大方廣佛華嚴經疏 14.26

14.26

Third, the profundity of karma and result. Within the question there are also two parts: first, identifying the person who asks and the one asked. Because revealing the noumenon within phenomena is precious, he asks Bao Shou. Second, from 'all' downward, properly presenting the opening of the question, in three parts: First, citing the principle to establish the premise: the bodies of sentient beings are merely the provisional names of the four great elements; the four elements have no master, and the body is likewise without a self—how could there be what belongs to a self? Both parties mutually accept this, so it is taken as the established premise. Second, from 'how' downward, directly presenting the doubt and difficulty. The maker and the experiencer are called the self; what is made and what is experienced is what belongs to the self. Because there is no self, there is no maker or experiencer: who causes suffering and pleasure? Because there is nothing belonging to a self, there is nothing made or experienced: why is it manifestly observed that there are suffering and so forth, ten items in five pairs? 1. Suffering and pleasure are spoken of in terms of coarse marks: the three evil destinies are suffering, while humans and devas are pleasure. 2. Within suffering, each has beauty and ugliness. 3. Within that pleasure, there are the internal body and external objects. 4. Pervading the experiences of suffering and pleasure, both time and events have much and little. All the above concern retribution in the next life (upapanna-vedanīya), being produced by past lives. 5. What is done in the present and experienced in the present is called retribution in the present life (dṛṣṭa-dharma-vedanīya); what is experienced after an interval of a lifetime is called retribution in subsequent lives (apara-paryāya-vedanīya). Third, from 'yet the dharmadhātu' downward, concluding the difficulty: the principle of the two selflessnesses is itself the true dharmadhātu; within the true dharmadhātu, there is definitely neither wholesome nor unwholesome—from where do suffering and pleasure arise? This asks for the reason. Is there nothing belonging to a self because there is no self? Or, because there is something experienced, is there also a self? This poses the doubt. Because the authority of sacred words and the authority of correct reasoning contradict direct perception, how can this be resolved? This concludes and forms the difficulty.