勝鬘寶窟 3.39

3.39

「出世間上上第一義依所謂滅諦」者，上來明小乘依，今對小依以辨大依。從此文始，正是〈一依章〉。小乘一滅諦已名為上，今大乘過於彼上，故云上上。以上上故，名第一義。「所謂滅諦」者，前對小明大，今出依體也。此釋無前二失，復得大乘義分明。「世尊生死依如來藏」，江南諸師從此下是〈顛倒真實章〉。顛倒是生死、真實是一依，明本在因中能為生死依作持建立，是為顛倒依於真實。今但存略，故云顛倒真實。今謂此章實是〈顛倒真實章〉，但釋顛倒真實與南北義不同。若言生死是顛倒、如來藏是真實，與上空義隱覆是復何異？空義隱覆，亦明能覆是虛妄不實、所覆是實。又與下自性清淨心煩惱隱覆，此復何異？今所釋者，依如來藏有生死。作此說者，名為善說，是不顛倒。若三種眾生，外道、二乘、空亂意菩薩，不依如來藏而有生死。作此說者，名曰顛倒。問：此章何故不屬一依？答。〈一依章〉對昔小乘依非究竟，明今常住一依究竟。今文乃對三種人不依如來藏有生死是顛倒，依如來藏有生死是不顛倒，故不屬〈一依章〉。此章為二：一明真實、二者明顛倒。真實中為二：初略明真實、次廣明真實。各有三句。初三者，一明依如來藏有生死、二以如來藏故說生死本際不可知、三明能如上說當於道理名不顛倒。問：此與上〈一依〉何異？答：上是境為智依，今明染淨依。又前亦得是顯為顯依，今亦得是隱為顯依。境為智依，一實諦境，能生一實智，故境為智依。問：何以得知境為智依？答：上明二乘四依智，乃至二乘果智，依有量滅諦境。既非究竟，故智亦非究竟。為對彼故，明無作滅諦是究竟，能生究竟智故，故境為智依。又前明顯法為依者，滅諦顯現為如來所證，故前云「一切智境界及如來法身」。又前是能生依，以境能生智故；後明依持名依，非佛性能生生死。就前釋依，以依憑為依；就後釋依，以依持為依。後以隱法為顯依者，如來藏即是隱，能為生死顯法作依。「生死依如來藏」者，為對外道小乘人及餘大乘人，不依如來藏有生死故，今明依如來藏有生死。外道有二人：一執邪因、二執無因。執邪因中，一計人為因、次計法為因。計人為因者有二種：一計自在天為生死之因、二計神我為生死因。計法為因，或計世性、或計塵微為生死因。言無因者，謂自然而有生死。今為對彼邪因無因，故說生死依如來藏，故如來藏為其本因。二小乘及餘大乘人，但知依結業而有生死，此但得末、未窮本。今為對彼故，明依如來藏故有生死。又欲明一切眾生有佛性義，故說依如來藏有生死。「以如來藏故說本際不可知」者，此是第二句釋上依義。既明由如來藏有生死，如來藏本際無始不可知。依藏有生死，生死亦無始，本際不可知。若不依藏有生死，則不可無始來有生死也。有人言：佛性無始、生死有始。始應可知，但與佛性合用，故云本際不可知。又釋佛性無始、生死有始，背佛性故有生死，須見佛性方了生死之始。唯佛能見其始，十地亦不知其始，故云本際不可知。問：龍樹云「生死有始無始，皆是邪見。」今何故偏言生死無始？答：雖二俱邪見，但為破眾生有始，故說無始。無始者，欲明其有因義。又《中論》中，佛說無始者，欲明空義。既其無有始，亦無中間、亦無有終，無中無終，故無生死。有言其無始者，欲明無有始，非謂有無始，是故無始辨生死實。不作此解，則是邪見。「世尊如來藏故說生死是名善說」者，此第三句。能如是上說信依如來藏有生死，此是當理之言，名為善說，即是真實。若如外道二乘所說者，名不善說。又舉能說是善，顯所說不虛。

"The supramundane, supreme, ultimate refuge is the so-called cessation truth": previously the Hīnayāna refuge was clarified; now, in contrast to the lesser refuge, the Great Refuge is distinguished. Beginning with this passage is precisely the "Chapter on the Single Refuge". The single cessation truth of the Hīnayāna is already called "supreme"; now the Mahāyāna surpasses even that, hence it is called "supreme of the supreme" (supramundane, supreme). Because it is supreme of the supreme, it is called "ultimate". "The so-called cessation truth": previously the Mahāyāna was clarified in contrast to the Small; now the substance of the refuge is presented. This explanation avoids the previous two flaws and furthermore makes the Mahāyāna meaning clear.

"World-Honored One, saṃsāra relies on the tathāgatagarbha": the masters south of the Yangtze consider that from this point downward is the "Chapter on Inversion and Reality". "Inversion" is saṃsāra, and "reality" is the single refuge; clarifying that the root in the cause can serve as the refuge, support, and foundation for saṃsāra is inversion relying on reality. Here it is simply abbreviated, hence called "Inversion and Reality". We now state that this chapter is indeed the "Chapter on Inversion and Reality", but the interpretation of inversion and reality differs between the southern and northern doctrines. If one says that saṃsāra is inversion and the tathāgatagarbha is reality, how would this differ from the above explanation of the concealment of the meaning of emptiness? The concealment of the meaning of emptiness also clarifies that what conceals is false and unreal, while what is concealed is real. And how would it differ from the later concealment of the prakṛtiprabhāsvara-citta by defilements? What is now explained is: saṃsāra exists relying on the tathāgatagarbha. Making this statement is called a good explanation; it is non-inversion. If the three kinds of sentient beings—heterodox non-Buddhists, the two vehicles, and bodhisattvas whose minds are confused about emptiness—hold that saṃsāra exists without relying on the tathāgatagarbha, making such a statement is called inversion.

Question: Why does this chapter not belong to the single refuge?
Answer: The "Chapter on the Single Refuge" contrasts the past Hīnayāna refuge as non-ultimate with the present permanently abiding single refuge as ultimate. The present text, however, contrasts the three kinds of persons who hold that saṃsāra exists without relying on the tathāgatagarbha as inversion with holding that saṃsāra exists relying on the tathāgatagarbha as non-inversion; therefore it does not belong to the "Chapter on the Single Refuge".

This chapter has two parts: first, clarifying reality; second, clarifying inversion. Within reality there are two parts: first, briefly clarifying reality; next, extensively clarifying reality. Each has three sentences.

The first three are: 1. clarifying that saṃsāra exists relying on the tathāgatagarbha; 2. stating that because of the tathāgatagarbha, the beginning of saṃsāra is unknowable; 3. clarifying that being able to explain as above accords with reason and is called non-inversion.

Question: How does this differ from the preceding single refuge?
Answer: The preceding was the object serving as the refuge for wisdom; the present clarifies the refuge of defilement and purity. Furthermore, the preceding could also be the manifest serving as the refuge for the manifest; the present can also be the hidden serving as the refuge for the manifest. When the object serves as the refuge for wisdom, the object of the single real truth can generate the single real wisdom, hence the object serves as the refuge for wisdom.

Question: How is it known that the object serves as the refuge for wisdom?
Answer: Above it was clarified that the wisdom of the four refuges of the two vehicles, up to the fruition wisdom of the two vehicles, relies on the limited object of the cessation truth. Since it is not ultimate, their wisdom is also not ultimate. To counter them, it clarifies that the unconditioned cessation truth is ultimate and can generate ultimate wisdom; therefore the object serves as the refuge for wisdom. Furthermore, regarding the previously clarified manifest dharma serving as refuge: the cessation truth is manifest as that which is realized by the Tathāgata, hence it was stated above: "the sphere of omniscient wisdom and the dharmakāya of the Tathāgata". Moreover, the preceding is an originative refuge, because the object can generate wisdom; the latter clarifies reliance and support as refuge, not that the buddhadhātu can generate saṃsāra. Regarding the earlier explanation of refuge, it takes relying upon as refuge; regarding the later explanation of refuge, it takes supporting and maintaining as refuge. Regarding the later hidden dharma serving as the refuge for the manifest: the tathāgatagarbha is hidden, yet can serve as the refuge for the manifest dharma of saṃsāra.

"Saṃsāra relies on the tathāgatagarbha": in order to counter heterodox non-Buddhists, Hīnayāna practitioners, and other Mahāyāna practitioners who hold that saṃsāra exists without relying on the tathāgatagarbha, it is now clarified that saṃsāra exists relying on the tathāgatagarbha. There are two kinds of heterodox non-Buddhists: those who cling to a wrong cause, and those who cling to no cause. Among those clinging to a wrong cause, first are those who posit a person as the cause, and next are those who posit a principle as the cause. Those positing a person as the cause are of two types: first, positing Maheśvara as the cause of saṃsāra; second, positing a spiritual self (puruṣa) as the cause of saṃsāra. Those positing a principle as the cause either posit primordial nature (prakṛti) or minute atoms (paramāṇu) as the cause of saṃsāra. Those speaking of no cause maintain that saṃsāra exists spontaneously. Now, to counter their wrong causes and lack of cause, it is said that saṃsāra relies on the tathāgatagarbha; thus the tathāgatagarbha is its fundamental cause. Second, Hīnayāna practitioners and other Mahāyāna practitioners only know that saṃsāra exists relying on defilements and karma; this grasps only the branches without exhausting the root. Now, to counter them, it is clarified that saṃsāra exists because of relying on the tathāgatagarbha. Furthermore, wishing to clarify the meaning that all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu, it is stated that saṃsāra exists relying on the tathāgatagarbha.

"Because of the tathāgatagarbha, it is said that the beginning is unknowable": this is the second sentence, explaining the above meaning of reliance. Having clarified that saṃsāra exists due to the tathāgatagarbha, the beginning of the tathāgatagarbha is beginningless and unknowable. Relying on the garbha there is saṃsāra, so saṃsāra is also beginningless, and its beginning is unknowable. If saṃsāra did not rely on the garbha, it could not have existed since beginningless time. Some say: the buddhadhātu is beginningless, while saṃsāra has a beginning. The beginning should be knowable, but because it functions in union with the buddhadhātu, it is said that its beginning is unknowable. Others also explain: the buddhadhātu is beginningless, while saṃsāra has a beginning; because of turning away from the buddhadhātu there is saṃsāra, and one must see the buddhadhātu to comprehend the beginning of saṃsāra. Only a buddha can see its beginning; even those on the tenth bhūmi do not know its beginning; hence it is said that the beginning is unknowable.

Question: Nāgārjuna says, "Whether saṃsāra has a beginning or is beginningless, both are wrong views." Why now is it specifically said that saṃsāra is beginningless?
Answer: Although both are wrong views, merely to refute sentient beings' view of a beginning, it is said to be beginningless. Calling it beginningless is intended to clarify the meaning that it has a cause. Furthermore, in the Madhyamakaśāstra, when the Buddha speaks of beginninglessness, it is intended to clarify the meaning of emptiness. Since it has no beginning, it also has no middle and no end; having neither middle nor end, there is no saṃsāra. When some say it is beginningless, it is to clarify that there is no beginning, not to assert that there exists a beginninglessness; therefore beginninglessness distinguishes the reality of saṃsāra. If one does not interpret it in this way, it is a wrong view.

"World-Honored One, that saṃsāra is spoken of because of the tathāgatagarbha is called a good explanation": this is the third sentence. Being able to explain thus and have faith that saṃsāra exists relying on the tathāgatagarbha is speech that accords with reason, is called a good explanation, and is reality itself. What is spoken by heterodox non-Buddhists and the two vehicles is called not a good explanation. Furthermore, raising that the explanation is good reveals that what is explained is not vain.