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大方廣佛華嚴經疏 33.2

English (machine translation) 33.2

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English

33.2

Second, directly presenting the verses. There are twelve verses, divided broadly into two: the first seven reveal the greatness of meaning, and the latter five elucidate the greatness of exposition. Now for the first, it is divided into four: first, four verses generally reveal the subtlety of the stage-wisdom; second, there is one verse that assimilates the subtlety of the stage-practices; third, there is one verse that brings out subtlety by means of contrast; fourth, there is one verse that illustrates the subtlety of the stage by analogy. Now for the first, it is divided into two: the first two generally reveal the stage-wisdom, and the latter two individually reveal the subtle characteristics. Now for the first, it directly reveals the characteristics of the subtlety of stage-wisdom. Therefore the Śāstra states: "In reliance on what meaning is this verse spoken? It is in reliance on the wisdom-stage." "In reliance on" means based upon. How is it known that it relies on the wisdom-stage? Heretofore, both the Fundamental Section and the Request Section relied on the wisdom-stage, and in the subsequent Exposition Section, the wisdom-stage is also spoken of; furthermore, the sixth verse right here says, "Wisdom arises in the Buddha's sphere," which also relies on the wisdom-stage. Thus we clearly know that this reveals the subtlety of stage-wisdom and does not separately elucidate the Buddha-fruit. Therein, the Śāstra's sūtra text has only six lines: the first two lines correspond to this initial verse, stating: "Subtle and difficult to know is the noble path; it is beyond conceptual differentiation and free from thought." As for "subtle and wondrous," this is the general characteristic of the two verses, because the aforesaid stage-wisdom transcends words and thoughts. The rest are all particular characteristics: therein, the first line is the subtle essence, and the rest are all the reasons for its subtlety. Therein, "difficult to know" generally reveals the reasons, while the six lines below individually reveal the reasons. The Śāstra states: "Why is it subtle? Because the verse says 'the noble path is difficult to know.'" This points to both, meaning that the noble path is the essence, and because it is difficult to know, it is subtle. Therefore the Vimalakīrti says: "The subtle and wondrous is bodhi, for all dharmas are difficult to know." Why is it difficult to know? This has two meanings: first, it is difficult to know when explained, because when the mouth wishes to express it, words fail; second, it is difficult to know when realized, because when the mind is about to grasp it, thoughts cease. The "path of the Great Sage" above is that which is realized and explained, for the Great Sage is the Buddha. The "subtle and wondrous path" is the cause—the cause of cultivating practice and realizing wisdom—which attains the fruit of the Great Sage. Among the six lines that individually reveal the reasons for its subtlety, the first line is its being difficult to know when explained. "Beyond thought" means that it is not the sphere of those with deliberate thought and conceptualizing minds. Why is it not an object of deliberate thought? Because the stage-wisdom's own essence is without thought; hence it says "free from all thoughts." Due to the two meanings above, such a noble path is called extremely subtle. The five lines below elucidate its being extremely subtle when realized, within which there are again general and particular aspects. The first line is general: because in seeking to realize and see it, it is difficult to realize and attain, for only through non-seeing and non-attaining can one realize it. The four lines below have four distinct extreme subtleties: first, contemplative practice; second, support; third, purity; fourth, merit. The first line is the extreme subtlety of merit. "Unarisen" means that it accords with noumenon and transcends the world. "Unceasing" means that it is not a unilateral cessation, for it does not abandon the activities of benefiting sentient beings; that is, the merit of the non-obstruction between stillness and function in non-abiding nirvāṇa. The next line is the extreme subtlety of purity: its nature is free from defilements, not because it was previously defiled and later became free; hence it is called "naturally pure." In this way, there is no time when it is not free, and therefore it is ever tranquil; this is naturally pure nirvāṇa. "Free from defilement" is the extreme subtlety of contemplative practice: it means that within contemplative wisdom, one is free from the defilement of ignorance, unlike the worldly eight dhyānas which are intermingled with ignorance. From "intelligent persons" downward is the extreme subtlety of support. "Intelligent persons" are those who possess wisdom having ascended to the stages and above; the wisdom of such persons can practice stage-wisdom. What wisdom can practice it? If taken generally and in terms of reality, there is only the single real wisdom, because it perceives the single real truth. If taken particularly and including the provisional, then it encompasses three wisdoms: first, preparatory wisdom, because of the superior wholesome resolution; second, fundamental wisdom, because of superior wholesome tranquil cessation—meaning that it extinguishes all afflictions and realizes the tranquil noumenon; third, subsequent wisdom, because it is lucidly clear in accordance with what is heard. What is its sphere of practice? This stage-wisdom is their realized wisdom, because it is self-realized. Because the arising of realized wisdom is spoken of in reliance on that stage-wisdom, it is said to "practice"; it does not mean that at the time of direct realization there is an agent or an object of practice. Among the four subtleties above, merit differs from the Hīnayāna, contemplative practice differs from ordinary persons, and support and purity are distinguished from non-Buddhists. As for those who respect themselves, they do so because their wisdom and eradication are distinct. The former subtlety of purity is the virtue of eradication, unlike their holding views of afflictions and extinguishing mind and thought to achieve purity. The support is the virtue of wisdom, unlike their subduing afflictions by means of the six practices. The above is based on preeminence; if spoken of comprehensively, all differ from ordinary persons and the Hīnayāna. The second two verses individually reveal the subtle characteristics. Therefore the Śāstra states: "What further characteristics does this extremely subtle wisdom have?" This inquires into its essential characteristics. This wisdom has two characteristics: the first two lines explain the common characteristic, because the wisdom-essence is empty and tranquil; the latter six lines explain the uncommon characteristics, because of the distinctions among wisdom-stages. Now for the first, within the common: the upper line is general, and the lower line is particular. In the general: whose characteristic is this? It is the characteristic of that wisdom; hence it says "its own essence." What does the essence of this wisdom take as its characteristic? It means originally empty and tranquil. Why is it said to be common? This is naturally pure nirvāṇa: upwardly, it is identical with all buddhas; downwardly, it is identical with sentient beings, because all sentient beings possess this. Horizontally, it is identical with all dharmas, because all dharmas are suchness. This suchness is precisely the emptiness of its own essence; hence all take emptiness as their self-nature. Because the nature of wisdom and the nature of form are originally not different, all possess the nature of peace and bliss. As for the lower line being particular, the Śāstra's sūtra text adds the character "is" (you), saying "is non-dual and inexhaustible." The explanation states: "As for this wisdom being empty and tranquil, what are its characteristics? It means being free from the inclusion of three kinds of emptiness; this is the characteristic of true emptiness." As for the three kinds of emptiness, they belong to the bodhisattvas of chaotic intent regarding emptiness prior to the stages: first, suspecting that emptiness extinguishes form, they grasp at the emptiness of total annihilation—this misses the empty tathāgatagarbha and is a deprecation; second, suspecting that emptiness is different from form, they grasp at an emptiness outside of form; third, suspecting that emptiness is an entity, they grasp at emptiness as existent. Now saying "is" is the inclusion of being free from the first deprecation, not considering it annihilated like a rabbit's horn. Saying "non-dual" is the inclusion of being free from difference, not considering that different from this empty wisdom there is another, different emptiness. Saying "inexhaustible" is the inclusion of being free from exhaustion and cessation, not considering that there are self-essences of this and that, which mutually transform and cease. This clarifies that it is not that wisdom with an essence is extinguished to become an emptiness with an essence, nor that emptiness is an entity that can transform and cease. Free from these three emptinesses, one then sees the originally empty tathāgatagarbha of self-nature. Now lacking the character "is," how are they reconciled? This has two senses: first, it is subsumed under "inexhaustible"—meaning that because it has an essence, it is inexhaustible, and its not being nothingness differs from annihilation. If there is nothing that can be exhausted or extinguished, then it is not an entity, the meaning of which is as explained before. Second, the sūtras of the Western Regions naturally have two versions; therefore the Śāstra states: "There are two kinds of verses: one says 'is non-dual and inexhaustible'; the other says 'definitely non-dual and inexhaustible.' Although these verses differ, they equally clarify real existence. If it were not real existence, one could not say 'definitely.' Why is it definite? Because it can definitely eradicate all afflictions." The meaning is: "definite" means existent, and thus it can eradicate afflictions. The present sūtra also lacks the character "definitely," yet its meaning is identical to the "definitely" version, meaning that it is definitely the dharma of the non-duality of existence and non-existence, and thus free from the former two emptinesses. That is, within non-duality it concurrently attains the non-duality of emptiness and existence, and hence is not annihilation. The meaning of the three kinds of emptiness is as elucidated in the fourth chapter of the Ratnagotravibhāga. Second, the six lines elucidating the uncommon characteristics refer to the nirvāṇa of purity through expedients. Eradicating afflictions equally is not like ordinary persons and the Hīnayāna, and being able to eradicate is not like external objects. Because it is solely that which is realized and has distinctive characteristics, it is not identical with emptiness. Nirvāṇa is the fruit; how can this be it? It is in terms of partial realization. Furthermore, it is the ocean of fruit that serves as the support, just as the ten mountains and ten virtues below are not separate from the ocean. This corresponds to the greatness of meaning, because it is ineffable. Now, elucidating stage-wisdom should be bodhi; why speak of nirvāṇa? If according to the approach of differentiating characteristics, then that which is realized is nirvāṇa; now, revealing the fusion of characteristics, the very nature of wisdom is naturally pure nirvāṇa, and wisdom emerging from the obstructions of afflictions is the nirvāṇa of purity through expedients. They are two yet non-dual; difficult to express and profoundly deep, it truly lies in this. In the text, "liberation" is general, and the rest are all particular. The general refers to the liberation of the characteristic of purity, and hence it differs from the preceding. The fourth chapter of the Ratnagotravibhāga states: "There are two kinds of purity: first, natural purity, meaning natural liberation, which is the aforementioned common characteristic; second, purity free from defilement, meaning attained liberation, which is this liberation of the characteristic of purity." In the particular, the general is revealed through the particular, and there are two particular aspects: first, where is liberation attained? That is the sūtra's "in all destinies." This reveals that from which one is liberated: afflictions are the destinies, karmic conditions are the destinies, because arising through causes serves as the fruit of the destinies. The three defilements are all subsumed under the destinies; if one is liberated from causes and conditions, then there is no fruit of rebirth. Second, how is one liberated? That is the five lines below, which clarify the essence of liberation. The five lines reveal five kinds of characteristics of liberation: first, equating the two extremes, which is the characteristic of contemplative wisdom; second, severing afflictions, which is the characteristic of freedom from obstruction; the latter three, with essence and virtues fully complete, are the characteristics of nirvāṇa. "Equal" means equally embracing both the world and nirvāṇa, not unilaterally turning one's back on the world like the śrāvakas, because the nature of the world is itself nirvāṇa. The Madhyamaka states: "The limit of the world is the limit of nirvāṇa; there is not the slightest difference between them." Second, regarding the characteristic of severing afflictions: it is only when there is no severing in the three periods that it is spoken of as severing; hence it says "not at the beginning, middle, or end." In explaining this there are two meanings: first, in terms of mutual opposition; second, in terms of continuity. As for mutual opposition: when the uninterrupted path directly severs afflictions, does wisdom arise first and afflictions cease afterward? Or do afflictions cease first and wisdom arise afterward? Or are they simultaneous? These three each have two faults regarding afflictions and wisdom, and so it is as if severing is not established. If wisdom arises first, wisdom has the fault of becoming outflow-free on its own, and the fault of being unable to extinguish afflictions. If afflictions cease first, afflictions have the fault of ceasing on their own, and the fault of not obstructing the noble path. If wisdom is later and they are simultaneous, each possesses four faults; this can be illustrated by a lamp not dispelling darkness. Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa states that vipaśyanā does not destroy afflictions. If so, how can one speak of severing? If, according to the ninth fascicle of Vijñaptimātratā, when the two kinds of real path of seeing are present, the seeds of those two obstructions are definitely not accomplished, just as light and darkness definitely do not arise together, and like the two ends of a scale where lowering and rising occur at the same time—for all mutually contradictory dharmas, the principle must be so, and therefore there is no fault of both natures being accomplished together—this merely puts forward one side of the characteristics of dharmas, yet does not contradict the meaning of severing through the convergence of conditions. If viewed from this school, then something is left out: the beam of the scale is one, so lowering and rising are unobstructed. Understanding and affliction are not like this; how could they be simultaneous? Although the analogy of light and darkness involves mutual dispelling, whether reaching or not reaching, neither dispels darkness; because at the same time they conflict, and at different times they do not affect each other. If severing bonds according to this school, it requires the non-obstruction of nature and marks. The above explanation that it is neither prior, posterior, nor simultaneous is to reveal the absence of intrinsic nature; when the absence of intrinsic nature is conditionally accomplished, it is spoken of as severing bonds. Because the severer lacks intrinsic nature, it can be the severer; because that which is severed is originally empty, it constitutes that which is severed. If it were definitely existent, it would fall into eternalism, because it could not be severed; if it were definitely non-existent, it would fall into annihilationism, because it would lose noble wisdom. As for continuity: it is not in terms of the opposition between affliction and wisdom, but merely in terms of a single wisdom naturally having three periods; the Śāstra relies on this interpretation. With regard to these three periods, there are again two kinds: first, dividing into three periods broadly from the initial mind to the ultimate; second, the three periods of moments within the uninterrupted path. Both the sūtras and the treatises cover these two. The Śāstra states: "Is the exhaustion of outflows by this wisdom the beginning, is the severing by wisdom the middle, or the end? The answer is: It is not the initial wisdom that severs, nor the middle or the end, for the verse says 'not beginning, middle, or end.'" This directly explains the verse text and concurrently determines the three periods, speaking solely in terms of wisdom; hence it is said that this wisdom severs afflictions. If so, when there is no severing in the three periods, how is it severed? The Śāstra states: "Just as a lamp's flame does not consume the wick solely at the beginning, middle, or end, but is apprehended through the earlier, middle, and later." This adduces an analogy to explain and establish it, meaning that in the real teaching, severing afflictions must clarify both nature and marks. The sūtra text directly reveals realized wisdom, relying solely on the ineffable meaning of the profound nature of conditions. The author of the treatise concurrently clarifies the meaning of severing, and therefore analyzes both nature and marks as not being beginning, middle, or end. Analyzing the absence of intrinsic nature in causes and conditions is the non-severing of severing. Apprehending earlier, middle, and later means not destroying the marks of conditions, which is the severing of non-severing. Therefore the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā states: "A bodhisattva does not attain bodhi with the initial mind, nor is it apart from the initial mind; the final mind is also like this, yet they attain bodhi. For example, when lighting a lamp, it is not the first flame that chars the wick, nor is it apart from the first flame; the final flame is also like this, yet the wick is truly charred." Nāgārjuna judged: "The Buddha answered by means of profound causes and conditions." The twenty-ninth fascicle of the Nirvāṇa also states: "Although the five aggregates of sentient beings perish from thought to thought, there is cultivation of the path, just as although a lamp perishes from thought to thought, there is light." All the sūtras and treatises above reveal the severing of non-severing through the non-obstruction of nature and marks. Furthermore, the present sūtra and treatise mutually reinforce each other reciprocally, meaning that if it were definitely severed, a single thought would suffice; why rely on three minds? Since it is only accomplished by taking them together, we clearly know that without intrinsic nature there is no beginning, middle, or end; because having no beginning, middle, or end is the absence of intrinsic nature, only then can severing across beginning, middle, and end be accomplished. This is: because of causes and conditions, there is no intrinsic nature; because of the absence of intrinsic nature, there are causes and conditions. If one says that the initial thought can sever, and only the subsequent thought definitively severs, this does not differ from the Abhidharma's view that in a single thought there is burning, but only from beginning to end is it completed. If one says that the initial thought alone cannot sever, and only when accumulated to the middle and end can it sever, this does not differ from the Tattvasiddhi's view that a single thought does not burn, and only in continuity is it so. Do not lose the fundamental tenet. The above still applies generally to the real teaching. If according to the perfect school, regarding the afflictions that are severed: when one is deluded, all are deluded, and therefore when one is severed, all are severed—there is neither severing nor non-severing. If fully revealing the distinctions among the various schools, it is as in the separate chapter. The three lines from "not words" downward clarify the three virtues: the first line is prajñā, which is the characteristic of contemplative practice, meaning that the essence of non-conceptual contemplation transcends names and words, and true wisdom arises from within, unlike the śrāvakas who awaken relying on sound. Previously, "contemplative wisdom" was spoken of in terms of its decisive resolution; here, "contemplative practice" is spoken of in terms of practice according with the ultimate. The next line, dharmakāya, is the characteristic of the transformation of the basis, meaning transforming the impermanent basis; it says "transcending the three times," and therefore this subtle wisdom relies on the permanent dharmakāya. The Śāstra states: "It is not like the wisdom of the impermanent conscious mind relying on impermanent causes and conditions." This distinguishes the time before the basis has been transformed; now it is that which is transformed into the basis. The wisdom of the impermanent conscious mind is that which relies, and impermanent causes and conditions are that which is relied upon. The fundamental consciousness holding seeds is the impermanent cause; the defiled and pure seeds and so forth held by it are the impermanent conditions; relying on these causes and conditions, the impermanent conscious mind arises. Now, transforming impermanent consciousness accomplishes the wondrous observing wisdom, and transforming the impermanent manas accomplishes the equality nature wisdom, which serve as that which relies; relying on that tathāgatagarbha nature of the fundamental consciousness, the true suchness dharmakāya, as that which is relied upon. The Śāstra states: "As definitively spoken in the sūtras, for this is the definitive meaning." The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "Transforming impermanent consciousness, one obtains permanent consciousness." In various Mahāyāna sūtras, such passages are not singular. Question: That which is relied upon is originally existent, so it can be permanent. That which relies is cultivated and arisen, so how can it be free from arising and ceasing? If according to Vijñaptimātratā, because that which is relied upon is permanent, that which relies is also spoken of as permanent; it is not permanent by self-nature, because it is conditioned. If according to the Awakening of Faith and so forth, initial enlightenment is identical to original enlightenment, and thus is also permanent. The Śrīmālā Sūtra states: "Because all dharmas are permanently abiding." Third, "its characteristics are like empty space" is the characteristic of liberation, unlike the śrāvakas who still have the cognitive obstruction. Because both obstructions are eliminated, it is unobstructed like space. The meaning of the three virtues has already appeared in the text above. However, their consummation is in the Buddha; the ten abodes of the perfect teaching already permit their unfolding. Here, in terms of the cause, it is spoken of as partial attainment. The ocean of fruit that serves as the support is equal to the Buddha without difference; the transformation of the basis is also like this. From the approach of the cause, it is the transformation through seeing and cultivation; analyzing it in terms of the fruit, it is the ultimate and vast transformation. These uncommon characteristics arise from attaining the aforementioned common characteristic; accomplishing these uncommon ones can reveal the aforementioned common one. Causing it to be pure and free from obstructions, there are no separate uncommon ones, just as molten gold forms an image, and the image is not outside the gold. In the Śāstra, concluding the latter five lines, it states: "Such is contemplative wisdom, such is the severing of afflictions, such is contemplating suchness. Contemplating suchness, such is the support; supporting such liberation, liberation is attained." The fact that the latter three all repeat words is because in each case the upper reiterates what precedes and the lower establishes the conclusion, meaning "contemplating with such contemplation," and so forth. That only these latter three have reiterations is because the latter three in the preceding text revealed the true in contrast to the false; hence it was necessary to reiterate the true in order to conclude it.

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