大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 62.50

62.50

疏「勝鬘亦說」下，第二廣引，證成具上二意。《勝鬘》云「凡夫識者，二見顛倒。一切阿羅漢辟支佛智者，則是清淨。邊見者，凡夫於五陰我見妄想計著，生於二見，是名邊見，所謂常見、斷見。見諸行無常，是斷見，非正見。見涅槃常，是常見，非正見。妄想見故。作如是見，於身諸根分別思惟。現法見壞，於有相續不見續故，起於斷見，妄想見故。於心相續，愚暗不解不知，剎那間意識境界起於常見，妄想見故。故於彼義，若過若不及，作異想分別，若斷若常。顛倒眾生，於五陰中無常常想、苦生樂想、無我我想、不淨淨想。一切阿羅漢及辟支佛淨智者，於一切智境界及如如法身本所不見。或有眾生信佛語故，起常想樂想我想淨想，非顛倒見，是名正見。何以故？如來法身是常波羅蜜，於佛法身作是見者，是名正見。正見者，是佛真子，從佛口生、從正法生、從法化生，得法勝財。世尊淨智者，一切阿羅漢辟支佛智波羅蜜，此淨智者雖曰淨智，於彼滅諦尚非境界，況四德智。」釋曰：此上經文乃有數重。初見諸行無常、涅槃是常，名斷常見者，自有二意：一以取相心見，不合法體故。斯最深玄。則常與無常二見雙泯，方能見理。二者見生死實有可斷、涅槃實有可證，不合法體。不知有淨說生死、無諍說涅槃，生死及涅槃二俱不可得故。若如此知，即非二見。二從於身諸根分別思惟現法見壞下，唯約生死諸蘊起斷常見。三從於彼義若過若不及下，雙結上二，以第一義起見著故，為若過，第二義不知剎那壞為斷、不知心相續為常，為不及故。上智妄見。四從眾生於五陰無常常想下，明其正見。謂破生死無常常想等，為二乘淨智。見如來法身常樂我淨，為菩薩正見。破常等倒，廣病而略於藥，不言修無常行以破常等故；顯如來常，但舉其藥而略其病，不言二乘，謂法身等亦無常等故。然皆約五蘊，即是總明四念，隨一一陰容起四倒之義。若取言總意別，則無常常想即屬心念，若有樂想即是受念，無我我想即是法念不淨淨想即是身念。既是三重破於八倒，故云「勝鬘亦以四念能破八倒」。

On the Commentary's text from “The Śrīmālā[devī-sūtra] also says” downward, this is the second [section], which cites broadly to corroborate that [the practice] possesses the above two meanings. The Śrīmālā[devī-sūtra] states: “The consciousness of ordinary persons is inverted by two views. The cognition of all arhats and pratyekabuddhas, by contrast, is pure. As for extreme views: ordinary persons, clinging in conceptual discrimination to a view of self regarding the five aggregates, give rise to two views, which are termed extreme views—namely, eternalist views and annihilationist views. Seeing all conditioned phenomena as impermanent is an annihilationist view, not right view. Seeing nirvāṇa as permanent is an eternalist view, not right view. This is because they are conceptually discriminated views. Holding such views, they discriminate and reflect upon the sense faculties of the body. Seeing destruction in the present life, and not seeing continuation in the succession of existence, they give rise to an annihilationist view because it is a conceptually discriminated view. Regarding the succession of mind, being dull and ignorant, not understanding and not knowing, they give rise to an eternalist view regarding the perceptual domain of the conscious mind in an instant, because it is a conceptually discriminated view. Therefore, regarding that meaning, whether going too far or falling short, they make divergent conceptually discriminated notions, either of annihilation or of permanence. Inverted sentient beings form the notion of permanence regarding the impermanence of the five aggregates, form the notion of pleasure where there is suffering, form the notion of self where there is no self, and form the notion of purity where there is impurity. The pure cognition of all arhats and pratyekabuddhas has never seen the domain of omniscience and the tathatā dharmakāya. There may be sentient beings who, relying on faith in the Buddha's words, give rise to the notion of permanence, the notion of pleasure, the notion of self, and the notion of purity—these are not inverted views; they are termed right views. Why is this? The Tathāgata's dharmakāya is the perfection of permanence; those who hold such a view regarding the Buddha's dharmakāya have what is termed right view. Those with right view are the Buddha's true children, born from the Buddha's mouth, born from the right Dharma, born through transformation from the Dharma, and attaining the superior wealth of the Dharma. O World-Honoured One, as for pure cognition: it is the perfection of cognition of all arhats and pratyekabuddhas. Although this pure cognition is called pure cognition, even the noble truth of cessation is not yet its object, let alone the cognition of the four virtues.”

Explanation: The above sūtra passage actually has several layers. First, regarding seeing all conditioned phenomena as impermanent and nirvāṇa as permanent being called views of annihilation and permanence, this itself has two meanings: First, because they are seen with a mind that grasps at characteristics, they do not accord with the essence of reality. This is the most profound and mysterious. Only when both the two views of permanence and impermanence are vanished can one see the principle. Second, seeing saṃsāra as truly existing and capable of being severed, and nirvāṇa as truly existing and capable of being realized, does not accord with the essence of reality. They do not know that saṃsāra is spoken of conditionally as pure, and nirvāṇa is spoken of without dispute, because both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are unobtainable. If one knows in this way, then these are not the two views. Second, from “discriminat[ing] and reflect[ing] upon the sense faculties of the body, seeing destruction in the present life” downward, it speaks solely of giving rise to annihilationist and eternalist views with reference to the aggregates of saṃsāra. Third, from “regarding that meaning, whether going too far or falling short” downward, it concludes both of the above: because of giving rise to dogmatic adherence regarding the ultimate truth, it is “going too far”; because of not knowing that moment-by-moment destruction is annihilation and not knowing that the continuity of mind is permanence, it is “falling short.” These are the deluded views of high cognition. Fourth, from “sentient beings [form the notion of permanence] regarding the impermanence of the five aggregates” downward, it explains right view. That is to say, shattering the notions of permanence regarding the impermanence of saṃsāra and so forth constitutes the pure cognition of the two vehicles; seeing the Tathāgata's dharmakāya as permanent, pleasant, self, and pure constitutes the bodhisattva's right view. In refuting the inversions of permanence and so forth, it elaborates on the illness while keeping the medicine brief, not mentioning the cultivation of impermanence practice to refute permanence and so forth; in revealing the permanence of the Tathāgata, it merely cites the medicine while keeping the illness brief, not mentioning that the two vehicles regard the dharmakāya and so forth also as impermanent and so forth. However, both are discussed with reference to the five aggregates; that is, it generally clarifies the four mindfulnesses, meaning that each individual aggregate is capable of generating the four inversions. If one takes the words generally and their meaning specifically: the notion of permanence regarding impermanence belongs to mindfulness of mind; if there is a notion of pleasure, it is mindfulness of feelings; the notion of self regarding no-self is mindfulness of phenomena; and the notion of purity regarding impurity is mindfulness of the body. Since this refutes the eight inversions on three levels, it says: “The Śrīmālā[devī-sūtra] also takes the four mindfulnesses as capable of refuting the eight inversions.”