大方廣佛華嚴經疏 40.9

40.9

Eighth: arising and cessation through causes and conditions, also called "lacking self-nature through conditions." First, in terms of the contemplation of all-knowledge (sarvajñatā): the three gates from here down all clarify profound contemplation, meaning that when one seeks conditions through the four propositions, in all cases there is no arising; yet there is arising without arising, hence it is called profound contemplation. This gate clarifies neither arising from self nor arising from other; the ninth gate clarifies not arising from both; the tenth gate clarifies not arising without a cause. In explaining these four propositions, there are briefly two senses: first, refuting the heterodox; second, revealing the principle. Delusional reckonings outside the principle are called heterodox. When the heterodox is eliminated, the principle is revealed; when the principle is revealed, delusion is eliminated; they correspond mutually and reciprocally. However, the four [terms]—self, other, and so forth—are the reckonings and their supports, while the single word "not" is the medicine and the principle. Fathoming the principle of arising does not go beyond self and the rest; if self and the rest do not exist, where can arising lodge? Therefore, by negating them with "not," delusion is eliminated and the principle is revealed. Now, the reckonings are briefly of three kinds: First, the non-Buddhists: they reckon the unmanifest primordial nature (prakṛti) as self, Brahmā as other, the aggregation of minute particles (paramāṇu) as both, and spontaneity (svabhāva) as causeless. Furthermore, these four reckonings are also those of the Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Jñātiputra (Nirgrantha-jñātiputra), and Rākṣasa (or Lākṣa/Lokāyata). Second, the Hīnayāna: they take homogeneous cause (sabhāga-hetu) as self, vipāka-cause (vipāka-hetu) as other, co-existent cause (sahabhū-hetu) as both, and reckoning the link of ignorance as arising dependent on vacuity as causeless; the reckonings above also apply to those in the Mahāyāna who grasp at marks. Third, in terms of the Mahāyāna: taking the result dharma as self, the various conditions as other, combining these as both, and departing from these as causeless. Furthermore, the ālaya[-vijñāna]'s own seeds are taken as self, the various conditions as other, combining these as both, and departing from these as causeless. Furthermore, phenomena arising from the real is taken as self, arising from delusion as other, combining these as both, and departing from these as causeless. Although the reckonings are numerous, merely revealing the correct principle causes all reckonings to become delusive on their own. Revealing the principle also has two aspects: first, revealing profound contemplation in terms of non-arising; second, revealing profound contemplation in terms of the non-obstruction between arising and non-arising. In the former, there are briefly two explanations: First, explaining through mutual dependence: since phenomena arise from conditions, they do not arise from self. Since there is no self, relative to what could one speak of "other"? Furthermore, because all phenomena collectively constitute the self, and also because the other looked at from the perspective of another is also a self, since there is no other, they do not arise from other. Since self and other are not established, combining what would constitute "both"? When even [an effect] with a cause does not arise, how could it arise without a cause? Second, explaining through causes and conditions mutually defining and negating each other: hence the Abhidharmasamuccaya states: "Because its own seeds exist, it does not come from other; because it depends on various conditions, it is not made by self; because there is no agency, it does not arise from both; because it has efficacy, it is not causeless." The explanation in the treatise is identical to this. If so, then since its own seeds exist, it would be arising from self; how could it be called non-arising? This is merely adopting "self" provisionally to refute "other," not establishing "self." The next phrase provisionally uses "other" to dispel "self"; hence the Madhyamakaśāstra states: "Just as the self-nature of phenomena does not exist in conditions." The lower two phrases follow this model; merely examine them carefully. Second, regarding non-obstruction: causes and conditions each possess two senses in producing an effect, namely, being completely potent and being completely impotent. If the conditions relative to the effect are completely potent, then the cause is completely impotent; hence it is said that the cause does not produce and conditions produce, meaning it does not arise from self. Second, the cause relative to the effect being completely potent is also like this; hence it is said that conditions do not produce and it arises from its own cause, meaning it does not arise from other. Third, the two potencies do not co-exist, hence it does not arise from both. Fourth, the two impotencies do not co-exist, hence it is not without cause. This again has two senses: first, in terms of function, potency and function mutually penetrate, possessing the meaning of mutual entry, meaning that the potent subsumes the impotent. Hence the "Ten Forbearances Chapter" states: "Bodhisattvas skillfully know the phenomena of dependent origination; within one phenomenon they understand many, and within many phenomena they understand one," and so forth. Second, based on essence having emptiness and non-emptiness, there is the meaning of mutual identity: not only does the potency of the cause return to the conditions, but the essence of the cause is also revealed through conditions; fully subsumed and assimilated to conditions, the cause is like empty space. Hence the text above states: "One is precisely many, many is precisely one," and so forth. Potency and impotency must co-exist, hence they are perpetually mutually identical and mutually entering; this is the profound contemplation of the inexhaustible great dependent origination. In the text, there are also forward and reverse [orders]. First, in the forward contemplation, the sūtra stating that ignorance conditions karmic formations is the restatement [of the link]. Ignorance as a cause and condition being able to produce all karmic formations is the explanation. The treatise states: "The constituent of existence (bhavāṅga) is not made by another, because it arises from its own cause." This uses "not arising from other" to explain the word "cause" (hetu) in the sūtra, meaning that just as the link of karmic formations comes solely from ignorance, it is called its "own cause," which is the above contemplation of its own cause. Second, it is not made by self, because it is conditioned arising. This uses "not arising from self" to explain the word "condition" (pratyaya) in the sūtra, meaning that the link of karmic formations merely relies on ignorance as a condition, and it is not that the self-substance of karmic formations exists within ignorance and arises from itself; this is the contemplation of other causes. It merely designates "cause" by selecting what does not indirectly produce, revealing the former rather than the latter; and designates "condition" because of being distant, not referring to the cause-condition (hetu-pratyaya) among the four conditions. The rest can all be understood accordingly. Second, in terms of the contemplation of great compassion, this belongs to [the theme of] seeking what is different: reckoning the [sphere of] neither-perception-nor-non-perception, etc., as nirvāṇa, and reckoning wondrous practices as liberation; these are not the permanent virtue [of nirvāṇa] but are merely arising and cessation, hence they are pitiable. Third, in terms of the contemplation of the cognition of all aspects, this and the subsequent gate are called the contemplation of beginninglessness. This has two senses: first, if spoken in terms of the conventional, causes and conditions are the root of arising and cessation, and because cyclic existence has no limit, causes and conditions have no beginning. Second, if spoken in terms of the real, seeing that phenomena gather through conditions without any fundamental nature to rely upon, it is therefore called beginningless; this is what Vimalakīrti refers to in saying: "From the root of non-abiding all phenomena are established." The real nature of defilement and purity has neither beginning nor end; to show that defilement can be eliminated, it merely speaks of beginninglessness, the rest being as explained elsewhere. The treatise states: "Because causes and conditions of the intermediate limit arise, the subsequent limit arises"; this precisely adduces this eighth gate. Conforming to bondage is precisely the ninth gate, meaning that merely a single thought arising from conditions is precisely non-arising, hence it is beginningless. It does not mention arising from the initial limit because the intention is to reveal that there is no beginning. If one does not give rise to delusion now, then there is non-arising.