大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 30

English (machine translation) 30

Language: English

30.1

Exposited by the Śramaṇa Chengguan of Da Huayan Monastery on Mount Qingliang under the Tang

Section Two. Regarding the commentary's "Like a thorn in the mud, one does not notice its wound": being covered by passionate desire is like being submerged in mud, so that one is unaware of its injury. As for "like a thorn in a sore": this is a thorn of flesh, which is why the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] calls it a polyp. That sūtra's thirteenth fascicle says: "Contemplating this desire deeply, there are in general nine kinds: first, like remaining debt; second, like a rākṣasa woman; third, like a venomous snake beneath the stem of a wondrous lotus; fourth, like an aversion to a bad food, which is forced upon oneself though unsuitable; fifth, like a courtesan; sixth, like a mālukā seed; seventh, like a polyp in a sore; eighth, like a violent gale; ninth, like a comet." The first is the residual habit-energy of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. The second eats its child upon giving birth and later eats its husband; desire consumes the good child and later consumes sentient beings, causing them to fall into the three bad destinations. The third is the venomous snake of desire beneath the flower of the five desires, causing one's life to end. The fourth is falling into the three bad destinations under the affliction of forced eating. The fifth is intercourse with desire, which plunders one's wholesome dharmas, causing one to be cast out and fall into the three bad destinations. The sixth entangles ordinary beings' wholesome dharmas, causing them to perish. The seventh is like a person with a chronic sore in which a polyp grows: that person must diligently treat it and not give rise to neglect; if they give rise to neglect, the polyp grows larger and maggots appear, so that because of these causes and conditions they immediately die. The sores of the five aggregates of ordinary fools are also like this: desire is the polyp within them, and one should diligently treat the polyp of desire. If one does not treat it, upon death one will fall into the three bad destinations; only bodhisattvas are excepted. This is called the polyp in a sore. The eighth is a violent gale, which can topple mountains and level peaks, uprooting trees with deep roots. When desire gives rise to an evil mind toward one's parents, it uproots the root of bodhi. The ninth is the comet of desire, which can sever all wholesome roots, rendering ordinary persons destitute and starving. Here, the text specifically employs the single meaning of the polyp in a sore.

30.3

Regarding the commentary's "Universally seeing penetrates both nature and characteristics, hence freeing one from both extremes": the above generally explains the single verse, and what follows separately interprets the first half. The first half says: "Universally seeing all dharmas, / one renounces both extremes." Now one should ask: "If one universally sees all dharmas, how is one able to be freed from both extremes?" Hence it is answered here: "Because it penetrates nature and characteristics." If one sees only characteristics, that is the extreme of existence; if one sees only nature, that falls into the extreme of nonexistence. Because nature and characteristics are unobstructed, one is free from both extremes. The Madhyamakaśāstra states: "Although empty, it is not annihilated; although existent, it is not permanent." It is precisely because emptiness and existence are mutually identical that one is free from both extremes. From "Because it is ultimate truth, it does not exist..." onwards, it cites Master [Seng]ying's "Preface to the Madhyamakaśāstra" to explain it. The ultimate truth is precisely nature; the conventional truth is precisely characteristics. Relying on the harmonization of the two truths, one is freed from both extremes. Now, the meaning of the two truths has already been clarified in the "Mysteries"; to explain this commentary, four meanings are briefly set forth: First, it is said that delusion is empty while truth is existent, as the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] states: "The empty is so-called saṃsāra, and the non-empty is so-called mahāparinirvāṇa." Second, delusion is existent while true nature is empty, which is precisely the present text. Third, both are empty, because they lack nature in mutual dependence. Fourth, both are existent, because nature and characteristics are not destroyed, and with respect to the truths they are always intrinsically twofold. Here, it properly corresponds to the second meaning: conventional existence and true emptiness, which has four pairs: The first pair determines where existence and nonexistence reside. When I speak of emptiness with respect to ultimate truth, it is the emptiness of naturelessness, not the emptiness of non-being; when I explain existence with respect to conventional truth, this is conditioned existence, not the existence of a fixed nature. Second, "because of the ultimate it does not exist, yet although nonexistent it exists": the next pair reveals that the essence and characteristics of existence and nonexistence are nonexistence that does not destroy existence, and existence that does not obstruct nonexistence, thus establishing the Middle Way. Third, from "'although existent it is nonexistent, hence one is not burdened by existence'" onwards, it reveals the virtues of existence and nonexistence. If it were an existence of a fixed nature, this existence would be exclusively existent and could not be immediately nonexistent; if it were a nonexistence of a fixed nature, this nonexistence would be exclusively nonexistent and could not be immediately existent. Now, because the two are mutually identical, one is not biased or stalled. Fourth, the pair beginning with "'not stalled in nonexistence'" reveals that existence and nonexistence are free from faults: stalling in emptiness leads to annihilation, and being burdened by existence leads to permanence; since one is neither stalled nor burdened, there is neither annihilation nor permanence. Another explanation: The first pair leaves behind both existence and nonexistence, hence saying "there is neither existence nor nonexistence"—this accomplishes the contemplation of emptiness. The second pair does not destroy existence and nonexistence, hence saying "although existent it is nonexistent, although nonexistent it exists"—this accomplishes the contemplation of the provisional. The third pair explains that because the two truths are mutually identical, one is not biased or stalled in existence or nonexistence, and thus one is neither moved by the extreme of existence nor stilled by the extreme of nonexistence, which accomplishes the contemplation of the Middle Way. Master [Seng]zhao also said: "Entering existence, one is never deluded about emptiness; hence one always abides in existence without being tainted"—this is not being burdened by existence; "not abhorring existence while contemplating emptiness, one contemplates emptiness without realizing [cessation]"—this is not being stalled in nonexistence. The fourth, freedom from faults, follows the previous explanation. In the first pair, the first phrase says that because of the ultimate it does not exist—lacking that existence of a fixed nature is the meaning of true emptiness; the next phrase says that because of the conventional it is not nonexistent—lacking that nonexistence of annihilation is the meaning of wondrous existence. The second pair is the meaning of both existent and nonexistent. The third pair is the meaning of neither existent nor nonexistent. In the fourth pair, being free from faults completes the four propositions endowed with virtue. Furthermore, the first pair leaves behind both faults: first, freedom from existence; second, freedom from nonexistence. The second pair is free from neither-existent-nor-nonexistent. The third pair is free from both-existent-and-nonexistent. The fourth pair generally clarifies freedom from faults. Therefore, the Awakening of Faith states: "True suchness has neither the characteristic of existence, nor the characteristic of nonexistence, nor the characteristic of neither existence nor nonexistence, nor the characteristic of both existence and nonexistence"—this is precisely the meaning. Therefore, it concludes: "How could 'both' and 'not both' arise?" This means the fourth pair properly leaves behind annihilation and permanence. The third pair, because it is not biased or stalled, is free from the proposition of "both". The second phrase, because it does not destroy the two, is free from the dual negation, and thus both are quiescent. Furthermore, if there were two, one could speak of "both"; now, since existence is precisely nonexistence, outside of existence there is no nonexistence that could be combined with existence; and since nonexistence is precisely existence, outside of nonexistence there is no existence that could be combined with nonexistence; hence "both existent and nonexistent" are mutually contradictory and cannot stand. As for "not both cannot stand": if there were fixed existence and fixed nonexistence, negating them would give the proposition of neither. Now, existence is precisely nonexistence—how could there be a non-nonexistence? And nonexistence is precisely existence—how could there be a non-existence? Thus the dual negation is also quiescent. Since there is neither existence nor nonexistence, there is also neither identity nor difference, neither annihilation nor permanence, neither coming nor going; there is none that is not thus, and hence it is called completely quiescent. Therefore, the sūtra states: "one renounces both extremes." To renounce both means that all dual extremes are not confined to existence and nonexistence. Furthermore, saying "renounces" means that by nature they are inherently free, one does not grasp or cling, and one understands the true nature—it is not that there are actual extremes that can be renounced.

30.4

Regarding the commentary's phrase, 'The next [verse concerns] subduing Māra through the power of benevolence': The *Mahāyāna-upāyakauśalya-sūtra* states that Pāpīyas's army covered thirty-six yojanas, surrounding the Bodhi tree to create obstacles. The Bodhisattva, abiding in benevolence, compassion, and wisdom, touched the earth with his finger, whereupon the great multitude of eighty-four thousand beings of the eight classes all generated the great bodhicitta. Therefore it says, 'subduing Māra through the power of benevolence.' A sūtra says: 'The Guide subdues the hosts of Māra; it is thus on account of benevolence and compassion.' Fascicle two of the *Guanfo sanmei hai jing*, in explaining the merit of contemplating the white curl (ūrṇā-keśa), describes subduing Māra through benevolence and compassion; here, its meaning is cited in summary. Pāpīyas summoned all eight classes, as well as the wilderness ghosts and spirits, and King Yama together with the spirits of the eighteen hells. All the great hells such as Avīci arrived completely at the Buddha's place, and boundless terrifying phenomena simultaneously threatened the Bodhisattva. At that time, the Bodhisattva gently raised his right arm and extended his eyebrow-curl downward, aiming it toward the Avīci hell, causing all the sinners to see various streams of water flowing forth from the white curl, pouring down like cart-axles; the fires were extinguished, suffering ceased, and their minds attained coolness. The hell wardens saw the tips of their iron forks become like mountains of white silver, with tens of millions of niches containing white lions coiled to form seats; atop these seats bloomed white lotuses, where wondrous bodhisattvas entered the supreme benevolence samādhi. The lord of hell generated the mind [for bodhi], the sufferings of the numerous sinners ceased, and chanting 'Namo Buddhāya', they all attained liberation. The boundless evil occurrences had no means of approaching the Buddha. The Demon King, emaciated and distraught, retreated and lay upon his couch. There were three demon daughters who also harbored the intent to confuse and disorder the Bodhisattva; he likewise aimed the white curl at them, and the maidens all saw the thirty-six impure substances and the nine orifices of impurity; carrying an old mother on their backs and embracing a dead infant in their arms, their nine orifices overflowing with filth, they crawled away. The Demon King brandished his sword and advanced; the World-Honoured One again aimed the white curl at him, causing Māra's retinue to enjoy peace and bliss of body and mind as if in the third dhyāna. Hungry ghosts saw that at the tip of the curl there were hundreds of thousands of koṭis of great bodhisattvas entering the supreme benevolence samādhi. These are all instances of subduing Māra through the power of benevolence. As for the sūtra's phrase, 'Expounding wondrous meaning from within the light': this refers to the light from between his eyebrows. That is to say, when the demon Pāpīyas was unable to harm the Buddha, he suddenly returned to his palace; the white curl followed along, reaching directly up to the six desire heavens. In between, countless gods and goddesses saw that the hollow of the white curl's pore was entirely empty within, round and lovely like the banner of the god Brahmā. Within that space there were precious lotuses numbering as many as the dust motes in hundreds of thousands of Ganges sands; each lotus was immeasurable and boundless, with wondrous white curls forming their platforms, and atop the platforms were transformed buddhas and bodhisattvas emitting the light of the white-curl major mark, which was likewise so. On the crowns of the bodhisattvas were wondrous lotuses, golden in colour, upon which sat the seven Buddhas of the past. These transformed buddhas themselves proclaimed their names, which were no different from the sūtras. This is precisely 'expounding wondrous meaning from within the light'. However, this is the power of the benevolence samādhi; therefore it is collectively spoken of as 'subduing Māra through the power of benevolence'. As for the commentary's phrase, 'The next [verse concerns] wisdom and eradication bringing about functioning': the first line is wisdom, and the next line is eradication; this is precisely refining the meaning to enter the spirit, and thus being able to manifest all things suddenly in a single instant—this is 'bringing about functioning'. The *Yijing: Xici* states: 'The inchworm bends its body in order to stretch forth; dragons and serpents hibernate in order to preserve their lives; refining the meaning enters the spirit, in order to bring about functioning.' The commentary to that text states: 'Refining the meaning refers to the subtleties of principles of things. The spirit is tranquil and unmoving, yet responds and subsequently penetrates all. Therefore, one can take advantage of the subtleties beneath heaven, unifying and giving flow to their functions.' Here, this language is borrowed so that the profound communion of wisdom and eradication is taken as 'refining the meaning to enter the spirit'.

30.5

Section three. Regarding the commentary's phrase, 'The non-obstruction of nature and characteristics is true penetration': the commentary's explanation of 'unobstructed penetration' has two meanings: first, the dharma that is penetrated has nature and characteristics unobstructed; second, the wisdom that understands is free from the two obstructions. The two obstructions are precisely the two hindrances: understanding characteristics, there is no hindrance of knowables; understanding nature, there is no hindrance of afflictions. Therefore the next line states, 'Free from attachment to the two obstructions, the basis is transformed and the mind is pure', which means that one transforms the basis of impermanence and defilement, relying solely on the permanent dharmakāya by means of merit; hence it says, 'the mind is pure, free from all attachments.' Penetration is wisdom, non-obstruction is eradication, and regulating sentient beings is grace; hence it says, 'endowed with the three virtues'.

30.6

Regarding the commentary's phrase, 'All stating "some see"': within these nine distinctions there are nine instances of 'some see'; the meaning is easily understood, yet people are still confused about it. Now, drawing by analogy upon seeking to see Mañjuśrī at the Five Terraces of Qingliang, to illustrate the differences in seeing the Buddha throughout the dharmadhātu, there are ten points in all. First, 'some multiple capacities in different places each have a corresponding perception and see': for instance, suppose there are five people, which is called 'multiple capacities', each on a terrace, which is called 'different places'. One person on the South Terrace sees a bodhisattva; one person on the West Terrace sees a lion; one person on the Central Terrace sees the myriad holy ones; one person on the East Terrace sees a transformed buddha; and one person on the North Terrace sees a holy monk. This is the first: each having a corresponding perception and seeing. Second, 'or in the same place, each seeing differently': five people together on the Central Terrace, hence 'the same place'; one sees a bodhisattva, one sees a lion, and so forth, hence 'each seeing differently'. Third, 'or at different times, seeing separately': one person in the morning sees a bodhisattva, and in the evening sees a transformed buddha, and so forth. Fourth, 'or at the same time, seeing differently': whereas the above 'at different times, seeing separately' was not restricted to one person or multiple people, here it must be multiple people; that is, two people at the same morning time, one seeing a transformed buddha and one seeing a bodhisattva. Fifth, 'or at the same time in different places, seeing': this also refers to multiple people, at the same morning dawn, one seeing on the East Terrace and one seeing on the North Terrace; the objects seen may be the same or different—either both seeing a bodhisattva is also seeing at the same time in different places, or one seeing a bodhisattva and one seeing a transformed buddha is likewise at the same time in different places. Sixth, 'or in the same place at different times, seeing': together on the Central Terrace, seeing in the morning and also seeing in the evening; the perceiving subjects may be one person or multiple people, and the perceived objects may also be one object or different objects; it merely takes the place as the same and the times as different. Seventh, 'or at different times in different places, seeing': the times are different as morning and evening, and the places are distinct as the East and West Terraces. The perceiving subjects may also be one person or multiple people; that is, either one person in the morning sees a bodhisattva on the Central Terrace and in the evening sees a bodhisattva on the North Terrace, while different people can be inferred. However, regarding one person, the objects seen may also be the same or different: both seeing a bodhisattva is as explained above; or one person in the morning on the Central Terrace sees a bodhisattva and in the evening on the North Terrace sees a lion; yet for the most part this is explained regarding one object. Eighth, 'or at the same time in the same place, seeing': this also refers to multiple people together on the Central Terrace, who at midday all see a bodhisattva; what is seen also allows for being the same or different, but is explained provisionally as the same. Ninth, 'or one person at mutually intersecting times and places seeing what multiple people see': 'mutually intersecting times and places' means the same time in different places, and different times in the same place, which are called intersecting times and places. Now, the same time in different places is the fifth case, and must involve multiple people; different times in the same place is the sixth case, applying to either one person or multiple people. Here, a single person suddenly sees that which the aforementioned multiple people saw; such a capacity is also an inconceivable person, because they are able to see at the same time in different places. That is to say, there is one person who, at morning time on the Central Terrace, sees what multiple people on the Central Terrace see, and also sees on the West Terrace what multiple people see; furthermore, on the Central Terrace, in both morning and evening, sees what multiple people see. Tenth, 'or one person at times and places that are both the same and different seeing what all people see': the same time in the same place, and different times in different places, are called 'times and places that are both the same and different'. Since this is one person, the time encompasses many times, the place pervades all places, and the vision penetrates all realms; therefore, this is the capacity of the Universal Eye.

30.7

From the commentary's phrase, 'Yet the Buddha does not divide his body' downward, it means unpartitioned yet pervasive. 'Manifesting universally without thought' suddenly responds to the preceding ten [cases]. The commentary's phrase, 'As in the eighth assembly', refers precisely to fascicle fifty-nine; each has ten meanings, which an expounder ought to cite.

30.8

Section four. Regarding the commentary's phrase, 'Now contemplating the body: if the self were identical with the skandhas', and so forth: this is the meaning found in the 'Chapter on Dharmas' in the *Madhyamakaśāstra*. The treatise states: 'If the self were identical with the five skandhas, the self would be subject to arising and ceasing. If the self were different from the five skandhas, it would lack the characteristics of the five skandhas. If there is no self, how could there be what belongs to a self? Because internal and external self and what belongs to a self are completely eradicated and nonexistent, all appropriations are thereby eradicated; with appropriations eradicated, the body is eradicated. Because karma and afflictions are eradicated, it is named liberation. Karma and afflictions are not real; entering emptiness, conceptual proliferations are eradicated.' Explanation: The above meaning from the *Madhyamakaśāstra* properly contemplates the dharmas of the five skandhas of the body. Furthermore, the 'Tathāgata Chapter' seeks the Tathāgata with respect to the five skandhas, and can also speak with respect to the self and what belongs to a self; this is just as one contemplates the real mark of one's own body, and contemplates the Buddha likewise. If one understands that the two selves are originally empty and quiescent, one will see the dharmakāya clear, serene, and ever-abiding. The first two lines in the commentary are precisely the first two lines of the treatise, clarifying that identity with the skandhas entails no self: the skandhas are conditioned dharmas of arising and ceasing; if the self were identical with the skandhas, it would likewise arise and cease. The next two lines are the second two lines of the treatise, regarding difference from the skandhas entailing no self. While the treatise master merely says, 'it would not have the characteristics of the five skandhas', the commentary now says, 'by what characteristic could it be known?'; this is an explanation in prose. That is to say, all dharmas are known to exist by their characteristics; if there were a self apart from the skandhas, it would not take the five skandhas as its characteristics or functions—by what characteristic could the self be known to exist? Thus it is merely a delusional sentiment; this concludes the meaning of the treatise. Delusional sentiments impute existence, but the nature of a self is truly nonexistent; hence it says, 'the nature of a self has never existed'.

30.9

Regarding the commentary's phrase from 'Since there is no self' downward: using the [absence of] self to refute what belongs to it, this explains the sūtra's 'what belongs to a self is also empty and quiescent', which is precisely the treatise's 'If there is no self, how could there be what belongs to a self?'

30.10

Regarding the commentary's phrase, 'Self and what belongs to a self being empty, whence could a body exist?': using selflessness to dismiss the body, this explains the sūtra's latter half, 'How could the Tathāgatas possess a body?'; this corresponds to the passage of one and a half verses following 'internal and external self and what belongs to a self' in the treatise.

30.11

From the commentary's phrase, 'A body of no-body' downward: concluding by returning to the meaning of the commentary, the three virtues are internally perfected and the dharmakāya is one. Therefore the sūtra says: 'The Buddha takes Dharma as his body, pure like empty space.'

30.12

Regarding the Commentary's stating, "Second, revealing the virtues of liberation and prajñā": these are two of the three virtues. First, it explains the virtue of liberation. Citing the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, there are broadly two aspects: the first is an explanation found in the eighth virtue in chapter twenty-five, "Bodhisattva Noble and Virtuous King." The sūtra says: "What is the bodhisattva's mind being well-liberated? Because the mind of greed, anger, and delusion is permanently eradicated, this is called the bodhisattva's mind being well-liberated." As the Yogācārabhūmi (fascicle 85) says: "By three characteristics should one know that the mind is well-liberated: first, because one thoroughly comprehends all conditioned states; second, because one realizes the virtue of eradication with respect to the afflictions associated with them; third, because, afflictions having been eradicated, one dwells free from craving in all places." The sūtra says: "What is the bodhisattva's wisdom being well-liberated? When a bodhisattva-mahāsattva knows all phenomena without obstruction, this is called the bodhisattva's wisdom being well-liberated. Relying on the liberation of wisdom, what was previously not heard is now heard, what was previously not seen is now seen, and what was previously not reached is now reached." The explanation states: The mind being well-liberated is the destruction of the obstruction to absorption (dhyāna); wisdom being well-liberated is the liberation from the obstruction to knowledge. Once the two obstructions are eradicated, one is free, easy, and unattached; hence it is called "liberation." Later in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, it questions again to illuminate the preceding meaning: if the mind definitely possessed greed and so forth, it could not be liberated; if it definitely lacked greed and so forth, there would be no need for liberation. It intends to clarify that characteristics exist while nature is nonexistent, and that these two being unimpeded is precisely what is called liberation. Regarding "The Mahāparinirvāṇa[-sūtra] summarily has one hundred and eight phrases to reveal its depth and breadth": this refers to the fifth fascicle, which extensively explains the two virtues and elucidates the virtue of liberation. Kāśyapa asked: "World-Honoured One! What is called nirvāṇa?" "Good man! Nirvāṇa is called liberation." First its essence is revealed. Below "neither matter nor non-matter," Kāśyapa requests again, clarifying the characteristics of liberation. At that time, Bodhisattva Kāśyapa again said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One! We pray only that out of pity, you will deign again to speak extensively on the meaning of liberation in Mahāparinirvāṇa." The Buddha praised Kāśyapa: "Excellent, excellent! Good man! True liberation is called being far removed from all bondage. If in true liberation one is free from all bondages, then there is no birth and no compounding. Just as a child is born from the coming together of father and mother, true liberation is not like this; therefore, liberation is called non-arising. Kāśyapa! Just as the nature of ghee is pure, the Tathāgata is also like this; he is not born from the coming together of father and mother, and his nature is pure. The reason he manifests having parents is that he desires to transform and deliver sentient beings. True liberation is the Tathāgata; the Tathāgata and liberation are not two and not distinct. Just as when seeds are planted in springtime, receiving warmth and moisture, they immediately sprout and grow; true liberation is not like this." This is one phrase; the rest is as in that sūtra. However, according to Master [Hui]yuan: "Categorized by meaning, there are ninety-four phrases; divided into fine distinctions, there are one hundred and nine phrases. Under the twenty-second, 'freedom from oppression,' there are separately seven phrases; under the twenty-third, 'the meaning of unshakeability,' there are four phrases; under the twenty-fourth, 'the meaning of rarity,' there are two phrases; under the twenty-fifth, 'the meaning of vacuous quiescence,' there are also two phrases; under the fortieth, 'the meaning of profound depth,' there are two phrases; under the fifty-first, 'the meaning of equality,' there are also two phrases; under the sixty-seventh, 'freedom from narrowness,' there are three phrases; and the others each have one, so they are divided into one hundred and nine phrases." Now saying one hundred and eight is because under the twenty-second, "freedom from oppression," there are only six phrases; because Master Yuan saw seven similes, he divided them into seven. Yet the third phrase says: "How is there oppression and freedom from oppression? For instance, an ordinary person, haughty with self-conceit, grasps snakes, tigers, and poisonous insects—this is called oppression. Freedom from oppression is like the divine jewel of a wheel-turning king, which can tame poisonous insects—this is called freedom from oppression." All six phrases concern the meaning of freedom from oppression; only this single phrase concurrently clarifies oppression to illuminate freedom from oppression. Though appearing to be two phrases, it is actually one phrase. It signifies the eradication of the one hundred and eight afflictions, and also corresponds to the one hundred and eight questions and phrases in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra.

30.13

Regarding the Commentary's stating, "The term 'illuminated practitioner' (mingxing zhe)": this refers to the virtue of prajñā brilliantly illuminating the myriad phenomena; hence he is called an "illuminated practitioner"—that is, the Tathāgata as the person possessing the three virtues.

30.14

Regarding the Commentary's stating, "If interpreted as vidyācaraṇasaṃpanna (one endowed with knowledge and conduct)": this reinterprets the two characters "knowledge and conduct" (mingxing) as one of the ten titles [of a Buddha]. First, citing the Yogācārabhūmi, because of possessing calm abiding and insight, they are called the virtues of dhyāna and wisdom. Later in that text, there is also "extremely well perfected" to explain the meaning of "endowed/foot" (zu). Since this takes the sense of fulfillment and not the sense of feet, the Commentary does not cite it.

30.15

Regarding the Commentary's stating, "Under Mahāparinirvāṇa[-sūtra] 16": this is fascicle 18 of that sūtra. It first explains "knowledge" (ming) and then explains "conduct" (xing). In the former, it first cites the sūtra. That text has four explanations, and here it corresponds to the fourth, which explains "knowledge" in terms of cultivating practice and realizing entry—that is, the essence of realization and entry. Later, "However, they are all merely distinctions between cause and fruit, or principle and wisdom, within prajñā" is the Commentary's explanation of the sūtra. The bodhisattva's "knowledge" is the realizing wisdom in the causal stage. The Buddha's "knowledge" is the realizing wisdom in the fruition stage. Both of the above are wisdom. The "knowledge of ignorance" is the principle that is realized. Wisdom is contemplation, and principle is the true characteristic. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says, "Speaking of wisdom and the locus of wisdom, both are named prajñā"—this is precisely that meaning.

30.16

Regarding the Commentary's stating, "'Foot' (zu) has two meanings": this explains the character "conduct" (xing). Here "foot" is omitted, being subsumed under the character "conduct." However, the sūtra's four explanations do not go beyond two meanings: The first explanation states: "Knowledge" means attaining immeasurable wholesome fruits, and "conduct" means feet. Wholesome fruit means anuttarabodhi, and feet means the vehicle of precepts and wisdom. Endowed with the feet of precepts and wisdom, one attains great bodhi; hence it is called vidyācaraṇasaṃpanna. The explanation states: This traces back from the fruit to find the cause. It interprets "knowledge" as the fruit and "conduct" as the feet—conduct is itself the feet, bearing the sense of feet. Conduct and feet not being distinguished is the intention of the present sūtra. Second, the sūtra states: "Furthermore, 'knowledge' is called incantation (dhāraṇī), 'conduct' is called auspiciousness, and 'foot' is called fruit. Good man! This is the worldly meaning. Incantation is called liberation, auspiciousness is called anuttarabodhi, and fruit is called great nirvāṇa." The explanation states: This is explained solely in terms of the virtues of fruition, using the worldly to illustrate the supramundane. Here taking nirvāṇa as "foot" carries the meaning of fulfillment, and it also refers to the general and specific aspects of wisdom and eradication. Third, the sūtra states: "Furthermore, 'knowledge' is called light, 'conduct' is called karma, and 'foot' is called fruit. Good man! This is called the worldly meaning. Light is called non-heedlessness, karma is called the six pāramitās, and fruit is called anuttarabodhi." The explanation states: This explains the fruit from the cause. The interpretation holds that both knowledge and conduct are causes, with "foot" as the fruit. In the previous explanation, all three were fruits; here, bodhi alone is the fruit. What the Commentary cites at present corresponds to the fourth, citing only the explanation of knowledge. In explaining conduct and foot, that text says: "'Conduct' means cultivating wholesome karmas for the sake of sentient beings throughout immeasurable kalpas. 'Foot' means clearly seeing the Buddha-nature." The explanation states: This also explains "foot" as fulfillment, taking "foot" as fruit and "conduct" as cause, so that the meanings of conduct and foot are divided. The present sūtra lacks the word "foot"; therefore, it adopts the combined meaning of conduct and foot from the first explanation, and does not cite this passage.

30.17

Regarding the Commentary's stating, "'Innumerable' below reveals their freedom from faults": this refers to the following three lines. There are four parts within it: 1. A general explanation. 2. Below "Hetuvidyā establishes an inference (pramāṇa)", it explains the worldly meaning. 3. Below "As when speaking of the Buddha's voice", it points to an instance to clarify seeking faults. Not being able to be definitely existent entails permanence; now it is not definitely existent, unlike non-Buddhist permanence. Being created from causes and conditions entails impermanence; now it proceeds from the dharmatā, and is therefore free from creation, unlike impermanence. How could a fault be sought? 4. Below "Regarding the various hetus and pramāṇas", it takes up difficult points in turn and explains them. "Various hetus (reasons)" refers to the productive cause (janaka-hetu) and the illuminating cause (jñāpaka-hetu). "Various pramāṇas (means of valid cognition)" refers to direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and authoritative testimony (śabdapramāṇa). What is called a reason (hetu) is the semantic mark of that from which, that by which, compliant assistance, and dependency. Because of having this origin, cause, compliant assistance, and dependency, the thesis (pakṣa) and fruit are made clear; therefore, these are said to be called "reasons." That is, it must be that from which the thesis arises and that by which the thesis is established, etc. By this, it is shown that it establishes the thesis with single-minded consistency with the thesis to be established; hence it is called a reason. Furthermore, a reason has three marks (trairūpya): 1. presence in the subject of the thesis (pakṣadharmatva); 2. definite presence in similar instances (sapakṣe sattvam); 3. absolute absence in dissimilar instances (vipakṣe 'sattvam). For example, in establishing that sound is impermanent, a pot and the like are similar instances, and space and the like are dissimilar instances. It is definitely present in similar instances and completely absent in dissimilar instances. This is the reason for impermanence and the like. Both similar and dissimilar examples are called examples (dṛṣṭānta). Regarding "the three kinds of inference: for oneself, for others, and shared": in Hetuvidyā, this is explained at length in the second commentary; now it is briefly indicated. For instance, when the Sarvāstivādins establish non-manifest form (avijñapti-rūpa), they establish their own inference thus: 'Our non-manifest form is definitely real matter, because we accept the nature of matter, just like accepted visible matter and sounds.' This is an inference for oneself, meaning one establishes one's own proposition to lead another to understand. Second, an inference for others is to point out faults in the thesis or reason within another's proposition. For instance, the Mahāyāna refutes the Sarvāstivādins: 'Your non-manifest form is not definitely real matter, because you accept that it has no resistance, just like the mind and mental factors.' Third, a shared inference is pointing out inferential faults in another's proposition.

30.18

Regarding the Commentary's stating, "Because the reason (hetu) is the principal element of inference": this addresses an objection regarding the deficiency of the three members. Generally, in establishing an inference, the three members are complete; yet the illumination of the fruit is not mentioned, and hetuvidyā alone is proclaimed. The answer has two explanations: The first says: Presenting an inference to an opponent is the means of establishment, with all three members complete. All that from which the opponent generates knowledge may be called a "reason," and the generated knowledge of the opponent is called "illumination"; principle and wisdom are mentioned together, hence it is called hetuvidyā (knowledge of reasons). The second says: Regarding an inference, there is what is accepted and what is not accepted. In order to establish what is not accepted, there must be that which can establish it; thus that which can establish is the reason, and that which is to be established is the thesis. The thesis is revealed by the reason, and its meaning becomes clearly evident. This makes both cause and fruit evident, and there is no contradiction in principle. Of the above two meanings, the latter meaning is the primary one: the reason is the principal element of inference. Furthermore, when the sūtra says "worldly reasons and inferences," it can also mean that even through worldly mutual contradiction, no fault can be found.

30.19

Regarding the Commentary's stating, "Aggregates (skandhas) mean heaps," and so forth: the Abhidharmakośa's "Dhātu-nirdeśa" states: "That treatise asks: What are the distinct meanings of aggregates, bases, and constituents? The verse says: 'Heap, gate of arising, and lineage are the meanings of aggregate, base, and constituent.'" The explanation states: The first line explains the meanings, and the second line concludes them. "Heap" means accumulation, which is the meaning of aggregate (skandha). All conditioned matter—whether past, future, or present, whether internal or external, whether coarse or subtle, whether inferior or superior, whether near or far—all such [matter] is gathered together into one heap and called the form aggregate. Regarding coarse and subtle: that which is visible and resistant is coarse; the other two are subtle. Furthermore, that which is invisible and resistant is subtle compared to the former, but coarse compared to that which is invisible and non-resistant; the third is solely subtle. Defiled is called inferior, and undefiled is called superior. Present is called near, and past and future are called far. The other aggregates are patterned on this. However, the category of coarse and subtle has a difference: the four aggregates associated with the mental consciousness (manovijñāna) are subtle, while the five aggregates associated with the five sense-consciousnesses are coarse, because they rely on the five sense faculties. Alternatively, in terms of the nine realms, lower realms are coarse and upper realms are subtle. "Gate of arising" is the meaning of base (āyatana): the six faculties and six objects are the gates and loci where mind and mental factors arise and grow. "Lineage" is the meaning of constituent (dhātu). The treatise has two explanations: First, "lineage" (gotra) means stock or origin, bearing the meaning of the source of arising: the eighteen constituents serve as homogeneous causes (sabhāga-hetu), each producing equal-outflow results (niṣyanda-phala) of its own kind; therefore, they are the source of the arising of phenomena. Second, it means classification into classes: the classes and intrinsic natures of the eighteen kinds of phenomena are each distinct and diverse.

30.20

Regarding the commentary's "The Kośa says: 'Because of the three [types] of delusions, faculties, and inclinations'" onward: this half-verse is the treatise's explanation that the arising of the teachings differs. That is, delusions are threefold: first, being deluded about mental factors as self; second, being deluded about form; third, being deluded about both mind and form; these correspond in turn to the three. As for faculties being threefold, it means that for higher faculties who attain awakening upon hearing in brief, the five aggregates are taught; for middling faculties who hear moderately, the twelve sense bases are taught; and for lower faculties who comprehend only upon hearing extensively, the eighteen elements are taught. As for the three inclinations, they refer to inclining toward the brief teaching of the aggregates, inclining toward the middling teaching of the sense bases, and inclining toward the extensive teaching of the elements.

30.21

The commentary's "Because of eliminating impermanent form" is from the thirty-eighth fascicle of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra], as will be cited below. In the commentary's "Because the wondrous form of the Tathāgata is eternally secure," it merely takes this line, but the full verse is present. The verse states: / "Not transformed by the passage of seasons or kalpas, / The Great Sage practiced loving-kindness and compassion for vast kalpas, / And obtained a diamond-like indestructible body."

30.22

Regarding the commentary's "Fourth, praising the Buddha's virtue of transcending sense faculties and sense objects": that is, their nature is fundamentally empty and quiescent. The opening line of the verse asks what phenomenon is not quiescent, yet alone praises the Tathāgata; hence the commentary responds by saying: "Sense objects and cognitive awareness are both quiescent, tallying with their empty nature; therefore it is a virtue of the Buddha." For this reason, if the mind does not attend to things, the sense objects have not yet perished; if sense objects are gathered back to the mind, the mind is not yet quiescent. Now, only when the Buddha causes both quiescence and illumination to perish does he tally with empty nature. This uses the second line to complete the first line above. Next, it says: "Both faculties and dusts perish, with inner and outer liberation"; this is using the upper line to explain the lower line. Because of tallying with empty nature, the faculties and dusts perish. All phenomena known by the mind are entirely empty, and so the dusts perish; the cognizing mind is also ungraspable, and so the faculties perish. Because the inner perishes, the faculties cannot bind; because the outer perishes, how could objects pull? This is true liberation—this is the liberation from the affliction-hindrance. Next, it says: "Also constantly illuminating inner and outer, liberated from ignorance"; this is the liberation from the cognitive hindrance. The former is quiescence and the latter is illumination; quiescence and illumination are not two—this is the true Buddha mind. Next, regarding "Even emptiness is not preserved": this cites an analogy to explain the third line. If emptiness, as that which is tallied with, is not even held in mind, how could deluded thoughts of sky-flowers ever correspond to the Buddha's mind?

30.23

Section Five. Regarding the commentary's "Next are four practices of cultivating cognition to aspire upward": the commentary's explanation has two senses. The former sense takes each as an individual single practice; the latter sense takes them as universally cultivating all practices. Although the text is restricted to one, the meaning applies to both. As in cultivating for a long time: that is, long-term faith, long-term aspiration, long-term mindfulness, and long-term learning; the same applies to the lower three. If considered in terms of what is trusted, mindfulness and the others are all the Buddha's merits.

30.24

Regarding the commentary's "Like the Vimalakīrti's contemplating the Buddha as neither coming from the past, etc.": this is the "Seeing Akṣobhya Buddha" chapter. "The Buddha asked Vimalakīrti: 'When you wish to see the Tathāgata, by what means do you contemplate the Tathāgata?' Vimalakīrti said: 'Just as I contemplate the real characteristic of my own body, I contemplate the Buddha in the same way. When I contemplate the Buddha, the Tathāgata, he does not come from the past, does not go to the future, and currently does not abide. I do not contemplate form, nor the suchness of form, nor the nature of form. I do not contemplate sensation, perception, volition, or consciousness, nor their suchness, nor their nature. He does not arise from the four great elements and is identical to empty space. The six sense-entrances have no accumulation; eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, and mind have been transcended. He is not in the three realms, having parted from the three defilements and accorded with the three gates of liberation. The three knowledges are equal to ignorance. He is not a single characteristic and not different characteristics, not his own characteristic and not another's characteristic, neither without characteristics nor grasping characteristics, not on this shore, nor the other shore, nor in midstream—and yet he transforms sentient beings. He contemplates cessation yet is not permanently extinguished,'" and so forth. In that text, contemplating the real characteristic of one's own body is used to contemplate the Tathāgata; now it is merely self-contemplation, which is slightly different, yet the contemplation of reality is the same.

30.25

Regarding the commentary's "Also, the Lotus Sūtra's 'not inverted,' etc.": this refers to the second sphere of association in the "Practices for Ease and Joy" chapter. The sūtra states: "Mañjuśrī! Furthermore, a bodhisattva-mahāsattva contemplates all phenomena as empty, as they really are, not inverted, not moving, not retreating, not turning, like empty space without any inherent nature, all paths of words being cut off, not born, not emerging, not arising, without name and without characteristic, truly without anything existing, immeasurable, boundless, unhindered, and unobstructed. They exist solely through causes and conditions, born from inversion; therefore it is said they are constantly joyful. To contemplate such characteristics of phenomena is called the second sphere of association of a bodhisattva-mahāsattva." Explanation: The sūtras above both contemplate the real characteristic, which is the real characteristic of principle, stating that all are quiescent and ceased. Under the commentary's "Madhyamakaśāstra's 'Examination of Dharmas'" onward, it cites the treatise to fully explain a verse. Yet in accordance with the present sūtra, the quotation of the treatise is inverted. Now I shall first fully quote the treatise text and then explain its meaning. The treatise states: / "The Buddhas have sometimes spoken of a self, / Or sometimes spoken of no-self. / Within the real characteristic of all phenomena, / There is neither self nor non-self. / As for the real characteristic of all phenomena, / The workings of the mind and paths of speech are cut off; / Neither arising nor ceasing, / It is quiescent and ceased, like nirvāṇa. / Everything is real and unreal, / Both real and unreal, / Neither real nor unreal: / This is called the Dharma of all Buddhas. / Known by oneself, not dependent on another, / Quiescent and ceased, without prapañca, / Without distinction and without conceptual discrimination: / Such is named the real characteristic. / If a phenomenon arises from conditions, / It is neither identical with nor different from its cause; / Therefore it is named the real characteristic, / Neither interrupted nor eternal. / Neither one nor different, / Neither eternal nor interrupted: / This is called by all World-Honoured Ones / The ambrosia flavor of transforming instruction." / Explanation: There are six verses here, broadly divided into four. The first three explain the essence of the real characteristic; the next one explains cognition tallying with the real characteristic; the third has one verse explaining the reason it is named real characteristic; the fourth has one verse explaining the teaching of the real characteristic. Among the first three, the first explains the real characteristic as double negation; the next explains its profound quiescence; the last speaks of its essence being complete. Furthermore, three are horizontally broad and three are vertically deep, the first being neither deep nor broad. Also, the first speaks of the real characteristic in contrast to self; the second reveals the real characteristic in terms of nature; the third comprehensively covers nature and characteristics to clarify the real characteristic, because what is real is the nature and what is unreal is the characteristic. Thus one broadly knows the main purport. What is utilized now uses only two verses. First, it uses vertical depth to explain the first half of the sūtra verse: because the mind terminates wavering and speech abandons the four alternatives, it is said that the workings of the mind and speech are cut off. The principle is complete while words are one-sided; the principle is severed from words, so it is said that the path of speech is cut off. Because if one wishes to say it exists, it lacks shape and form; if one wishes to say it does not exist, the sages are made numinous by it; therefore when the mouth wishes to explain it, phrasing fails. The mind acts by grasping characteristics; since the real characteristic is without characteristics, the place of the mind's workings is severed—this is where, when the mind is about to take an object, contemplation ceases. Because raising the mind and stirring thoughts do not tally with the principle as such, its essence is unarisen. Since phenomena are fundamentally unarisen, how could there now be ceasing? Neither arising nor ceasing is precisely quiescence and cessation. Saying "like nirvāṇa" presents an analogy to reveal it. However, the essence of the real characteristic is itself the naturally pure nirvāṇa; but people know that nirvāṇa is quiescent, ceased, and unarisen, while not knowing that the real characteristic is quiescent and ceased; hence nirvāṇa is used as an analogy. If one comprehends that the real characteristic is precisely nirvāṇa, the characteristic of nirvāṇa is also ungraspable. Next, it uses the real characteristic of double negation to explain the lower half of the sūtra verse. Departing from self and no-self grasping: the real characteristic is devoid of a self and cannot be clung to. From "also without no-self," one also does not cling to no-self. If one clings to the principle of the two kinds of no-self, one has not escaped clinging. From "Furthermore, departing from self" onward, what precedes directly explained it in terms of the essence, while from here down it is revealed in relation to persons. Not clinging to no-self, one does not rush to realize [cessation], and hence is able to rescue with compassion. From "However, regarding self and no-self" onward, it again synthesizes and harmonizes with the four alternatives to explain these four lines. There are broadly three senses: First, revealing it in relation to persons to complete the former relation to persons. That is, holding solely to self is ordinary beings. Holding to no-self is the two vehicles. The simultaneous affirmation, contrasting the lesser with the Great Nirvāṇa, says that no-self refers to saṃsāra, while self refers to the Great Nirvāṇa. Persons of the two vehicles only see no-self and do not see the self; the double negation completely extinguishes both great and small. Second, directly in terms of Mahāyāna nature and characteristics, there are also these four: The first line is solely the one true self, towering and standing alone; the next line reveals the real in contrast to illness, with self and phenomena both empty. The line of simultaneous affirmation contemplates both true and deluded without destroying nature and characteristics. The line of double negation, because nature and characteristics are merged and identical, mutually strips away so that both perish. Third, it is taken purely in terms of contemplative illumination. The first line knows that all sentient beings falsely grasp that there is a self; the second line contemplates according with the principle, departing from the two selves; the third also simultaneously illuminates nature and characteristics; the fourth is the mutual stripping away of true and deluded. The difference from the second explanation is that here, the first line's "there is a self" is a deluded self, whereas the first "self" in the second explanation is the true self within the dharma of no-self.

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大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 — Classical Chinese