大般涅槃經集解 67.12

67.12

案僧亮曰：為水生意也。謂汝若以見從乳生酪，不從水生，證乳有酪性。此非證也。何者？乳是近因，酪是遠因。汝見近，不見遠也。其實二俱是因，而言一有一無，此心不等也。智秀曰：此下第四因緣，取彼異人執意也。其云所以得知乳已有酪性者，以能生酪故。如水無酪，故不生也。此中有四復次破之。第一責令草中亦有乳，作必不等之難；第二責令酪中有出乳之過；第三引經為證；第四舉四因和合故生眼識，正說因有生果之理也。此即第一難也。

Sengliang comments: He formulates the idea from the perspective of water. This means: if, seeing that curd is produced from milk and not produced from water, you take this as proof that milk possesses the nature of curd, this is not proof. Why? Milk is a proximate cause, while curd is a remote cause. You see the proximate, but do not see the remote. In reality, both are causes, yet you claim that one has [the nature] and the other does not; this mind is not impartial. Zhixiu says: Below is the fourth causal scenario, taking up the adherent's conception. Their statement that one knows milk already possesses the nature of curd because it is able to produce curd—just as water lacks curd and therefore does not produce it—is refuted here by four subsequent arguments. First, he challenges them by demanding that grass must also contain milk, making the objection that this is necessarily unequal; second, he challenges them with the fault that curd would then have to produce milk; third, he cites a sūtra as proof; fourth, he adduces the harmonious coming together of the four factors to produce visual consciousness, correctly explaining the principle of a cause producing an effect. This is the first objection.