勝鬘寶窟 2.43.1

2.43.1

From "World-Honoured One" onward: the preceding section was the first, briefly explaining refuge and fear; now the second extensively explains refuge and fear. Within the text there are two parts: from the beginning to "boundless and uninterrupted" it extensively explains fear; from "the Tathāgata abiding for an unlimited time" onward it extensively explains taking refuge. The first part also has two sections: first, it directly clarifies the reason why arhats and pratyekabuddhas have fear; second, from "the knowledge that there is no subsequent rebirth" onward, it integrates the Small into the Great. Because they have fear, in the end they must enter the Great. The slight difference between this and the earlier integration of worldly wholesome dharmas is that the earlier worldly wholesome dharmas were simply adduced to be integrated; here, in integrating the supramundane, it extensively strips away [their claim to] ultimacy before integrating them. Why is this? It intends to show that the two vehicles do not cling to worldly wholesome dharmas as ultimate, so there was no need to strip them away to reveal that they are not ultimate, and they were simply adduced and integrated; but the two vehicles cling to supramundane dharmas as ultimate, so it must strip them away to reveal that they are not ultimate, and only then integrate them. Furthermore, it is a complementary expression showing the intention, also illustrating that the meanings of integration are manifold. First, stating that "arhats and pratyekabuddhas have fear" restates the earlier [mention of] fear. From "therefore, arhats…" onward, it extensively explains. Why is an extensive explanation needed? Previously it was said that arhats abide in the idea of fear regarding all non-practice, but it was not yet known what kinds of practice they lack; therefore an extensive explanation is needed, meaning they lack the practice of wisdom and nirvāṇa. Because they lack the four wisdoms, the practice of wisdom is not accomplished; because they lack nirvāṇa, the practice of cessation is insufficient. Furthermore, lacking the four wisdoms, the practice of the path is not complete; lacking nirvāṇa, the practice of eradication is insufficient. Again, lacking the four wisdoms, bodhi is not complete; lacking nirvāṇa, nirvāṇa is not ultimate. Furthermore, lacking the four wisdoms, conditioned merits are not fulfilled; lacking nirvāṇa, unconditioned merits are not complete. Again, within the text there are two parts: first, it directly clarifies that the four wisdoms of the two vehicles are not complete and their nirvāṇa is not fulfilled; second, from "Why is this? Only the Tathāgata…" onward, it explains the reason why the two vehicles do not attain them, because they do not accomplish all virtues. Within the first, it first clarifies that the four wisdoms are incomplete, and next reveals that nirvāṇa is unfulfilled. Now stating "therefore arhats and pratyekabuddhas" restates those persons who do not possess the four wisdoms. Question: Why did the preceding text not reveal the pratyekabuddha and only reveal the arhat, whereas here both persons are adduced together? Answer: Truly, because pratyekabuddhas appear in an age without a Buddha, in the present they do not show reliance on the Buddha, though they may have reliance in the past and future; unlike arhats, who rely on the Buddha at all times. Therefore, in the earlier revelation of relying on the Buddha, it did not reveal the pratyekabuddha but only revealed the arhat; now, both persons equally possess these four wisdoms and nirvāṇa, so it adduces both persons together, stripping away their ultimacy: because remaining dharmas of rebirth are not exhausted, the knowledge that "my births are exhausted" is not ultimate. Within this, it first briefly explains the meaning and characteristics of the four wisdoms, and then explains the meaning of the four wisdoms. It is analysed and explained through three gateways: first, explaining the difference between the meaning and object-conditions of the four wisdoms; second, distinguishing them according to the knowledge of the four truths; third, distinguishing them according to the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising. As for the difference between meaning and object-conditions: in the arhat's wisdom of contemplation on the principle in the stage of non-learning, in thought-moment after thought-moment it completely possesses these four kinds of semantic functions, from "my births are exhausted" up to "there is no subsequent rebirth." Just as a single thought-moment of vigor can diligently sever two unwholesome things and diligently cultivate two wholesome things. However, when the wisdom of contemplation on the principle possessing these four semantic functions is present, there are not the four kinds of object-directed minds; later, when emerging from contemplation into phenomenal matters, there are the four kinds of object-directed minds—taking their own wisdom's capacity as object: "my births are exhausted, the holy life is established, what was to be done has been accomplished, and there is no subsequent rebirth"—yet they lack the four kinds of semantic functions. If discussed within the Mahāyāna, the Buddha and great bodhisattvas contemplate both truths simultaneously without the difference of entering and emerging from contemplation. As for the distinction in meaning: the contemplation of the ultimate truth completely possesses these four semantic functions without the four kinds of object-directed minds; the contemplation of conventional truth has the four kinds of object-directed minds without the four semantic functions. Distinguishing according to the four truths: according to the *Vibhāṣā-śāstra*, "my births are exhausted" is the knowledge of origin; "the holy life is established" is the knowledge of the path; "what was to be done has been accomplished" is the knowledge of cessation; and "there is no subsequent rebirth" is the knowledge of suffering. That treatise merely assigns them distinctively to the four truths according to their characteristics; in reality, each and every truth completely possesses these four kinds of semantic functions: "my births are exhausted" up to "there is no subsequent rebirth." As for distinguishing them according to the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising: the various masters in the *Vibhāṣā* differ, stating four views. The first says that "my births are exhausted" is the knowledge of exhaustion, and the remaining three wisdoms are the knowledge of non-arising. The second says that the knowledge that "my births are exhausted" and the knowledge that "the holy life is established" are the knowledge of exhaustion, and the remaining two are the knowledge of non-arising. The third says that the first three wisdoms are the knowledge of exhaustion, and the fourth is the knowledge of non-arising. In that treatise it asks: there is no arhat who, after two kṣaṇas of the knowledge of exhaustion, generates the knowledge of non-arising; why then are the three wisdoms such as "my births are exhausted" the knowledge of exhaustion? The meaning of this question is: the arhat illuminates the exhaustion of defilements in only a single kṣaṇa, called the knowledge of exhaustion, and the second kṣaṇa is precisely the knowledge of non-arising; how can it be said that the knowledge of exhaustion completely possesses the three wisdoms: "my births are exhausted," "the holy life is established," and "what was to be done has been accomplished"? That treatise answers: although it is a single kṣaṇa, it possesses three meanings, hence it is stated in this way. The fourth says that the four wisdoms such as "my births are exhausted" are neither the knowledge of exhaustion nor the knowledge of non-arising, nor are they [counted among] the knowledge of the ten right views. These are words praising the arhat, saying that for an arhat "my births are exhausted" up to "there is no subsequent rebirth." Saying here that they are not the knowledge of exhaustion, knowledge of non-arising, etc., means they are not distinctively assigned as in the previous three traditions, hence it says "not"; it does not mean they are entirely not so. However, the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising completely possess these four kinds: if one simply says "my births are exhausted," "the holy life is established," "what was to be done has been accomplished," and "there is no subsequent rebirth"—speaking in this way refers to the four wisdoms within the knowledge of exhaustion. If one says "my births are exhausted and will not arise again," "the holy life is established and will not be established again," "what was to be done has been accomplished and will not be accomplished again," and "there is no subsequent rebirth and it will not be undergone again"—speaking in this way refers to the four wisdoms within the knowledge of non-arising. According to the *Vibhāṣā*, "my births are exhausted" is the knowledge of abandoning origin; according to this text, it is the knowledge of abandoning suffering. Why is this? The *Vibhāṣā* is based on origin being able to bring about rebirth, so "my births are exhausted" is the knowledge of abandoning origin. This sūtra states that suffering is of two kinds: first, the suffering of birth-and-death of individual lifetimes; second, the suffering of birth-and-death of inconceivable transformation. Although the two vehicles have severed the suffering of individual lifetimes, transformation still remains; therefore it says "there is a remainder." Because it is not exhausted, in the future there will still be rebirth. Therefore the knowledge that "my births are exhausted" is the knowledge of suffering, because there will still be rebirth in the future. "Because a remainder of the holy life is accomplished, it is not pure" means that "the holy life is established" is not ultimate.