大般涅槃經集解 63.3

63.3

案僧亮曰：夫為行同，有違不違。前〈師子吼品〉辨不違，此品論違也。何者？前品所說，雖有佛性，要修善以成之；此品所說，雖有佛性，而斷善者塞之。故知俱論性，而有違不違之異也。法瑤曰：前品廣說佛性不一，或因或果、非因非果，或因或緣、或善非善、或言心是、或言心非，或言離陰、或不如是。眾說雖非一途，而佛性一也，是則不可偏執一法為是而餘法非也。迦葉今引四十九年不定之說，偏執者皆失佛意，謂執往既失，執今豈得耶？若有偏執上所說者，皆不得佛意也。經有明文，下至煩惱諸結眾生、五陰善法，皆是佛性。又說性非內非外、亦內亦外，非有非無、亦有亦無，又就闡提或善根人，四句互明佛性。復引恒河七人不離佛性水，又言如是七人若善不善、若方便道若解脫道、若因若果，悉是佛性。經文如此，豈可以一法偏執乎？若不尋結始末所論，佛性各舉一邊以為決定，但以果為佛性者，恐失其知旨矣。前品明生死河中有七人，明不但佛性力故，自得菩提，不修道耶？今明涅槃河中有七種人，闡提人聞《涅槃經》，然後誹謗不信，斷善根耳。然涅槃聲先冥以遠益，謂入涅槃河中，況餘六人耶？今明七人雖異，而皆不離佛性水中。雖復兩品同明，而所論碩異也。僧宗曰：上第三十四問安樂性，向師子吼發斯論，而所顯之旨猶有未了，今還成本問也。前明闡提雖斷善根，猶有佛性；今因善星，廣釋闡提斷善之方，及還生之由。明所斷者，是起作之善故，則正因之義存也。釋還生之由，所以緣因之理足也。亦以因果相望，則中道詳矣。二聖相成，俱顯妙旨，但辨理周悉，未必文廣也。大分品有六：第一明斷善根；第二辨還生；第三明中道；第四顯修道；第五勸；第六歎佛也。寶亮曰：師子吼、迦葉但論佛性，其大旨為異者，師子吼就次第從理為談，迦葉就違背邊為論也。師子吼所說，直論從因至果，附理信心，不言先斷善根，後更生之義也。迦葉所說，亦言從因次修，然其行未立，還斷信心成一闡提，後厭情還發，能生於善，更進趣取佛。正以此為異。是則師子吼雖明斷善，未辨還生。今迦葉所論，明斷善之後更生之義也。大分為九門：第一明斷善根相；第二釋所以斷善，良由眾生根性不定也；第三辨諍論，由根性異故感教各別，致令互執，乖於中道也；第四廣明執著起邪見之過，正以根性不定、不體佛教，各隨所執誹謗失旨也；第五明後從悉自拔得還生善根也；第六明同得常果；第七釋異生死以三漏為因故感報無常，佛果以真解為資，遣漏盡而體常；第八歎經；第九歎佛也。道慧私記曰：師子吼所問，雙樹間事。迦葉所問，從得道已來事。科簡始末以為異也。又此品就人明性，前品就法明性也。智秀曰：大分此品為六段，第一明斷善根而佛性不斷；第二明還生善根；第三明非內外非有無中道；第四明不諍；第五明梵行；第六歎佛也。

Sengliang notes: In practicing the path together, there is transgression and non-transgression. The preceding 'Chapter on Siṃhanāda' distinguished non-transgression, while this chapter discusses transgression. Why is this? As for what the preceding chapter stated, although one possesses the buddhadhātu, one must cultivate goodness to bring it to completion; as for what this chapter states, although one possesses the buddhadhātu, those who sever goodness obstruct it. Thus we know that while both discuss the nature, there is the difference of transgression and non-transgression. Fayao says: The preceding chapter extensively explained that the buddhadhātu is not single: it is either cause or fruit, neither cause nor fruit; either cause or condition; either wholesome or unwholesome; or it is said to be the mind, or said not to be the mind; or it is said to be separate from the aggregates, or not so. Although the various explanations are not of a single track, the buddhadhātu is one; thus one must not cling one-sidedly to one dharma as correct and others as incorrect. Kāśyapa now cites the non-definitive teachings of forty-nine years, in which those who cling one-sidedly all miss the Buddha's intention. If clinging to the past was already mistaken, how could clinging to the present be correct? If anyone clings one-sidedly to what was stated above, none of them will grasp the Buddha's intention. The sūtra has explicit text stating that down to sentient beings bound by all fetters of affliction and the wholesome dharmas of the five aggregates, all are the buddhadhātu. It also says that the nature is neither internal nor external, both internal and external, neither existent nor non-existent, and both existent and non-existent; moreover, with respect to an icchantika or a person with roots of goodness, it elucidates the buddhadhātu through four alternatives. It further cites the seven persons in the Ganges River who are not apart from the water of the buddhadhātu, and also says that these seven persons, whether wholesome or unwholesome, whether on the path of expedients or the path of liberation, whether cause or fruit, are all the buddhadhātu. With the sūtra text being like this, how could one cling one-sidedly to a single dharma? If one does not examine and conclude what was discussed from beginning to end, but instead cites a single aspect of the buddhadhātu and takes it as definitive, regarding only the fruit as the buddhadhātu, one will, I fear, miss its intended meaning. The previous chapter explained that there are seven persons in the river of birth and death, showing that one does not naturally attain bodhi merely through the power of the buddhadhātu without cultivating the path, does one? Here it explains that there are seven kinds of persons in the river of nirvāṇa; the icchantika hears the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, and only then slanders it and does not believe, severing his roots of goodness. Yet the sound of nirvāṇa first secretly brings distant benefit, which is called entering the river of nirvāṇa; how much more so for the remaining six persons? Here it explains that although the seven persons differ, none of them is apart from the water of the buddhadhātu. Although both chapters explain the same thing, what they discuss differs substantially. Sengzong says: Above, in the thirty-fourth question regarding the nature of peace and bliss, Siṃhanāda initiated this discourse, but the principle revealed was still not fully clarified, so here it returns to complete the original question. Previously it explained that although an icchantika severs his roots of goodness, he still possesses the buddhadhātu; now, by way of Sunakkhatta, it extensively explains how an icchantika severs goodness and the cause of its rebirth. It explains that what is severed is active, produced goodness, and therefore the meaning of the primary cause is preserved. It explains the cause of its rebirth, and therefore the principle of the conditional cause is complete. Furthermore, viewing cause and fruit against each other, the Middle Way is detailed. The two sages complement each other and together reveal the wonderful principle; yet discerning the principle completely does not necessarily require an expansive text. Broadly speaking, the chapter has six sections: first, explaining the severing of the roots of goodness; second, discerning their rebirth; third, explaining the Middle Way; fourth, revealing the cultivation of the path; fifth, exhortation; sixth, praising the Buddha. Baoliang says: Siṃhanāda and Kāśyapa both discuss the buddhadhātu, but the broad difference in their main import is that Siṃhanāda speaks in terms of orderly progression in accord with principle, whereas Kāśyapa discusses it in terms of transgression. What Siṃhanāda stated speaks directly from cause to fruit, relying on principle to generate faith, and does not speak of the meaning of first severing the roots of goodness and later regenerating them. What Kāśyapa stated also speaks of sequential cultivation from cause; however, when one's practice is not yet established, one turns back, severs faithful mind, and becomes an icchantika, after which disgust is renewed, one is able to give rise to goodness, and one advances further toward attaining buddhahood. It is precisely this that constitutes the difference. Thus, although Siṃhanāda explained severing goodness, he had not yet clarified its rebirth. What Kāśyapa now discusses explains the meaning of its regenerating after having been severed. Broadly divided, there are nine sections: first, explaining the characteristics of severing the roots of goodness; second, explaining why goodness is severed, which is truly because the capacities and natures of sentient beings are indeterminate; third, discerning disputes, which arise because differing capacities and natures evoke distinct teachings, leading people to cling mutually to their views and deviate from the Middle Way; fourth, extensively explaining the fault of giving rise to wrong views through attachment, precisely because their indeterminate capacities and natures do not fathom the Buddha's teaching, and each follows their own attachments to slander and miss the intended meaning; fifth, explaining that later they all extricate themselves and regain the roots of goodness; sixth, explaining that they equally attain the permanent fruit; seventh, explaining the difference, in that birth and death take the three outflows as their cause and thus evoke impermanent retribution, while the fruit of buddhahood is assisted by true understanding, exhausting the outflows so that its substance is permanent; eighth, praising the sūtra; ninth, praising the Buddha. Daohui's private record states: What Siṃhanāda asked concerned matters at the Twin Śāla Trees. What Kāśyapa asked concerned matters since the attainment of the path. Classifying the beginning and the end establishes their difference. Moreover, this chapter elucidates the nature in terms of persons, while the preceding chapter elucidated the nature in terms of dharmas. Zhixiu says: Broadly divided, this chapter has six sections: first, explaining that the roots of goodness are severed while the buddhadhātu is not severed; second, explaining the rebirth of the roots of goodness; third, explaining the Middle Way of neither internal nor external, neither existent nor non-existent; fourth, explaining non-dispute; fifth, explaining pure conduct; sixth, praising the Buddha.