大方廣佛華嚴經疏 14.9

14.9

Second, stating the intent of the inquiry: it clarifies that the nature of the mind is one, so how is it seen that there are various kinds of retributions? If the nature were to vary according to phenomena, then ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) would be lost; if phenomena were to be one according to the nature, then conventional truth would be destroyed. Suppose they rescue [their argument] by saying: 'The differences in kinds of retributions naturally arise from karma and so forth perfuming consciousness and transforming into manifestation, having no relation to the nature of the mind, and therefore there is no contradiction.' In order to block this rescue, the challenge is reiterated, saying: 'Karma does not know the mind,' and so forth, meaning that the five supports of mind and karma each lack intrinsic nature (svabhāva); since intrinsic nature is fundamentally non-existent, how could they mutually know each other to produce all phenomena? Since none can establish itself apart from the true nature, it is clear that these all arise relying on the nature of the mind. Since the nature of the mind is one, phenomena should not be manifold; since phenomenal dharmas are manifold, the nature should not be one. This is the contradiction between root and branch, also the contradiction between noumenon and phenomena, also the contradiction between oneness and difference, and also the contradiction between true and false.