大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 56.28

56.28

Regarding the commentary's "Stating 'equal'", this takes up the sūtra text to explain it. This is the first: "Equaling the two limits is the characteristic of contemplative cognition," which is the sūtra's "abiding equally in nirvāṇa." From "Referring to the world and nirvāṇa" onward is all the text of the treatise. From "Taking the nature of the world" onward, the commentary explains the meaning of equality. However, the treatise states "equally gathering and grasping," which explains equality in terms of persons. It is not that, like the śrāvakas, one does not attain equality; attaining and not attaining are both spoken of in terms of persons. Yet the commentary explains it in terms of nature because, since the two vehicles do not understand that the nature is equal, they turn their backs on saṃsāra and turn toward nirvāṇa; whereas the bodhisattva understands that the nature is originally equal, that saṃsāra is identical with nirvāṇa, and therefore does not abandon saṃsāra to grasp nirvāṇa. Neither separating nor remaining, receiving dharmas into the mind—hence it is called "equally gathering and grasping." Regarding the commentary's "Madhyamaka says" and so forth: it cites proof to explain and establish it. That is, the verse in the "Chapter on Nirvāṇa" says: / "Between nirvāṇa and the world / There is not the slightest differentiation; / Between the world and nirvāṇa / There is also not the slightest differentiation. / The bhūtakoṭi of nirvāṇa / And the limit of the world— / Between such two limits / There is not a hair's breadth of difference." / Here, merely citing three lines according to their meaning, the intent is already complete. If explained more extensively, there should be four propositions: First, because it is entirely nirvāṇa, there is not a hair's breadth of difference. This is because the true nature of the world is said to be nirvāṇa, and the characteristic of nirvāṇa is said to be the world. Subsuming characteristics with nature, there is no characteristic that is not nature; therefore, it is solely nirvāṇa, and there is also no difference. Second, because it is entirely the world, there is not a hair's breadth of difference, because subsuming nature with characteristics, there is no nature that is not characteristic. Third, between the nirvāṇa that is entirely the world and the world that is entirely nirvāṇa, there is not a hair's breadth of difference. This is because, although they mutually subsume, they do not destroy the two characteristics. Fourth, the nirvāṇa that is entirely the world is not nirvāṇa, and the world that is entirely nirvāṇa is not the world; between non-world and non-nirvāṇa, there is not a hair's breadth of difference, because nature and characteristics mutually displace each other, and difference cannot be found. Although there are four propositions of meaning, the dharma is only one single matter, namely non-matter; hence it is not four. Therefore, if grasped in accordance with sentiment, all four propositions are wrong; if spoken in accordance with the Dharma, all four propositions are right. This prajñā cognition can externally illuminate all dharmas as completely empty, and the essence of inner illumination is vast and immediately empty, because it is transcendent of the four propositions. In the midst of the fourfold transcendence, the spiritual illumination that is identical with emptiness shines clearly upon the markless, open source—this is the dharma of prajñā. This is the center that is non-center. Because of the principle that does not obstruct phenomena, the entirety of nirvāṇa enters saṃsāra, and the entirety of saṃsāra enters nirvāṇa. Because of phenomena that do not obstruct the principle, differentiations remain distinct. Because both are unobstructed, entering and not entering are both established. Because the two are unobstructed and yet non-dual, entering is immediately not entering, and not entering is immediately entering; only this is ultimate equality.