大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 79.78

79.78

疏「亦猶淨名法隨於如無所隨故」者，二引例也，即目連章。彼約性相相對，此約如智相對，義非全同，義勢相似，故云引例。言「法隨於如」者，法即一切，一切法即如，故云隨如。言「無所隨故」者，經自釋隨如之義「由法即如，法外無如，故云無所隨。」故若有所隨，能所未泯，豈得隨如？又法外有如，法非如矣。故無所隨方曰隨如。此中亦爾，若有所依，智外有法，能所未忘，不名如智。如外有智，智亦不如。故得引例。

Regarding the commentary's statement, "It is also like Vimalakīrti saying that dharmas conform to tathatā because there is nothing to conform to": this is the second part, citing an analogous case, which is the Maudgalyāyana section. That passage deals with the contrast between nature and characteristics, while this passage deals with the contrast between tathatā and cognition; their meanings are not entirely identical, but the drift of the meaning is similar, hence it is called citing an analogous case. "Dharmas conform to tathatā" means that dharmas are all things, and all dharmas are precisely tathatā; hence it says conforming to tathatā. "Because there is nothing to conform to": the sūtra itself explains the meaning of conforming to tathatā as "because dharmas are precisely tathatā and outside dharmas there is no tathatā, it is said that there is nothing to conform to." Therefore, if there were something conformed to, subject and object would not yet be obliterated, so how could it conform to tathatā? Furthermore, if outside dharmas there were tathatā, dharmas would not be tathatā. Hence only when there is nothing to conform to is it called conforming to tathatā. Here it is likewise: if there were something relied upon, there would be dharmas outside cognition; subject and object not yet being forgotten, it would not be called the cognition of tathatā. If there were cognition outside tathatā, cognition would also not be tathatā. Therefore it may be cited as an analogous case.