大般涅槃經集解 1.23

1.23

Daosheng explains: True principle is spontaneous, and awakening also accords with it in dark convergence. When the true is without disparity, how could awakening be changeable? The unchanging substance is serene and ever-illuminating; it is merely that beings follow delusion and diverge from it, so that in fact it has not yet become theirs. If one can proceed to seek it, one reverses delusion and returns to the ultimate. Sengliang sets forth: The dharmas of the stage of aśaikṣa are all its substance. The Buddha briefly explained three to indicate the spiritual path: first, prajñā; second, dharmakāya; and third, vimokṣa. Fayao sets forth: Nirvāṇa is the supreme designation, and its meaning is abundant and broad. How could its import be exhausted solely by the three such as prajñā? He merely briefly cited what is essential. Thus, these three differ in name but are the same in reality; they are not different in substance. If their substances were distinct, they would be like dharmas of provisional designation formed by causes—empty and unreal—how could they be called permanent? Sengzong sets forth: When defilements and troubles are stilled, its substance is complete with manifold virtues; briefly citing three can encompass them all. However, as for these three virtues, their substance is one while their aspects differ; based upon the single substance, there are three designations of aspect. Baoliang sets forth: When hindrances and defilements are exhausted, the ten thousand practices return to the true; there is no virtue that is not replete, and manifold functions are all fully sufficient; the cause is transformed and designated as the result, which is named mahānirvāṇa. Yet its virtues are profound and vast, difficult to enumerate completely; briefly setting forth their essentials, in principle there can be three: first, the precious citadel of the true Dharma; second, marking distinct virtues; and third, conveying efficacious functions. Why is this? Nirvāṇa has no independent substance and is formed by the manifold virtues; taking the analogy of the precious citadel illustrates this purport. 'Distinct virtues' refers to great permanence, great self, and so on; these are the supreme causes that form nirvāṇa. 'Efficacious functions' refers to being a refuge and an island, able to make beings avoid suffering and obtain peace. Zhixiu sets forth: The substance is the root of consummate, wondrous being. The virtues are the currents of prajñā, dharmakāya, and vimokṣa. Although the virtues spoken of are manifold, in discussing the substance it is only one. Why is this? The fact that the consummate has an exemplary aspect is called dharmakāya; having the efficacy of serene illumination is called prajñā; having the virtue of being free of defilement is called vimokṣa. Thus, the substance of vimokṣa is exemplary, and the exemplary substance can illuminate; there is no other substance distinct from these possessing the virtues. [The compiler] notes: In what has traditionally been closely studied, there are two kinds of explanations: One holds that the consummate result-substance is real, wondrous being, not like a provisional designation that merely has function without substance; the other holds that nirvāṇa has no substance and is provisionally formed from manifold virtues—how could it not be empty? Huilang relates Fayao's words: Saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are divided in principle into two: [saṃsāra] exists because of the inversions of the twelve links of dependent origination; that these links of dependent origination are devoid of intrinsic nature is called nirvāṇa. How could it be that, upon separating from afflictions, there is a wondrous being to be attained that is not empty? Therefore the Prajñā Sūtra says: 'Even if there were a dharma surpassing nirvāṇa, I would still say it is like an illusion, like a dream.' He also relates the traditional explanations of Qian, Ai, Zong, and others, saying: The ten thousand practices attain the consummate result; the result-substance is real, and meanings are established according to its virtues; it is not that manifold meanings are provisionally combined to form a single substance. Fa'an says: Although nirvāṇa takes manifold virtues as its substance, this differs from the five aggregates forming a person. Why is this? A person and the five aggregates are both empty, whether provisional or real; now, although nirvāṇa is empty, its manifold virtues are real.