大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 57.8

57.8

The commentary states: "The treatise says: 'As the sūtra states...'" and so on: fourth, explaining the treatise's citation of scriptural proof. Within this there are two parts: first, stating the treatise; second, from "Because it is of definitive meaning" downward, the commentary's explanation. Within this there are also two parts: this sentence brings out the intention that, because it is of definitive meaning, the sūtra definitively speaks of it. The commentary states: "The Nirvāṇa Sūtra..." and so on, citing the sūtra text; within this there are also two parts: first, directly citing it; second, resolving an objection. First, this is the thirty-fifth chapter, "Kauṇḍinya," in the Southern edition of the sūtra: "At that time the World-Honoured One said to Kauṇḍinya: 'Form is impermanent. Through the cessation of this form, one attains the permanent form of liberation. Sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness are also impermanent. Through the cessation of this consciousness, one attains the permanent consciousness of liberation.'" That sūtra subsequently states: "Suffering, emptiness, and impurity are also like this; therefore it is said that the Tathāgata's five aggregates are permanence, bliss, self, and purity." As for "its texts are more than one," this refers to the second fascicle of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, which, in setting forth the doctrine and revealing the virtues, immediately speaks of permanence, as has already been extensively distinguished in the profound discussion. Throughout this sūtra, above and below, its texts are more than one.
The commentary states: "Question: The locus is fundamentally present..." and so on: secondly, resolving an objection. First asking, and later, from "If according to Consciousness-Only..." downward, explaining. Within this there are also two parts: first, according to the Dharmalakṣaṇa school. Saying "it is not permanent in self-nature": the self-nature is permanently immutable, which refers to the dharmakāya. The saṃbhogakāya is called permanent in continuity; that is, the dependent [cognition] is also spoken of as permanent. Third, the nirmāṇakāya is called permanent in non-interruption, because its functioning in response is uninterrupted. The commentary states: "If according to the Awakening of Faith..." and so on: secondly, according to the Dharmatā school. First citing the treatise, meaning that original enlightenment is the dharmakāya, and initial enlightenment is the saṃbhogakāya. Since it says that initial enlightenment is identical to original enlightenment, there are no longer separate names of initial and original; in ultimate enlightenment, the two permanences are without distinction. Master [Dao]sheng also said: "The true principle is spontaneous; awakening also tallys with it obscurely. Since truth is without difference, how could awakening be mutable? The immutable essence is serene, ever illuminating," and so forth, all as stated earlier.
The Śrīmālādevī Sūtra says: "All dharmas are permanently abiding. If speaking separately of the three bodies: 'The Tathāgata's wondrous form-body is without equal in the world, incomparable and inconceivable; therefore I now pay homage'—this speaks of the nirmāṇakāya. 'The Tathāgata's form is inexhaustible, and his wisdom is likewise'—this praises the saṃbhogakāya. 'All dharmas are permanently abiding'—this praises the dharmakāya. 'Therefore I take refuge'—this generally praises the three bodies." Since it says that all dharmas are permanently abiding, how could the upper two bodies not be permanently abiding? This is also like the Lotus Sūtra's "The characteristics of the world are permanently abiding." If even the world is permanently abiding, how could the three bodies be impermanent?
The commentary states: "Third: its characteristic is like empty space, which is the characteristic of liberation": first, it adduces the sūtra to establish the name; second, from "Unlike the śrāvakas..." downward, it explains and reveals its characteristics, also taking up the intention of the treatise. The treatise also has three parts: first, a reverse question distinguishing what it is not, saying: "Can it be the same as the liberation of the wisdom of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, which still has hindrances? No." Second, a direct question revealing what it is, saying: "What is liberation? The verse says: 'Its characteristic is like empty space.'" Third, explaining what it is and distinguishing it from what it is not, saying: "Because it is free from all afflictions and hindrances." Explanation: afflictions—this is what the Lotus Sūtra calls: "Freedom from all bonds of suffering is called attaining liberation. From what has this person attained liberation? Merely departing from falsehood is called liberation; in reality he has not yet attained all liberation. He has not escaped the knowable, because there are three remainders." Now, escaping the two hindrances, it is not like that.
The commentary states: "The meaning of the three virtues has already appeared above..." and so on: third, concluding generally with the three virtues. Within this there are two parts: first, concluding generally with the three virtues; second, speaking specifically of the transformation of the locus. In the former, pointing generally by saying "appeared above" refers to the "Inquiry on the Manifest" chapter, yet below in the "Appearance" chapter it will again be extensively clarified. The commentary states: "However, its consummation is in the Buddha..." and so on, distinguishing according to stages. This is the meaning of Zhiyi of Tiantai, clarifying according to the six identities of the Perfect Teaching. First, the three virtues of identity in principle: that all sentient beings equally possess the three defilements—affliction is prajñā, karma-bondage is liberation, and suffering retribution is the dharmakāya. Delusion forms the three defilements, yet their essence is just the three virtues. Second, the three virtues of identity in name: regarding the perfect principle, whether cause or fruit, one understands clearly. Third, the three virtues of identity in contemplative practice: the three virtues are cultivated perfectly; there is no hindrance that is not stilled, no principle that is not illuminated; stillness and illumination flow together, seeing through to the mind-nature. Furthermore, one emptiness is all emptiness, which is prajñā; one provisionality is all provisionality, which is liberation; one middle is all middle, which is the dharmakāya. Fourth, the three virtues of identity in resemblance: the six faculties are purified, the body is like lapis lazuli, illuminating the true characteristic of dharmas, unbound by the ties of karma. Fifth, the three virtues of identity in partial reality: as in the Abode of the Initial Aspiration, one attains the Tathāgata's single body and immeasurable bodies, with sovereign mastery in preaching the Dharma and wisdom activities. Sixth, the three virtues of ultimate identity: that is the Tathāgata. Here this corresponds to the three virtues of identity in partial reality. Saying now "its consummation is in the Buddha" refers to the three virtues of ultimate identity. The opening and unfolding in the ten abodes is partial reality. Here, in terms of the cause, it says "partially attained," which is also partial reality, because from the initial mind of the ten abodes straight up to the ten bhūmis, all are called partial reality. The fruit-sea depended upon is equal to the ultimate.