大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 19.37

19.37

疏「今正釋者」下，第三申今正義。於中四：初約證理，以釋境智非一異義；二約照俗以明；三雙融事理以釋；四約三觀圓融以釋。今初。即肇公《般若無知論》中之意，而便以疏間而釋之。彼論先有難云：聖智之無、惑智之無，俱無生滅，何以異之耶？答曰：聖智之無者無知，惑智之無者知無。其無雖同，所以無者異也。何者？夫聖心虛寂，無知可無，可曰無知，非謂知無。惑智有知，故有知可無，可謂知無，非曰無知也。無知即般若之無也，知無則真諦之無也。是以般若之與真諦，言用則同而異，言寂則異而同。同故，無心於彼此；異故，不失於照功。是以辯同者同於異、辯異者異於同，斯則不可得而異、不可得而同也。何者？內有獨鑒之明，外有萬法之實。萬法雖實，然非照不得，內外相與以成其照功，此則聖所不能同用也。內雖照而無知，外雖實而無相，內外寂然相與俱無，此則聖所不能異寂也。是以經云諸法不異者，豈曰續鳧截鶴、夷岳盈壑，然後無異哉？誠以不異於異，故雖異而不異耳。故經云「甚奇世尊！於無異法中而說諸法異。」又云「般若與諸法，亦不一相亦不異相。」信矣。釋曰：但觀上來所引論文，則疏之中自分主客。但觀疏文中間釋論，則論旨趣居然可知。

Regarding the Commentary's text from 'As for correctly explaining now' onward, this is the third [part], presenting the correct meaning for the present. Within this there are four parts: first, explaining the meaning of the non-identity and non-difference of object and cognition in terms of realizing principle; second, clarifying it in terms of illumining phenomena; third, explaining it in terms of fused harmonization of phenomena and principle; fourth, explaining it in terms of the perfect fusion of the three contemplations. First is the present [part]. This adopts the purport of Sengzhao's Treatise on the Unknowingness of Prajñā, interpolating it throughout the commentary to explain it. In that treatise, an objection is first raised: 'The absence in noble cognition and the absence in deluded cognition are both free from production and cessation; how are they distinguished?' The answer says: 'The absence of noble cognition is unknowing; the absence of deluded cognition is knowing absence. Though their "absence" is the same, that by which they are absent is different. Why? The noble mind is empty and quiescent, with no knowing to be negated; it can be called "unknowing", but not "knowing absence". Deluded cognition has knowing, and hence there is a knowing to be negated; it can be called "knowing absence", but not "unknowing". Unknowing is the absence of prajñā; knowing absence is the absence of absolute truth. Therefore, as for prajñā and absolute truth, spoken in terms of function they are identical yet distinct; spoken in terms of quiescence they are distinct yet identical. Because they are identical, they are without mental partiality toward one or the other; because they are distinct, they do not lose the efficacious function of illumination. Therefore, that which articulates identity is identical within distinction, and that which articulates distinction is distinct within identity; thus they cannot be attained as distinct, nor can they be attained as identical. Why? Internally there is the clarity of solitary reflection; externally there is the reality of the myriad dharmas. Though the myriad dharmas are real, yet without illumination they are not apprehended; internal and external cooperate with each other to accomplish this efficacious work of illumination—this is where the sage cannot make their functions identical. Though internally illumining, it is unknowing; though externally real, it is characterless; internally and externally quiescent, they are mutually and completely absent together—this is where the sage cannot make their quiescence distinct. Therefore the sūtra says that all dharmas are not different: could this mean lengthening the duck's legs and shortening the crane's, leveling the mountains to fill the ravines, and only then being not different? Truly, because non-difference is within difference, although they are distinct, they are not different. Thus the sūtra says, "How wonderful, World-Honoured One! Within undifferentiated dharmas you speak of the differentiation of dharmas." It also says: "Prajñā and all dharmas are neither of a single characteristic nor of different characteristics." This is truly trustworthy.' Explanation: Merely by examining the text of the treatise cited above, host and guest are naturally distinguished within the Commentary. Merely by observing the commentary's interpolation explaining the treatise in between, the purport of the treatise is readily apparent.