大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 39

English (machine translation) 39

Language: English

39.1

Expounded by the śramaṇa Chengguan of the Da Huayan Temple on Mount Qingliang under the Tang

Regarding "First, the contextual intent has six points": first, the correlation of stages and practices: although there were practices previously, the intent lay in the stages. Second, the correlation of general and specific: as before, in the first abode its own component merely clarified generating the aspiration toward cognitive objects, while its superior advancement merely clarified diligently making offerings to Buddhas, rejoicing in dwelling in saṃsāra, etc.; in the second abode, its own component merely clarified generating ten minds such as beneficial great compassion toward sentient beings, while its superior advancement merely clarified reciting, hearing much, dwelling in seclusion, stillness, etc.—thus the practices cultivated in the ten abodes were each different. Now, this pure practice is cultivated universally throughout the ten abodes. Third, the correlation of the religious and the lay: because the text states, "The assemblies of bodhisattvas in all worlds, relying on the Tathāgata's teaching, dye their robes and go forth into homelessness." In the reply it extensively clarifies receiving and following the precepts and so on, whereas the previous ten abodes did not distinguish between the religious and the lay. Fourth is the correlation of conforming to characteristics and conforming to reality: 'conforming to characteristics' refers to the distinct practices before; since the practices differed, they conformed to characteristics. Now, the contemplation intent here is having no grasping regarding the body, no attachment regarding practice, up to receiving signless dharmas, contemplating signless dharmas, knowing all dharmas to be the mind's own nature, and so on. Fifth is the correlation of cause and effect: because the question asks, "How does one attain purity of pure practice, and from the bodhisattva stages attain the path of anuttarabodhi?" The initial bodhisattva stages are the stages of the ten abodes. Since the explanation of the stages is complete, fearing people might seek the cause, it causes them to cultivate this—just as one first knows cessation and subsequently reveals the path. Sixth is the correlation of heading and explanation, which generally explains the former meaning: at the end of each preceding stage it says, "wishing to enable the bodhisattva to comprehend on his own the Dharma he has heard without relying on another's instruction." This was merely a general heading; thus it now explains: when corresponding with this contemplative practice, one immediately attains Buddhahood at the initial aspiration, knows all dharmas to be the mind's own nature, and accomplishes the body of wisdom without awakening through another.

39.4

Regarding the commentary's "Second, explaining the name," the text has four parts: first, directly explaining the name; second, identifying its essential nature; third, concluding and establishing its original name; and fourth, distinguishing differences in contrast to what came before. As for the first, there are three [explanations]: 1. General explanation: If translated according to this land, it should be named "pure practice" (jingxing), yet to distinguish it from what came before, the Sanskrit sound [brahmacaryā / fanxing] is retained here. 2. The true realm is brahma [purity]: this is explained in terms of the causal stage. 3. Nirvāṇa is brahma: this is explained in terms of the contrast between cause and fruit. All may be understood.

39.5

From the commentary's "With what as the essence of brahmacaryā" downward, the second part identifies its essential nature. Within this there are three parts: first, listing three categories; second, from "the five practices of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]" downward, debating similarities and differences in contrast; and third, from "However, these three" downward, separately explaining their characteristics. In the second part, what is called the "five practices" refers to the "Chapter on Noble Practices" in the eleventh fascicle of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra], namely: 1. noble practice, 2. pure practice (brahmacaryā), 3. heavenly practice, 4. infant practice, and 5. sick practice.

39.6

Regarding the commentary's "namely the four immeasurables and also the seven good knowledges": the sūtra possesses both of these, and the ancient masters also employed both in identifying the essence. Its "Chapter on Brahmacaryā" is in the fifteenth fascicle of the sūtra; the meaning of the four immeasurables will be explained directly below. As for "also the seven good knowledges," the sūtra states: "Good son! What is the pure practice (brahmacaryā) of a bodhisattva-mahāsattva? Good son! A bodhisattva-mahāsattva abides in the Great Vehicle and the great parinirvāṇa; abiding in the seven wholesome dharmas, he comes to fully possess pure practice. What are the seven? First is knowing dharmas; second is knowing meanings; third is knowing the proper time; fourth is knowing contentment; fifth is knowing oneself; sixth is knowing assemblies; seventh is knowing the superior and the inferior." That text explains them extensively; here they shall be indicated briefly. Knowing dharmas means knowing the twelve divisions of scripture. Knowing meanings means properly knowing the meanings of all letters and spoken words. Knowing the proper time means knowing that at such a time one can cultivate meditative contemplation, at such a time one can cultivate vigor, and so forth. Knowing contentment refers to food, drink, clothing, medicines, and the like. Knowing oneself means knowing "I possess such faith, precepts," and so forth. Knowing assemblies refers to kṣatriyas, brāhmaṇas, and so forth. Knowing the superior and the inferior is stated as: "Good son! There are two kinds of people: first, those who have faith; second, those who lack faith. The bodhisattva should know that those who have faith are good, while those who lack faith are not called good. Those with faith are again of two kinds: first, those who go to the monastery; second, those who do not go. Those who go are good, while those who do not go are not called good." In this manner—prostrating, listening to the Dharma, setting the mind on contemplating the meaning, practicing according to what has been taught, seeking the śrāvaka vehicle, and dedicating merit toward the Great Vehicle—progressively each follows the pattern of the first two; therefore, it concludes at the end: "Dedicating merit toward the Great Vehicle is the most supreme and most good." It does not explicitly state the names "superior" and "inferior," but the intention is: the good is superior and the ungood is inferior; thus, each subsequent one is superior to each preceding one.

39.7

From the commentary's "Brahma is precisely pure" downward, the third part concludes and establishes its original name. This employs the rhetorical momentum of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra to harmonize and integrate the divergent explanations, all serving as the comprehensive meaning. In the earlier explanation of the name there were three interpretations; here, stating that "brahma is precisely pure" is the earlier general explanation, named as a karmadhāraya compound. However, drawing below to integrate the above, nature-purity is the earlier "the true realm is brahma." Since the true realm is the cause of pure practice, one cannot speak of purity outside of practice; purity is itself practice. Furthermore, saying that "purity of practice is precisely purity of wisdom" means that purity of practice is the cause of wisdom; one cannot regard wisdom alone as practice. "Purity of wisdom is precisely purity of mind" means that one does not take the true realm alone to be purity either. "Purity of mind is precisely purity of all merits" harmonizes with the earlier Nirvāṇa [Sūtra's] regarding the fruit as pure: cultivating the cause is practice, and now the cause is also pure. "Up to attaining buddhahood, the merit reverts to practice" means that it reverts to pure practice. Since the fruit of nirvāṇa is accomplished by pure practice, how could one speak exclusively of nirvāṇa as pure? Thus it is known that practice is precisely purity. As for "by the rhetorical momentum of the Vimalakīrti," that sūtra states: "Therefore, Ratnakūṭa! In accordance with their straight mind, they are able to initiate practice... up to... in accordance with the purity of preaching the Dharma, their wisdom is pure; in accordance with the purity of wisdom, their mind is pure; in accordance with the purity of their mind, all merits are pure." This is precisely that text. Its textual momentum is already known. Why does purity of nature lead to purity of practice and so forth? It means that one initiates practice in accordance with principle; when practice is accomplished, wisdom is established. Because wisdom is established, one sees that the mind is fundamentally pure. With the mind as the master, what merit is not accomplished? Therefore, they are mutually dependent. From the commentary's "However, the preceding faith..." downward is the fourth part, distinguishing differences in contrast to what came before, which can be understood.

39.8

Regarding the commentary's "Pure practice is accomplished in dependence on heavenly practice": the text of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] does not explain heavenly practice, pointing instead to the Avataṃsaka. The ancients also had two meanings when identifying its essence: one pointed to the eight dhyānas; the second was precisely the pure heaven. The pure heaven is precisely the heaven of supreme meaning (paramārtha-deva); seeing the supreme meaning, pure practice is accomplished. Hence, pure practice is accomplished in dependence on heavenly practice.

39.9

Regarding the commentary's "Therefore one should not say that 'pure' is inferior to 'brahma'": this rejects a divergent explanation. The divergent explanation claimed that because the "Chapter on Pure Practice" (Jingxing pin) is inferior, it is named "pure practice" (jingxing), whereas the ten abodes explain "brahma" (fanxing), from which it is clearly known to be superior. Therefore it is now refuted: How can one attain the purity of brahmacaryā? Brahmacaryā is that which is purified; how could it be superior to purity itself?

39.10

Regarding the commentary's "The body includes the unwholesome": the body is formed of the five aggregates, and the aggregate of formations (saṃskāra-skandha) is subsumed under the unwholesome as well. As for "Its essence does not accord with principle," generating a mind in accord with principle is called wholesome.

39.11

Regarding the commentary's second, "Its essence is indeterminate (avyākṛta)": form is karmically retributive form, and is therefore indeterminate.

39.12

Regarding the commentary's "Fourth, its intrinsic characteristics are foul and repulsive": here the five impurities are indicated, as the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "The practitioner, relying on pure precepts, abides in one-minded practice, vigorously contemplating the five kinds of impure characteristics: 1. Impurity of seed, meaning it grasps the semen and blood of the parents and the karmic cause of consciousness seeds to form the bodily parts. 2. Impurity of dwelling place, being in the mother's womb below the stomach and above the intestines. 3. Impurity of self-nature, meaning it is formed of the thirty-six constituents. 4. Impurity of intrinsic characteristics, also called impurity of external characteristics, meaning that the nine apertures constantly flow: the eyes secrete rheum and tears, the ears secrete wax, the nose runs with mucus, the mouth secretes saliva and spittle, and the passages of feces and urine constantly discharge impurity. 5. Ultimate impurity, meaning that after the breath is cut off, it swells, rots, and decays, becoming utterly abhorrent." The commentary has already implicitly matched these.

39.13

Regarding the commentary's "Sixth, its seed, dwelling place, and so forth are all detestable": the five impurities are all detestable. Because it matches self-nature and intrinsic characteristics above and ultimate [impurity] below, it cites these two to encompass the remaining three by "and so forth." As for "all detestable," the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa concludes all five with verses. 1. The verse on seed states: / "The seed of this body is impure, / not any other wondrous jewel; / it does not arise from what is pristine and pure, / but emerges only from a foul passage." / 2. The verse on dwelling place states: / "This body is a foul stench, / not born from amidst flowers, / nor born from campaka, / nor issuing from a jewel mountain." / 3. The verse on self-nature states: / "The substance of earth, water, fire, and wind / can transform into impurity; / emptying the ocean to wash this body / cannot make it fragrant and clean." / 4. The verse on external characteristics states: / "Various impure substances / fill the interior of the body, / constantly flowing out without stopping, / like a leaking bag holding things." / 5. The verse on the ultimate states: / "Contemplating this body carefully and truly, / it will certainly return to the place of death; / unruly and without reciprocity, / turning its back on kindness like an infant." / It concludes: "When practitioners cultivate this contemplation, it succeeds in shattering the inverted notion of purity." Hence it is known that all five are detestable.

39.14

Regarding the commentary's "eighty thousand families of worms": many sūtras speak of this, and below in the "Chapter on the Ten Treasuries" there is an explicit text. The "Chapter on Contemplating Characteristics" in the Sūtra of the Ocean-like Samādhi of the Visualization of the Buddha says: "How does the bodhisattva's light of the curl of white hair between the eyebrows subdue Māra? ... Māra had three daughters who went to the bodhisattva's place and said to the bodhisattva: 'We are heavenly maidens, supremely beautiful without compare. Now with our humble bodies we offer ourselves to the prince, to serve your attendants and be ready to sweep and sprinkle.' The prince was serene, body and mind unmoved; directing the curl of white hair at them, he caused the three heavenly maidens to see within their own bodies sacks of pus, mucus, saliva, the nine apertures, tendons, and veins, all fundamental large and small intestines, the stomach and the bowels, amidst which, twisting, turning, and surging forth, there arose worms numbering fully eighty thousand families, with each family having nine hundred million tiny worms. When frolicking, they scurried into the small intestine, each having four mouths opening upward. Large worms, frolicking, entered the large intestine; emerging from the intestine, they re-entered the stomach, where there further arose four worms joined like four serpents, simultaneously gnawing and eating the various viscera from above and below, exhausting the dregs and extracting the juices, which entering the eyes became tears, entering the nose became mucus, gathering in the mouth became saliva, and issuing from the mouth became spittle. Throughout the thin skin, thick skin, tendons, marrow, and all vessels, there arose worms finer than autumn hairs, so numerous they cannot be fully recounted. Seeing this, the women immediately vomited, discharging endlessly from their mouths."

39.15

Regarding the commentary's "entirely made of worms": this is as stated in the Mahāvibhāṣā: The inside of the human body is entirely a congregation of worms; the worms' heads are on the inside eating what the person eats, and the worms' tails are on the outside braided together to form the human skin.

39.16

Regarding the commentary's "Now, the essence of this pure practice can serve as a model": it comprehensively clarifies the sense in which the ten aspects of the body above are not pure practice, matching each individually. "Its essence can serve as a model" contrasts with "non-dharma" above. "Clear and pure" contrasts with "turbid" above. The rest of the text can be understood.

39.17

Regarding the commentary's "The activity of the body is called bodily karma": the verse in the "Chapter on Karma" of the Kośa states: / "The variety of the world arises from karma, / from intention (cetanā) and what is done by intention; / intention is mental karma, / and what is done is called bodily and verbal [karma]." / This is broadly explained in the Nine Grounds. As for the commentary's "wind touching seven places" and so forth, the seventh fascicle of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: "When a person wishes to speak, there is a wind in the mouth named udāna that enters down to the navel, and a sound then emerges. When the sound emerges, it passes by and touches seven places, which is called the production of speech." As a verse says: / "The wind is named udāna; / touching the navel, it rises up; / this wind touches seven places: / the neck, gums, teeth, lips, / tongue, throat, and chest; / in these, speech is produced. / Foolish people do not understand this; / deluded and attached, they give rise to anger and ignorance." / However, both the second and third fascicles of the Laṅkāvatāra contain this text. The second fascicle states: "The Buddha told Mahāmati: 'The neck, chest, throat, nose, lips, tongue, gums, and teeth come together to produce sound.'" Explanation: Here there are eight places, adding the nose as one. When the nose is stopped, although speech is slightly obstructed, one can still speak; hence the treatise omits it. What is spoken of in the third fascicle has only seven things. The sūtra says: "What is speech? It refers to speech formed by words and conceptual discrimination, dependent on the throat, lips, tongue, teeth, gums, and cheeks; because of the habit-energy of conceptual discrimination in speaking of that and self, it is called speech." Explanation: From the previous eight, it omits the neck, chest, and nose, while adding the cheeks. "Words and conceptual discrimination" indicates the emptiness of speech. Next, the sūtra states: "Mahāmati! What is transcending all characteristics of conceptual discrimination and speech? Mahāmati! With respect to such meanings, the bodhisattva in a solitary, quiet place cultivates the wisdom of hearing, contemplation, and cultivation, takes self-realized awareness as object, and proceeds toward the city of nirvāṇa. Having transformed the body of habit-energy, he contemplates the characteristics of superior progressive meaning midway between ground and ground in his realm of self-realization; this is called the bodhisattva-mahāsattva's excellence in meaning." Explanation: This is precisely the intention of the subsequent contemplation to refute [erroneous views].

39.18

Regarding the commentary's "Fifth, the intention of the contemplation" and so forth: this mental faculty is precisely the mental organ (manendriya). Some say it is precisely the seventh consciousness, which solely takes internal gateways as object and cannot have dreams and the like. If according to the Golden Light Sūtra, the mental organ distinguishes all dharmas, thereby admitting external objects; hence Master Wonhyo of Haedong established the doctrine of external objects. Furthermore, the Ghanavyūha-sūtra states: "Like a two-headed snake, each performs its respective karma." Or it is said: it is the immediately preceding past mind (samanantara-niruddha-manas) of the sixth consciousness. Now this precisely corresponds to the method of provisional conformist doctrine, speaking in terms of other tenets.

39.19

Regarding the Commentary's statement, "Initial mental application (jue) is searching; sustained mental application (guan) is examining": The old terms were jue and guan; the new translations are xun (vitarka) and ci (vicāra). The Commentary uses the Kośa and other texts to explain the terms vitarka and vicāra in order to interpret jue and guan. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: "Vitarka means searching; it causes the mind to be hurried, having as its nature a coarse movement with regard to objects of mental speech. Vicāra means examining; it causes the mind to be hurried, having as its nature a subtle movement with regard to objects of mental speech. Both have volition (cetanā) and discernment (prajñā) as their nature." The Triṃśikā-bhāṣya says: "Both take a portion of volition and discernment as their substance, because of the distinction in meaning-types between non-deep deliberation and deep deliberation with regard to objects of mental speech. If separated from volition and discernment, a distinction in the substance-types of the two, vitarka and vicāra, cannot be found. Both have as their function being the basis for the states of bodily and mental ease and unease." Its commentary explains: "If body and mind are at ease, the two—vitarka and vicāra—have slowness and deliberation as their function; if body and mind are uneasy, they have hurriedness as their function." It also says: "Or, volition is called ease, because it is slow and subtle, and because its nature is deliberation. Discernment is called unease, because it is urgent and coarse, and because its nature is selection. Body and mind before and after having ease or unease all rely upon vitarka and vicāra; hence they are called their basis."

39.20

Regarding the Commentary's statement, "These are indeterminate dharmas": This presents their general substance and characteristics. The Triṃśikā-bhāṣya says: "'Indeterminate' refers to remorse, sleep, vitarka, and vicāra—the two sets of two—because their explained characteristics are as [stated] before."

39.21

Regarding the Commentary's statement, "Among the three kinds of conceptual discrimination, this is conceptual discrimination of intrinsic nature": This is from the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, fascicle two, which says: "There are three kinds of conceptual discrimination: conceptual discrimination of intrinsic nature, conceptual discrimination of recollection, and conceptual discrimination of calculation; various conceptual discriminations are matched with the remaining two. Conceptual discrimination of intrinsic nature refers to the conceptual discrimination that operates on the specific characteristics of the various formations currently experienced. Conceptual discrimination of recollection refers to the conceptual discrimination that operates by recalling the various formations experienced in the past. Conceptual discrimination of calculation refers to the conceptual discrimination that operates by deliberating on things not visibly present in the past, future, or present." As for the "seven kinds of conceptual discrimination," the treatise says: "Furthermore, there are seven kinds of conceptual discrimination: spontaneous conceptual discrimination regarding cognitive objects, conceptual discrimination with marks, conceptual discrimination without marks, searching conceptual discrimination, examining conceptual discrimination, defiled conceptual discrimination, and undefiled conceptual discrimination. The first conceptual discrimination refers to the five consciousness-bodies conceptually discriminating without difference in accord with the marks of their cognitive objects, because they operate spontaneously on their own domains. Conceptual discrimination with marks refers to the two kinds of conceptual discrimination—intrinsic nature and recollection—because they apprehend the various marks of past and present objects. Conceptual discrimination without marks refers to the conceptual discrimination that operates by aspiring for future objects. The remaining conceptual discriminations all take conceptual discrimination of calculation as their intrinsic nature. Why is this? Because by deliberating, they at times search, at times examine, at times are defiled, or are undefiled, conceptually discriminating in various ways." The Yogācārabhūmi says: "Searching conceptual discrimination refers to the conceptual discrimination that arises by observing and searching regarding dharmas. Examining conceptual discrimination refers to the conceptual discrimination that arises by examining and establishing what one has already searched and observed. Defiled conceptual discrimination refers to all conceptual discriminations accompanied by lingering attachment to the past, accompanied by hope and desire for the future, and accompanied by grasping in the present—whether conceptual discrimination of desire, conceptual discrimination of malice, or conceptual discrimination of harm, or conceptual discrimination arising in association with any one root affliction or secondary affliction. Undefiled conceptual discrimination refers to those that are wholesome or indeterminate, namely conceptual discrimination of renunciation, conceptual discrimination of non-malice, and conceptual discrimination of non-harm, or those arising in association with any one wholesome dharma such as faith, or all conceptual discriminations belonging to postures, crafts, or transformations." The Exegesis says: In the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, the characteristics of the latter four are implicit, so the Yogācārabhūmi is cited to explain them. Now, merely saying "conceptual discrimination" refers to the first one; "various conceptual discriminations" refers to the remaining six, which can be understood by comparing with the Commentary. Regarding the Commentary's statement, "The above six are all subsumed under the particular mental states": The particular mental states are five: first, desire (chanda); second, resolve (adhimokṣa); third, mindfulness (smṛti); fourth, concentration (samādhi); and fifth, discernment (prajñā). They will be frequently explained below.

39.22

Regarding the Commentary's statement, "Various recollections in meaning also include remorse (kaukṛtya)": This refers to the Triṃśikā verse cited above: "Indeterminate refers to remorse, sleep, vitarka, and vicāra—the two sets of two." The Exegesis says: The first two characters label the general name of this category. The treatise says: "Remorse, sleep, vitarka, and vicāra are indeterminate with regard to wholesome, defiled, and so forth; unlike contact and so forth, they do not definitely pervade all minds; unlike desire and so forth, they do not definitely pervade all bhūmis; hence the name 'indeterminate' is established." The next five characters differentiate their names. "Remorse" (hui) means kaukṛtya (bad action), because one regrets what was done; taking regret as its nature, its function is obstructing tranquility (śamatha). This is fictively establishing the name of the cause upon the fruit, because one first hates what was done, and only afterwards regrets it. Regretting what was previously done is also subsumed under kaukṛtya. For example, when one regrets, saying: "I previously did not do such a deed," this is called kaukṛtya. The Exegesis says: This has two meanings: first, regretting previously committing evil; second, regretting previously not doing good. Since it regrets good and evil, it is subsumed under "various recollections." The three characters "the two sets of two" (er ge er) explain the meaning of indeterminacy. The prose below explains: "Saying 'two' indicates two kinds of pairs: first, remorse and sleep; second, vitarka and vicāra. The classes of these two pairs are distinct, so the single word 'two' indicates the two pairs." Regarding "Sleep is indeterminate": This refers to the prose of the above treatise: "Sleep (middha) causes the body to be unfree, having dullness and contraction as its nature, and having obstructing contemplation (vipaśyanā) as its function. In the state of sleep, the body is unfree, the mind is extremely dark and weak, operating through only one gateway. 'Dullness' excludes being in meditative concentration; 'contraction' differentiates it from the waking state. Now to show that sleep is not without substance and function: in the mindless state, this name is fictively established. Like other hindrances and entanglements, it is associated with the mind." The Exegesis says: The text from "In the state of sleep..." downward explains the previous words "causes the body to be unfree," meaning it causes the body to be unfree because one sleeps even while sitting, and does not perceive when shaken by another. This causes the mind to be extremely dark and dull, taking slightness and contraction as its nature, incapable of being sharp, deep, and deliberate.

39.23

When the Commentary says, "The mental consciousness also operates," this corresponds to the treatise's "operating through only one gateway," showing that the five consciousnesses do not operate. A concentrated mind focused on one object is contracted but not dull; hence it says, "'Dullness' excludes being in meditative concentration." The waking state broadly cognizes objects and cannot be called contracted; hence it says, "'contraction' differentiates it from the waking state." Therefore, sleep is of two kinds, showing that it has a distinct substance and necessarily relies on the mind. Among the five mindless states, the first, deep sleep, is fictively designated as sleep; it is not real sleep, because sleep must be associated with the mind, like other hindrances and so forth. Saying "light sleep has dreams" excludes deep sleep, and is able to show that this sleep is subsumed under the indeterminate, because it is open to both wholesome and unwholesome, since dreams have good and evil.

39.24

Regarding the Commentary's statement, "These ten are mental factors (caitta)..." and so forth: Having explained mind (manas), mind is the primary mind (citta-rāja), yet factors are spoken of because factors are not separate from the primary mind. Furthermore, among the five aggregates, form and sound are excluded, because they are subsumed under mental karma.

39.25

Regarding the Commentary's statement, "Interrogating in terms of the five omnipresent mental factors": The fifth fascicle of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: "Namely, contact (sparśa), attention (manaskāra), feeling (vedanā), perception (saṃjñā), and volition (cetanā), because they are definitely obtainable in all minds, are called omnipresent. Furthermore, they possess the four kinds of omnipresence: first, pervading all three moral natures; second, pervading the nine bhūmis; third, pervading all times when mind is present; and fourth, pervading all positions. They are mental factors that accompany any position. Because the conjunction of contact is preeminent, the treatise lists it first." The Yogācārabhūmi and other texts put attention first. Attention has alerting the mind as its nature, and directing the mind toward a cognitive object as its function. This means alerting the seeds of mind that should arise and directing them toward an object; hence it is called attention. Although this can also induce mental factors, because the mind is the master, it merely speaks of directing the mind. "Attention" (zuoyi) means the action that is mind itself—a karmadhāraya compound; or, acting upon the concurrent mind, proximity being preeminent. What is contact? Contact means the alteration of the harmonious union of the three, taking causing the mind and mental factors to touch an object as its nature, and serving as the basis for feeling, perception, volition, and so forth as its function. That is, sense-faculty, object, and consciousness—these three—mutually accord; hence they are called the harmonious union of the three. Contact arises in reliance on them and causes them to unite harmoniously, so it is designated by their name. At the stage where the three unite harmoniously, they all have the capacity to accord with the arising of mental factors, which is called alteration. Contact arises resembling them; hence it is called discerning. When the power of the faculty's alteration induces contact to arise, it cognizes the object of that consciousness; hence the Samuccaya and other texts merely speak of discerning the alteration of the faculty, uniting all minds and mental factors to cause them together to touch the object—this is the nature of contact. Since it resembles the capacity to accord with the arising of mental factors, it takes serving as the basis for feeling and so forth as its function. What is feeling? Feeling takes experiencing agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral marks of objects as its nature, and giving rise to craving as its function, because it can produce desires for union, separation, or neither. What is perception? Perception takes grasping images of objects as its nature, and formulating various names and words as its function. That is, one must establish the delimitations and marks of an object before one can accordingly produce various names and words. What is volition? Volition takes causing the mind to be active as its nature, and directing the mind toward wholesome dharmas and so forth as its function. That is, it is able to grasp marks such as the correct causes of objects, driving one's own mind to produce good and so forth. These latter four have no sixfold compound analysis. The Exegesis says: Because their names are mostly identical to the omnipresent mental factors, attention and observation pervade the ten passages; conforming to the treatise, it is explained first.

39.26

Regarding the Commentary's statement, "The above four sections are also each an aggregate": These are the aforementioned five omnipresent factors. In terms of the sūtra: volition is the aggregate of formations; perception is the aggregate of perception; cold, heat, hunger, and thirst are the eleven kinds of tactile sensations belonging to the aggregate of form; suffering and so forth are the aggregate of feeling; attention is also formations. However, contact pertains to both body and mind. Above, cold and so forth must be accompanied by the mind, so they belong to the omnipresent factors. Here, it refers to bodily contact, so it belongs to form. If so, bodily contact is in the ground of the five consciousnesses; why is it now in the mind? Answer: There are three reasons. First, by virtue of association: the mental consciousness shares cognitive objects with the five [consciousnesses]. Second, by virtue of the mental consciousness's powerful function, having cognitive objects corresponding to them. Third, because the mental consciousness experiences pleasant contact in realms of extreme bliss, and experiences mental distress in destinies of extreme suffering. Cold and heat above should be understood accordingly. Among the three reasons above, the first two pertain to contact, while the latter also clarifies feeling. Cold is the tactile sensation of coolness. Heat is the fire element, which can produce tactile sensations. The Kośa also states that these four tactile sensations are also mental factors. That treatise says: "Desire for food is called hunger; desire for warmth is called cold; desire for drink is called thirst." Its commentary explains: "The three—cold, hunger, and thirst—are the fruits of contact, not tactile sensations themselves. Now they are called contact by taking their name from the fruit. Thus the treatise says: 'These all establish the designation of the fruit from the cause.'" The Exegesis says: Regarding "desire for warmth is called cold," heat is calibrated against cold; cold and heat are opposites, and by meaning there is also desire, so these four are all mental karma.

39.27

Regarding the commentary's statement, "The last four are feeling": that is, suffering, pleasure, grief, and joy. However, when the sacred teachings explain feeling, their categorisations into divisions and combinations differ. Sometimes it is termed feeling generally, which is the omnipresent mental factor. Sometimes it is divided into three, namely suffering, pleasure, and equanimity. The *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra* states: "Experiencing pleasant phenomenal marks that gratify body and mind is called pleasant feeling. Experiencing unpleasant phenomenal marks that torment body and mind is called unpleasant feeling. Experiencing neutral phenomenal marks that neither torment nor gratify body or mind is called neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling." Sometimes it is divided into five, namely suffering, pleasure, grief, joy, and equanimity. The *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra* states: "All gratifying feelings associated with the five consciousnesses are only called pleasure. Those associated with the mental consciousness, if in the desire realm or the preliminary stage of the first two dhyānas, are called joy because they only gratify the mind. If in the fundamental stages of the first two dhyānas, they are called joy because they gratify both body and mind. If in the preliminary or fundamental stages of the third dhyāna, they are called pleasure because of their exceptional tranquility and absence of conceptual discrimination. All tormenting feelings associated with the five consciousnesses are only called suffering. For those concomitant with mental consciousness, one position holds that they are only grief, because they torment the mind. Another position holds that they encompass both: among humans and gods, they are only called grief, because they are not exceptionally severe; in the realms of animals and ghosts, they are called both grief and suffering, because mixed and pure feelings have degrees of lightness and severity; in the Naraka hells, they are solely called suffering, because pure feeling is exceptionally severe and devoid of conceptual discrimination." The reason why, within the three, suffering and pleasure are each divided into two is that the treatise states: "Because the characteristics of gratifying body and mind are each distinct, because they are differentiated by absence and presence of conceptual discrimination, and because there are differences of exceptional severity and slightness." The reason why the fourth, neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant, is not divided into two is that the treatise states: "Because it is neither tormenting nor gratifying, and its characteristic has no distinction."

39.28

Regarding the commentary's text from "Here volition and so forth" downwards: this is a question-and-answer clarifying potential confusion. First is the question, because formerly in the mind there was investigation, examination, and contemplation, and here there is also conceptualisation, volition, and so on. From "However, volition and so forth" downwards is the answer. The meaning of the answer is: volition and the like have two aspects. First, in terms of essence, they support the primary mind and together serve as instruments of action; second, in terms of function, they are associated with the primary mind and together perform karma. Regarding the statement "Therefore it is mostly distinguished on the basis of experienced objects": this explains the reason why this constitutes karma. That is to say, among the ten phrases of karma, conceptualisation is grasping the object, cold and so forth are touching the object, and suffering and so forth are feeling the object; all are discussed in terms of the object. Thus volition here is deliberate reflection and decision. Although previously there was investigation, examination, and contemplation, they mostly spoke directly of the mind; therefore, among the ten of mental action, volition is the mental action capable of producing karma, and conceptualisation is the preliminary application of the mind, causing the mind to become the root of karma. The next four factors of contact unite the sense faculties and objects with consciousness, being induced by karma; and the last four factors of feeling are also induced by karma. Therefore, all these above are retinues of karma. The *Cheng weishi lun* says, "The retinues of karma are also established under the name of karma," which is precisely this meaning. If one wishes to refute them, it can be understood from this.

39.29

Regarding the commentary's "Seventh, contemplating the Buddha": the phrase "the uncontaminated moral discipline and so forth" takes by "and so forth" concentration, wisdom, liberation, and the knowledge and vision of liberation. These receive their names from what has already been transformed, as detailed in the "Chapter on the Ten Treasuries". The phrase "as well as the retinue of uncontaminated five aggregates" refers to form, feeling, and so forth. Although the aforementioned uncontaminated moral discipline is formed from the transformation of the five, each takes one as its primary factor; thus it now designates the mind and mental factors simultaneous with concentration, wisdom, and so forth as the retinue five aggregates.

39.30

Regarding the commentary's "By means of three asaṃkhyeya kalpas" and so on: through three asaṃkhyeya kalpas of cultivation one accomplishes the dharmakāya, and through a hundred kalpas one cultivates the thirty-two marks and eighty minor signs. The subsequent magical manifestation through supernatural powers is the transformation body (nirmāṇakāya), whose meaning also encompasses transformations into myriad kinds of beings. If according to the Mahāyāna, only two bodies are taught, because the dharmakāya is precisely that which is revealed through cross-examination and refutation.

39.31

Regarding the commentary's "Now investigating and examining them one by one": the commentary's text has four parts: first, the refutation proper; second, citing scriptural proof; third, warding off objections; fourth, concluding summary. Now, in the first: it refutes first by way of the approach of identity and difference, and then, from "conjunction of causes..." downwards, it refutes by way of the approach of causes and conditions. In the second part, from "Therefore the Madhyamakaśāstra" downwards, it cites proof, completely proving two points: first, it proves identity and difference, which was already explained in the first assembly. Now that it is present in the commentary text, it should be briefly re-explained. The statement "is not the aggregates" means that the aggregates themselves are not the Tathāgata, because the aggregates arise and cease. "Not apart from the aggregates" means that apart from the aggregates there is also no Tathāgata, because there would be no marks to know. "These do not reside in one another" means, third, the Tathāgata does not reside in the aggregates, and fourth, the aggregates do not reside in the Tathāgata; both of these are due to non-difference. Fifth, the aggregates belong to the Tathāgata, meaning the aggregates are like servants. Stating "The Tathāgata does not possess the aggregates; where is there a Tathāgata?" concludes the refutation.

39.32

Regarding the commentary's text from "When the aggregates combine" downwards: this proves the approach of causes and conditions above. That is, if it only arises through the combination of conditions, then it has no intrinsic nature. Regarding the commentary's "Seeking forward and backward": seeking separately apart from the aggregates is going backward; seeking within the combination of the aggregates is going forward. Neither is tenable; hence one knows that their essence is quiescent.

39.33

Regarding the commentary's "It is not even existent": this is the third part, warding off objections. The objection states: If so, there should be no Tathāgata, which then falls into nihilism. Hence it now wards this off, stating: False views are of two kinds: asserting existence is shallow, asserting non-existence is deep. In refuting your shallow error, why must you plunge into a deep chasm? These are all passages from the *Madhyamakaśāstra*, cited as above.

39.34

Regarding the commentary's text from "Thus we know that the true Buddha" downwards: this is the fourth part, the concluding summary; the dharmakāya is revealed.

39.35

In the commentary's "Eighth, contemplating the Dharma", there are three parts: first, a general explanation of the intent; second, from "However, dharma has..." downwards, the explanation of the text. The phrase "meaning unwholesome states do not arise" means that, in terms of principle, dharmas originally do not arise, and in terms of practice, there are no unwholesome states that can arise. The *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra* states, "Unwholesome states do not arise, and wholesome dharmas do not cease." The rest of the meaning can be known. From "These six..." downwards is in terms of the fruit. Third, from "Now investigating..." downwards, it subsequently explains the characteristics of contemplation, which also refutes through the approaches of identity and difference, and causes and conditions. From "If by non-combination..." downwards, it wards off an attempt at salvage. The salvage attempt states: Precisely this non-combination is the true Dharma! Hence it now answers: How could it be existent? Subsequently, from "Furthermore, this raising of..." downwards, it clarifies the intention based on the text.

39.36

Regarding the commentary's "Ninth, contemplating the Saṅgha": "provisionally relying on the Hīnayāna explanation" is because the Mahāyāna also possesses the four fruits. Regarding "the term stream-enterer (srotāpanna)": the *Kośa* states, "All uncontaminated paths are collectively named 'the stream'; entering this stream for the first time is therefore named stream-entry. This means having exhausted the defilements abandoned by the path of seeing, being complete in patience and cognition. Second, once-returner: the nine grades of defilements of the desire realm can moisten seven rebirths; having already severed six of them, it will be known below." Regarding the commentary's "Meaning severing the view-defilements of the three realms": unlike the defilements of cultivation which are divided across the three realms, these are severed all at once. Regarding "the sixteen minds": these are the patience regarding the dharma of suffering, cognition of the dharma of suffering, patience regarding the subsequent dharma of suffering, cognition of the subsequent dharma of suffering; patience regarding the dharma of origin, cognition of the dharma of origin, patience regarding the subsequent dharma of origin, cognition of the subsequent dharma of origin; patience regarding the dharma of cessation, cognition of the dharma of cessation, patience regarding the subsequent dharma of cessation, cognition of the subsequent dharma of cessation; patience regarding the dharma of the path, cognition of the dharma of the path, patience regarding the subsequent dharma of the path, and cognition of the subsequent dharma of the path—these constitute the sixteen minds. That is, contemplating the suffering of the desire realm involves patience regarding the dharma of suffering and cognition of the dharma of suffering; contemplating the upper two realms is called patience regarding the subsequent dharma of suffering and cognition of the subsequent dharma of suffering. The other three [truths] are also like this; hence there are sixteen. When speaking of the path of seeing, it sees what has never been seen before; within patience regarding the subsequent dharma of the path, one has already seen the upper suffering, so the sixteenth is not called the path of seeing, but immediately enters the path of cultivation. A detailed explanation of its characteristics is found in the "Chapter on Pariṇāmanā". Regarding the commentary's "The defilements of cultivation in the desire realm are divided into nine grades": this is also text from the *Kośa*, combining verse passages from two places. One states that establishing the noble beings on the basis of the stage of fifteen minds: possessing the defilements of cultivation, severing one through five is approaching the first fruit. Severing the next three is approaching the second. Severing eight grounds is approaching the third. Next, the treatise states: "Next, regarding the distinctions in establishing the noble beings at the time of the subsequent cognition of the path of cultivation, the verse states: 'Reaching the sixteenth mind, according to the three approaches, one abides in the fruit.'" The above are all from fascicle 23 of the treatise. Following this, fascicle 24 of the treatise states: "Having already explained abiding in the fruit without yet having severed the defilements of cultivation, called a stream-enterer, who takes at most seven returns; now next we should explain the noble beings in the stages of severance, and first we should establish the approach and fruit of the once-returner. The verse states: 'Severing three or four grades of desire, taking three or two births, [one is called] from clan to clan (kulaṃkula); severing up to five is approaching the second; severing six is the fruit of the once-returner.'" Explanation: The first two lines clarify the kulaṃkula. That is, when a stream-enterer advances to sever the defilements of cultivation, if three conditions are complete, their designation changes to kulaṃkula: first, by severing three or four grades of the defilements of cultivation of desire; second, by achieving uncontaminated faculties; third, by undergoing further two or three rebirths. The verse briefly omits the words 'achieving faculties', but because in principle they must be present, they are omitted and not stated. If one severs three grades, it is called taking three rebirths; if one severs four grades, it is called taking two rebirths. That is, the nine grades of defilements can moisten seven births: the highest-high grade defilement can moisten two births; the highest-middle, highest-low, and middle-high each moisten one birth; the middle-middle and middle-low together moisten one birth; and the lower three grades of defilements together moisten one birth. Since the upper three grades can moisten four births, severing the upper three reduces four births, which is called taking three births. Further severing the single grade of middle-high reduces one more birth; thus severing four grades reduces five births in total, taking only two births; hence it says 'three or two births, kulaṃkula'. The reason why there is no kulaṃkula through severing one or two grades of defilements is that, upon attaining the first fruit, one initiates great preliminary exertion; there is definitely no case where one severs one or two without severing the third and undergoes death and rebirth. Nor is there a kulaṃkula of five rebirths, because upon severing five, one definitely severs the sixth and immediately realizes the once-returner; there is no single grade of defilement that can obstruct the fruit. If there is no single grade capable of obstructing the fruit, why is it that after severing eight grades without having severed the ninth, there is death and rebirth? Answer: regarding the single ninth grade: first, once severed, one attains the fruit; second, one furthermore transcends the desire realm; therefore, this ninth can obstruct the fruit. The sixth does not transcend the realm, so it does not obstruct the fruit. Regarding the term 'from clan to clan' (kulaṃkula): it is because the clans are not one. There are two kinds of kulaṃkula: first, heavenly kulaṃkula, undergoing two or three births among desire-realm devas; second, human kulaṃkula, undergoing two or three births among humans, and subsequently realizing complete quiescence (parinirvāṇa). The first half has been explained; the second half clarifies its approaching the fruit. Since severing six grades attains the once-returner, severing the lower five is called advancing toward the second fruit. The treatise next names the non-returner, stating: "Severing seven or eight grades, with one birth remaining, it is called one interval (ekavīcika); this is the approach to the third; severing nine is the non-returner fruit." Explanation: having three conditions complete is called 'one interval'. The above two lines are two conditions; there is furthermore a third, attaining uncontaminated faculties as the antidote, which is not stated because it is obvious. Similar to the previous kulaṃkula, because the lower three grades together moisten one birth, when severing seven or eight, the ninth remains, and there is also one birth that acts as an interval; hence it is called 'one interval'. Having one grade of defilement remaining, one does not realize non-returning. Having one birth remaining, one does not realize complete quiescence; both are called 'one interval'. This very 'one interval' is the approach to the non-returner. When all nine grades are severed, one never returns again to be born in the desire realm, achieving the fruit of the non-returner. The approach and fruit of the arhat can be known from the text.

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大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 — Classical Chinese