大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 45.21.2

45.21.2

In the commentary, [he] immediately points out the fault and refutes [it]. Because "neither existence" negates existence, it does not escape non-existence; because "nor non-existence" negates non-existence, how could it be free from existence? Therefore it reverts to becoming both existence and non-existence, and there is no meaning of the fourth [position] merely negating [them], because all [these views] grasp at what is not the Middle Way. From "How in this..." onwards, [he] concludes by censuring erroneous views. Regarding the commentary's "Second, the four propositions of permanence and so forth": compared to the refutation of the finite and so forth above, where [he] first stated the four propositions and only afterwards refuted them individually, here with the proposition of permanence, it is established and immediately refuted. In the first proposition, permanence, it is first established. Now, the previous questioning verse stated: "Did I in past eras / exist, or was I non-existent?" That is, it asks: did the present self of now already exist previously in the past? Now the first proposition says it did exist; therefore, the self of past eras is this present self. The treatise, first refuting the proposition of permanence, states: "That there was a self in past eras / is untenable. / The self in past eras / does not become the self of the present era." Regarding the commentary's "If one says it is permanent, there is a great fault..." and so forth: this points out the fault and refutes [it]. That is, the prose text of that [treatise] states: "The self in the previous era does not become the present self, because of the fault of permanence. If it were permanent, there would be limitless faults. Why? Just as a person, by causal conditions of cultivating merit, becomes a deva, and afterwards becomes a human: if the self of the previous era were identical with the present self, then a deva would be a human. By causal conditions of sinful karma one becomes a caṇḍāla, and afterwards becomes a brāhmaṇa: if the self of the previous era were identical with the present self, a caṇḍāla would be a brāhmaṇa," and so forth. Regarding the commentary's "If one claims that I now...": this is the second proposition; it is likewise first established, and then refuted from "If so..." onwards. There are two kinds of refutations: first, refutation by causes and conditions, [since] what is made by conditions is impermanent, while you posit a permanent self; second, because it falls into [the fault of having] no cause. Therefore the treatise states: "If the past self did not do [this], that is incorrect; / that the self in past eras is different from the present is also incorrect. / If one claims there is a difference, / apart from that [past self] there should be a present [self]. / My abiding in the past era / while the present self arises of itself— / if so, there would be annihilation, / and loss of karmic retribution; / that one would act and this one receive [it]— / there are faults such as these. / That it was previously non-existent and now exists / also contains a fault here: / the self would then be a fabricated dharma, / and it would also be uncaused." Explanation: Here, the first two lines reiterate the claim and refute it generally; the next two lines state the fault of being different; the next two verses contrast the two eras to explain the fault of difference; the final verse takes up the future alone to reveal its fault: the upper two lines indicate it, the lower two lines make it clear; the third line [shows that] because it begins to exist only now, it becomes a fabricated dharma and thus falls into impermanence; the next line points to its agreement with the preceding refutation, saying "it would also be [uncaused]". The previous loss of karmic result was precisely [falling into] being uncaused; if the present self arises of itself, how could that not be uncaused? Regarding the commentary's "Third, seeing the above...": this means that seeing the faults of the previous two, one immediately posits both. It is refuted from "apart from the body" onwards: this is the approach of identity and difference in the previously cited verse. Second, regarding "It also incurs the above two faults": also permanent is the same as the first proposition, and also impermanent is the same as the second. The fourth proposition merely inverts and applies the previous propositions to establish and refute, and thus reverts to being the same as the third. The verse of the treatise merely states: "As in past eras, / views of having a self and not having a self, / whether combined or not combined— / none of these meanings is correct." Regarding the commentary's "Furthermore, the Madhyamakaśāstra states...": this is the verse at the end of the chapter, which sums up the above faults and reveals them to be empty by nature. The final verse further states: "Gautama, the Great Holy Lord, / out of pity for sentient beings, / completely severed all views; / I now bow my head in reverence to him." This concludes the entire chapter. Regarding the commentary's "Third, after the Tathāgata's parinirvāṇa...": earlier, in explaining what the views rely upon, following its latter meaning, it was said to arise relying upon nirvāṇa; whereas its former meaning generally arises relying upon the aggregates of the self in the three times, conforming to the Jin translation of the sūtra. Regarding the commentary's "If according to the Madhyamakaśāstra...": in the second meaning, there are two [parts]: first, determining the basis of the views and the distinction regarding the Tathāgata, because non-Buddhists themselves claim that Ṛṣabha and others are World-Honoured Ones and Tathāgatas. Therefore in the Śataśāstra, in the preface [extolling] virtues in comparison, it is stated that Ulūka and others are also World-Honoured Ones. Regarding the commentary's "Some claim that after the Tathāgata's parinirvāṇa, he definitely exists unchangingly": this distinguishes and shows the four propositions. The initial demonstration can be understood; later, from "Because all four propositions become prapañca...", it explains the meaning of refuting the undeclared (avyākṛta). Above, relying upon the verses of the "Nirvāṇa Chapter" of the Madhyamakaśāstra, it states: "After the Tathāgata has passed into extinction, / one does not say he exists or does not exist, / nor does one say he both exists and does not exist, / nor neither exists nor does not exist." And it further states: "Between nirvāṇa and the mundane world / there is not the slightest difference; / between the mundane world and nirvāṇa / there is also not the slightest difference. / The bhūtakoṭi of nirvāṇa / and the limit of the mundane world: / between these two limits / there is not a hair's breadth of difference." Explanation: The first single verse is spoken relying upon the two truths; the latter two verses rely solely upon the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), identical to the Yogācārabhūmi. Regarding the commentary's "Yogācārabhūmi fascicle eighty-seven...": this corroborates and establishes the above meaning, revealing that the first verse of the Madhyamakaśāstra applies equally to both truths. In terms of the conventional truth, it only explains two propositions, the word "and so forth" being equivalent to the third and fourth. In terms of nirvāṇa, it only explains the first two propositions. From "Furthermore, because this nirvāṇa is extremely difficult to know...", the three meanings generally reveal freedom from the four propositions and severance of the hundred negations. The final verse of the Madhyamakaśāstra states: "All dharmas are empty: / how could there be the finite or the infinite, / both finite and infinite, / neither finite nor infinite? / What is identical or different? / How could there be permanent or impermanent, / both permanent and impermanent, / neither permanent nor impermanent? / All dharmas are unobtainable; / all prapañca is extinguished; / there is no person and no self; / the Buddha also taught nothing." Explanation: This verse may conclude the section on the undeclared (avyākṛta); it is cited here because the text is continuous. In the commentary's "Fourth, the four propositions of the existence, non-existence, and so forth of the self and sentient beings", regarding the phrase "positing both": this posits both self and dharmas, since sentient beings are the aggregates, and the aggregates are dharmas; hence the commentary directly explains existence and non-existence in terms of the principle of dharmas arising through conditions. However, regarding these four propositions, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, the Abhidharmakośa, and so forth posit two propositions for this position. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and others say that the body and the soul (jīva) being one and being different constitute two propositions; the Abhidharmakośa says that the life-principle and the body being identical and distinct constitute two propositions. The first proposition, saying both exist, means that there is an attachment claiming: wherever there is a body, there is a soul-self; wherever there is a soul-self, there must be a body, because the body and the soul are not separated from each other. Explanation: This is the single proposition of the body and the soul; hence the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: "Regarding 'the soul is identical with the body,' some say: the body is identical with the soul. Why? Analyzing this body, in seeking the soul it cannot be found; because what is received, whether coarse or subtle, is all body, therefore it is said that the body is identical with the soul."