大般涅槃經集解 66.110

66.110

案僧亮曰：以譬申其旨也。時節有異，其體是一者，花菓是樹分，而樹是有分，樹分則時異，有分則體一。體一則有，時異則無也。僧宗曰：明諸法非先有無，況正因佛性，非有無也。寶亮曰：外道計言，外四大力強能增長內四大，而內四大力弱不能增長外四大也。今佛言不爾，無有外四大力獨能增長內四大者。何以然？如穀子是內、地水等是外，若言力強故能增者，何故水土與穀子初並時不即生，要待後時方生，而不爾？當知先有穀子為正因，後得水土為緣因，故次第得生。何容直外四大力能增長於內四大耶？智秀曰：第二因緣，寄辨種子以明理也。所以者何？以下逆取伏難之意也。明雖復果不即子，而有果必關子。雖復時節先後，而始終得為不異一假，故得稱言子有於果也。

Sengliang notes: This uses a simile to explain the principle. 'The seasons differ, but the substance is one': flowers and fruit are parts of the tree, and the tree is the possessor of parts; the parts of the tree differ in time, but the possessor of parts is one in substance. Being one in substance, it exists; differing in time, it does not exist. Sengzong says: This clarifies that phenomena do not previously exist or not exist, much less the primary-cause buddhadhātu, which is neither existent nor non-existent. Baoliang says: Non-Buddhists reckon that the power of the external four great elements is strong and able to increase the internal four great elements, while the power of the internal four great elements is weak and unable to increase the external four great elements. Now the Buddha says this is not so; there is no power of the external four great elements that can alone increase the internal four great elements. Why is this so? Just as the grain seed is internal and the earth, water, and so forth are external: if one says that because its power is strong it can bring increase, why is it that when water and soil are initially juxtaposed with the grain seed it does not immediately sprout, but must await a later time before it sprouts, and is not like that? One should know that first having the grain seed serves as the primary cause, and later obtaining water and soil serves as the conditioning cause; hence it can sprout in sequence. How could the power of the external four great elements alone increase the internal four great elements? Zhixiu says: The second cause and condition relies on analyzing seeds to clarify the principle. Why? The text below anticipates and addresses a tacit objection. It clarifies that although the fruit is not identical with the seed, the fruit must certainly depend on the seed. Although the seasons are earlier and later, from beginning to end they constitute an indifferently unified provisional entity; hence one can say that the seed possesses the fruit.