大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 12.28

12.28

Regarding the commentary's statement, "From the *Cheng weishi lun* below up to 'the cognitive objects of unhindered cognition regarding dharma and discourse would have no distinction'": The explanation states: The opponent asks: "If names and the like are identical with sound, what difference is there between the cognitive objects of the two unhindered cognitions regarding dharma and discourse?" The answer is: Precisely due to this [difference between nominal designation and sound], the two cognitive objects are distinct. The unhindered cognition regarding dharma takes provisional names and the like as its object. The unhindered cognition regarding discourse takes real sounds and the like as its object; therefore, a distinction between their objects is spoken of. It is not that both take the real as their object. Although their two intrinsic natures are not separated from one another, because dharma corresponds to that which is expressed, it takes only names; because discourse mostly corresponds to the capacities [of listeners], it speaks only of sound. After the ear hears sound, the mind understands the meaning; because that which they correspond to is not the same, the two are said to be different, not that their essences are different. Furthermore, regarding these two objects and the three [factors of] names and so forth being distinct from sound, their subsumption under aggregates, bases, and elements also differs: the aggregate of form and the aggregate of formations; the sound-base and the mental-object-base; the sound-element and the dharmadhātu. In this order, they subsume sound and name-phrase respectively. Question: "If inflection on sound is provisional, it is then said to be a non-concurrent [formation]. If inflection on visible form is provisional, it should not be subsumed under the form-base." Answer: "On sound, it is because there is teaching that name and so forth are non-concurrent; on visible form, it is because there is no teaching, hence it is subsumed under the form-base." Question: "If having inflection on sound immediately allows it to be teaching, then having inflection on visible form should likewise immediately allow it to be teaching." Therefore, the treatise also says: "For the time being, in accordance with this world, it is said that names, phrases, and syllables are provisionally established dependent on sound; this is not said of all [worlds]. For in other Buddha-lands, these three are also provisionally established dependent on light, wondrous fragrances, tastes, and so forth." The explanation states: The fourth is reconciling contradictions; the explanation of the meaning can be known, and what is cited is the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra*. When it says "and so forth," "and so forth" includes touch, volition, mental factors, and so on—all can provisionally establish the three [factors of] names and so on. These three dharmas are also subsumed under non-concurrent [formations] because they are provisional in correspondence with the capacities and desires of sentient beings. Furthermore, Sanskrit *vyañjana* has four meanings: first, a fan; second, major and minor marks; third, sense faculties and shapes; fourth, flavor—this is salt, because it can reveal the flavor in all things. Flavor is precisely syllable (letter). As in saying "the expressions (letters) and meanings are ingenious," they are designated *vyañjana*. Among these four meanings, all together have the single meaning of "revealing"; therefore, ancient masters called it "flavor." The *Abhidharma-samuccaya* says: "This syllable is called 'revealer' because it can reveal that meaning; therefore, it serves as the support for names and phrases, because it can reveal meaning. *Akṣara* is a character/letter, meaning unalterable." As the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* says: "*Pada* is a footprint; just as one tracks elephant footprints to find an elephant, this is called a phrase (pada). In principle, it should be called a footprint, because it is the footprint of meaning; tracking this, one understands the meaning." In accordance with ancient translations, it is termed a phrase. Now the commentary is comprehensive and concise; matching the commentary against the treatise makes the meaning clear. Regarding the commentary's statement, "The *Cheng weishi lun* says: 'These three, apart from sound, up to … are also not identical with sound'": The explanation states: The third is clarifying that they are neither identical with sound nor separate from sound, which is the treatise master answering an objection. This refers to a prior question: "Earlier, although it was said that names and so forth are identical with sound, if names and so forth are non-concurrent formations, why is it that inflection on visible form is not non-concurrent, whereas sound is?" Therefore, this answer is given: Although these three have no separate essence apart from sound, names and so forth are provisional while sound is real; because provisional and real differ, these three—names and so forth—are not identical with sound and are not subsumed under sound. It is merely that distinct sounds are nominally termed names and so forth because they express meaning. Being non-concurrent [formations], they are not produced from a separate seed; therefore, it is said that they are not identical with sound. Regarding the commentary's statement, "The fourth fascicle of the *Saṃdhinirmocana* up to … 'and thus can proclaim' with 'therefore'": in that [original text], there is no character "therefore" (故); beneath the character "proclaim" (說), it says: "Therefore, relying on the perfection of wisdom, I am able to grasp the naturelessness of all dharmas." The meaning is: by means of the prajñā of letters, one can reveal the prajñā of the true mark. Since both speech and letters are reiterated together, one clearly knows that the four dharmas are commonly used. The citation of *Vimalakīrti* below is also the text of the third, the "Fragrance Accumulation" chapter. In the *Daśabhūmika-śāstra*, "voice" is sound, and "phonetic characters" are names, phrases, and syllables; therefore, the two metaphors of wind and painting are cited below. Wind allegorizes voice and sound, and painting allegorizes names, phrases, and syllables, the meaning being explained below. Regarding the commentary's statement, "According to my understanding" below: The third is evaluation and twofold reconciliation. Within this, there are two parts: first, directly stating the correct view, the intention being to adopt both; second, from "If in terms of" below, reconciling the previous two. Within this, there are five points: 1. Directly clarifying what is rejected and what is accepted. 2. From "Because indeed" below, presenting the reason. 3. From "Although writing is visible form" below, warding off objections. Fearing there might be an objection saying: "The commentary does not properly discern: writing on bamboo and silk is not names, phrases, and syllables. The bodies of names, phrases, and syllables are non-concurrent [formations], whereas brush, ink, and bamboo tablets are merely material dharmas; how can they be taken as the essence?" Therefore, this defense is made: "Visible form also serves as a support for names and so forth; how is it different from sound serving as a support for names and so forth? Sound is subsumed under the aggregate of form; is the visible form of written characters not also subsumed under form?" Therefore, in the *Cheng weishi lun* earlier, by analogy to other lands, names, phrases, and syllables also depend on visible form and so on; they are likewise identical with the essences of all dharmas that reveal meaning. Because it reveals the principle of having no fixed direction, it does not adopt conventional rules. 4. From "The previous *Vimalakīrti*" below, reconciling the earlier text. "Only speaks of what is employed" means using these four dharmas; why must all four be required? Question: "If one takes whatever one pleases among the four, and takes only names and so forth, does that not contradict the text of the *Cheng weishi lun* that a separate existence apart from sound is not the correct doctrine?" Answer: "There, being inseparable from sound, provisional and real are spoken of together; here, being inseparable from visible form, provisional and real are also preserved, which does not violate the universal principle." 5. From the commentary's statement "The *Benevolent King* says" below, citing proof to establish it. Since it speaks only of names, phrases, and flavors, and does not mention voice and sound, it is clear that it adopts only names and so forth. This is the "Contemplating Emptiness" chapter of the *Benevolent King*, though the text is slightly abbreviated. Fully, it states: "Great King! The names, phrases, and flavors of this sūtra—hundreds of Buddhas, thousands of Buddhas, hundreds of thousands of myriads of Buddhas have spoken its names, phrases, and flavors. If one were to fill immeasurable seven jewels across three thousand great thousand worlds numerous as the sands of the Ganges, and bestow them upon the sentient beings in those three thousand great thousand worlds, causing them all to attain the four fruits of nirvāṇa, it would not equal generating a single thought of pure faith in this sūtra, let alone understanding a single phrase—because a phrase is not a phrase and is not a non-phrase." Now, the intention merely lies in the words having names, phrases, and flavors without sound, so it is not cited in full.