大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 17.65

17.65

In the commentary, from “Although depending on the ear-base” downward is the second [section], resolving objections. Here there are two objections. First, there is a question: “It is clearly the ear that hears; why say ‘I heard’?” Hence this is resolved: it explains that “I” is the general term, generally subsuming the various sense-bases such as the eyes and ears. This is from the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra. Second, there is a question: “All of the Buddha's teachings explain non-self. Ānanda is already a noble one who has entered the principle; how could he, like an ordinary person, state ‘I heard’?” Hence the resolution states: “Although dharmas are devoid of self…”—this cites the thrust of the question. Below, “because of the convenience of language…” is the resolution proper. Within this, it first reveals the correct [meaning], and below “not with a mind of defilement or pride” it rejects errors. The resolution here reflects the intent of two treatises. First, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, Fascicle 1, presents three alternatives to explain why “I” is spoken when there is no self. The first says: Furthermore, “I” is spoken within worldly phenomena, not within the ultimate truth. For this reason, all phenomena are empty and devoid of self. Because it is a worldly phenomenon, although “I” is spoken, it lacks real essence. The second says: Furthermore, worldly language has three roots: first, false view; second, pride; third, conventional designation. The first two are impure; the latter one is pure. All ordinary people possess all three kinds of speech; practitioners on the path of seeing possess two kinds of speech, namely pride and conventional designation. The noble ones possess only one kind of speech, namely conventional designation: in their minds they do not conceive of real dharmas, but merely follow worldly people in conventionally transmitting this speech. The disciples of the Buddhas accord with the conventional, so speaking of “I” entails no fault. The third says: Furthermore, if someone clings to the mark of non-self, [thinking], “All dharmas are real, and the rest is all false speech,” such a person would object: “The true mark of all these dharmas is non-self; why say, ‘Thus have I heard’?” Now the disciples of the Buddhas know that all dharmas are empty and non-existent; in this, their minds do not cling, nor do they cling even to the true mark of dharmas, how much less could they cling in their minds to non-self! For this reason, one should not raise the objection: “Why speak of ‘I’?” Explanation: The three alternatives above mean: first, according with the world; second, breaking false views; third, not clinging to non-self. Second, according to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, Fascicle 6: “Briefly, for four reasons one states ‘I heard’: first, for the convenience and ease of worldly language; second, to accord with the world; third, to sever fear of definite non-self; fourth, to proclaim the gains and losses of oneself and others so as to engender definite conviction.” The Prakaraṇāryavācā, Fascicle 9, and the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, Fascicle 13, both say the same. Explanation: This largely agrees with the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa. The first point of the Yogācārabhūmi is omitted in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa because it is simple and obvious. The second is the first point of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa. The third is the third point of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa: clinging to non-self constitutes the “fear of non-self,” meaning, “If there is definitely no self, for whom does one practice and study?” If non-self were not taught, clinging would cause fear; because there is no clinging, non-self is not rigidly asserted, and this fear naturally vanishes. The fourth corresponds to the second: by following worldly convention, it causes others to engender definite conviction. Knowing that the two treatises differ in words but agree in meaning, the commentary now encompasses both treatises, taking their points of agreement: “convenience of language” is the intent of the Yogācārabhūmi's first point; “according with the worldly” is the second point of the Yogācārabhūmi and the first of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa; “spoken not with a mind of defilement or pride” rejects the two types of speech in the second point of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa. However, Mahāyāna masters, drawing on the meaning of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, establish three kinds of self: first, the falsely grasped self, which is this false self; second, the conventionally designated self, namely the self of bliss, purity, permanence, and self in great nirvāṇa, which is forcibly designated to eliminate the inversions of the two vehicles—this is also subsumed under “conventional designation” in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, yet the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa refers to worldly conventional designations, while this relies on supramundane conventional designations; third, the self of worldly convention, which precisely corresponds to the self of conventional designation among the three kinds of speech in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa. Furthermore, there is another question here: “Does one say ‘I heard’ because the Buddha taught the Dharma, or does one say ‘I heard’ because he did not teach the Dharma?” This is the doctrine of archetype and image. Since this has already appeared under the essence of the teaching, the commentary does not raise the question.