大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 13.37.5

13.37.5

言虛空者，即第九因力論師，謂彼虛空為萬物因。 別有一法是實是常是一，是一切萬物因。 從空生風，從風生火，火生暖，暖生水，水生凍，凍堅作地，地生五穀，五穀生命，命歿還歸空。 是故虛空能為一切萬物因，是涅槃因。 《百論》亦云「外曰：定有虛空法，亦常亦遍亦無分，一切處一切時信有故」等。 廣如彼破。 言宿作者，即第十宿作論師，計一切眾生受苦樂報，皆隨往日本業因緣。 是故若有持戒精進，受身心苦，能壞本業。 本業既盡，眾苦亦滅。 眾苦盡滅，即得涅槃果。 是故宿作為一切因。 《瑜伽論》云「何因緣故，彼之外道作如是見、立如是論？ 答：彼見世間雖具正方便而招於苦，雖具邪方便而招於樂。 彼如是思：若由現法士夫作用為彼因者，彼應顛倒。 由彼所見非顛倒故，是彼諸法皆以宿作為因。 由此理故，起如是見、立如是論。 」《涅槃》三十五廣破此見。 而疏云等者，等取第十一無因論師，計一切萬物無因無緣，自然而生自然而滅。 故此自然是常，是萬物因，是涅槃因。 此計一切無染淨因，如棘刺自纖、烏色非染、鶴色自白。 大乘法師云：別有一法是實是常，號曰自然，能生萬物。 與下此方計有同義。 《瑜伽》第七云「何因緣故，彼諸外道起如是見、立如是法？ 答：謂見世間無有因緣，或時欻爾大風卒起，或時一日寂然止息，或時忽爾暴沙瀰漫於一時間頓即空竭，或時欝爾果木敷榮或一時間颯然衰悴。 由如是故，起無因見、立無因論。 」《顯揚》亦同。 此則無因為自然，非別有物。 若廣分別上諸異計，如《瑜伽》六七、《顯揚》九十、《婆沙》十一二，及《金七十》、《廣百論》等。

Regarding "empty space": this refers to the ninth, the theorists of the power of causes, who assert that empty space is the cause of all things. There is separately a dharma that is real, eternal, and single, which is the cause of all things. From space is produced wind; from wind is produced fire; fire produces warmth; warmth produces water; water produces ice; the hardening of ice makes earth; earth produces the five grains; the five grains produce life; and when life ends it returns to space. Therefore, empty space can be the cause of all things and is the cause of nirvāṇa. The Śataśāstra also says: "The opponent says: The dharma of space definitely exists, and it is eternal, omnipresent, and partless, because at all times and in all places it is believed to exist," and so forth. The detailed refutation is as found there. Regarding "actions done in past lives": this refers to the tenth, the theorists of past actions, who assert that the experiences of suffering and pleasure by all sentient beings all accord with the causes and conditions of past karmic actions. Therefore, if one maintains precepts and exerts vigor, enduring physical and mental suffering, one can exhaust the fundamental karma. Once the fundamental karma is exhausted, the various sufferings are also destroyed. When all sufferings are completely destroyed, one attains the fruit of nirvāṇa. For this reason, past actions are the cause of all things. The Yogācārabhūmi says: "By what cause and condition do those tīrthikas give rise to such views and establish such treatises? Answer: They see that in the world, even when endowed with right means, people incur suffering; and even when endowed with wrong means, they incur pleasure. They think thus: 'If human activity in the present life were their cause, this would be contrary. Because what is seen is not contrary, therefore these dharmas all have past actions as their cause.' By this principle, they give rise to such views and establish such treatises." Fascicle thirty-five of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra refutes this view in detail. When the commentary says "and the like," it includes the eleventh, the theorists of causelessness, who assert that all things have neither cause nor condition, but are spontaneously born and spontaneously extinguished. Therefore this spontaneity is eternal; it is the cause of all things and the cause of nirvāṇa. This view asserts that all things have no cause for defilement or purity, just as thorns are naturally pointed, the color of a crow is not dyed, and the color of a crane is naturally white. A Mahāyāna master says: There is separately a dharma that is real and eternal, called spontaneity (nature), which can produce all things. This shares the same meaning with the theories in this land [of China] below. The seventh fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi says: "By what cause and condition do those tīrthikas give rise to such views and establish such doctrines? Answer: It is because they see that in the world there are no causes and conditions; sometimes suddenly a great wind abruptly arises, and sometimes on a certain day it becomes quiet and ceases; sometimes suddenly swirling sand covers the expanse and then in a moment abruptly empties and vanishes; sometimes trees and fruits flourish luxuriously, and then in a moment they wither and decline with a rustle. Due to such things, they give rise to the view of causelessness and establish the doctrine of causelessness." The Prakaraṇāryavācā is also the same. Here, causelessness is taken as spontaneity, not as a separately existing entity. For detailed analyses of these various heterodox assertions, see Yogācārabhūmi fascicles six and seven, Prakaraṇāryavācā fascicles nine and ten, Mahāvibhāṣā fascicles eleven and twelve, as well as the Sāṃkhyakārikā-bhāṣya (*Suvarṇasaptati*), Śatakaśāstra-vaipulya, and the like.