大般涅槃經集解 30
English (machine translation) 30
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30.1
Presenting the origin story of King Māndhātṛ; reconciling the meaning of the suffering of the five grasping aggregates between the present and past teachings; citing the past discourse to Mahānāma on form possessing pleasure; citing the past discourse that wholesome dharmas obtain pleasant feeling; citing the verses on pleasant feeling spoken in the past; explaining the meaning of conceiving the notion of pleasure regarding lesser suffering; explaining the meaning of the suffering of the three feelings; explaining that because the two vehicles do not know the cause of permanently abiding bliss, it was spoken for their sake that lesser suffering is considered pleasure.
30.2
Chapter on Noble Practices, Part Four.
30.3
"Kāśyapa! How does a bodhisattva-mahāsattva [...] the suffering of separation from what is loved, namely the end of life."
30.4
Sengliang comments: Birth is the root of the five aggregates, and craving is the root of all fetters; previous verses are cited as proof. That the arhat is free from sorrow and fear is because craving has been exhausted. As for 'namely the end of life', this merely speaks of the gravest [instance]; herein it is stated that all suffering arises from craving.
30.5
"Good son! Because of separation, it can give rise to various [...] the suffering of separation from what is loved in the present world."
30.6
Huilang comments: He brings out the origin story to make manifest the gravest [instance].
30.7
"Good son! How does a bodhisattva-mahāsattva [...] mahānirvāṇa contemplates the suffering of meeting what is hated?"
30.8
Zhixiu comments: In discerning the suffering of meeting what is hated, it refers directly to the body that is received, which means one is constantly meeting with an enemy.
30.9
"Good son! How does a bodhisattva practicing the Mahāyāna [...] Kāśyapa, this is called the truth of suffering."
30.10
Baoliang comments: Any realm of insufficiency cannot avoid this. Everything short of the Buddha is nothing other than this suffering. As for the 'five grasping aggregates', they have no separate entity, but point directly to the seven sufferings.
30.11
At that time, Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva Kāśyapa [...] that the five grasping aggregates are suffering—this meaning is not so.
30.12
Sengliang comments: To say that the five aggregates are entirely suffering contradicts the past teaching; he uses the past to contest the present. Sengzong says: Below is the fourth [part], citing the past to examine the present, reconciling both teachings. Baoliang says: Third, reconciling both teachings of the present and the past. Teachings contain cause and effect: in the past he had already reconciled the fruit, and now he reconciles the cause. In the past he had already pointed out that the three feelings are all suffering, causing living beings' minds to turn away with disgust and advance in virtue. Although the meaning was such, it had not yet reached the point of dismantling the cause. If cause and effect had both been dismantled, how would living beings have been willing to cultivate the good? He could only temporarily suppress merit and lay it aside; hence the scriptural teachings of the four seasons merely exhorted the cultivation of good in order to extinguish evil, training within the body of saṃsāra to achieve sagehood. Yet the substance of all-knowledge was not exempt from impermanence. But because the fruit of bliss had not yet been revealed, the cause could not be dismantled. Now that the teaching of permanent abiding has manifested the meaning of the fruit of bliss, the cause can finally be dismantled. I originally said that cultivating the good is indeed the cause of bodhi, not a phenomenon of saṃsāra. Some explain that the present teaching is still reconciling the fruit; this is feared not to be the Buddha's intent. In the past it had already been fully reconciled, so how could it be repeated now? Therefore, we know that in principle this cannot be so. Now, wishing to reconcile the cause, Kāśyapa first seizes upon the fruit to raise an objection. After the Buddha first eliminates the fruit, establishing that it is solely suffering, he then speaks uprightly: 'What I said in the past about the good obtaining bliss refers to the bliss of the path of bodhi.' But this meaning was not yet clear, and is only now reconciled.
30.13
"Why is this? As the Buddha in the past told Mahānāma [...] if there are those who seek it, then it is not called suffering."
30.14
Sengliang comments: He raises five grounds in all. This is the first: raising the conditions of pleasure, showing that because it is sought, there cannot be an absence of pleasure. Baoliang says: Kāśyapa first raises five objections. The first is that because there is pleasure among the five desires of humans and devas, it should not be suffering.
30.15
"As the Buddha told the bhikṣus: 'There are three kinds of feeling: painful feeling, pleasant feeling, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling.'"
30.16
Sengliang comments: Second, he cites the three feelings, clarifying that if there is no pleasure, how could there be a pleasant feeling? Baoliang says: In the second objection, because there is pleasant feeling among the three feelings, it should not be suffering.
30.17
"As the Buddha previously told the bhikṣus: 'If someone is able to practice wholesome dharmas, they will obtain pleasant feeling.'"
30.18
Sengliang comments: Third, he cites the cultivated wholesome cause. Since the cause is wholesome, in principle it must have a pleasant fruit, so he uses the cause as proof. Baoliang says: In the third objection, because the wholesome is the cause of pleasure, one knows there cannot be an absence of pleasure.
30.19
"Furthermore, as the Buddha said: 'In a wholesome realm [...] the mind reflecting on agreeable phenomena is also like this.'"
30.20
Sengliang comments: Fourth: just before he raised the wholesome cause, now he cites the six contacts, which are the wholesome fruit; moreover, having obtained a pleasant fruit from a pleasant cause, how could there be no pleasure? Baoliang says: In the fourth objection, just as Śuka received a heavenly retribution among humans, we know that what the six sense faculties encounter is never without pleasure.
30.21
"As the Buddha said in a verse: 'Upholding the precepts is pleasure [...] accomplished in all deeds undertaken, this is called the supreme pleasure.'"
30.22
Sengliang comments: Fifth, he cites various verses on cause and fruit to collectively prove that pleasure exists. Baoliang says: In the fifth objection, he cites authentic verses from the past to raise the objection.
30.23
"World-Honoured One! As stated in the various sūtras [...] how could this be congruent with this meaning?"
30.24
Zhixiu comments: He raises all the above matters collectively to seek reconciliation. Baoliang says: Although there are five objections, they do not go beyond two approaches: the first, second, and fourth raise objections regarding the karmic retribution; the third and fifth examine the fruit by means of the cause.
30.25
The Buddha told Kāśyapa: "Excellent, excellent! [...] the notion of suffering spoken of is not different from the original."
30.26
Daosheng comments: As for 'absence of suffering', its substance is not painful yet is able to be without suffering; but living beings use the slight in place of the grave and consider it to be free of suffering—this is called an erroneous conception. Sengliang says: Answering the first, second, and fourth. Concerning 'erroneous pleasure', living beings still erroneously give rise to the notion of pleasure regarding lesser suffering, and this was merely accommodated in the teaching. The pleasure spoken of in the past was in accordance with their erroneous feelings, but in the end there is no pleasure; to say now that all is suffering also does not contradict it. Sengzong says: He comprehensively answers the five objections. Because living beings do not recognise the true nature [of things], they erroneously give rise to the notion of pleasure within lesser suffering. Fearing that giving rise to [unrestrained desires] would surely cast them into the three evil paths, he temporarily stated that humans and devas are pleasurable, causing them to cultivate the ten virtues and the five precepts so as to turn their backs on the evil paths—this is what is called 'using a splinter to remove a splinter'. Baoliang says: From here down to the three feelings, he first answers the objections concerning the fruit and retribution of the first, second, and fourth. 'Lesser suffering': the heavy [suffering] of the three evil paths is greater suffering; the light [suffering] of humans and devas is lesser suffering. Ordinary beings do not realise lesser suffering and erroneously give rise to the notion of pleasure.
30.27
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha, saying: "As the Buddha has spoken [...] superior rebirth refers to the heavens."
30.28
Daosheng comments: Rebirth is what the living crave; suffering is what the afflicted loathe. Craving makes it superior; loathing makes it severe. Inferior rebirth is naturally the three evil paths; lesser suffering is naturally humans and devas. Yet rebirth is itself suffering, seemingly as though lesser suffering were that inferior rebirth; hence he raises the question. Sengliang comments: He is merely taking the word literally to raise an objection, thereby proposing three checkpoints of questioning. What the Buddha calls 'lesser' means slight and minor as 'lesser'. As Kāśyapa says, the most severe is taken as 'inferior'. This is the first checkpoint. Baoliang says: Since the mind of living beings did not immediately comprehend, Kāśyapa now raises two further objections. The Buddha's intent takes humans and devas as lesser suffering, while Kāśyapa takes the three evil paths as inferior suffering.
30.29
"If someone were to ask thus: [...] gives rise to the notion of pleasure, how should one answer?"
30.30
Daosheng comments: He makes the objection against erroneously giving rise to the notion of pleasure regarding lesser suffering. Sengliang comments: The second clarifies the reciprocal answer: If pleasure is spoken of because of lesser suffering, showing that all is suffering, then now suffering should also be spoken of because of lesser pleasure, and one should know that all is pleasure. Baoliang says: Second, he inverts and counters the Tathāgata's preceding meaning: if the three feelings are entirely suffering, now the three feelings are entirely pleasure, and it is only suffering because the pleasure is slight.
30.31
"World-Honoured One! If within lesser suffering one gives rise to the notion of pleasure [...] give rise to the notion of pleasure within lesser suffering."
30.32
Daosheng comments: The objection's intent does not allow that lesser suffering gives rise to pleasure, so he uses this as an examination. Sengliang comments: The third checkpoint: if one truly gives rise to pleasure regarding light and lesser suffering, then comparing one stroke of punishment to a thousand, the thousand is extremely heavy and the one is extremely light; yet we have never seen one who should receive heavy suffering give rise to the notion of pleasure upon the light suffering. Therefore, we know that one does not take light suffering as the notion of pleasure. Baoliang says: This argues in terms of principle. If one takes the light suffering of humans and devas as lesser suffering, one should take the light suffering of one stroke of punishment as lesser suffering. If that were so, one should give rise to pleasure in relation to this single stroke.
30.33
The Buddha told Kāśyapa: "So it is, so it is, just as you say. For this reason, there is no notion of pleasure."
30.34
Daosheng comments: In answering the final objection, the previous two objections are naturally resolved. That such a single stroke does not give rise to the notion of pleasure is proof that there is no pleasure at all. Sengliang comments: As for 'in reality there is no pleasure', he explains it according to the sentence. This person ought to receive a thousand punishments; being spared the remaining vast suffering, he erroneously gives rise to the notion of pleasure regarding the single stroke. Tan'ai says: Therefore, he does not take the single stroke as pleasure, but takes being spared the heavy [punishment] as pleasure. The mind that conditions itself upon being spared the heavy is in reality the suffering of conditioning; ordinary beings take it as pleasure. With this single answer, he answers all three objections together. How so? The single punishment and the thousand punishments are both heavy suffering. Since he does not take the single stroke as pleasure, how can it be said that he gives rise to pleasure in the lowest suffering? This answers the first objection. Furthermore, this person erroneously gives rise to the notion of pleasure based on escaping heavy suffering; how could one say that he gives rise to the notion of suffering regarding lesser pleasure? This answers the second checkpoint. Baoliang says: This directly answers the three objections. Now he first explains the meaning of 'erroneously giving rise'. If through one stroke he is spared, when he relies upon the single stroke and settles upon it as pleasure, how is that not false pleasure? It is not that he gives rise to pleasure at the time of receiving the single stroke.
30.35
"Why is this? It is like that man who was due to receive a thousand strokes of punishment [...] falsely gives rise to the notion of pleasure where there is no pleasure."
30.36
Daosheng comments: Escaping a thousand and receiving one, he then falsely gives rise to the notion of pleasure; that there is no pleasure is truly credible. What was said earlier about erroneously giving rise to the notion of pleasure within lesser suffering refers to this. Sengzong says: He explains the meaning of 'erroneously'.
30.37
Kāśyapa said: "World-Honoured One! That man does not take the single stroke [...] gives rise to the notion of pleasure because he has obtained release."
30.38
Baoliang comments: Kāśyapa says that because there are truly no nine hundred and ninety-nine, conditioning upon this absence, there is in truth real pleasure.
30.39
"Kāśyapa! Therefore, what I previously said to Mahānāma—that there is pleasure within the five aggregates—is truly not false."
30.40
Sengliang comments: Since in receiving the punishment he does not take the single stroke as pleasure, pleasure is not erroneous. When the Buddha says that pleasure is truly not false, it is because avoiding receipt is taken as pleasure; one cannot speak of pleasure out of thin air. Tan'ai says: Kāśyapa's comprehension is not an objection, and the Buddha immediately affirms it. Baoliang says: He explains the third meaning of 'real pleasure'. The suffering within the three evil paths truly does not exist in humans and devas; how does this state of absence differ from the Buddha? Therefore, we know that it is not a false statement.
30.41
"Kāśyapa! There are three feelings and three sufferings [...] the other two feelings are what are called the suffering of conditioning and the suffering of decay."
30.42
Sengliang comments: Formerly, the three feelings were explained in terms of their relative lightness and heaviness. Now, on account of the three sufferings, all is said to be suffering. Because the intended purposes are different, they do not contradict each other. That the feeling of pain is called 'possessing the three sufferings' means that its nature subsumes the three sufferings; the remaining two feelings are distinct aspects of the nature of suffering. Baoliang comments: This answers the second objection raised earlier. The Buddha previously said that the three feelings are all suffering; Kāśyapa objected, saying that the three feelings are all pleasure. The Buddha now points out that the three feelings are only suffering and without pleasure; how could one object that the three feelings are all pleasure? Since, when a lesser suffering is subtle, one is unconscious of it and arbitrarily gives rise to the idea of pleasure, this directly answers the first objection, which refers to producing the idea of pleasure regarding an extremely grave lesser suffering. As for the feeling of pain possessing all three sufferings: according to the former explanation, one simply identified the three feelings with the three sufferings; thus, the feeling of pain was the suffering of suffering, the feeling of pleasure was the suffering of change, and the feeling of neither-pain-nor-pleasure was the suffering of conditioned existence. Now, explaining that the feeling of pain possesses all three sufferings has an intended meaning slightly different from the past. Why is this? If the mind arises in connection with swords and staves, that is also a feeling of pain; if the mind arises in connection with loss and destruction, that too is a feeling of pain. Now, taking the feeling of pain arising in connection with swords and staves as the suffering of suffering, taking the feeling of pain arising in connection with loss and destruction as the suffering of change, and recognizing that this very substance of pain is the conditioning factor of agitated seeking and conditioning—this is the suffering of conditioned existence. Therefore, it is said that the feeling of pain possesses the three sufferings, not that the suffering of suffering possesses the three sufferings. As for the other two feelings each possessing two sufferings: when a feeling of pleasure arises, speaking of the effect while referring to the cause, it is the suffering of change. Its substance itself being the conditioning factor of agitated seeking and conditioning, it is therefore the suffering of conditioned existence; thus one may also say that the feeling of pleasure possesses two sufferings. As for the feeling of neither-pain-nor-pleasure possessing two sufferings: from the fourth dhyāna upward is the feeling of neither-pain-nor-pleasure. Yet when those sentient beings relinquish life, they also cherish their lifespan, which is the suffering of change. Is its substance not the agitated seeking of the conditioning factor of conditioned existence? If so, then the feeling of neither-pain-nor-pleasure possesses two sufferings.
30.43
"Good son! For this reason, within saṃsāra, […] therefore it is said that all is suffering."
30.44
Sengliang comments: This is due to the causal conditions of lightness and heaviness. That the natures of suffering and pleasure are not separate from each other means that the three sufferings are not separate from each other. Baoliang comments: It is truly because of the absence of the suffering of the three evil destinies that there is actual pleasure. That the natures of suffering and pleasure are not separate means: the unoutflowing understanding of the ten abodes, from the first abode up to the vajropama-citta, eliminates delusions according to its portion; with respect to the aspect without delusion, it is constantly actual pleasure. Yet, because the substance of the unoutflowing has not yet escaped the conventional truth, in its entirety it is suffering. Therefore, it is said that the natures of suffering and pleasure are not separate from each other.
30.45
"Good son! Within saṃsāra, there is truly no pleasure […] in accordance with worldly convention, it is said that there is pleasure."
30.46
Sengliang comments: Preparing to explain the causes of pleasure in order to answer the third and fifth objections, he therefore speaks of conditioned celestial pleasure. Baoliang comments: Among the five desires, there is truly no blissful pleasure.
30.47
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha, saying: "World-Honoured One, […] now making this statement, what is its meaning?"
30.48
Sengliang comments: Because the meaning above was not yet clear, he inquires in order to bring it to completion. Dharmakṣema comments: He grasps and understands it. Baoliang comments: The third and fifth objections were not yet answered; he raises them again here to request an answer.
30.49
The Buddha said: "Good son! As explained above, […] all is suffering and there is no idea of pleasure."
30.50
Sengliang comments: 'Also producing the causes of suffering' clarifies that external objects are not themselves suffering; because they are the causes of suffering, they are called suffering. Baoliang comments: Answering his two objections, this clarifies that these are all speaking of the effect in terms of the cause; what falsehood could there be in this?
30.51
"Good son! A bodhisattva-mahāsattva […] is then able to know these causes of suffering and causes of pleasure."
30.52
Daosheng comments: The two vehicles do not know the permanently abiding, and so they do not know the cause of pleasure. Sengliang comments: Understanding suffering refers to understanding the three sufferings. 'Without suffering' means speaking of a lesser suffering as pleasure; pleasure is not suffering.
30.53
Collected Commentaries on the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, Fascicle Thirty
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- 大般涅槃經集解 — Classical Chinese