大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 32.44

32.44

疏「圓成實於彼」下，釋圓成性。一偈分二：上半正釋、下半明與依他起性非一異義。彼論釋云：謂圓滿成就諸法實性，顯此常遍體非虛謬，揀自共相虛空我等。此即於彼依他起上，常遠離前遍計所執，二空所顯真如為性。說於彼言，顯圓成實與依他起不即不離。常遠離言，顯妄所執能所取性理恒非有。前言為顯不空依他，性言顯二空非圓成實，真如離有離無義故。釋曰：玄文已釋，但釋論意。分前性字二義不同，遠離前言已空遍計，故是離有而言。性者自屬真如，故能離無，是以結云真如離有離無相故。若依此釋，即空無性，妄分別有，皆是遍計。前偈法性方是圓成，今順法性依他無性，即是圓成，故一偈中三性具足。設順彼宗離有離無，遠離前性離遍計有。又此偈云「此諸法勝義，亦即是真如，常如其性故，即唯識實性。」此即離無。未失彼宗，何須傷巧離前性字。若會二宗，依他起上無遍計性即是圓成，此無性理是真如故，已離有無，故八地云「無性為性」。疏「故此與依他非異非不異」者，釋非一異。謂由圓成於依他起，遠前性故成非一異，故云故此。彼論釋云「由前理故，此圓成實與彼依他非異不異，異應真如非彼所依，不異此性應是無常。彼此俱應淨非淨境，則本後智用應無別。」釋曰：圓成唯淨智境，依他通淨非淨，豈得全同？

Regarding the Commentary's 'The consummate reality upon that...' onward: this explains the consummate nature. One verse is divided into two: the first half directly explains it, and the second half clarifies the meaning of its being neither one with nor different from the other-dependent nature. That treatise's commentary says: It means fully accomplishing the real nature of all phenomena, revealing that this permanent and pervasive essence is not false, distinguishing it from self-characteristics, common characteristics, space, the self, and so forth. This is precisely upon that other-dependent [nature], constantly divorced from the previously mentioned imaginary construction, with tathatā revealed by the two emptinesses as its nature. The word 'upon that' shows that consummate reality is neither identical with nor separate from other-dependence. The words 'constantly divorced' show that the nature of grasped and grasper falsely constructed in delusion is fundamentally non-existent in principle. The word 'previously' shows that it does not empty other-dependence; the word 'nature' shows that the two emptinesses are not the consummate reality, for the meaning of tathatā is free from both existence and non-existence. Commenting, I say: The Profound Meaning has already explained it, but here it simply explains the treatise's intent. It divides the previous word 'nature' into two different meanings: 'divorcing the previous' has already emptied the imagined, so it speaks of being free from existence. 'Nature' belongs inherently to tathatā, and thus can be free from non-existence; therefore it concludes that the characteristic of tathatā is free from both existence and non-existence. If one relies on this explanation, then emptiness and naturelessness, and existing through false conceptualization, are all the imagined [nature]. Only the dharmatā in the previous verse is the consummate [nature]; now, according with the Dharmatā [tradition], the other-dependent's lack of nature is itself the consummate [nature], so the three natures are complete in a single verse. Even if one accords with that [Characteristics] tradition in being free from existence and non-existence, 'divorcing the previous nature' is being free from the existence of the imagined. Furthermore, this verse says: 'This ultimate truth of all phenomena / is also precisely tathatā; / because it is constantly like its nature, / it is precisely the real nature of consciousness-only.' This is being free from non-existence. Without losing that tradition's doctrine, why force an over-clever separation of the previous word 'nature'? If reconciling the two traditions, the absence of the imagined nature upon the other-dependent is precisely the consummate [nature]; because this principle of naturelessness is tathatā, it is already free from existence and non-existence; hence the eighth bhūmi says 'taking naturelessness as nature.' Regarding the Commentary's 'Therefore this is neither different from nor not different from the other-dependent': this explains neither one nor different. That is, because consummate reality is upon the other-dependent and divorces the previous nature, they become neither one nor different; hence it says 'therefore this.' That treatise's commentary says: 'By the preceding principle, this consummate reality is neither different nor not different from that other-dependent: if different, tathatā would not be that on which it relies; if not different, this nature would be impermanent. Both would equally be objects of the pure and the non-pure, and the functions of fundamental and subsequent wisdom would have no distinction.' Commenting, I say: Consummate reality is exclusively the object of pure wisdom, whereas other-dependence extends to both the pure and the non-pure; how could they be completely identical?