大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 74.16

74.16

第九一切法智通。「然此三對釋有三義」者，然此三義散在經論，古德隨見取捨不同。以今疏意並皆收之，而取義各別並為正解，合其三意方盡玄旨。然此三對，皆由下句成別，上非異句義旨皆同，同是遣差別相故。下句對上，別成三重：第一唯約顯實者，則拂迹入玄。非異者，拂差別相也。非不異者，拂上不異之迹，則遣之又遣之，以至於無遣耳。而文中二：先總明兩句，故云「則相待而空故」。次先破異，云「異相互無故云不異」者，此即《中論．破合品》中意。以小乘立見可見，見者三事和合，因將異以破之，云「異法當有合，見等無有異，異法不成故，見等云何合？」釋曰：此但總明無異，異則無合。次例破異，云「非但可見等，異相不可得。所有一切法，皆名無異相。」釋曰：上總言無，下出無所以，云「異因異有異，異離異無異。若法所因出，是法不異因。」謂如眼於色，異色於眼異，是名為異。今明因色異故眼異，故云異因異有異。若離於色，眼與誰異？故云異離異無異。然則眼色二異相因而成，則無定眼色而成於異，故云若法所因出，是法不異因。亦由梁椽成舍，舍不異於梁椽等法，故云法所因出，法不異因。若眼如舍，則色加梁等；若色如舍，眼如梁等，故互為所因。所以疏云「異相互無」，謂眼色相因無定異故。又如長與短異，長中無短相，長無可對，故無有長；短中無長相，短無可對，故無有短。既無長短，孰言異耶？故云異相互無故無異。又長中自無長相，短中自無短相，將何長短而說異耶？亦《中論》意，亦《百論》意。故《中論》云「異中無異相，不異中亦無，無有異相故，則無彼此異。」《百論．破一品》中，外道立一，內破云「若因果不異，三世應為一。彼救云：不然，因果相待成故，如長短。」注云「如因長見短、因短見長，如見泥團，觀瓶則因、觀土則是果。」內破曰「因他相違共過故，非長中長相，亦非短中，及共中。」注云「若實有長相，若長中有、若短中有、若共中有、是皆不可得。何以故？長中無長相，以因他故，因短為長故。短中亦無長相，性相違故。若短中有長，不名為短。共中亦無長，二俱過故。若長中有、若短中有，先已說二過故。將何共耶？長相既無，短相亦爾。若無長短，云何相待？」上來破異竟。次疏云「遮異言不異」下，以相待門釋無不異，謂無異可待故，故二雙絕，以契性空。亦《百論》云「若無長短，云何相待」意也。

Ninth, the penetration of the cognition of all dharmas. As for "However, these three pairs of explanations have three meanings": these three meanings are scattered throughout the sūtras and treatises, and ancient masters accepted or rejected them differently according to their own views. In the intention of the present commentary, all of them are gathered, and their distinct meanings are all taken as correct interpretations; only by combining these three intentions does one exhaust the profound purport. However, in these three pairs, all of them establish their differences through the lower line, whereas the upper line of "neither different" has the same meaning throughout: they are all alike in dispelling the mark of differentiation. The lower line, contrasted with the upper, separately establishes three levels: First, considering it solely in terms of revealing the real, one sweeps away traces and enters into the profound. "Neither different" sweeps away the mark of differentiation. "Nor not different" sweeps away the trace of the aforesaid non-difference; thus it dispels and dispels further, until there is nothing left to dispel. And within the text there are two parts: first it generally explains both lines, hence saying "because they are empty by mutual dependence." Next, it first refutes difference, saying "because difference mutually lacks [the other], it is said to be not different." This is the intention in the chapter 'Examination of Combination' of the Madhyamakaśāstra. Because the Hīnayāna asserts the combination of the three factors of seeing, the visible, and the seer, it uses difference to refute it, saying: "If there were different things, there would be combination; seeing and so forth have no difference. Since different things are not established, how could seeing and so forth combine?" The explanation says: this only generally clarifies that there is no difference, and that if there is difference there is no combination. Next, it refutes difference by analogy, saying: "Not only are the visible and so forth ungraspable in their marks of difference, all existing dharmas are without marks of difference." The explanation says: above it generally states their absence; below it provides the reason for their absence, saying: "Difference is different because of difference; apart from difference, there is no difference. If a dharma arises conditioned by something, that dharma is not different from its cause." This means, for instance, the eye is different from form, and form is different from the eye: this is called difference. Now it clarifies that because it is different due to form, the eye is different; hence it says "difference is different because of difference." If apart from form, from what would the eye differ? Hence it says "apart from difference, there is no difference." In that case, the two differences of eye and form are established depending on each other, so there is no fixed eye or form to constitute difference; hence it says "if a dharma arises conditioned by something, that dharma is not different from its cause." It is also like beams and rafters making a house: the house is not different from the dharmas such as beams and rafters; hence it says "if a dharma arises conditioned by something, that dharma is not different from its cause." If the eye is like the house, then form is added like the beams, etc.; if form is like the house, the eye is like the beams, etc.; thus they are mutually the condition. Therefore the commentary says "difference mutually lacks [the other]," meaning that because eye and form depend on each other, there is no fixed difference. Furthermore, it is like the difference between long and short: within long there is no mark of short, so long has nothing to correspond to, and thus there is no long; within short there is no mark of long, so short has nothing to correspond to, and thus there is no short. Since there is neither long nor short, who can speak of difference? Hence it says "because difference mutually lacks [the other], there is no difference." Furthermore, within long there is inherently no mark of long, and within short there is inherently no mark of short; taking what long and short could one speak of difference? This is also the intention of the Madhyamakaśāstra, as well as the intention of the Śataśāstra. Therefore the Madhyamakaśāstra says: "In difference there is no mark of difference, nor is there in non-difference. Because there is no mark of difference, there is no difference between this and that." In the chapter 'Examination of One' of the Śataśāstra, the non-Buddhists assert oneness, and the Buddhist refutes it, saying: "If cause and effect were not different, the three periods of time would be one." They rescue their position, saying: "It is not so, because cause and effect are established by mutual dependence, like long and short." The commentary says: "Like seeing short because of long, and seeing long because of short; like seeing a lump of clay: viewing the pot, it is the cause; viewing the earth, it is the result." The Buddhist refutes: "Because of the joint error of depending on the other and mutual opposition, the mark of long is not in the long, nor in the short, nor in both." The commentary says: "If there were truly a mark of long, whether it existed in the long, or in the short, or in both, all of these are ungraspable. Why? Within long there is no mark of long, because it depends on the other—because it is long due to short. Within short there is also no mark of long, because their natures are mutually opposed. If within short there were long, it could not be called short. Nor is there long in both, because both would incur the errors. If it existed in the long or in the short, both errors have already been explained above. Taking what could they combine? Since the mark of long does not exist, the mark of short is likewise. If there is neither long nor short, how could there be mutual dependence?" The refutation of difference above is complete. Next, when the commentary says "stopping difference, it says 'not different'" onward, it explains the absence of non-difference through the gate of mutual dependence, meaning that because there is no difference to depend on, both are mutually cut off, thereby according with nature-emptiness (svabhāva-śūnyatā). This is also the intention of the Śataśāstra's saying: "If there is neither long nor short, how could there be mutual dependence?"