大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 12.26

12.26

疏「故正理十四破彼師云：汝不應立名句文身即聲為體」者，引此為成上來《經部》立聲為體。論文繁廣，今當略引，令知其源。論云「此中經主作如是言，豈不此三語為性故，用聲為體？色自性攝，如何乃說為心不相應行？此責非理。所以者何？由教及理知別有故。教謂經言語身文身，若文即語，別說何為？又說應持正法文句。又言依義不依於文。」釋曰下，廣引教證，大意則同。故論結云「由此等教證，知別有能詮諸義名句文身。猶如語聲實而非假，理為現見。有時得聲而不得字，有時得字而不得聲，故知體別。有時得聲不得字者，謂雖聞聲而不了義。現見有人粗聞他語，而復審問汝何所言？此聞語聲不了義者，都由未達所發文故。如何乃執文不異聲？有時得字不得聲者，謂不聞聲而得了義。現見有人不聞他語，覩脣等動知其所說。此不聞聲得了義者，都由已達所發文故。由斯理證，文必異聲（下文廣說，大意同也）。」論下又云「隨思發語，因語發字，字復發名，名方顯義。由依如是展轉理門，說語發名，名能顯義。如斯安立，其理必然。」又次下云「或如樹等大造合成，非不緣斯別生於影。影由假發，而體非假。如是諸文，亦應總集別生名句。而彼名句雖由假發，而體非假。此為善說，理極成故。」又下結云「故知離聲別有名等。」又下云「故不應立名句文身即聲為體。是故於我所說，離聲有名等三，能顯義理。」今疏但引後結文，已顯正義耳。

The Commentary states, "Therefore Nyāyānusāra 14 refutes that master, saying: You should not establish that the collection of names, phrases, and phonemes has voice itself as its essence": this is cited to confirm the Sautrāntika position mentioned above that establishes voice as the essence. The text of the treatise is extensive; here I will cite it briefly to make its source known. The treatise says: "Here, the master of the treatise [Vasubandhu] states: 'Do not these three have voice as their nature, thereby taking sound as their essence? Since they are subsumed under the own-nature of form, how can one speak of them as conditioned factors disassociated from mind?' This reprimand is unreasonable. Why so? Because from both teaching and reasoning we know they exist separately. 'Teaching' refers to the sūtra speaking of 'collections of voice' and 'collections of phonemes'; if phonemes were identical to voice, why speak of them separately? Furthermore, it says that one should uphold the phonemes and phrases of the true Dharma. It also says to rely on the meaning and not on the letter." In the explanation below, scriptural citations are extensively adduced, and the general meaning is the same. Therefore the treatise concludes: "From such scriptural proofs, we know that the collections of names, phrases, and phonemes that express the various meanings exist separately. Just as vocal sound is real and not nominal, by reasoning this is directly perceived. Sometimes one apprehends the sound but does not apprehend the letter; sometimes one apprehends the letter but does not apprehend the sound; thus we know their essences are distinct. 'Sometimes apprehending the sound but not the letter' means that although one hears the sound, one does not understand the meaning. We see in daily life that someone vaguely hears another's words and then asks again, 'What did you say?' This hearing of the vocal sound without understanding the meaning is entirely because they have not grasped the phonemes produced. How could one cling to phonemes not being different from sound? 'Sometimes apprehending the letter but not the sound' means that without hearing the sound, one understands the meaning. We see in daily life that someone does not hear another's words, yet observing the movement of the lips and so on, knows what they said. This understanding of the meaning without hearing the sound is entirely because they have already grasped the phonemes produced. By this logical proof, phonemes must be different from sound. (The text below explains this extensively, and the general meaning is the same.)" Below, the treatise further states: "Following thought, speech is produced; depending on speech, phonemes are produced; phonemes again produce names; and names only then reveal meaning. Relying on such an interrelated sequence of reasoning, it is said that speech produces names, and names are capable of revealing meaning. When established in this way, the reasoning is inevitable." Further below, it says: "Or just as a tree and the like are composed of the great elements, and it is not that, conditioned by this, a shadow is not separately produced; the shadow is produced from what is nominal, yet its essence is not nominal. Likewise, these various phonemes should also aggregate and separately produce names and phrases. And although those names and phrases are produced from what is nominal, their essence is not nominal. This is well spoken, because the reasoning is thoroughly established." Further below, it concludes: "Therefore, we know that apart from sound, there separately exist names and the like." And further below, it states: "Therefore, one should not establish that the collection of names, phrases, and phonemes has voice itself as its essence. Hence, according to what I have said, apart from sound there exist these three—names and the like—which are capable of revealing meaning and principle." Now, our Commentary merely cites this concluding passage to clarify the correct meaning.