大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 64.64

64.64

疏「又論主反徵」下，第三引論反徵釋。於中三：初總標、二別徵釋、三結成無我。疏初徵著我，下二別徵釋中二句。先徵世間受生皆由著我、後徵若離此著則無生處。今初，於中二：先標舉、後「若第一義」下舉論牒釋。然論但云「若第一義中實有我相者，著我之心即是第一義智，不應世間受身處生。」疏有二釋：一依《百論》縱奪勢釋、二依因明立量以釋。前中數節，論文以為三段，兼疏有四：一初句按定、二次句縱立、三後句正徵、四「何以著我」下即疏舉經反質結破。但觀向引論文，自分主客，云何結破？然有二意：一結成縱破。縱其有我已成過故，舉經反成。二著我既世間生，明知著我之心非第一義智，所著之我非第一義，明理無我矣，即奪破其我。

Under the commentary's phrase "Furthermore, the treatise master questions inversely," this is the third, citing the treatise to question inversely and explain. Within this there are three: first, a general presentation; second, distinct questions and explanations; third, concluding and establishing selflessness. The commentary first questions attachment to self, and the two phrases below fall within the second, distinct questions and explanations: first questioning that receiving birth in the world is entirely due to attachment to self, and afterwards questioning that if one is free from this attachment, there is no place of birth. Now, regarding the first, within it there are two: first, presenting; afterwards, under "If in the ultimate truth," citing the treatise to take up and explain. However, the treatise merely says: "If within the ultimate truth there truly were a characteristic of a self, the mind attached to self would simply be ultimate truth cognition, and one should not be born in places of receiving embodiment in the world." The commentary has two explanations: first, explaining according to the dynamic of concession and deprivation in the Śataśāstra; second, setting up an inference (pramāṇa) according to hetuvidyā to explain it. In the former, through several clauses, the treatise text forms three sections, and together with the commentary there are four: first, the initial phrase affirms and fixes; second, the second phrase concedingly posits; third, the final phrase directly questions; fourth, under "Why, through attachment to self," the commentary cites the sūtra to question back and conclude the refutation. Merely looking at the cited treatise text, host and guest naturally divide; how does it conclude the refutation? However, there are two intents: first, to conclude the refutation by concession: conceding that there is a self has already generated a flaw; hence citing the sūtra inversely establishes this. Second, since attachment to self causes birth in the world, one clearly knows that the mind attached to self is not ultimate truth cognition, and the self attached to is not the ultimate truth; this clarifies that in principle there is no self—namely, refuting its self by deprivation.