大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 47.29

47.29

疏「九總顯諸事能成因緣」者，諸事即能迴能向等，皆從緣生故。疏「明上迴向不出於十」者，即總結也。言「由後二句故無性」者，二句即能成因緣及緣所起，以從緣起故無性也。言「無性故無所著」者，結歸總句，安置眾生於無所著法性迴向也。以總該別，故皆無著也。疏「二離能取想」下，疏文有三：初略釋經文、二「故大品」下引證、三釋三不同。二中，引三經證：一引《大品》、二即〈光明覺〉、三《大般若》。今初，即〈隨喜迴向品〉，引文小略。若具，經云「爾時彌勒菩薩語須菩提：『若新發意菩薩，念諸佛及佛弟子諸善根，隨喜功德最上、第一、最妙、無上、無與等者，隨喜已應迴向菩提。云何菩薩不墮想顛倒、心顛倒、見顛倒？』須菩提言：『若菩薩念諸佛及僧，於中不生佛想、不生僧想、不生善根想，用是心迴向菩提，心中亦不生心想。菩薩如是迴向，想不顛倒、心不顛倒、見不顛倒、若菩薩念諸佛及僧善根取相，取相已迴向菩提，名為想顛倒、心顛倒、見顛倒。』」《智論》釋云「須菩提答，若是菩薩以般若波羅蜜方便力故，能於諸佛不生佛想及弟子，諸善根中不生善根想，一切法從和合生，無有自性故，無有實法名為佛，是不生佛等想。是迴向心，亦不生心想。是故菩薩不墮顛倒。與此違故，即墮顛倒。」二〈光明覺〉，可知。三若依《大般若》第二會，正當別行《大品》，文辭小異，大旨無別。而《大品》所引經末亦云「若菩薩摩訶薩用是心念諸佛及僧諸善根，是心念時即知盡滅法，若盡滅法是不可得。迴向心亦是盡滅相，所迴向處及法亦如是相。」而有人謂二經全別，故疏影略引之，皆明性空心無取耳。疏「然小乘或說」下，第三釋三不同，略舉三說。小乘有二：初即分別論者說想心見次第起，謂初發微想常無常等，次重起心緣前之想取為定實，後見成就於所取中執見分明，此即三心俱是倒也。若釋名者，想謂取境分齊之相，見謂推求，心謂積集。此中想等體即是倒，皆持業釋。疏「或說一時，義分前後」者，即法救論師。心想見三同時義分，唯見是倒；餘二非倒，與見相應，為見所亂，名之為倒。是故見唯持業，餘二依主。《俱舍論》主正扶此義。頌云「四顛倒自體，從於三見生，唯倒推增故，想心隨見力。」釋曰：初兩句出體，第三句廢立，第四句通經。初出體者，謂邊見中唯取常見以為常倒，見取中唯取計樂淨為樂淨倒，於身見中唯取我見以為我倒也。唯倒推增故者，廢立也。此舉三因以立四倒，一一向倒，故云唯倒也。二推度性故。三妄增益故。餘或無此三因，謂戒禁取非一向倒執有漏道得淨涅槃，雖非究竟斷惑證滅，而能暫時離染證滅，緣為淨故。斷見邪見非妄增益，無所轉故。餘貪瞋等不能推度，非見性故。是故諸惑非顛倒體。言想心隨見力者，通經也。謂有問云：若唯見是倒，何故經言「於非常計常，有想心見三倒。於苦不淨非我，亦有想心見三倒。」答：理實唯見是倒，想心隨見亦立倒名，與見相應故，行相同常樂我淨。三四十二，故此十二倒，依婆沙師，預流永斷見及相應，見所斷故。餘如彼說。依此釋名，想謂取境分齊，見謂推求，心謂積集。疏「若依大乘」下，雖標多說，但出意通性相二宗，在文可知。又有釋云：若細分別，想心二倒可通七識，見是執著局於六識者，即下三藏意。七識既有四惑，中有我見，豈無見耶？疏「諸宗異說」等者，不欲繁文。然上已有三宗之義，其薩婆多中更有一釋：想謂於無常苦不淨中妄想分別，見謂即於彼所分別中忍可欲樂建立執著，心謂即於彼所執著中，貪等顛倒，皆即心所名心，非心王也。既以王為所，不順今文，故不出之。大乘之中復有三說：一依《起信》，三倒之中心唯一妄念，亦名不覺，亦名無始無明。而此無明全依本覺，還迷本覺，從無始來念念相續未曾離念，即是一切心識之相。然依不覺，復生三種：一無明業相等，即以三細業轉現三，如次為心、見、想之三倒也。今菩薩雖未究竟覺，已離凡夫不覺。二乘初心相似覺，故亦名為離。釋曰：以三細諸德正義皆在賴耶，菩薩地盡始覺同本方得永離。以此而為三倒，非順今文，故疏不出。二又依禪宗，傳於達磨，同《楞伽》意，五識帶想總名想倒，第七染淨別名心倒，第六意識起諸見倒。釋曰：不順法相，故不出之。三云依唐三藏傳慈氏論，五識現量總無顛倒，猶如明鏡現眾色相，故第七染識有想心倒，第六意識具有三倒。取我法相名為想倒，於想愛樂復名心倒，於想計著建立乃名見倒。此亦分明。上之大小乘大同小異，故不委存。恐要委知，故復出耳。初釋經文乃通諸說，多同唐三藏意。

Regarding the commentary's statement, "Ninth, comprehensively displaying the causes and conditions through which all matters are accomplished": "all matters" refers to the ability to redirect, the objects toward which one redirects, and so forth, because all are produced from conditions. Regarding the commentary's statement, "Explaining that the aforementioned pariṇāmanā does not exceed ten": this is an overall summary. As for the statement, "Due to the latter two lines, they are without intrinsic nature": the two lines are the causes and conditions through which they are accomplished and that which arises from conditions; because they arise from conditions, they lack intrinsic nature. As for the statement, "Because they lack intrinsic nature, there is no attachment": this concludes by returning to the overarching line, "establishing sentient beings in the pariṇāmanā of the unattached dharmatā." Because the general subsumes the particular, all are free of attachment.
Regarding the commentary from "Second, departing from thoughts of grasping subject" below: the commentary text has three parts: first, a brief explanation of the sūtra text; second, from "Therefore the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā" below, adducing proof texts; third, explaining the differences among the three [delusions].
Within the second, it cites three sūtras as proof: first, it cites the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā; second, the chapter on "Radiance-Awakening"; third, the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra. Now the first is the chapter on "Rejoicing and Pariṇāmanā"; the cited text is somewhat abridged. If cited in full, the sūtra states: "At that time, the Bodhisattva Maitreya said to Subhūti: 'If a bodhisattva who has newly generated the aspiration [for awakening] recollects the roots of goodness of the buddhas and the disciples of the buddhas, rejoicing in merit that is supreme, foremost, most wonderful, unsurpassed, and without equal, having rejoiced, they should redirect it toward bodhi. How does a bodhisattva not fall into perceptual inversion, mental inversion, or view inversion?' Subhūti said: 'If a bodhisattva, recollecting the buddhas and the Saṅgha, does not within this produce a perception of a buddha, does not produce a perception of the Saṅgha, does not produce a perception of roots of goodness, and uses this mind to redirect toward bodhi, and within the mind also does not produce a perception of mind—when a bodhisattva redirects in this way, perception is not inverted, mind is not inverted, and view is not inverted. If a bodhisattva recollects the roots of goodness of the buddhas and the Saṅgha and grasps characteristics, and having grasped characteristics redirects toward bodhi, this is called perceptual inversion, mental inversion, and view inversion.'"
The Dazhidulun explains: "Subhūti answers that if this bodhisattva, by the power of skillful means of the prajñāpāramitā, is able, with respect to the buddhas and disciples, not to produce a perception of a buddha, and among roots of goodness not to produce a perception of roots of goodness—because all dharmas arise from conditions and have no intrinsic nature, there is no real dharma named 'buddha,' which is the non-production of perceptions of buddhas and so forth. Regarding this mind of pariṇāmanā, they also do not produce a perception of mind. Therefore, the bodhisattva does not fall into inversion. To contradict this is to fall into inversion."
Second, the chapter on "Radiance-Awakening" can be understood. Third, according to the second assembly of the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra, it corresponds precisely to the separate translation of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā; the phrasing differs slightly, but the main purport is identical. At the end of the text cited from the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, it also states: "If a bodhisattva-mahāsattva uses this mind to recollect the roots of goodness of the buddhas and the Saṅgha, at the time of this mental recollection they immediately know the dharma of exhaustion and cessation; that which is the dharma of exhaustion and cessation is unobtainable. The mind of pariṇāmanā is also a characteristic of exhaustion and cessation, and the locus toward which it is redirected as well as the dharmas also possess such characteristics." Yet some claim that the two sūtras are entirely different; thus the commentary obliquely cites them in summary, both clarifying that the nature is empty and the mind is free of grasping.
Regarding the commentary from "However, the Hīnayāna sometimes explains" below: the third part explains the differences among the three, briefly presenting three explanations. The Hīnayāna has two: First, the Vibhajyavādins explain that perception, mind, and view arise sequentially: first, subtle perceptions such as permanence or impermanence arise; next, the mind arises again, taking the preceding perception as its object and grasping it as fixed and real; finally, view is accomplished, distinctly clinging to views within what has been grasped. Thus, all three mental states are inversions. If interpreting their names: perception refers to grasping the delimited characteristics of an object; view refers to speculative investigation; mind refers to accumulation. Here, the essence of perception and so forth is itself inversion; all are karmadhāraya compounds.
Regarding the commentary's statement, "Or it is said that they are simultaneous, but their meanings are divided into earlier and later": this refers to the master Dharmatrāta. The three—mind, perception, and view—are simultaneous yet distinct in meaning; only view is inversion. The other two are not inversions; they are associated with view and thrown into confusion by view, and hence are called inversions. Therefore, view alone is a karmadhāraya compound, while the other two are tatpuruṣa compounds. The master of the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya precisely supports this position. The verse states: "The self-nature of the four inversions / Arises from three views; / Because they are solely inverted, investigate, and superimpose, / Perception and mind follow the power of view."
Explanation: The first two lines identify the essence; the third line explains exclusion and establishment; the fourth line resolves the sūtra text. In the first, identifying the essence: within extreme views, only the view of permanence is taken as the inversion of permanence; within the attachment to views, only grasping at pleasure and purity is taken as the inversions of pleasure and purity; within the view of selfhood, only the view of a self is taken as the inversion of a self. As for "Because they are solely inverted, investigate, and superimpose": this is the exclusion and establishment. This adduces three causes to establish the four inversions: (1) each is unswervingly inverted, hence called "solely inverted"; (2) their nature is speculative investigation; (3) they are false superimpositions. Others may lack these three causes: the attachment to rules and rituals is not unswervingly inverted, as it holds that defiled paths achieve pure nirvāṇa; although it does not definitively eliminate defilements and realize cessation, it can temporarily transcend defilement and realize cessation, taking it to be pure. The view of annihilation and wrong view are not false superimpositions, because nothing is transformed. Other defilements such as greed and hatred cannot investigate, because they are not of the nature of views. Therefore, other defilements are not the essence of inversion. As for "Perception and mind follow the power of view": this resolves the sūtra text. That is, someone asks: "If only view is inversion, why does the sūtra state: 'Regarding the impermanent, imputing permanence involves the three inversions of perception, mind, and view; regarding suffering, the impure, and the non-self, there are also the three inversions of perception, mind, and view'?" Answer: In actual truth, only view is inversion; perception and mind follow view and are also given the name of inversion; because they are associated with view, their modes of activity are similar to permanence, pleasure, self, and purity. Three times four is twelve; therefore, these twelve inversions, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, are completely severed by the stream-enterer along with their associated factors, because they are abandoned by seeing [the truth]. The rest is as explained there. According to this explanation of names, perception means grasping the delimited boundaries of an object; view means speculative investigation; mind means accumulation.
Regarding the commentary from "If according to the Mahāyāna" below: although multiple explanations are indicated, it merely brings out the intent to reconcile both the nature and characteristic traditions, which can be understood from the text. There is also an explanation stating: if analyzed in detail, the two inversions of perception and mind can apply to the seven consciousnesses, while view is a grasping confined to the sixth consciousness; this is the intent of the Tripiṭaka master below. Since the seventh consciousness possesses the four afflictions, among which is the view of self, how could it lack view?
Regarding the commentary's statement, "The divergent explanations of the various schools" and so forth: it does not wish to multiply words. However, the positions of the three schools have already been given above. Among the Sarvāstivādins, there is yet another explanation: perception refers to falsely imagining and discriminating among impermanence, suffering, and impurity; view refers to approving, delighting in, establishing, and clinging to what has been discriminated therein; mind refers to greed and other inversions directed toward what has been clung to therein—all of these are mental factors called 'mind,' not the primary mind. Since it treats the primary mind as a mental factor, it does not accord with the present text, and hence is not brought out here.
Within the Mahāyāna there are also three explanations: First, according to the Awakening of Faith, among the three inversions, mind is solely a single deluded thought, also named non-enlightenment, and also named beginningless avidyā. And this avidyā relies entirely on original enlightenment, yet turns back to delude original enlightenment, continuing from beginningless time thought-moment after thought-moment without ever departing from thought; this is precisely the characteristic of all mind and consciousness. However, relying on non-enlightenment, three kinds are further produced: first, the karmic characteristic of avidyā, and so forth; that is, using the three subtle aspects of karma, turning, and manifesting, they correspond in order to the three inversions of mind, view, and perception. Now, although the bodhisattva has not yet attained ultimate enlightenment, they have already departed from the non-enlightenment of ordinary beings. Because the initial mind of the two vehicles has an approximate enlightenment, it is also said to have departed. Explanation: Because the authoritative meaning of the various masters places the three subtle aspects in the ālayavijñāna, only when a bodhisattva completes the stages and initial enlightenment becomes identical with the original do they attain eternal departure. Taking these as the three inversions does not accord with the present text, so the commentary does not bring it out.
Second, according to the Chan school, transmitted from Bodhidharma, matching the intent of the Laṅkāvatāra: the five consciousnesses bearing perception are collectively called the inversion of perception; the seventh consciousness, whether defiled or pure, is distinctively called the inversion of mental states; the sixth, mental consciousness, gives rise to the various inversions of view. Explanation: This does not accord with the characteristics of dharmas, so it is not brought out.
Third, it is said that according to the Tang Tripiṭaka master's transmission of the treatises of Maitreya: the five consciousnesses are direct perception and are entirely free from inversion, like a bright mirror reflecting diverse colors and forms; thus the seventh, defiled consciousness has the inversions of perception and mind, while the sixth, mental consciousness possesses all three inversions. Grasping the characteristics of self and dharmas is called the inversion of perception; delighting in those perceptions is called the inversion of mind; clinging to and establishing those perceptions is called the inversion of view. This is also distinct. Because the differences between the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna above are largely similar with minor variations, they are not preserved in full detail. Fearing that someone might need detailed knowledge, they are brought out again here. The initial explanation of the sūtra text encompasses the various explanations and mostly accords with the intent of the Tang Tripiṭaka master.