗，謂薩婆多。二假名宗，謂即經部。三不真宗，謂諸般若。四真實宗，謂法性、真理、佛性等教。又此四宗，初名立性、二名破性、三名破相、四名顯實。初二小乘、後二大乘，各初淺、後深。此亦有理，但收義不盡，以十八部中但判二故。今總收一代時教以為十宗：第一我法俱有宗，謂犢子部等。彼立三聚：一有為；二無為；三非二聚，非二即我。又立五法藏，謂三世為三；無為為四；第五不可說藏，我在其中，以不可說為有為無為故。然此一部，諸部論師共推不受，呼為附佛法外道，以諸外道所計雖殊，皆立我故。二法有我無宗，謂薩婆多等。彼立諸法不離色心，或立三世無為、或分五類，皆無有我。以無我故，異外道計。又於有為之中立正因緣，以破外道邪因無因。然西域邪見雖九十五種，或計二十五諦從冥生等、或計六句和合生等、或謂自在梵天等生、或謂時方微塵虛空宿作等，而為世間及涅槃本。統收所計，不出四見，謂數論計一、勝論計異、勒沙婆計亦一亦異、若提子計非一非異。若計一者，則謂因中有果；若計異者，則謂因中無果；三則亦有亦無；四則非有非無。餘諸異計皆不出此，雖多不同，就其結過不出二種，從虛空自然生，即是無因；餘皆邪因。此方儒道二教亦不出此，如莊老皆計自然，謂人法地、地法天、天法道、道法自然。若以自然為因能生萬物，即是邪因；若謂萬物自然而生，如鶴之白、如烏之黑，即是無因。《周易》云「易有太極，是生兩儀，兩儀生四象，四象生八卦，八卦定吉凶，吉凶生大業」者，太極為因，即是邪因。若謂一陰一陽之謂道，即計陰陽變易能生萬物，亦是邪因。若計一為虛無自然，則亦無因。然無因、邪因乃成大過，謂自然虛空等，生應常生故。以不知三界由乎我心，從癡有愛流轉無極，迷正因緣，故異計紛然，安知因緣性空真如妙有。言有濫同釋教者，皆是佛法之餘，同於《涅槃》盜牛之喻，乳色雖同，不能善取醍醐，況抨驢乳安成酥酪？廣明異計，如《瑜伽》第六、《顯揚》第九第十、《婆沙》十一十二，及《金七十論》說，《中》、《百》等論亦廣破之。今但說正因緣，已總破諸計。是如佛法之淺淺，已勝外道之深深。三法無去來宗，謂大眾部等，說有現在及無為耳。其過未之法，體用俱無。四現通假實宗，謂說假部，就前現在之中法，在蘊為實、在界處為假。其《成實論》經部師即是此類。五俗妄真實宗，即說出世部等，謂世俗是假，以虛妄故；出世反上。六諸法但名宗，謂一說部等，一切我法唯有假名，無實體故。七三性空有宗，謂遍計是空，依、圓有故。八真空絕相宗，謂心境兩亡，直顯體故。九空有無礙宗，謂互融雙絕而不礙兩存，真如隨緣具恒沙德故。十圓融具德宗，謂事事無礙、主伴具足、無盡自在故。然此十宗，後後深於前前。前四唯小，五六通大小，後四唯大乘，七即法相宗、八即無相宗、後二即法性宗。又七即始教、八即頓教、九即終教、十即圓教。又第七亦名二諦俱有宗，謂勝義真實故不無世俗，因果不失故是有，如《深密》、《瑜伽》等。第八亦名二諦雙絕宗，謂勝義離相故非有，世俗緣生如幻故是無。如《掌珍》頌云「真性有為空，如幻緣生故。無為無有實，不起似空華」等，即般若三論中一分之義。九二諦無礙宗，如《維摩》、《法華》等，義如前顯。然十宗五教互有寬陜，教則一經容有多教；宗則一宗容具多經，隨何經中皆此宗故。若局判一經以為一教，則抑諸大乘。又夫立教必須斷證階位等殊，立宗但明所尚差別。前之六宗執法有異，故分六宗；斷證次位不離八輩，合為一教。餘義如前立教中辯。

Sixth is the general and specific overarching tenets and aims. What a discourse honors is called its tenet (zong); where the tenet converges is called its aim (qu). First the general is clarified, and then the specific is revealed. In the former, discussing broadly the Buddha's teachings of an entire lifetime, the different assertions of the various schools each constitute a tenet: because the eighteen [sub-schools] and the two root [schools] are each distinct, they are further combined according to the affinity of their doctrines. Now, Dharma Master Dayan of the Sui dynasty established four tenets in general: 1. the tenet of causes and conditions, which refers to the Sarvāstivāda; 2. the tenet of nominal designations, which refers to the Sautrāntika; 3. the tenet of untruth, which refers to the Prajñāpāramitā [sūtras]; 4. the tenet of ultimate reality, which refers to teachings such as the dharmatā, ultimate noumenon, and buddha-nature. Furthermore, among these four tenets, the first is called positing intrinsic nature; the second is called refuting intrinsic nature; the third is called refuting characteristics; the fourth is called revealing the real. The first two are Hīnayāna, and the latter two are Mahāyāna; in each case, the earlier is shallow and the later is deep. This also has reason, but its inclusion of doctrines is not exhaustive, since among the eighteen schools it only classifies two. Now, we comprehensively encompass the teachings of the entire lifetime into ten tenets: First is the tenet that both the self and phenomena exist, which refers to the Vātsīputrīya and others. They posit three aggregates: 1. conditioned; 2. unconditioned; 3. the aggregate that is neither of the two, which is the self. They also posit five dharma treasuries: the three times are three; the unconditioned is the fourth; the fifth is the ineffable treasury, in which the self resides, because it is ineffable as conditioned or unconditioned. However, the treatise masters of the various schools unanimously reject this school and do not accept it, calling them outsiders attached to the Buddha's Dharma, because although the views of various outsiders differ, they all posit a self. Second is the tenet that phenomena exist but the self is non-existent, which refers to the Sarvāstivāda and others. They posit that phenomena are not separate from form and mind, or posit the three times and the unconditioned, or distinguish five categories, all without a self. Because of selflessness, it differs from the views of outsiders. Furthermore, within conditioned phenomena they posit correct causes and conditions in order to refute the erroneous causality and absence of causality of outsiders. However, although there are ninety-five kinds of erroneous views in the Western Regions—such as positing that the twenty-five principles arise from primordial matter (prakṛti), positing that things arise from the combination of the six categories (padārtha), positing that they are produced by Īśvara, Brahmā, and so forth, or asserting that time, space, atoms (paramāṇu), space (ākāśa), or past actions are the origin of the world and of nirvāṇa—comprehensive summary shows that what they assert does not go beyond four views: the Sāṃkhya asserts oneness; the Vaiśeṣika asserts difference; Nirgrantha posits both oneness and difference; Jñātiputra posits neither oneness nor difference. If one posits oneness, one asserts that the effect exists in the cause; if one posits difference, one asserts that the effect does not exist in the cause; the third posits both existence and non-existence; the fourth posits neither existence nor non-existence. All other diverse views do not go beyond these. Although they are manifold and distinct, in terms of their concluding errors they do not go beyond two kinds: arising naturally from empty space is causelessness; all the rest are erroneous causes. The two teachings of Confucianism and Daoism in this land also do not go beyond this: Zhuangzi and Laozi both posit spontaneity (ziran), saying: "Humans emulate the Earth, the Earth emulates Heaven, Heaven emulates the Dao, and the Dao emulates spontaneity." If one takes spontaneity as the cause capable of producing the myriad things, this is an erroneous cause; if one says that the myriad things are produced spontaneously, just as a crane is white and a crow is black, this is causelessness. The Book of Changes says: "In Change there is the Supreme Ultimate (Taiji), which generates the Two Modes; the Two Modes generate the Four Images; the Four Images generate the Eight Trigrams; the Eight Trigrams determine good and bad fortune; good and bad fortune generate the great enterprises." Taking the Supreme Ultimate as the cause is an erroneous cause. If one says that "one yin and one yang are what is called the Dao," thus positing that the transformation of yin and yang can generate the myriad things, this is also an erroneous cause. If one posits that the One is emptiness, non-being, and spontaneity, then this is also causelessness. Now, causelessness and erroneous causes result in great errors: namely, that which arises from spontaneity, empty space, and so forth ought to arise constantly. Because they do not know that the three realms arise from one's own mind, and that from delusion arises craving which transmutes without limit, they are confused about correct causes and conditions, and thus their discordant views proliferate wildly; how could they know that causes and conditions are empty in nature and that tathatā is wondrous existence? As for statements that superficially resemble Buddhist teachings, they are mere remnants of the Buddha's Dharma, similar to the metaphor of the stolen cow in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra: although the color of the milk is the same, they cannot properly extract the ghee; how much less could churning donkey's milk yield butter and cheese? The extensive explanation of diverse views is as stated in Yogācārabhūmi fascicle six, Prakaraṇāryavācā fascicles nine and ten, Mahāvibhāṣā fascicles eleven and twelve, and the Sāṃkhya-kārikā (Suvarṇasaptati); treatises such as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and Śataśāstra also refute them extensively. Here, merely stating correct causes and conditions already completely refutes all these views. This shows how what is shallowest in the Buddha's Dharma already surpasses what is deepest among outsiders. Third is the tenet that phenomena have no past or future, which refers to the Mahāsāṃghika and others, who speak only of the existence of the present and the unconditioned. For them, past and future phenomena are devoid of both essence and function. Fourth is the tenet that the present is both conventional and real, which refers to the Prajñaptivāda: among the aforementioned present phenomena, they are real in the skandhas and conventional in the dhātus and āyatanas. The Sautrāntika masters of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra belong to this category. Fifth is the tenet that the worldly is false and the supramundane is real, which refers to the Lokottaravāda and others, who say that the conventional world is nominal because it is false and deceptive, whereas the supramundane is the opposite. Sixth is the tenet that all phenomena are mere names, which refers to the Ekavyāvahārika and others, for whom all selves and phenomena are merely nominal designations without real essence. Seventh is the tenet of the emptiness and existence of the three natures, which says that the imagined nature (parikalpita) is empty, while the dependent (paratantra) and perfected (pariniṣpanna) natures exist. Eighth is the tenet of true emptiness which transcends characteristics, which says that both mind and object are obliterated, directly revealing the essence. Ninth is the tenet of the non-obstruction of emptiness and existence, which says that they mutually blend and are doubly negated without preventing both from coexisting, because tathatā accords with conditions while possessing virtues numerous as the sands of the Ganges. Tenth is the tenet of perfect interpenetration endowed with virtues, which refers to the non-obstruction among phenomena, the complete endowment of host and companion, and inexhaustible ease. Now, among these ten tenets, each subsequent one is deeper than the preceding one. The first four are exclusively Hīnayāna; the fifth and sixth pertain to both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna; the last four are exclusively Mahāyāna. The seventh is the Faxiang school; the eighth is the Wuxiang (Markless) school; the latter two are the Faxing school. Furthermore, the seventh is the initial teaching; the eighth is the sudden teaching; the ninth is the final teaching; the tenth is the perfect teaching. Furthermore, the seventh is also named the tenet that both two truths exist, because the ultimate truth is real and therefore does not lack the conventional world, and causes and effects are not lost and therefore exist, as in the Saṃdhinirmocana, Yogācāra, and so on. The eighth is also named the tenet of the dual negation of the two truths, because the ultimate truth transcends marks and therefore is not existent, while the conventional world arises from conditions and is like an illusion and therefore is non-existent. As the verse of the Karatalaratna says: "In true nature, conditioned things are empty, / Because they arise from conditions like an illusion. / The unconditioned lacks reality; / Not arising, it is like a sky-flower," and so forth: this is one part of the doctrine in the Prajñā and Mādhyamika treatises. The ninth is the tenet of the non-obstruction of the two truths, as in the Vimalakīrti, Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, and so forth, the meaning of which was clarified previously. Now, the ten tenets and the five teachings mutually vary in scope: as for teachings, a single sūtra may contain multiple teachings; as for tenets, a single tenet may encompass multiple sūtras, since any sūtra might belong to this tenet. If one rigidly classifies a single sūtra as one teaching, this diminishes the various Mahāyāna scriptures. Furthermore, establishing a teaching must involve distinctions in stages of abandonment and realization, whereas establishing a tenet merely clarifies differences in what is valued. The prior six tenets differed in their attachment to phenomena and are therefore divided into six tenets; their sequence of abandonment and realization does not depart from the eight classes of holy persons, and thus they are combined into one teaching. The remaining points are as analyzed above in establishing the teachings.