大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 67.38

67.38

疏「法從緣故不自生」者，即對前果法為自，眾緣為他義說。通於二論：一通《中論》。青目釋不自生云「萬物無有從自體生，必待眾因緣。復次若從自體生，則一法有二體：一謂生、二謂生者。若離餘因從自體生者，則無因無緣。又生更有生，生則無窮。」釋曰：據此即以果體為自也。二通《對法》。先明三句無生、後辨不礙三作。初云「不從自生者，謂一切法非自所作，彼未生時無自性故。」釋曰：此釋同青目意。論云「不他生者，謂彼諸緣非作者故。不共生者，即由於二種因故。」釋曰：二種因者，即指上二句。自他二句各既不生，合亦不生。後辨三作，云「然非不自作他作，因生故甚深。」此意以三作釋不無因，故云「緣望於果，有功能故。因望於果亦然。」合上為三作故。既從三作，故非無因。然觀三作，則自亦是因。今疏中釋不自他等，即《中論》偈意。偈釋自生，即是下文因緣形奪中用，故云「如諸法自性，不在於緣中」，此即以他破自。次云「以無自性故，他性亦復無」，此即以自破他。憑公云：「以自破他，凡有三種：一總、二即、三相待。」今疏即全有此三。初云「既無有自，對誰為他」，即第三相待破，無自可待對故，如無長故無短。次云「又一切法總為自故」，即第一總義萬法皆自。如百人一處，皆用己為自，則他亦是自。今破一自，則他亦破矣。次云「又他望於他亦是自故」者，即第二即義，謂如兩人二互相望，此言是自、指彼為他，他亦自言我即是自、指此為他。故其兩人皆有於自。破此人自，他人之自亦已亡故。從「自他不立」下，即雙用自他破共生義。如二盲人，離不見色，合豈見耶？從「有因尚不生」者，即以三作破無因耳。此中非謂非是無因而立有因，舉況以釋因緣和合。合是生義尚不得生，豈用無因而立生義？故四句求生，生不可得，無生之理顯然可覩。正理既顯，計何由生？

The commentary states: 'Because dharmas are from conditions, they do not arise from self': this is spoken with respect to the aforementioned effect dharma being the 'self' and the manifold conditions being the 'other'. It applies to two treatises. First, it applies to the Madhyamakaśāstra. Piṅgala explains not arising from self, saying: 'The myriad things do not arise from their own essence; they must depend on manifold causes and conditions. Furthermore, if they arose from their own essence, then a single dharma would have two essences: one called the arising, and the second called that which causes arising. If apart from remaining causes it arose from its own essence, then there would be neither cause nor condition. Moreover, arising would have yet further arising, and arising would be infinite.' Explanation: According to this, it takes the essence of the effect to be 'self'. Second, it applies to the Abhidharmasamuccaya. It first clarifies non-arising in the three phrases, and afterward discerns that it does not obstruct the three makings. First it says: 'That they do not arise from self means that all dharmas are not made by oneself, because when they have not yet arisen they have no intrinsic nature.' Explanation: This explanation agrees with the intent of Piṅgala. The treatise says: 'That they do not arise from other means that those conditions are not the agent. That they do not arise from both is due to the two kinds of causes.' Explanation: The two kinds of causes refers to the above two phrases. Since both the self and other phrases do not arise individually, they also do not arise in combination. Afterward, discerning the three makings, it says: 'However, it is not that they are not made by self or made by other; because of arising from causes, it is extremely profound.' This intent uses the three makings to explain not lacking causes; hence it says: 'Conditions viewed in relation to the effect have efficacy; causes viewed in relation to the effect are also like this.' Combining the above constitutes the three makings. Since they arise from the three makings, they are not without cause. Yet observing the three makings, the self is also a cause. Now the explanation in the commentary of not self, other, and so forth is the intent of the verse in the Madhyamakaśāstra. The verse explaining arising from self is used below in the mutual deprivation of cause and condition; hence it says: 'As the intrinsic nature of all dharmas / Does not abide within conditions,' this refutes self by means of other. Next it says: 'Because there is no intrinsic nature, / The nature of other is also absent,' this refutes other by means of self. Master Ping says: 'Refuting other by means of self generally has three types: first, universal; second, identical; third, relative.' Now the commentary fully possesses these three. First it says: 'Since there is no self, relative to what would there be an other?' This is the third, refutation by relativity, because there is no self to be correlated with, just as without long there is no short. Next it says: 'Furthermore, all dharmas are universally self,' which is the first, the universal meaning: all dharmas are self. For instance, when a hundred people are in one place, all take themselves as self, so the other is also a self. Now when one self is refuted, the other is also refuted. Next it says: 'Furthermore, other viewed in relation to other is also self': this is the second, the identical meaning. For instance, when two people look at each other, this one says it is self and points to that one as other; that one also says of himself, 'I am self,' and points to this one as other. Therefore both people possess self. When this person's self is refuted, the other person's self has also perished. From 'Self and other are not established' downward, it uses both self and other to refute the meaning of arising from both. As with two blind people, who when separated do not see forms, how could they see them when combined? From 'Even with a cause they do not arise', it uses the three makings to refute causelessness. Here it does not mean that by negating causelessness one establishes having a cause, but rather brings up a comparison to explain the combination of causes and conditions. When combination is the meaning of arising, arising is still unattainable; how could one use causelessness to establish the meaning of arising? Therefore, seeking arising through the four phrases, arising is unattainable, and the principle of non-arising can be clearly observed. When the correct principle is already revealed, how could reckonings arise?