大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 66

English (machine translation) 66

Language: English

66.1

Expounded by the śramaṇa Chengguan of the Great Huayan Monastery on Mount Qingliang in the Tang

Regarding the commentary's "Second, the gate of root and branch relying on each other": the text of the commentary has six parts: first, marking the scope of the gates, which is eight and a half gates; second, from "Characteristics of conditions" downward, posing a hypothetical question to raise the issue; third, from "The treatise says 'following along'" downward, citing the treatise to give the direct answer, which is entirely identical to the twelfth fascicle of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra], where the Buddha answers Mañjuśrī's meaning, as already seen in the introductory overview; fourth, from "The conventional is the signifier of the real" downward, where the commentary explains the meaning of the treatise; fifth, from "The Madhyamakaśāstra says" downward, citing another treatise for proof, which is the "Examination of the Four Noble Truths," also seen in the text above; sixth, from "This contemplation has six" downward, developing the specific from the general, meaning that within the eight and a half gates of conventional truth there are six contemplations. Within this there are three parts: first, listing and explaining; second, critical analysis; third, specifically explaining the initial gate. Now, for the first part: in the text of each contemplation, there are two occurrences of the word "contemplation." The above marks names based on the treatise. From the word "contemplation" downward, the commentary clarifies the meaning. Because causes have self and other, two gates are required: the dependence of defilement is called the other-cause. The second, "contemplation of cause," is called the self-cause; defilement has four positions, thus subsuming three gates. The other-cause is the third, "self-karma assisting in completion"; the self-cause is the fourth, "not abandoning one another"; hence both are defiled causes. "Subsuming faults" is the fifth gate, "uninterrupted succession of the three paths"—namely, afflictions, karma, and suffering—because afflictions and karma constitute accumulation. "Protecting against faults" is the sixth gate, "saṃsāric transmigration across the three times"; stating this can eliminate the three faults of non-Buddhists, which are explained below. "Contemplation of revulsion without revulsion" is the seventh gate, "accumulation of the three sufferings"; ordinary beings and Hīnayānists are not revulsed, while bodhisattvas are revulsed. "Profound contemplation" refers to the last three gates; because searching for arising through the four positions cannot be attained, it is arising without arising, hence called profound contemplation—how could it be the same as grasping with emotional attachment?

66.3

As for the Commentary's "Among the six, the first two" and so on, this is the second [section], the critical assessment, subsuming the six into four. Regarding the "first two are characteristics of defilement": the first is the supported and the supporting; the second is self-cause and other-cause. Both are characteristics of delusion and defilement. The remaining three can be understood [by extension].

66.4

As for the Commentary's "Now, in this half-door" and so on, this is the third [section], the detailed explanation, containing two parts: first, setting forth the Śāstra's intent, and next, structuring the text into headings. Now regarding the first: examining conditioned arising's existence-constituents as defilement—the treatise itself explains, "What is the defiled part? Part has the meaning of 'branch'." From "And as for this defilement" onward, it explains the support of defilement; this is precisely the treatise master's text of origination. Yet the treatise merely says, "Conditioned arising's existence-constituents depend on the one mind," and the Commentary unpacks and explains it. Next, the treatise says, "This is the distinction of the two truths"; this is the treatise interpreting the sūtra. In full, it says: "This is the distinction of the two truths, the contemplation of the arising of causes and conditions in the commingling and harmony of one mind and miscellaneous defilements." The Commentary's text is merely abridged. From "Because the purely real does not generate" onward, the Commentary explains it. As for the Commentary's "In the subsequent explanation, the treatise has no separate interpretation" and so on, the text of the Commentary is divided into three: first, it briefly criticizes older explanations; second, from "Now I maintain that the speaker" onward, it marks and indicates the orthodox meaning; third, from "Therefore this doorway" onward, it comprehensively shows its inclusiveness. Within this there are three: first, subsuming two in terms of essence; second, subsuming five in terms of meaning; third, subsuming six in terms of time. Now regarding the first: first, "conditioned arising by self-nature" is the habit-energy of the two graspings. Second, "conditioned arising of the liked and unliked" is the habit-energy of various karmas. This is completely identical to the Vijñaptimātratā: "Due to the presence of both habit-energies of various karmas and habit-energies of the two graspings, once the former maturation is exhausted, further other maturations are produced."

66.5

As for the Commentary's "Second, it contains the Kośa" and so on, this is the second [heading], subsuming five in terms of meaning. Within this there are three: first, listing the headings. Only four are listed in the headings; why say it subsumes five? Because below there is an illustrative explanation of the meanings of "simultaneous" and "identical essence." Second, from "the subsequent three" onward, it points out that the three are below. Third, from "here it precisely corresponds to the first" onward, it separately explains the moment, which is the analysis of the sūtra text. Within this there are three: first, the separate explanation; second, the general summary; third, the illustrative explanation of identical essence. Now regarding the first: as for the Commentary's "Therefore here it need not follow the sequence": the first is the consciousness branch, the second is the formations branch, and only the third is ignorance; hence it does not follow the sequence. Yet the Kośa contains all twelve. Below it says, "Delusion is ignorance; volition is formations," still following the sequence; how much more so when not following the sequence is it not [other than] a single moment?

66.6

Regarding the Commentary's "Engaging in this matter of greed must arise depending on the mind" and so on: this is the consciousness branch. However, it has two meanings: first, arising depending on mind is the Mahāyāna meaning, namely the mind of the eight consciousnesses. From "further, discerning" onward, this is the intention of the Kośa, where distinguishing among various objects is called consciousness.

66.7

As for the Commentary's "Not producing the five consciousnesses, they are called only ten realms" and so on: the ten realms are the five sense faculties and five sense objects, because in the eighteen dhātus the faculties and consciousnesses are distinguished. If explaining the twelve āyatanas, consciousness is subsumed under the faculties; therefore it says that when the five consciousnesses arise based on them, they are then called ten āyatanas, and adding the mind to the five faculties makes them six āyatanas. In the Mahāyāna sense, faculties are distinct from the consciousness branch; in the Hīnayāna of the Kośa, the sixth consciousness itself is the essence of the consciousness branch, hence it says that resting upon the faculties of name-and-form is spoken of as the six āyatanas. Its commentary explains: "The five consciousnesses of the eye and so forth rest upon the faculties of name-and-form; hence the five faculties are spoken of under the name of six āyatanas. Although they are predominantly five, they are subsumed under the six āyatanas."

66.8

As for the Commentary's "Greed must face an object": this explains contact. The treatise says, "The six āyatanas confronting the rest in harmony is contact." The explanation says: "the rest" means the objects of consciousness. Explaining grasping accords with the sūtra, stating it is desire-grasping. If according to the Kośa, "the various entanglements associated with this are called grasping," its commentary explains: "namely, shamelessness, unconscionableness, torpor, restlessness, and so on," which are associated with greed. Explaining existence accords with the sūtra, stating that the various branches are produced. If according to the Kośa, "the physical and vocal two karmas that are initiated are called existence; aging and decay are death," this is completely identical to the treatise text. "Because it is destroyed in an instant" is an explanation from that commentary.

66.9

As for the Commentary's "If this is not interrupted, it is called connected binding" and so on: this is the second [part], briefly explaining the remaining three types of conditioned arising. As for what the treatise calls connected binding: as in the Prakaraṇapāda, "It refers to all states of conditioned things across the twelve branches, where all five aggregates are subsumed under states; this very continuous succession extending far from beginninglessness is called distant continuity." All of the above is treatise text. The explanation states: connected binding requires cause and effect to arise in direct, uninterrupted connection. Both the sentient and the non-sentient undergo arising and ceasing, continuing moment to moment; hence momentary and connected binding pervade all conditioned things. It refers to pervading the states of conditioned things. Conditioned arising strictly pertains to karma to be experienced in the next life and indefinite karma; the states of the twelve branches and five aggregates across the three periods of time, if in distant continuity, are merely the distant continuous succession of the aforementioned states. Hence the treatise says, "this very continuous succession." The Nyāyānusāra says: "Distant-continuity conditioned arising refers to karma to be experienced in subsequent lives and indefinite karma across previous and subsequent bounds, circulating from beginninglessness, as in the statement that the primal bound of ignorance and existence-craving is unknowable, and so forth. Connected-binding conditioned arising takes their being adjacent to each other and bound without interruption." That commentary says: "Distant continuity involves only intervening separation; connected binding involves only lack of interval. Distant continuity is only fruitional cause; if also encompassing the insentient, it is also a cause of the same category. Connected binding is definitely not fruitional, and fruitional causes are not connected binding; hence it extends to causes of the same category. Pervasive and efficient causes exclude associated and co-existent causes, because these two are not prior and posterior."

66.10

As for the Commentary's "The principle is shared by both the Great and Small": this is the second [heading], the general summary, and it also resolves an objection. That is, someone may ask: "Now in explaining the One Vehicle's doctrine of only one mind, why cite the Kośa as proof?" Therefore this answer is given. Regarding the meaning of one mind, the Hīnayāna posits six and the Mahāyāna has eight, etc., so they are not identical. But regarding a single moment possessing all twelve branches, both Great and Small possess it. As for the Commentary's "Were it not for the authoritative testimony of sacred teachings" and so on: this concludes and indicates [the point] to inspire trust. From ancient times this explanation was not given; now, by generally taking a single thought-moment to possess the twelve, authoritative testimony of sacred teachings is used to prove that it is no idle speculation. Regarding the statement "The treatise master did not explain it, which almost seems like an oversight": when the treatise master composed the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra, it was not that he did not know; taking it to be easily understood, he therefore did not explain it. Because the treatise did not explain it, causing later people to misunderstand, it merely seems like an oversight. Dai means close; words of close resemblance make clear that it was not an error.

66.11

As for the Commentary's "This text precisely clarifies" and so on, this is the third [heading], the illustrative explanation of being simultaneous and of identical essence, which can be understood [from the text].

66.12

As for the Commentary's "Taking these twelve branches of existence" and so on, this is the third [heading], subsuming six in terms of time. Within this there are two: first, an extensive explanation of the five periods of time; next, from "The second, based on the three periods of time" onward, a brief analogy with the remaining five. In the former, it first clarifies directly, and next resolves an objection. Now regarding the first: this is the intent of Nirvāṇa [Sūtra], fascicle 37—in the southern recension, fascicle 34—where Kāśyapa asks about contemplating karma and suffering, and the Tathāgata explains it. The sūtra says: "The wise also contemplate afflictions generating afflictions through causes and conditions; through karma as cause and condition, afflictions are also generated; afflictions through causes and conditions further generate karma; through karma as cause and condition, suffering is generated. Through suffering as cause and condition, afflictions are generated; through afflictions as cause and condition, the branches of existence are generated; through existence as cause and condition, suffering is generated. Through existence as cause and condition, existence is generated; through existence as cause and condition, karma is generated; through karma as cause and condition, afflictions are generated; through afflictions as cause and condition, suffering is generated; through suffering as cause and condition, suffering is generated. Good son! If a wise person is able to contemplate like this, you should know that this person is able to contemplate karma and suffering." Master Yuan explains: "This clarifies causes and conditions in terms of five periods of time. That is, the past of the past has two branches. 'Afflictions through causes and conditions generating afflictions' means that from the afflictions of that past of the past, the ignorance of the past is generated. 'Through karma as cause and condition, afflictions are also generated' means that from the karma and formations of that past of the past, the ignorance of the subsequent past is generated. For that subsequent past two branches are also established. 'Afflictions through causes and conditions further generating karma' means that past ignorance generates the formations branch. 'Karma generating suffering' means that from previous formations, the present consciousness branch is generated. Within the present period of time, four branches are established: the statement 'through suffering as cause and condition, afflictions are generated' means that regarding the five present fruits, craving and grasping arise. 'Through afflictions as cause and condition, existence is generated' means that from present craving and grasping, the present existence branch arises. 'Through existence as cause and condition, suffering is generated' means that from the present existence branch, the future birth and aging-and-death branches are generated. 'Through existence as cause and condition, existence is generated' means that from the present existence branch, future existence is generated, because wholesome and unwholesome karmas in the present period of time serve as causes of the same category, generating wholesome and unwholesome karmas in the future. In the subsequent future, three branches emerge. 'Through existence as cause and condition, karma is generated' means that future karma and formations sequentially generate one another. The statement 'through karma as cause and condition, afflictions are generated' means that from the karma produced in the future period of time, afflictions that moisten rebirth in the future period of time arise. 'Through afflictions as cause and condition, suffering is generated' means that from the afflictions moistening rebirth in the future period of time, the birth branch of the future of the future is generated. In the future of the future, only a single branch is established: 'through suffering as cause and condition, suffering is generated' means that from the birth branch of that future of the future, the aging-and-death branch of that period of time is generated." Explanation: Comparing the Commentary's text above with this sūtra's explanation, the meaning can be understood; the Commentary's text is merely somewhat brief.

66.13

As for the Commentary's "This is based on the three periods of time" and so on, this is the second [heading], resolving an objection. That is, someone may ask: "If past ignorance further depends on a past, then earlier, there is no beginning; if future aging-and-death further generates future fruits of aging-and-death, then the future is infinite. In that case, ignorance would not be without cause, and aging-and-death would not be without fruit, incurring the fault of infinite regress." Therefore it is now answered: tracing past ignorance shows that it does not arise spontaneously, but again depends on former habituation; and if an antidote is not obtained in the future, the fruit of suffering will be infinite. Because cause and effect are interrelated, there are five periods of time. Beyond the five periods of time there is no further involvement; hence there is no infinite regress. If considered in terms of the cycle of the three periods of time, there is no fault of infinite regress.

66.14

As for the Commentary's "Second, in terms of great compassion following along" and so on, this text has six parts: first, marking the name of the contemplation. Hence the treatise asks, "Why seek liberation in other places?" Second, from "namely, foolish worldlings" onward, citing the treatise to explain the characteristics. Third, from "the sūtra clarifies that it is solely" onward, using the treatise's intent to cite the sūtra as the antidote: seeking within self, self's [possessions], and so forth is incorrect; seeking within the mind and so forth is correct. Fourth, from "it is also identical to the Vimalakīrti" onward, citing a precedent as an explanation. That is, in the chapter "Inquiring after Illness", because of the question about the cause of the empty room, tracing the branches back to the root, there are three rounds of questions and answers: First, it asks, "Where should emptiness be sought?" It answers, "It should be sought within the sixty-two views." Again it asks, "Where should the sixty-two views be sought?" It answers, "They should be sought within the liberation of all buddhas." Again it asks, "Where should the liberation of all buddhas be sought?" It answers, "It should be sought within the mental activities of all sentient beings." However, investigating ancient explanations, there are roughly three interpretations: The first interpretation says: grasping at views contradicts emptiness, which shows that emptiness is not views; within the Buddha's liberation there are no views, which shows that views are not liberation. Within the minds of sentient beings there is no Buddha's liberation; one should know that within the liberation of all buddhas, sentient beings do not directly tally with emptiness. This is Master Sengzhao's interpretation. The second says: empty wisdom arises dependent on views, so empty wisdom has no intrinsic nature; having no intrinsic nature, wisdom is empty. Is the liberation of all buddhas not an existent? Based on the correct, the false arises, so it is also empty. The liberation of all buddhas arises from awakening to sentient beings' mental activities, so liberation is empty. The third says: in terms of the essence of emptiness being non-dual, the mutual seeking between them is universally pervasive in principle. This interpretation is close to the present sūtra. The present sūtra precisely clarifies seeking within the true and false minds: seeing that the nature of delusion is empty, one awakens to the fundamental real essence, as will be explained below.

66.15

Regarding the commentary's statement, "As for the ālāyavijñāna, it is here rendered 'storehouse consciousness' (zangshi)": From here down is the fifth section, collating and explaining the treatises. Now, the third fascicle of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi clarifies that the eighth consciousness has seven designations in total. That treatise states: "Although the eighth consciousness is fully realized by all sentient beings, various designations are established in accordance with different meanings. That is to say, it is sometimes named 'citta' (mind), because it is an accumulation [of seeds] perfumed by various phenomena. Or it is named 'ādāna', because it appropriates and holds the seeds and physical sense-faculties so that they do not deteriorate. Or it is named 'basis of the knowable' (jñeyāśraya), because it serves as the support for all defiled and pure knowable phenomena. Or it is named 'seed consciousness' (bījavijñāna), because it universally sustains all seeds of both mundane and supramundane domains. These designations apply across all stages." The explanation states: The former designation, "citta", is framed in terms of the accumulation of seeds. This "seed consciousness" is framed solely in terms of what can produce them, and therefore it is not established [as identical]. Next, the treatise says: "Or it is named 'ālaya', because it stores all defiled phenomena without letting them be lost. Grasping consciousnesses such as self-view and self-love appropriate and store it as their internal self. Thus this designation applies only to ordinary worldlings and learners, not to the stage of non-learners—yet non-retrogressing bodhisattvas still have the sense of defiled phenomena being held and stored." The explanation states: According to [the definition of] the ālaya, it has three meanings of storing. As the aforementioned treatise says: "Because this consciousness possesses the meanings of that which stores (active), that which is stored (passive), and that which is appropriated as an object of attachment. That is to say, it is mutually conditioned with defilements, and sentient beings cling to it as an internal self." The explanation states: Saying that they are "mutually conditioned" entails both the active and passive store meanings: First, it can hold defiled seeds; the seeds are called "that which is stored", and the consciousness is "that which stores"—this refers to the active ripening consciousness holding the seeds. Second, it is that which is perfumed by, and serves as the support for, defiled phenomena; thus defiled phenomena are called "that which stores", and this consciousness is "that which is stored". The Commentary on the Awakening of Faith says: "Moreover, it stores its own essence within all phenomena." Dharma Master Dacheng said: This means that due to the seven transforming consciousnesses perfuming it into seeds, the essence of the consciousness and the seeds are not of different natures. Also, following the stored seeds' inseparability from the transforming consciousnesses, it is stored within the transforming consciousnesses. Third, it is further appropriated and grasped by the seventh consciousness. Here, only two meanings are presented; the omission of "that which is stored" is because, when spoken of as extending through the undefiled stage, "that which is stored" is not mentioned. Next, the treatise states: "Or it is named 'ripening consciousness' (vipākavijñāna), because it induces the maturation fruits of wholesome and unwholesome karmas in saṃsāra. This designation applies only to the stages of ordinary worldlings, the two vehicles, and bodhisattvas; it is not found on the Tathāgata ground, which no longer has maturing neutral phenomena." The explanation states: This applies to non-learners of the two vehicles and bodhisattvas of the ten grounds, because the Tathāgata is solely wholesome and has no neutral states. Next, the treatise states: "Or it is named 'immaculate consciousness' (amalavijñāna), because it is the support for all supremely pure, undefiled phenomena. This designation exists solely on the Tathāgata ground. In the stages of bodhisattvas, the two vehicles, and ordinary worldlings, they retain defiled seeds and can receive perfuming, having not yet attained the completely purified eighth consciousness." The explanation states: Being a support not of afflictions, it is called immaculate. That the present treatise only adduces two designations is because the ālaya's intention is to cover the defiled, whereas the ādāna's intention is to cover the pure. By briefly adducing one pair, both are comprehensively taken as the locus of what is sought; their principle is already identical. Thus the commentary says: "The treatise master's intention is to clarify that the mind encompasses both the defiled and the pure."

66.16

Regarding the commentary's statement, "What is the meaning of seeking?": From here down is the sixth section, separately explaining the characteristics of seeking, which demonstrates the contemplation of the two forms of selflessness. Within it, delusion is first adduced; later, from "If attachment to a self perishes" downward, awakening is clarified. As for "it immediately relinquishes the name ālaya", the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: "It is relinquished at the stage of an arhat. Because among the three forms of storing, attachment to and grasping of a self-love are absent, it is relinquished at the stage of an arhat. In terms of bodhisattvas, it corresponds to the eighth ground, where they have already transcended the three realms." As for the statement that "when the deluded mind ceases, the true mind becomes manifest", this is the meaning of the Awakening of Faith, which the previous commentary has already cited. From "Hence the verse below says", proof is cited. First, the present sūtra is cited; it states in full: "Fully understanding that the three realms exist reliant on mind, / The twelve links of dependent origination are also like this. / Birth and death are entirely made by mind; / If the mind ceases, birth and death are exhausted." Next, the statement that "this is the cessation of delusion, not the cessation of the mind's essence" tacitly cites the Awakening of Faith to substantiate the sūtra's meaning of cessation. Thus that text states: "Only the characteristics of mind cease; the essence of mind does not cease." The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra also states: "If the ālaya were to cease, it would be no different from the nihilistic prapañca of non-Buddhists." This was also used in the earlier commentary.

66.17

Regarding the commentary's statement, "This corresponds to the second contemplation of reliance": The commentary has two explanations: The former explanation relies exclusively on the ultimate truth, and is thus strictly concerned with purity; this one clarifies the reliance and maintenance of the limbs of existence, and thus pertains to both defiled and pure. In the second explanation, "arising delusion relying on the true" refers to the fact that failing to understand the ultimate truth is called avidyā, and so forth. "Revealing that delusion relies on the true" refers to the fact that the twelve links of dependent origination are all established in reliance on the one mind in this manner.

66.18

Regarding the commentary's statement, "Third, one's own karma aids in completion": Now, the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā terms this "establishing the karma of the limbs", each possessing two kinds of karma, perfectly coinciding with the present sūtra. According to the original treatise, within the first contemplation there are two parts: first, a general explanation of the two causes, and later, a separate explanation of this passage. Within the former: first, a general identification; second, from "Venerable Huiyuan" downward, reciting former views; third, from "The other cause slightly works" downward, analyzing discrepancies. Because he recognized that avidyā is different from saṃskāra, he permitted its coherence, yet he still failed to understand that avidyā, viewed in relation to saṃskāra, possesses the senses of both self and other; taking it solely as another cause, it only slightly works. As for "taking it as one's own cause is problematic", this is because it contradicts the treatise. Since the treatise master cited the conditions of avidyā giving rise to saṃskāra to prove that in the absence of a preceding limb there is no subsequent limb, it clearly takes avidyā as the preceding and saṃskāra as the subsequent. How much less, within one's own cause and conditions, could there be an avidyā giving rise to the limb of avidyā! Fourth, from "We now state" downward, the present correct meaning is set forth. Within this are two parts: first, explaining separately; later, a general conclusion. In the former, regarding the two causes, both are first directly clarified, and then, from "Hence in Great Compassion" downward, the two contemplations are cited as proof. In the contemplation of Great Compassion, the "dark nature" (prakṛti) is the non-Buddhists' production from self, sharing the same sense with svabhāva; hence, using "other cause" refutes their production from self. Production from self is the non-Buddhists' meaning of production from another; hence, using "own cause" refutes their production from another. In the cognition of all aspects, the other cause is the antecedent, serving as the upāya for the subsequent; the own cause is the characteristic of cause and condition. This meaning is extremely evident. Hence, the curd metaphor directly illustrates the own cause and also illustrates the other cause: curd does not arise from itself, but must depend on milk as its cause. Here, milk is the other cause of the curd, because milk is not curd; it must arise from milk, and does not arise from reeds, stones, and the like. Milk is the own cause of the curd, because if it were not required to arise from milk, cause would be identical with non-cause. If there were no sense of other, milk would simply be curd, and both cause and effect would be lost.

66.19

Regarding the commentary's statement, "Taking the meaning of the three contemplations": This is the second part, a general conclusion: because of their great concordance, they can be cited as proof. From "The various virtuous teachers" downward, a concluding critique is given. Now, "own cause" and "other cause" are precisely "when this exists, that exists; when this arises, that arises" in the Abhidharmakośa and other texts. The ninth fascicle of the Abhidharmakośa states: "Why did the World-Honoured One speak the preceding two phrases? (This is the question.) The treatise answers: It means that by relying on 'when this exists, that exists; when this arises, that arises', dependent origination is definite. As stated elsewhere: 'Relying on the existence of avidyā, the formations (saṃskāra) can exist; apart from avidyā, formations cannot exist.' It is also to reveal the sequential arising of the limbs: relying on the existence of this limb, that limb can exist; due to the arising of that limb, other limbs can arise. It is also to reveal the sequential arising of the three periods of time: when the past exists, the present can exist; due to the arising of the present, the future can arise. It is also to reveal the two conditions of direct and indirect sequential development: avidyā immediately generates formations, or through indirect power formations only then arise. Other masters say: These two phrases are spoken to refute the two doctrines of causelessness and eternal cause: formations cannot exist without a cause, nor can formations arise due to an unproduced cause such as an eternal nature or self. If that were so, the former phrase would become useless. Only through the subsequent phrase, 'when this arises, that arises', can one fully refute the former causelessness, eternal cause, and so on. Therefore, the ācārya explained these two phrases as revealing cause and effect. Cause and effect being uninterrupted, and arising being existence, he explained them as revealing the abiding and arising of cause and effect (and so forth)." The explanation states: The above is all the treatise text; now they will be collated and explained. This is precisely what is in the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the sūtra above: "Because this exists, that exists; because this arises, that arises." Arising means birth, as already explained before. For now, let us collate the two causes: The preceding limb existing, the subsequent limb can exist—this is the meaning of own cause, because only by not departing from the preceding can there be the subsequent. "When this arises, that arises" is the meaning of other cause, because when this limb arises, that limb is distinct. Therefore, the fourth section above explained "when this exists, that exists" as the direct cause, and "when this arises, that arises" as the indirect cause. "Indirect" is precisely the sense of "other". "Must follow from the preceding limb" is precisely the sense of "self". In terms of the contemplation of conforming with Great Compassion, the fifth section above's refutation of the two causes accords very well with this meaning. Using own cause refutes causelessness, because curd must depend on milk. Using other cause refutes an eternal cause, because it must depend on an other cause, not an inherent nature or the like. Thus, first refuting the two causes does not fail the intended meaning. Since the intention of the present sūtra conforms with the intention of the treatise above and self and other are brightly manifest, the former virtuous masters not only failed to investigate the root treatise, but also failed to perceive the purport of other treatises.

66.20

Regarding the commentary's statement, "Now, this single gate": From here down is the second part, separately explaining this passage. Within it are two parts: first, explaining the meaning of "other cause" by means of the two karmas; later, separately explaining the text. Now, in the first, there are two explanations: the former combines them, using the "other" of one's own karma to aid in completing the cause of the subsequent limb; the second separately matches the two characters, which is readily understood.

66.21

Regarding the commentary's statement, "However, as for the cause of emergence": Second, separately explaining the sūtra text. First, explaining aiding in completion; later, explaining one's own karma. Within the former are two parts: first, generally explaining the sūtra text; later, extensively clarifying distinctions. Now, in the first: in the sūtra, "aiding in completion" is solely the sovereign condition (adhipatipratyaya); yet stating that it "acts as the cause of emergence" is spoken from the perspective of their common characteristic. Distinguished, causes are direct and conditions are indirect; comprehensively, a cause is simply a condition. Hence in the Abhidharmakośa, the four conditions encompass the six causes. The treatise says: "Four kinds of conditions are spoken of. The causal condition is of the nature of five causes. The equal-immediate condition is not the last; it is that by which citta and caittas arise. The objective condition is all phenomena. The sovereign condition is the active cause." In the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, the ten causes are also subsumed into the four conditions. The six causes and ten causes were already explained in the earlier commentary; the present intention is merely to reveal their general sense.

66.22

Regarding the commentary's statement, "Among the four conditions": Second, extensively clarifying distinctions. This corresponds to the section distinguishing the four conditions within the various categorical distinctions in the dependent origination section of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi; the commentary mostly relies on it. Concerning the text, there are four points: first, generally showing completeness and deficiency; second, separately explaining presence and absence; third, concluding that there is no fixed pattern; fourth, reconciling and synthesizing the sūtra's intent. Now, in the first, that treatise states in full: "Looking at the limbs in relation to each other, the sovereign condition is definitely present; the presence or absence of the remaining three conditions is indeterminate. The sūtra, relying on what is definite, speaks only of one." The explanation states: Comparing with the commentary, it can be understood. Because the sovereign [condition's] scope is broad, it is always definitely present. The remaining three conditions are limited, so their presence or absence is indeterminate.

66.23

Regarding the commentary's statement, "That is, craving (tṛṣṇā) viewed toward grasping (upādāna)": Second, separately explaining presence and absence. Within it are two parts: first, clarifying the causal condition (hetupratyaya); later, distinguishing the remaining two. Within the former are two: first, directly explaining; later, examining. In the former are four: first, based on real existence; second, based on indeterminacy; third, concluding with parallel examples; fourth, harmonizing with other treatises. Now, in the first: "craving is the causal condition of grasping": in speaking of the causal condition, one must distinguish the directly producing essence; since craving intensifies into grasping, craving is the seed of grasping and can produce manifest grasping, and is therefore the causal condition. "Consciousness intensifying into becoming (bhava)": becoming has no separate substance. Due to craving and grasping moistening the five seeds to become bhava, bhava is the seed of consciousness, and the limb of birth (jāti) is the manifest activity of consciousness. When the seed of consciousness exists, it produces manifestation; hence bhava can be the causal condition of birth.

66.24

From the commentary's "If one explains the link of consciousness to be karmic seeds" downward is the second [section], based on the indeterminate. This is the intention of the Vijñaptimātratā[siddhi] in reconciling with the Abhidharmasamuccaya. If one takes the seeds of consciousness to be the link of consciousness, then volitional formations are not the direct cause of consciousness. Now, by taking karmic seeds to be the link of consciousness, volitional formations are thereby able to be the causal condition (hetu-pratyaya) of consciousness; this is a case of an active manifestation serving as the causal condition for a seed. Consciousness is karmic seeds, as explained in the initial chapter.

66.25

From the commentary's "The remaining links" downward concludes with an analogy.

66.26

From the commentary's "Yet the Samuccaya" downward is the fourth [section], harmonizing with other treatises. First it harmonizes with the Samuccaya, and then it harmonizes with the Yogācārabhūmi. As for the first—namely the fourth—therein it first indicates what that [treatise] has, and then, from "based on the time of ignorance" downward, clarifies that its sense of existence is explained as nominal. That is to say, based on the habit-energy of the karma of intention concurrent with ignorance, which is concomitant with ignorance, the karmic seeds are nominally said to be ignorance, whereas in reality they are the seeds of volitional formations producing the active manifestations of volitional formations. However, in the Samuccaya this is called establishing the conditions of the links. That treatise says: "'Establishing the conditions of the links' means by reason of habit-energy, by reason of elicitation, by reason of reflection, and by reason of coexistence. Establishing the conditions of the links establishes the conditions of the links according to their proper application, based on the characteristics of the four conditions. For instance, ignorance with respect to volitional formations can serve as a condition by reason of previous habit-energy, because the various karmas produced by the continuum of its perfuming can generate future existence. First, at that time, because active ignorance can elicit [them], it serves as the immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya). Second, because the various differentiated formations elicited by it arise in transmigration in a continuum, and because they reflect upon it, it serves as the objective condition (ālambana-pratyaya). Third, because taking [things] as supreme through improper reflection takes the state of delusion as its cognitive sphere, and because it is coexistent with it, it serves as the empowering condition (adhipati-pratyaya), for by the power of that empowering condition, concomitant intention errantly cogitates objects and acts. Fourth, all should be known to be exhaustively applied like this according to their proper application." Commentary: The above constructs all four conditions for ignorance with respect to volitional formations. Since it analogizes all [the rest] to be exhaustively known, then all twelve links possess the four conditions. Dharma Master Dacheng explained: "This Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi relies upon distinct essences, and therefore they alternately exist and do not exist; that [treatise] relies upon states, and therefore can possess all of them. It takes ignorance as the model for phenomena, analogizing it to the remaining links. Now the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi for the time being only reconciles this partially." Commentary: The meaning of this Dharma Master Dacheng seems to be clarifying that the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi does not comprehend that [treatise's] intention, and that it should not have reconciled merely ignorance and volitional formations. Hence the commentary below says: "Since it is spoken of with reference to the cause, it already contains the remaining three, so that all possess the four."

66.27

From the commentary's "The Yogācārabhūmi states that the links lack a causal condition in relation to one another" downward is the second [section], reconciling with the tenth fascicle of the Great Treatise stating that there are three conditions and no causal condition. The above quotes the Great Treatise. From "explained based on active craving and clinging, and on becoming being solely karma", it harmonizes with the meaning of existence above. The Great Treatise says they are absent, while above it was fully explained that they are present. Above, there are four states of indeterminate nominal explanation; these do not need reconciliation, but only reconciling the two states that actually have a causal condition. "Based on active craving and clinging" reconciles the previous sense that craving has a causal condition with respect to clinging. That took craving intensifying into clinging, and because a seed generates an active manifestation, it can serve as a causal condition. Now, taking active craving with respect to active clinging, since it does not arise from its own seed, how could it have a causal condition? The statement "explained based on becoming being solely karma" reconciles the previous [assertion that] becoming has a causal condition with respect to birth. Previously, the seeds of consciousness giving rise to the active manifestation of birth could serve as a causal condition. Now, by taking karmic seeds to be becoming and giving rise to birth, since karma is not the essence of consciousness but only an empowering [condition], how could it be a causal condition? Hence the Yogācārabhūmi states: "For what reason do they all lack a causal condition in relation to one another? Answer: Because a causal condition is demonstrated by the cause that is its own-nature seed. Now active craving and clinging are not seeds, and because karma with respect to birth is not its own-nature." Dharma Master Dacheng says: "Without this treatise, it would be difficult to understand the Yogācārabhūmi."

66.28

From the commentary's "The four states above in relation to one another" downward is the second [section], differentiation. This is not the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, but merely the intention of the commentary, which can be understood by examining the above.

66.29

As for the commentary's "Ignorance with respect to volitional formations down to ... possess the remaining two conditions", this is the second [part], distinguishing the remaining two conditions. It naturally has three meanings: first, three states possess two; next, two states possess one; finally, it concludes that the rest lack both. As for the first, it first cites the text of the treatise, and from "both with" downward is the subcommentary's explanation. They both look to active manifestations with respect to one another, presenting the general reason for possessing the two conditions. The phrase "eliciting and generating without an interval" clarifies the presence of the immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya). That is to say, an immediately preceding condition must be an active mind or mental factor, because the previous thought-moment's cessation and destruction elicits and produces the subsequent thought-moment. The cessation of the mind and mental factors of ignorance elicits the mind of intention of volitional formations. The cessation of the mental factor of craving gives rise to the mind of clinging. Here, the link of craving also refers to an active manifestation. Birth and aging-and-death are merely the growth and decline of consciousness and name-and-form; the mind of growth ceasing elicits and produces decline, and therefore these three states have the immediately preceding [condition]. The phrase "because the mind of intention of volitional formations and so forth can reflect back upon [them]" clarifies the presence of the objective condition (ālambana-pratyaya). "And so forth" means equal to clinging and aging-and-death. That is to say, the mind of intention of volitional formations can reflect back upon the previous link of ignorance, and therefore the link of ignorance is indeed the objective condition of volitional formations. The two clingings are also mental factors, and therefore can take craving as object; craving is the objective condition of clinging. The mental factors of aging-and-death can take birth as object; birth is indeed the objective condition of aging-and-death. All are called "reflecting back" because the subsequent link takes the prior as object.

66.30

As for the commentary's "Becoming with respect to birth, and feeling with respect to craving, lack the immediately preceding but possess the objective condition", this is the second [section]: two states in relation to each other possess only one condition. The above is the text of the treatise. From "because of looking from seed to active manifestation" downward explains the meaning of lacking the immediately preceding [condition] above, because an immediately preceding [condition] must consist of active minds and mental factors mutually eliciting and producing [each other]. Now, becoming is a seed and birth is an active manifestation, so how could it have it? Feeling is also a seed and craving is an active manifestation, hence it is not immediately preceding. From "because the generated active manifestation reflects back upon the seed" downward explains the meaning of possessing the objective condition. Birth is an active manifestation, able to take the seed of becoming as an object; craving is an active manifestation, able to take the seed of feeling as an object; therefore becoming and feeling serve as objective conditions.

66.31

As for the commentary's "The remaining links in relation to one another lack both", this is the third [section], clarifying that they completely lack both. The "remaining links" refers to another six states in relation to one another that entirely lack the two conditions. That is to say, volitional formations with respect to consciousness, consciousness with respect to name-and-form, name-and-form with respect to the six sense bases, the six sense bases with respect to contact, contact with respect to the link of feeling, and clinging with respect to the link of becoming. The reason why they lack the immediately preceding is that their fruits are not elicited and produced by active minds and mental factors mutually. That is to say, from consciousness and so forth down to feeling, all are seeds. Becoming is also a seed. Volitional formations are the cause of consciousness, and clinging is the cause of becoming. Although they are active manifestations, the consciousness and becoming produced are precisely seeds, and hence are not immediately preceding. The reason why they are not objective conditions is that since they are not active minds and mental factors, how could there be intentional reflection?

66.32

From the commentary's "Here, this is merely based on proximity" downward is the third [section], concluding with an analogy of boundless applicability. This is also the intention of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Therein are two: first, it cites the treatise text; later, from "because their forward and reverse" downward, the commentary explains and establishes it. Yet in that treatise there are four tiers: First, being based on proximity is distinguished from skipping across, whether skipping just one, skipping two, or skipping many. Second, being based on forward order is distinguished from reverse order, only taking ignorance as a condition for volitional formations, not taking volitional formations as a condition for ignorance, and so forth. Third, being based on non-confusion is distinguished from confusion. As when the Samuccaya states: "Taking ignorance with respect to volitional formations selects the seed of volitional formations within ignorance to be ignorance, and hence it is confused." Fourth, being spoken of based on actual dependent origination is distinguished from nominal explanation, such as the aforementioned habit-energy of karma concomitant with ignorance, which in reality is the seed of volitional formations, but nominally called ignorance. The latter two meanings are broadly the same with minor differences. The phrase "different from this, in relation to one another their serving as conditions is indeterminate" refers to differing from the above four meanings, which is precisely what was distinguished in the preceding commentary notes, since it differs from skipping across and so forth. The commentary says: "Because their forward and reverse each have sequential order and skipping over intervals." First, with reference to the first, skipping across: for instance, ignorance with respect to the five starting with consciousness and with respect to becoming has only an empowering [condition], because it can only generate their seeds. Ignorance with respect to craving, clinging, and aging-and-death has two conditions, namely the objective condition and the empowering condition. All remaining conditions can be known by following this. Second, with reference to reverse order, there are also adjacent sequences and skipping across, which are now explained together. Aging-and-death with respect to birth, craving, clinging, volitional formations, and ignorance has two conditions, namely the objective and empowering conditions; with the rest, it is only empowering. Third, if they are confused, there are two: first, forward; second, reverse. In the forward, there are adjacent sequences and skipping across. Adjacent sequence is like that in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, which is the aforementioned ignorance with respect to volitional formations. Skipping across does not differ from the previous actual conditions, and is also spoken of in terms of the five seeds of consciousness and so forth. If spoken of in terms of future arising, it is according to its proper application. In the reverse order, there are adjacent and intervening; this should be inferred through reflection. The above is spoken of in terms of actual dependent origination, while this is spoken of in terms of the empowering [condition]; yet there are distant and close, and one should apply this to each and every link. However, here the five starting with consciousness are based on their state of future arising; with the various links skipping across, in reverse order, and leaping across intervals being mixed as conditions, each can be understood through reflection, so they need not be set forth at length.

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大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 — Classical Chinese