勝鬘寶窟 3.44

3.44

「何以故」下，第二破其七法自能作依持之義。小乘及餘大乘人云：妄心自能造於善惡，何須依藏？下對破之。破中有三：一「此六識及心法智」者，牒小乘人七法；二「此七法剎那不住」者，第二正破；三「不能種眾苦」下，正明不能起於染淨。「於此六識及心法智」者，有人言：六識者，六是事識。及心法智，是第七識。迷時名心，解名法智。第八名藏識，是阿利耶。此造疏人，不見《攝論》謂第七識名法智。《攝論》第八識名阿陀那，此云無解識，豈得稱法智耶？今所明者，六識不異舊。及心法智，能厭苦樂求涅槃，何須佛性？「此七法剎那不住」者，第二破。以念念不住，故不能起於染淨也。「不種眾苦」者，明六七心不能種有生死苦也。「不厭苦求涅槃」者，明六七心不能厭苦樂求涅槃得解脫也。舊法師多作此釋。今謂不爾。所以舉此七法者，舉六識，明不能起染淨及以種苦；舉心法智，明不能厭苦樂涅槃。故《楞伽》說「六七不受苦樂，非涅槃因」也。六七不受苦樂者，猶是不種苦。非涅槃因，猶是不厭苦求涅槃也。待至後釋。然經論中釋染淨緣起要有四別：一約緣不約佛性、二約佛性不約緣、三亦約緣亦約佛性、四不約緣不約佛性。一約緣不約佛性者，只由六七妄緣，不由如來藏。此小乘教及大乘教相中，彰染淨緣中因果自招感故有，都不言由藏實而有。如是一切。二明約佛性不約緣。染淨之興，只由藏實，不言從緣而有。此如《楞伽》說「六七非受苦樂，非涅槃因。藏識受苦樂，是涅槃因。」如是一切。今此說二同彼也。三明亦約緣亦約佛性者，此亦如《楞伽》說「藏識海常住，境界風所轉，種種諸識浪，騰躍而轉生。如海水起波浪，非異非不異。佛性亦爾，心俱和合生，亦非異非不異。」如是一切。故知真妄和合，方起染淨。海水起波浪非異非不異者，彰不可水外求波、波外求水，故言不異。而波息水靜，故言非不異也。佛性亦爾，心俱和合生非異非不異者，彰佛性與六七妄心和合生時，不可真外求妄、妄外求真，故言不異；而妄盡真顯，故言非不異。亦可在緣常靜，故言非不異。《法華論》云「不即眾生界、不離眾生界，有如來藏性。」故經言「佛性雖在陰界入中，而不同陰界入」也。四不約緣不約佛性者，實相之外無緣故，無染淨法可起。此如《金剛波若論》說「平等真法界，佛不度眾生。以無佛為能度，無眾生為所度。」又如《佛地論》說「煩惱妄想中，無一法可滅。清淨法中，無一法可增。」泯上三門，歸乎一絕。「世尊如來藏者」，此第二對邪顯正，即是對顛倒明真實。舉如來藏，明有如來藏故得厭苦樂求涅槃。有三：一「如來藏者」，舉法實體。二「無前際」下，辨能起染淨所以。良由藏體無前際等，故能起染淨。無前際，明本有義。以本有故，無始起修滅，能為染淨因也。三「種眾苦」下，正明能起染淨。問：由佛性故得厭苦樂求涅槃，此事可爾。若由佛法性種眾苦者，豈非佛性力故令眾生種生死苦？若言不由佛性力種生死苦，亦應不由佛性力樂求涅槃。又若不由佛性力種眾苦者，即是七法種苦，云何言七法一念不住不得種眾苦耶？答：須解此章大意。此章為破外道二乘人不知有佛性，欲勸一切眾生信有佛性，故說由佛性故得厭眾苦樂求涅槃。問：勸信之言有餘，而釋經意不足。若由佛性得種眾苦，即是佛性令物受苦。此乃是同於魔性，何名佛性？答：此乃明有佛性眾生，故得種眾苦，非是佛性令其種苦。亦明佛性眾生令其厭苦，非是佛性令其厭苦。如有海水，風吹成浪，非是海水令其成浪者。亦應非佛性種苦及厭苦，但顛倒妄緣種苦及厭苦。則違前文。答：雖因風成浪，終由有海。雖因妄心種苦及厭苦，終由有佛性，故說佛性為本。故說由佛性故種苦厭苦也。

From "Why is that?" onward: the second part refutes their notion that the seven dharmas can of themselves serve as a support. Followers of the Small Vehicle and other Mahāyānists say: "The deluded mind can of itself generate good and evil; why is there any need to rely on the [tathāgata]garbha?" Below, this is refuted in response. Within the refutation there are three parts: 1. "these six consciousnesses and the mental-dharma cognition" adduces the seven dharmas of the Small Vehicle adherents; 2. "these seven dharmas do not abide for an instant" is the second, the direct refutation; 3. from "they cannot plant the manifold sufferings" onward directly explains that they cannot give rise to defilement and purity. Regarding "these six consciousnesses and the mental-dharma cognition": someone said, "The six consciousnesses are the six phenomenal consciousnesses. The mental-dharma cognition is the seventh consciousness. In delusion it is called 'mind'; in awakening it is called 'dharma-cognition'. The eighth is called the storehouse consciousness, which is the ālaya." This commentator had not seen that the Mahāyānasaṃgraha calls the seventh consciousness dharma-cognition, while the eighth consciousness in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha is named ādāna, which is translated here as the "non-understanding consciousness"—how could it ever be called dharma-cognition? What is explained now is: the six consciousnesses do not differ from the old [interpretation]; as for the mental-dharma cognition, [they claim] it can feel revulsion toward suffering and take joy in seeking nirvāṇa, so why is there any need for buddhadhātu? "These seven dharmas do not abide for an instant": this is the second part, the refutation. Because they do not abide from thought-moment to thought-moment, they cannot give rise to defilement and purity. "Do not plant the manifold sufferings": this explains that the sixth and seventh minds cannot plant the suffering of saṃsāric existence. "Do not feel revulsion toward suffering and seek nirvāṇa": this explains that the sixth and seventh minds cannot feel revulsion toward suffering, take joy in seeking nirvāṇa, and attain liberation. Former masters mostly gave this explanation. Now I say this is not so. The reason these seven dharmas are cited is: citing the six consciousnesses explains that they cannot give rise to defilement and purity or plant suffering; citing the mental-dharma cognition explains that it cannot feel revulsion toward suffering and take joy in nirvāṇa. Therefore the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra says: "The sixth and seventh do not experience suffering and joy, and are not the cause of nirvāṇa." That the sixth and seventh do not experience suffering and joy corresponds to not planting suffering; that they are not the cause of nirvāṇa corresponds to not feeling revulsion toward suffering and seeking nirvāṇa. This will await later explanation. However, in the sūtras and treatises, explanations of the dependent origination of defilement and purity necessarily have four distinctions: 1. in terms of conditions and not in terms of buddhadhātu; 2. in terms of buddhadhātu and not in terms of conditions; 3. in terms of both conditions and buddhadhātu; 4. in terms of neither conditions nor buddhadhātu. 1. "In terms of conditions and not in terms of buddhadhātu": it is due solely to the deluded conditions of the sixth and seventh [consciousnesses], and not due to the tathāgatagarbha. This is found in the teachings of the Small Vehicle and in the doctrine of the Mahāyāna, showing that within the conditions of defilement and purity causes and effects naturally attract each other and therefore exist, without stating at all that they exist on the basis of the reality of the [tathāgata]garbha. All such are of this kind. 2. Explaining "in terms of buddhadhātu and not in terms of conditions": the emergence of defilement and purity is due solely to the reality of the [tathāgata]garbha, and is not said to exist from conditions. This is like the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra stating: "The sixth and seventh do not experience suffering and joy, and are not the cause of nirvāṇa. The storehouse consciousness experiences suffering and joy, and is the cause of nirvāṇa." All such are of this kind. What is said here in the second [case] is identical to that. 3. Explaining "in terms of both conditions and buddhadhātu": this is also like the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra saying: "The ocean of the storehouse consciousness permanently abides; stirred by the winds of objects, the waves of the various consciousnesses leap up and arise in succession. Just as waves rising on ocean water are neither different nor non-different, so it is with buddhadhātu: born in conjunction with the mind, it is also neither different nor non-different." All such are of this kind. Thus we know that when the real and the deluded unite, only then do defilement and purity arise. That the waves rising on ocean water are neither different nor non-different shows that one cannot seek waves outside water or seek water outside waves, hence they are said to be not different; yet when the waves cease the water is calm, hence they are said to be not non-different. So it is with buddhadhātu: born in conjunction with the mind being neither different nor non-different shows that when buddhadhātu is born in conjunction with the deluded minds of the sixth and seventh, one cannot seek delusion outside the real or seek the real outside delusion, hence they are said to be not different; yet when delusion is exhausted the real is revealed, hence they are said to be not non-different. It can also mean that while amidst conditions it is permanently calm, hence it is said to be not non-different. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa says: "Neither identical to the realm of sentient beings nor separate from the realm of sentient beings, there is the nature of the tathāgatagarbha." Therefore the sūtra says: "Although buddhadhātu is within the aggregates, realms, and bases, it is not the same as the aggregates, realms, and bases." 4. "In terms of neither conditions nor buddhadhātu": outside the true nature of reality there are no conditions, so no dharmas of defilement or purity can arise. This is like the Vajracchedikā-śāstra saying: "In the equal, true dharmadhātu, the Buddha does not deliver sentient beings, because there is no Buddha as the deliverer and no sentient beings as the delivered." It is also like the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra saying: "Amidst afflictions and conceptual constructions, not a single dharma can be extinguished; amidst pure dharmas, not a single dharma can be increased." Eradicating the above three gates, it returns to a single absolute. Regarding "World-Honoured One, the tathāgatagarbha": this is the second part, revealing the correct in contrast to the heterodox, which is clarifying the real in contrast to the inverted. Adducing the tathāgatagarbha clarifies that because there is the tathāgatagarbha, one can feel revulsion toward suffering and take joy in seeking nirvāṇa. It has three parts: 1. "the tathāgatagarbha" adduces the actual substance of the dharma; 2. from "without prior limit" onward explains the reason why it can give rise to defilement and purity: precisely because the substance of the [tathāgata]garbha is without prior limit and so forth, it can give rise to defilement and purity. "Without prior limit" clarifies the meaning of original existence: because it exists originally, it has no beginning, cultivation, or cessation, and can serve as the cause of defilement and purity; 3. from "planting the manifold sufferings" onward directly explains that it can give rise to defilement and purity. Question: That one can feel revulsion toward suffering and take joy in seeking nirvāṇa due to buddhadhātu may well be so. But if it is due to the buddha-dharmanature that one plants the manifold sufferings, is it not the power of buddhadhātu that causes sentient beings to plant the suffering of saṃsāra? If one says that one does not plant the suffering of saṃsāra due to the power of buddhadhātu, then likewise one should not take joy in seeking nirvāṇa due to the power of buddhadhātu. Furthermore, if one does not plant the manifold sufferings due to the power of buddhadhātu, then it must be the seven dharmas that plant suffering; why then say that because the seven dharmas do not abide for a single thought-moment they cannot plant the manifold sufferings? Answer: One must understand the main intent of this section. This section is to refute the non-Buddhists and followers of the two vehicles who do not know that there is buddhadhātu, and wishes to exhort all sentient beings to have faith that there is buddhadhātu; therefore it says that due to buddhadhātu one can feel revulsion toward manifold sufferings and take joy in seeking nirvāṇa. Question: The words exhorting faith are ample, but they are insufficient to explain the meaning of the sūtra. If it is due to buddhadhātu that one can plant the manifold sufferings, then it is buddhadhātu that causes beings to experience suffering. This would make it identical to demonic nature—how could it be called buddhadhātu? Answer: This merely explains that because there are sentient beings who possess buddhadhātu, they can plant the manifold sufferings; it is not that buddhadhātu causes them to plant suffering. It also explains that sentient beings who possess buddhadhātu are caused to feel revulsion toward suffering; it is not that buddhadhātu itself causes them to feel revulsion toward suffering. It is just like having ocean water: when the wind blows it forms waves, but it is not the ocean water that causes them to become waves. [Objection:] Then likewise, it should not be buddhadhātu that plants suffering and feels revulsion toward suffering, but only inverted deluded conditions that plant suffering and feel revulsion toward suffering; yet that contradicts the previous text. Answer: Although the waves are formed due to the wind, they ultimately depend on the existence of the ocean. Although suffering is planted and revulsion toward suffering is felt due to the deluded mind, it ultimately depends on the existence of buddhadhātu; hence buddhadhātu is said to be the root. Therefore it is said that due to buddhadhātu one plants suffering and feels revulsion toward suffering.