大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 65.50

65.50

Regarding the commentary's "Third, subsuming characteristics into the seeing [division]" and so forth: however, the first, fourth, and fifth are all refuted by the Cheng weishi lun. Thus, that treatise states at the beginning: "Furthermore, in order to elucidate for those who deludedly grasp at self and dharmas and are confused about consciousness-only, so that they may realize the two emptinesses and know the principle of consciousness-only as it truly is." This refutes ordinary people and non-Buddhists, which is not present in our present text. Next, the treatise further states: "There are those who are deluded about and misunderstand the principle of consciousness-only." Explanation: What follows is Dharmapāla extensively refuting the four masters, and this is the heading. Next, the treatise states: "Some cling that external objects, like consciousness, are not non-existent." Explanation: This refers to the Sarvāstivāda school; relying on the teaching of the twelve āyatanas, they cling that mind and objects both existing is the ultimate truth. The treatise states: "Some cling that internal consciousness, like objects, is non-existent." Explanation: This refutes Bhāviveka. Relying on the provisional teaching of emptiness, he repudiates consciousness as also being non-existent. The treatise states: "Some cling that the various consciousnesses differ in function but are identical in essence." Explanation: This refers to a class of Mahāyāna bodhisattvas who say that the essence of the eight consciousnesses is solely one, just as from a single pool of water or a single mirror many waves or reflections arise; this corresponds to the fifth meaning here. The treatise states: "Some cling that apart from mind there are no separate mental factors." Explanation: This is the view posited by Harivarman of the Sautrāntika. Because a sūtra states: "A person consists of six elements; defilement and purity arise from mind, and there are no characteristics of mental factors. Although there are also mental factors among the aggregates, they are merely provisionally posited according to states of consciousness, with no separate substantial existence." However, although Bhāviveka's view repudiates everything as empty, it forcibly contradicts the Middle Way to establish object-only. Because the Lokāyata also posited that only the four great elements constitute sentient beings, if we follow this meaning, there should be four positions. Bhāviveka and the Lokāyata hold that there are objects without mind; the Middle Way Mahāyāna holds that there is mind without objects; the Sarvāstivāda holds that there are both mind and objects; and wrong views repudiate everything, holding that there are neither mind nor objects. Yet having the mental king without mental factors is this fourth [meaning], but now the reference to sūtras and treatises is not the same as their [view]. Furthermore, the third meaning mentions "as in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra": this refers to the first fascicle, chapter 3, "Characteristics of Mind, Intellect, and Consciousness," where Bodhisattva Guāṅhuì asks the Buddha: "Bodhisattvas are skilled in the secret of mind, intellect, and consciousness." The Buddha answers: "Guāṅhuì, you should know that regarding the arising of those sentient beings in the saṃsāra of the six destinies and their physical embodiment through the four modes of birth, within that process, initially the mind-consciousness with all seeds matures, mutually coalescing, growing, and expanding, relying on two kinds of appropriation: first, the appropriation of the material sense faculties and what they depend on; second, the appropriation of the predispositions of verbal proliferation in signs, names, and discrimination. In the form realm, both appropriations are complete; in the formless realm, both are not complete." Explanation: Not having both in the formless realm means lacking the material faculties, and thus there are only the predispositions of signs, names, and discrimination, making it clear that there is only seeing. Next below, the sūtra further states: "Guāṅhuì! With the ādānavijñāna as support and foundation, the six consciousness bodies operate—namely, eye-, ear-, nose-, tongue-, body-, and mental consciousnesses. Herein, when there is consciousness, with eye and form as conditions, eye-consciousness arises. Accompanying the eye-consciousness, simultaneously and with the same object, the conceptual mental consciousness operates, and so on." Thus we know that all of this exclusively establishes the seeing division. This seeing is also the single self-verifying division established by Sthiramati; that is, whereas many establish the two divisions of characteristic and seeing, he discards characteristic and takes seeing as self-verification. As for the "Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratā": it is also called the Treatise on Consciousness-Only in Twenty Verses because it has twenty verses. Composed by Bodhisattva Vasubandhu and interpreted by the Tripiṭaka Master of the Tang. At the very beginning, it states: "To establish the Mahāyāna teaching that the three realms are mind-only, because a sūtra says: 'The three realms are mind-only.' 'Mind,' 'intellect,' 'consciousness,' and 'cognition' are differences in name. What is called 'mind' here includes mental factors; it only negates external objects and does not exclude associated factors. When internal consciousness arises, it appears resembling external objects. Like a person with cataracts seeing hairs, flies, and so forth, wherein there is not the slightest bit of real entity." Explanation: This also clarifies the meaning of mind-only. There is also a one-fascicle Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratā composed by Bodhisattva Vasubandhu and translated by Gautama Prajñāruci of the Later Wei. Upon careful examination, it is actually a different translation of the same original as the Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratā, but the text is slightly clearer. It first lists the twenty verses; the first verse says: "Consciousness-only has no sensory objects, / For viewing is observed without dust-particles; / Like a person whose eyes have cataracts, / Seeing things such as hairs or moons." After the verse, "A question asks: 'What meaning does the first verse clarify?' The answer says: 'In composing a treatise there are generally three meanings. The first is stating the thesis, which is the first line. The second is adducing proof, which is the second line. The third is a metaphor, which is the lower two lines.'" The text below explains extensively, also clarifying that external characteristics have no reality and are only manifestations of mind; hence it is called subsuming characteristics into the seeing. As for the Ālambanaparīkṣā: it has only two leaves, composed by Bodhisattva Dignāga. The treatise states: "All those who wish that the five consciousnesses such as the eye-consciousness take external form as their objective condition either grasp subtle atoms, claiming that they have real substance because they can generate consciousness, or grasp aggregate forms because when consciousness arises it bears their image. Both are unreasonable. Why is this? As for subtle atoms with respect to the five consciousnesses: / Even if a condition, they are not the objective support, / Because the consciousness lacks their characteristic, / Just like the eye faculty and so forth." Explanation: This refutes the former view that subtle atoms generate consciousness. The prose refutation means: the eye and other faculties can trigger consciousness, yet the consciousness does not bear the characteristic of the eye; subtle atoms can trigger consciousness, but how could consciousness possess the characteristic of subtle atoms? Therefore, there is no objective support. Furthermore, a verse states: "Aggregate forms with respect to the five consciousnesses: / Even if a condition, they are not the objective support, / Because their substance is truly non-existent, / Just like a second moon." Explanation: Examining the prose meaning, this refutes the above view that aggregate forms generate consciousness. That is, they grasp that the combination of multiple characteristics such as hardness in one place exists as an object of direct perception and can trigger consciousness. The refutation means: because composite dharmas are unreal, it is like an eye impairment seeing a second moon. Explanation: Because the above two characteristics do not exist and there is only consciousness, it is called subsuming characteristics into the seeing. However, Dignāga established three divisions. The statement here that there is no characteristic is because characteristics are truly non-existent. The correct doctrine below states: "That objective condition is not entirely non-existent; internal consciousness appearing like the external serves as the objective condition for consciousness. Because it is admitted that its characteristic exists in consciousness and can generate consciousness." Explanation: The prose states that internal consciousness appears like external objects and serves as the objective condition. It is admitted that the eye and other consciousnesses arise bearing that characteristic, and that they generate consciousness; hence it concludes: "The various consciousnesses are only internal objects; characteristics serve as the objective condition—this principle is thoroughly established." Thus, it is not completely without characteristics; characteristics entirely belong to consciousness, and therefore it is called returning to seeing. However, the citations in the above commentary are all Xianshou's intention; he cited them again because he wished to establish the ten meanings. The Dharma-characteristic [school] establishes consciousness as explained in the Cheng weishi lun cited previously.