大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 59.8

59.8

疏「三顛倒相中」，二：先總釋、後「此有四重」下別疏。「僧佉說覺以為神相」者，即《百論．破神品》第二中，外曰：「實有神。如僧佉經中說覺相是神。」次論復云：「優樓迦弟子誦衛世師經，言知與神異，是故神不墮無常中，亦不無知。何以故？神知合故。如有牛人。」注云「譬如人與牛合，人名有牛。如是神知情塵意合，故神有知生。以神合故，神名有知。」釋曰：上即論立。今但云無，不說無之所以，所以廣如前後。今當略說，論破僧佉云「內曰：神覺為一耶？為異耶？外曰：神覺一也。內曰：覺若神相，神無常故。」釋論云「譬如熱是火相，熱無常故，火亦無常。今覺實無常，相各異故，屬因緣故，本無今有故，已有還無故。」外曰：不生故常。意明神不生故。內曰：若爾，覺非神相。意云：覺無常神常，無常不應與常為相故。彼疏總釋云「此二相違，凡有三對：一神常覺無常、二神遍覺不遍、三神一覺眾。」此初段中，正就二對生過；神一覺眾，在第三重中方破。就初對中有四種過：一以神從覺，神則無常。二以覺從神，覺應是常。三若不相從，體即不一。四必欲令覺是神，神則二種，常無常也，亦言覺不覺也。今結四過之中，經文有一二，是破覺不應有之。三四略無。餘如彼論。二破衛世，先破其喻云「內曰：牛相，牛中住故，非有牛中。」釋曰：有牛是人，人與牛合，牛不是人。神與知合，知不是神，何得為相？次破其法云「汝言神相情塵意合故知生，是知知色等。是故但知能知，非神知。譬如火能燒，非有火人燒。」斯則知為神相義不成矣，今云無知。疏「若約小乘」等者，受蘊名覺，覺苦樂等。三蘊名知，想取於像、行有欲勝解等，皆是知義識義，更明色非此二。

The Commentary states: "In the third, the inverted characteristics," there are two: first, a general explanation; next, "This has four levels [and following]" provides an individual commentary. "The Sāṃkhya claims that sentience is the characteristic of the soul" refers to Chapter Two, "Refuting the Soul," in the Śataśāstra, where the outsider states: "A soul truly exists. As the Sāṃkhya scripture states, the characteristic of sentience is the soul." Next, the treatise again states: "The disciples of Ulūka recite the Vaiśeṣika scripture, stating that cognition is distinct from the soul; therefore the soul does not fall into impermanence, nor is it devoid of cognition. Why? Because soul and cognition unite. Just as a man possesses a cow." The commentary notes: "Just as when a man unites with a cow, the man is called 'possessing a cow'; likewise, when soul, cognition, sense faculties, sense objects, and mind unite, cognition arises in the soul. Because it unites with the soul, the soul is named 'possessing cognition.'" Explanation: The above is the treatise's presentation [of their view]. Now it merely says it is non-existent, without stating the reason for non-existence; the reasons are extensively given before and after. Now it should be briefly stated: the treatise refutes the Sāṃkhya, saying: "The insider says: Are the soul and sentience identical or different? The outsider says: Soul and sentience are identical. The insider says: If sentience is the characteristic of the soul, the soul would be impermanent." The commentary on the treatise states: "Just as heat is the characteristic of fire; because heat is impermanent, fire is also impermanent. Now sentience is truly impermanent, because its characteristics are distinct, because it belongs to causes and conditions, because having previously been non-existent it now exists, and because having existed it returns to non-existence." The outsider says: Because it does not arise, it is permanent—intending to clarify that the soul does not arise. The insider says: If so, sentience is not the characteristic of the soul—meaning: sentience is impermanent while the soul is permanent, and the impermanent should not serve as the characteristic of the permanent. That commentary generally explains: "These two are mutually contradictory in three pairs: first, the soul is permanent and sentience is impermanent; second, the soul is all-pervading and sentience is not all-pervading; third, the soul is one and sentience is manifold." In this first section, it generates faults precisely with respect to two pairs; soul being one and sentience being manifold is only refuted in the third level. Regarding the first pair, there are four kinds of faults: First, if the soul conforms to sentience, the soul is impermanent. Second, if sentience conforms to the soul, sentience should be permanent. Third, if they do not conform to each other, their substances are not one. Fourth, if one insists that sentience is the soul, the soul would be of two kinds: permanent and impermanent, or sentient and insentient. Now, in concluding these four faults, the sūtra text contains the first and second, which refute that sentience should exist; the third and fourth are omitted. The rest is as in that treatise. Second, refuting the Vaiśeṣika: it first refutes their analogy, stating: "The insider says: The characteristic of a cow resides in the cow, not in the one who possesses the cow." Explanation: The one who possesses the cow is a human; the human unites with the cow, but the cow is not the human. The soul unites with cognition, but cognition is not the soul; how can it serve as its characteristic? Next, it refutes their doctrine, stating: "You say that by the characteristic of the soul uniting with sense faculties, sense objects, and mind, cognition arises; this cognition knows form and so forth. Therefore, only cognition can know, not the soul knowing. Just as fire can burn, not the person possessing fire burning." Then the doctrine of cognition serving as the characteristic of the soul is not established; now it is said to be devoid of cognition. The Commentary's statement "If according to the Hīnayāna [and so forth]" means: the sensation aggregate is named sentience, sensing suffering, pleasure, and so forth. Three aggregates are named cognition: conception grasps marks, mental formations possess desire, resolve, and so on—all of which are the meaning of cognition and consciousness; further clarifying that form is neither of these two.