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大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 64.7

English (machine translation) 64.7

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English

64.7

Regarding the commentary’s "Second, the main exposition": the text of the commentary has three parts: first, a general breakdown; second, from "also the initial division" onward, a comparative subsumption with the preceding; third, from "Now, provisionally relying on the treatise" onward, a direct explanation based on the treatise. Within this, there are three [subdivisions]: 1. an appraisal in relation to the preceding; 2. explaining the name of the division; 3. directly explaining the text. Now, the first has three: first, indicating the superior characteristic; second, regarding "What is the superior characteristic?", the commentary raises a hypothetical inquiry; third, from "namely, the fourth" onward, explaining and revealing the superior characteristic. Because the fourth, fifth, and sixth grounds all counter conceit, they are compared with one another. Master [Hui]yuan said: "The fourth, fifth, and sixth grounds are alike in being the forbearance of conformity (anulomikī-kṣānti), and their operational aspects are broadly the same; therefore they are compared." There is indeed reason in this. If so, why are the previous three grounds, which are alike in being the forbearance of faith (śraddhā-kṣānti), not universally compared? And the seventh, eighth, and ninth grounds are alike in being the forbearance of non-arising (anutpattikadharmakṣānti)—the challenge applies equally to them. Therefore, one universally compares these various grounds based on their countering of conceit. Below, it says "gradually subtler," which reveals that the earlier ones are coarser; thus in these three grounds, each subsequent one is subtler than each preceding one. The treatise fully indicates three conceits, yet their coarse and subtle characteristics are concealed; now they shall be pointed out. The fourth [ground] counters [conceits of] the third ground: the conceit of a sentient being, of a self, and so on arise based on the mundane, and this conceit is the coarsest; the fifth counters [the conceit of] the fourth ground: the conceit of bodily purity arises based on the supramundane, and hence is known to be subtler; the sixth counters the conceits of the fifth: it arises in reference to both the mundane and the supramundane, and hence is even subtler. Regarding the commentary's "conceit of the self of a sentient being," and so on: according to the fruit of the fourth ground, there are four conceits to be countered: 1. relinquishing attachment to the self of a sentient being—namely, relinquishing [the notions of] self, person, sentient being, and soul; 2. relinquishing attachment to the self of phenomena—namely, skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas; 3. relinquishing the conceit of understanding phenomena—the sūtra calls it "grasping," and the treatise calls it "my knowledge"; 4. relinquishing the conceit of correct absorption—the sūtra calls it "emergence and submersion," and the treatise calls it "relinquishing the self that cultivates, that which is cultivated by the self," and so forth. Here it merely says "conceit of the self of a sentient being and conceit of understanding phenomena" because among the four, the first two are the root and the latter two are what arise from them; by citing the first of the root and the first of what arises to subsume the others, it omits the conceit of phenomena and the conceit of correct absorption. The rest is as fully explained in the fourth ground.

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