大般涅槃經集解 30.42

30.42

案僧亮曰：昔以輕重義故說三受，今以三苦故說一切苦，所為事異，不相違也。苦受名為三苦者，性攝三苦也，餘二受乃苦性之別義也。寶亮曰：答向第二難也。佛前云三受悉苦，迦葉難云三受悉樂。佛今舉三受唯苦而無樂，豈得難言三受皆樂耶？既於下苦微故不覺，橫生樂想，即答初難，謂於尤重之下苦生樂想也。苦受具三苦者，若如昔解，直點三受為三苦，是則苦受為苦苦、樂受為壞苦、捨受為行苦也。今明苦受具三苦者，義旨小異於昔。何者？若刀杖緣中生心，亦是苦受；失壞緣中生心，亦是苦受。今取刀杖緣中生苦受者為苦苦；失壞緣中生苦受者為壞苦；即此苦體是動求行緣便是行苦。故言苦受具三苦，非是苦苦具三苦也。餘二受各具二苦者，樂受起時，因中說果，即是壞苦。即體是動求行緣，故是行苦，亦得言樂受具二苦也。捨受具二苦者，四禪以上是捨受。然彼眾生捨命之時亦愛壽命，便是壞苦。其體豈非行緣動求？若爾，則捨受具二苦也。

Sengliang comments: Formerly, the three feelings were explained in terms of their relative lightness and heaviness. Now, on account of the three sufferings, all is said to be suffering. Because the intended purposes are different, they do not contradict each other. That the feeling of pain is called 'possessing the three sufferings' means that its nature subsumes the three sufferings; the remaining two feelings are distinct aspects of the nature of suffering. Baoliang comments: This answers the second objection raised earlier. The Buddha previously said that the three feelings are all suffering; Kāśyapa objected, saying that the three feelings are all pleasure. The Buddha now points out that the three feelings are only suffering and without pleasure; how could one object that the three feelings are all pleasure? Since, when a lesser suffering is subtle, one is unconscious of it and arbitrarily gives rise to the idea of pleasure, this directly answers the first objection, which refers to producing the idea of pleasure regarding an extremely grave lesser suffering. As for the feeling of pain possessing all three sufferings: according to the former explanation, one simply identified the three feelings with the three sufferings; thus, the feeling of pain was the suffering of suffering, the feeling of pleasure was the suffering of change, and the feeling of neither-pain-nor-pleasure was the suffering of conditioned existence. Now, explaining that the feeling of pain possesses all three sufferings has an intended meaning slightly different from the past. Why is this? If the mind arises in connection with swords and staves, that is also a feeling of pain; if the mind arises in connection with loss and destruction, that too is a feeling of pain. Now, taking the feeling of pain arising in connection with swords and staves as the suffering of suffering, taking the feeling of pain arising in connection with loss and destruction as the suffering of change, and recognizing that this very substance of pain is the conditioning factor of agitated seeking and conditioning—this is the suffering of conditioned existence. Therefore, it is said that the feeling of pain possesses the three sufferings, not that the suffering of suffering possesses the three sufferings. As for the other two feelings each possessing two sufferings: when a feeling of pleasure arises, speaking of the effect while referring to the cause, it is the suffering of change. Its substance itself being the conditioning factor of agitated seeking and conditioning, it is therefore the suffering of conditioned existence; thus one may also say that the feeling of pleasure possesses two sufferings. As for the feeling of neither-pain-nor-pleasure possessing two sufferings: from the fourth dhyāna upward is the feeling of neither-pain-nor-pleasure. Yet when those sentient beings relinquish life, they also cherish their lifespan, which is the suffering of change. Is its substance not the agitated seeking of the conditioning factor of conditioned existence? If so, then the feeling of neither-pain-nor-pleasure possesses two sufferings.