大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 37.42

37.42

第八菩薩。疏「後偈序昔以成今說」者，偈中但是序昔偈意，乃成今說。既執我受苦，明昔說無我為正說也。疏「初三覺妄證實是覺察義」者，三段顯其三覺也。一覺察者，如睡夢覺，亦如人覺賊，賊無能為，妄即賊也。二覺照者，即照理事也，亦如蓮華開照見自心，一真法界恒沙性德，如其勝義覺諸法故。三妙覺者，即上二覺離覺所覺，故為妙耳，非更別覺。故《楞伽》云「一切無涅槃，無有涅槃佛，無有佛涅槃，遠離覺所覺，若有若無有。」故為妙覺。故《起信》云「又心起者無有初相可知，而言知初相者，即謂無念。」此明非覺而覺也。疏「初句揀似比量」者，然準因明，總有八義，今此有四故。論云「能立與能破，及似唯悟他。現量與比量，及似唯自悟。」謂能立能破、現量比量，此之四義各有真似，故成八耳。言八義者，一對敵申量。三分圓明，開曉於賓，故名能立。二斥量非圓。彈支有謬，示悟於主，故名能破。三對敵申量。三支缺謬，非曉於敵，故名似立。四妄斥非圓。彈支有謬，不悟於主，故名似破。五於色等義有正智生，自相處轉，故名現量。六謂籍眾相而觀於義，相應智起，故名比量。七有分別智，於義異轉，了缾衣等，名似現量。八以似因智，於似所比相違解起，名似比量。廣如彼說。今疏云「無常計常」，即是第八。如色是無常，知從緣生，剎那滅故，故是無常。此籍因緣相應智起，是真比量。今以相續覆故，即似因智起，計之為常，即相違解起，名似比量，故為顛倒。今云於法不顛倒，故是揀似比量。疏「男女天地等見一合相名似現量」者，此即第七。一合相者，眾緣和合故。如攬眾微以成於色，合五陰等以成於人，名一合相。如是見者，是有分別智於義異轉，故名似現。言「一合相相不可得故，故名為離」下，顯真現量。不可得者，即《金剛經》云「如來說一合相，即非一合相。」以從緣合即無性故。無性之性，是所證理。如是知者，是正智生，是自相處轉，名真現量。上來離於所覺和合之相，已為現量。「非唯」已下又拂能所證跡，為真現量。謂若有如外之智與如合者，猶有所得，非真實證，能所兩亡方為真現。故《唯識》云「若時於所緣，智都無所得，爾時住唯識，離二取相故。」故下經云「無有智外如為智所入，亦無如外智能證於如。」如是方為真現量也，是故經云離諸和合相。

The eighth bodhisattva. Regarding the commentary stating, "The latter verse recounts the past to establish the present explanation": in the verse it merely recounts the meaning of the past verse, thereby establishing the present explanation. Since clinging to a self brings suffering, it clarifies that the past teaching of non-self is the correct teaching. Regarding the commentary stating, "The first three, awakening to delusion and realizing the real, are of the meaning of awakening and inspecting": the three sections reveal its three awakenings. First, awakening and inspecting: like waking from sleep and dreaming, or like a person perceiving a thief where the thief can do nothing; delusion is precisely the thief. Second, awakening and illumination: that is, illuminating principle and phenomena, and also like a lotus opening and illuminating one's own mind, the single true dharmadhātu with nature-virtues [as numerous as] the sands of the Ganges, awakening to all phenomena in accordance with their ultimate truth. Third, marvelous awakening: that is, the above two awakenings being free from the awaken-er and the awakened; thus it is marvelous, not another distinct awakening. Therefore the Laṅkāvatāra says, "In all things there is no nirvāṇa; there is no buddha of nirvāṇa, nor any nirvāṇa of a buddha; it is far removed from the awaken-er and the awakened, whether existing or non-existing." Therefore it is marvelous awakening. Thus the Awakening of Faith says, "Furthermore, as for the arising of mind, there is no first characteristic that can be known; when it is said that the first characteristic is known, it means no-thought." This clarifies awakening through non-awakening. Regarding the commentary stating, "The first line excludes pseudo-inference": according to hetuvidyā (Buddhist logic), there are eight aspects in total, and here there are four. As the treatise says, "Direct proof and refutation, and their pseudo-forms, only enlighten others. Direct perception and inference, and their pseudo-forms, only enlighten oneself." That is, direct proof, refutation, direct perception, and inference—these four aspects each have real and pseudo forms, thus making eight. As for the eight aspects: First, stating a formal syllogism (pramāṇa) against an opponent. When the three components are complete and clear, enlightening the interlocutor, it is called direct proof. Second, censuring a syllogism as non-complete. Rebuking an error in a member, showing it and enlightening the proponent, it is called refutation. Third, stating a syllogism against an opponent. When the three members have deficiencies and errors, failing to enlighten the opponent, it is called pseudo-proof. Fourth, falsely censuring as non-complete. Rebuking an error where none exists, not enlightening the proponent, it is called pseudo-refutation. Fifth, when correct cognition arises regarding objects such as form, operating in the domain of particular characteristics (svalakṣaṇa), it is called direct perception. Sixth, relying on multiple characteristics to contemplate the object, where corresponding cognition arises, it is called inference. Seventh, having conceptual cognition that operates aberrantly upon the object, understanding [constructs like] jars, robes, and the like, is called pseudo-direct perception. Eighth, by means of a cognition of a pseudo-reason, contradictory comprehension arises regarding the pseudo-inferendum; this is called pseudo-inference. It is broadly explained as in that text. Now the commentary says, "Grasping the impermanent as permanent," which is the eighth. For instance, form is impermanent; knowing that it arises from conditions and perishes in an instant, it is therefore impermanent. This relies on conditions and causes, and the arising of corresponding cognition is real inference. Now, obscured by continuity, a cognition of a pseudo-reason arises, grasping it as permanent; this is the arising of contradictory comprehension, called pseudo-inference, and is therefore a perversion. Now stating that one is unperverted regarding phenomena excludes pseudo-inference. Regarding the commentary stating, "Seeing an agglomerated characteristic in men, women, heaven, earth, and so forth, is called pseudo-direct perception": this is the seventh. An agglomerated characteristic is due to the harmonious combination of many conditions. For instance, gathering minute particles to form form, or combining the five aggregates to form a person, is called an agglomerated characteristic. Seeing like this is conceptual cognition operating aberrantly upon the object, and is thus called pseudo-direct perception. Regarding the words, "Because the agglomerated characteristic is unattainable, it is called detachment" and so forth, this reveals real direct perception. Being unattainable refers to the Diamond Sūtra's statement: "The Tathāgata says that an agglomerated characteristic is not an agglomerated characteristic." This is because arising from conditional combination means having no intrinsic nature. The nature of non-nature is the principle to be realized. Knowing like this is the arising of correct cognition, operating in the domain of particular characteristics, and is called real direct perception. The preceding detachment from the perceived agglomerated characteristics is already direct perception. From "Not only..." onward, it also sweeps away the traces of the realizer and the realized, constituting real direct perception. That is to say, if there were cognition outside of suchness that unites with suchness, there would still be apprehension, and it would not be true realization; only when subject and object are both forgotten is there real direct perception. Thus the Vijñaptimātratā says, "When regarding the cognitive object cognition has nothing whatsoever to apprehend, at that time one abides in consciousness-only, because of being free from the characteristics of the two graspings." Therefore the subsequent sūtra says, "There is no suchness outside cognition to be entered by cognition, nor is there cognition outside suchness capable of realizing suchness." Only in this way is there real direct perception; therefore the sūtra speaks of detachment from all agglomerated characteristics.