大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 75.15

75.15

疏「然皆具德不同四謗」者，揀非也。言四謗者，謂定有者是增益謗，若定無者是損減謗，亦有亦無相違謗，非有非無戲論謗。疏以具德故，出不同所由。謂上明四句即是具德，以稱真故，不同情計定執四句。今重顯初門具德之義。一真如是有義，以迷悟依故、不空義故、不可壞故。二真性是空，以離相故、隨緣義故、對染說故。三真如亦有亦空，以具德故、逆順自在故、體鎔融故。四真性非有非空，以二不二故、定取不可得故。餘之四句，前已略明。又皆即有之空，方為具德之空；即空之有，方為具德之有。是則非有之有、非空之空為具德耳。又盡有之空、盡空之有方為具德。又隨一句必具餘三，若隨闕者則非具德。又四句齊照成解境故，四句齊泯成行境故，皆言亡慮絕方為具德耳。是知若依四謗，四句皆絕；若依具德，四句不亡。不即不離，方知幻法。故《楞伽》第二令觀四句，謂一、異、俱、不俱，有、無、非有非無，常、無常等。

In the commentary, "However, all are endowed with virtues, unlike the four slanders," is the elimination of errors. Regarding the "four slanders": [holding] fixed existence is the slander of exaggeration; [holding] fixed non-existence is the slander of deprecation; [holding] both existence and non-existence is the slander of contradiction; [holding] neither existence nor non-existence is the slander of prapañca. The commentary, through being endowed with virtues, shows the reason for their difference. That is, the four propositions explained above are themselves endowed with virtues, because they accord with the real, unlike the four propositions grasped by sentiments and fixed attachments. Now to re-clarify the meaning of being endowed with virtues in the first approach: 1. Tathatā is the meaning of existence, because it is the reliance for delusion and awakening, because of the meaning of being non-empty, and because it cannot be destroyed. 2. The true nature is emptiness, because it is free from characteristics, because of the meaning of concordance with conditions, and because it is spoken in contrast to defilement. 3. Tathatā is both existent and empty, because it is endowed with virtues, because of its mastery in reverse and forward sequence, and because its essence is fused. 4. The true nature is neither existent nor empty, because the two are non-dual, and because fixed grasping cannot be attained. The remaining four propositions have already been briefly clarified earlier. Furthermore, all [cases where] emptiness is identical to existence are the emptiness endowed with virtues; existence identical to emptiness is the existence endowed with virtues. Thus, existence that is non-existence and emptiness that is non-emptiness are what is endowed with virtues. Moreover, the emptiness exhausting existence and the existence exhausting emptiness are endowed with virtues. Furthermore, any single proposition necessarily possesses the other three; if any is lacking, it is not endowed with virtues. Furthermore, the four propositions being simultaneously illuminated constitutes the cognitive sphere of understanding; the four propositions being simultaneously obliterated constitutes the cognitive sphere of practice; thus only when words perish and thoughts end is it endowed with virtues. From this it is known that according to the four slanders, all four propositions are severed; according to endowment with virtues, the four propositions do not perish. Being neither identical nor separate, only then does one know the illusory dharmas. Therefore, the second [chapter of the] Laṅkāvatāra has one contemplate the four propositions: namely, oneness, difference, both, neither; existence, non-existence, neither existence nor non-existence; permanence, impermanence, and so forth.