勝鬘寶窟 3.35

3.35

上來第一廣明二見；「顛倒眾生」下，第二次明顛倒。顛倒眾生者，舉倒見人也。「於五受陰」，是倒見處，謂是有漏五陰也。「無常常」等，是倒見相。別就常倒中有三：一無常者，是倒所迷法；二言常者，是倒所建立；三言想者，是倒想也。體是真見，通名說想。又無為有，故名為想。常倒既爾，餘三亦然。通而論之，於五陰同起四倒；別則迷色起於淨倒、迷受起樂、迷識起常、迷想迷行起於我倒。問：五陰實是無常苦等，凡夫何緣計為常等？答：如《雜心》云「以其相似相續覆故，計之為常。威儀覆故，計以為樂。作業覆故，計以為我。薄皮覆故，計以為淨。」問：經中說生死法，具有五義：無常、苦、空、無我、不淨。今此何故偏說四種，翻為四倒？答。此等離合故爾。若就生死無我法中分二無我，則有五義，如《成實》說：眾生空者，名之為空法。法體空者，說為無我。如《維摩》中，眾生空者說為無我，法體空者名之為空。故彼經言「眾生是道場，知無我故。一切法是道場，知諸法空故。」由分此二，故有五義。翻對此五，倒亦應爾；言此今合故，但云四耳。問：凡夫起我倒，是何等我？答：是人我也。今明無我者，人無我也。又問：無我理通染淨，今此何故偏說生死以為無我，翻之為倒？答：然我無我，通局不定。凡有四種：一就解惑二情相對，生死有我、涅槃無我。以著我故，世間受生，故說有我；離我不生，便證涅槃，故說無我。故《地經》言「世間受生，皆以著我；若離著我，則無有生。」斯文顯矣。二就法相虛實相對，生死無我、涅槃有我。生死之法虛誑不實，又不自在，故名無我；涅槃真實，具八自在，故說有我。故經說言「生死無常，無我樂淨，涅槃之法常樂我淨。」三據如理二俱無我，故經言「凡夫我空，乃至諸佛，生死法空乃至涅槃者。」四就假用及實以論生死涅槃二俱有我。生死我者有其二種：一者世諦假名之我，謂五陰法和合為人，故經說言「眾生佛性不離六法。六法者，所謂五陰及我。」二實性之我，故經說言「二十五有有我不耶？佛言有我，我者所謂如來藏性。」生死之中具斯二我，涅槃亦爾。諸德和合，名之為佛，是其假我；窮其體實，即是性我。我無我義，通局如是。今據第二，故說生死一向無我，翻之宣說取我為倒也。「一切阿羅漢」下，上來明凡夫二見及顛倒，從此下釋二乘上智。就文為二：初明二乘不見真實；從「或有眾生信佛語」下，第二明有能信之人。「淨智」者，對前凡夫二見及顛倒之垢，故名淨智。「於一切智境界」者，一諦理是一切智之境界。「及如來法身」者，是佛界德。二乘雖有淨智，本不見此二也。

The above was the first [part], which extensively explained the two views; from "inverted sentient beings" onward is the second, explaining inversion. "Inverted sentient beings" brings up the persons with inverted views. "In the five appropriated aggregates" is the locus of inverted views, namely the defiled five aggregates. "Permanence in the impermanent" and so forth are the characteristics of inverted views. Specifically regarding the inversion of permanence, there are three [aspects]: first, "impermanent" is the phenomenon regarding which the inversion is confused; second, "permanent" is what is established by the inversion; third, "conception" (saṃjñā) is the inverted conception. In essence it is actually a view, but is collectively designated "conception"; alternatively, taking what is non-existent to be existent is therefore called "conception." Since the inversion of permanence is like this, the remaining three are likewise. Considered generally, all four inversions are generated regarding the five aggregates; specifically, however, one generates the inversion of purity through delusion regarding form, the inversion of pleasure through delusion regarding sensation, the inversion of permanence through delusion regarding consciousness, and the inversion of self through delusion regarding conception and volition. Question: The five aggregates are in truth impermanent, suffering, and so on; for what reason do ordinary persons grasp them as permanent and the rest? Answer: As the Za xin [lun] (Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya) states: "Because they are obscured by resemblance and continuity, one grasps them as permanent; because they are obscured by deportment, one grasps them as pleasure; because they are obscured by intentional actions, one grasps them as self; because they are obscured by thin skin, one grasps them as pure." Question: Sūtras speak of the phenomena of saṃsāra as possessing five meanings: impermanence, suffering, emptiness, non-self, and impurity. Why here are only four kinds spoken of, turned into four inversions? Answer: This is due to their division or combination. If regarding the phenomena of non-self in saṃsāra one distinguishes two kinds of non-self, then there are five meanings, as the Chengshi [lun] (Tattvasiddhi-śāstra) explains: emptiness of sentient beings is called the emptiness of phenomena, while the emptiness of the intrinsic essence of phenomena is spoken of as non-self. As in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra, emptiness of sentient beings is spoken of as non-self, and emptiness of the intrinsic essence of phenomena is termed emptiness. Therefore that sūtra states: "Sentient beings are the site of awakening (bodhimaṇḍa), because one knows non-self; all phenomena are the site of awakening, because one knows the emptiness of all phenomena." It is from dividing these two that there are five meanings. Corresponding to these five, inversions should also be likewise; it is because here they are combined that only four are mentioned. Question: When an ordinary person generates the inversion of self, what kind of self is it? Answer: It is the self of persons (pudgala). What is clarified here as non-self is the non-self of persons (pudgalanairātmya). Question: The principle of non-self pervades both the defiled and the pure; why here is saṃsāra alone spoken of as non-self, which when inverted is [made into an inversion]? Answer: Indeed, self and non-self are not fixed in their general or restricted [applications]. Broadly there are four kinds: First, contrasting the two states of understanding and delusion, saṃsāra has self and nirvāṇa has no self. Because of attachment to self, one takes birth in the world, hence it is said to have self; free from self one is not born and then realizes nirvāṇa, hence it is said to have no self. Therefore the Daśabhūmika-sūtra states: "Taking birth in the world is all due to attachment to self; if one is free from attachment to self, there is no birth." This text is obvious. Second, contrasting the unreal and real of phenomenal marks, saṃsāra has no self and nirvāṇa has a self. The phenomena of saṃsāra are deceptive and unreal, and also not autonomous (svatantra), hence they are called non-self; nirvāṇa is real and possesses the eight sovereign masteries, hence it is said to have a self. Therefore the sūtras state: "Saṃsāra is impermanent, without self, pleasure, or purity; the phenomena of nirvāṇa are permanent, blissful, self, and pure." Third, based on the principle of suchness, both are non-self; therefore the sūtras state: "The self of ordinary persons is empty, up to and including the buddhas; the phenomena of saṃsāra are empty, up to and including nirvāṇa." Fourth, in terms of conventional function and ultimate reality, both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa possess a self. The self in saṃsāra has two kinds: the first is the conventional self of worldly truth, meaning the combination of the five aggregate dharmas into a person, hence the sūtras state: "The buddha-nature of sentient beings is not separate from the six dharmas; the six dharmas are the so-called five aggregates and the self"; the second is the self of real nature, hence the sūtras state: "Is there a self in the twenty-five states of existence, or not? The Buddha said: 'There is a self; the self is the nature of the tathāgatagarbha.'" Saṃsāra possesses these two selves, and nirvāṇa is also like this: the harmonious combination of all virtues is named Buddha, which is its conventional self; exhausting its essence and reality, that is the self of nature. The meanings of self and non-self have such broad and narrow applications. Here, based on the second [perspective], saṃsāra is said to be exclusively non-self, and turning it around to grasp a self is proclaimed to be an inversion. From "all arhats" onward: the above explained the ordinary persons' two views and inversions; from here downward explains the superior wisdom of the two vehicles. In the text there are two parts: first, clarifying that the two vehicles do not see the real; from "or there are sentient beings who have faith in the Buddha's words" onward is the second, clarifying that there are persons capable of faith. "Pure wisdom" is named pure wisdom in contrast to the prior defilements of the ordinary persons' two views and inversions. "The realm of omniscient wisdom" means that the principle of the one truth is the realm of omniscient wisdom (sarvajñāna). "And the tathāgata's dharmakāya" is the virtue of the buddha-realm. Although the two vehicles possess pure wisdom, they fundamentally do not see these two.