大般涅槃經集解 33

English (machine translation) 33

Language: English

33.1

Extensively explaining the previously mentioned seven kinds of real truth; extensively setting forth the permanence, bliss, self, and purity grasped by non-Buddhists.

33.3

Mañjuśrī addressed the Buddha, saying: "World-Honoured One, (and so on down to) all inversions are not called real."

Sengliang states: Above, having inquired about the true, he next inquires about the four inversions. If they do not enter the four truths, then the real truth does not subsume all dharmas; below, down to the Buddha's explanation, it is also like this. From 'the one path' onward, it does not challenge that the subsumption of the real is not comprehensive; rather, it ensures that the explanation of the real is not confused. Fayao states: The preceding text clarified that the four truths are all called real truths, which seemed to suggest that inversions and false errors are not subsumed under the truths of suffering and origination; therefore this question was raised. Baoliang states: Explaining the second, the reality of the object. He asks whether there are inversions within the four truths; if there are, how can they be called real? If the four truths lack them, then outside the four truths there should be further dharmas.

33.5

The Buddha told Mañjuśrī: "All inversions (and so on down to) are not non-suffering; they are precisely suffering."

33.6

Fayao states: Discussed in terms of mental conception, they are inversions; viewed in terms of their nature, they enter the truth of suffering. Baoliang states: It should be said that they all enter the truths of suffering and origination. Now it only says that they enter suffering based on one side.

33.7

Mañjuśrī said: "As the Buddha has spoken (and so on down to) because they are severed and eliminated, they are therefore called real truths."

33.8

Baoliang states: Explaining the third, the reality of wisdom. If the object focused upon by wisdom has no correspondence, then it is false and illusory.

33.9

Mañjuśrī said: "As the Buddha has spoken (and so on down to) being dharmas subject to change, they are called unreal."

33.10

Baoliang states: Explaining the fourth, the reality of the vehicle. The Mahāyāna conditions the middle and forgets characteristics, and is therefore real; the Hīnayāna grasps at characteristics, and is therefore unreal.

33.11

Mañjuśrī said: "As the Buddha has spoken (and so on down to) such falsehood is called the teaching of Māra."

33.12

Sengliang states: Explaining the fifth, the reality of teaching. What the Buddha speaks is necessarily able to benefit beings; what Māra speaks gives rise to bondage, and is therefore not real.

33.13

Mañjuśrī said: "As the Buddha has spoken (and so on down to) they have no single path that is pure and without duality."

33.14

Sengzong states: Conceiving non-extinction to be extinction means positing neither-conception[-nor-non-conception] as the fruit of nirvāṇa and the eight dhyānas as the cause. Baoliang states: Explaining the sixth, the reality of the single cause.

33.15

Mañjuśrī said: "As the Buddha has spoken (and so on down to) also say that conditioned formations are permanent."

33.16

Sengzong states: It means the Buddha's words concerning the permanent are not seen by ordinary people; non-Buddhists posit the aggregates as permanent, verifying what they grasp, so [they think] it must exist. Baoliang states: Explaining the seventh, the reality of the fruit. Mañjuśrī takes up the positions held by non-Buddhists and examines these four dharmas; the text is below, totaling twenty-three phrases.

33.17

"How are they permanent? Agreeable and disagreeable (and so on down to) if they are permanent, then they are real truths."

33.18

Baoliang states: Proving permanence by means of seven matters.

33.19

"World-Honoured One! There are non-Buddhists who further say there is bliss (and so on down to) because there are superior, middling, and inferior, one should know there is bliss."

33.20

Sengliang states: Proving bliss by means of five matters.

33.21

"World-Honoured One! There are non-Buddhists who further say there is purity (and so on down to) by this meaning it is called pure."

33.22

Baoliang states: Proving purity by means of three matters.

33.23

"World-Honoured One! There are non-Buddhists who further say there is a self (and so on down to) one may also say that the self possesses the true truth."

33.24

Baoliang states: Proving the self by means of eight matters.

33.25

The Buddha said: "Good son! If there are ramaṇas (and so on down to) that conditioned formations could be permanent is impossible."

33.26

Baoliang states: Intending to refute attachments and answer his question, he first rebukes the positions held by non-Buddhists with twenty matters.

33.27

"Good son! I observe that conditioned formations are all impermanent (and so on down to) there is not a single dharma that is not produced from conditions."

33.28

Sengliang states: Since they are said to be conditioned formations, their principle is naturally impermanent. That all dharmas are from conditions proves that conditioned formations are impermanent. Dharmas arise from conditions: being originally absent and now existing, this is called arising; having existed and reverting to absence, this is called ceasing. Why? The mind takes the cognitive object as fundamental; because it does not correspond to the cognitive object, it is called originally absent. Yet the mind arbitrarily arises on its own; this is 'now existing.' Arbitrary arising has no root; arising, it naturally ceases of itself. The cause being thus, the fruit must also be so. Therefore the sūtra says: 'Because the cause is impermanent, form is impermanent'; this is its proof. Sengzong states: What non-Buddhists grasp cannot be separated from the aggregates; in every single dharma, none is not from conditions. Only the buddhadhātu is not produced from conditions, and is not subsumed within the three periods of time.

33.29

"Good son! The buddhadhātu is without arising and without ceasing (and so on down to) is preserved and maintained by it; therefore it is called permanent."

33.30

Sengliang states: This speaks of the nature as primary cause. It is also seen by relying on conditions, not produced from conditions. Why? Practicing and relying on conditions to seek the principle, the principle is not originally absent and now existing, which means non-arising; seeking it constantly in thought after thought means non-ceasing. Since it is neither arising nor ceasing, without going and without coming, and also without the three periods of time, the cause does not arise arbitrarily, hence it is unmade; seeking understanding in conditions, it is not unmade. Because it does not take a single dharma as cause, it is unnameable; because it is explained as the primary cause, it is not without name. It is neither name nor form, down to not being subsumed by aggregates and realms, which proves it is unnameable. The aggregates and realms undergo destruction, but the buddhadhātu does not perish and is not subsumed. That it is therefore called permanent is because it is permanent in two senses: first, it definitely attains the fruit; second, the cause cannot be destroyed.

33.31

"Good son! The buddhadhātu is precisely the Tathāgata (and so on down to) all are false speech and have no true truth."

33.32

Sengliang states: Seeing the nature and becoming a Buddha, the nature is directly the Buddha. 'The Tathāgata is precisely the Dharma': the Dharma is the emptiness of nature, the emptiness of nature is the Dharma, and the Dharma is precisely the buddhadhātu. The buddhadhātu is existence; the emptiness of nature is non-existence; that the Buddha sees existence and non-existence is called awakening. 'The Buddha is precisely the Dharma, and the Dharma is precisely the permanent': considering both phrases together, because he sees the permanent, he is permanent. 'The Tathāgata is precisely the Saṅgha': seeing the permanent, he is permanently harmonious. Harmony is the meaning of the Saṅgha; following the teacher is the meaning of the disciple. 'The Saṅgha is precisely the permanent': because the teacher is permanent, they attain permanence. If one does not know that the Three Jewels are permanent and yet speaks of permanence, this is called false speech.

33.33

"Ordinary people previously see jars, clothes, carriages, and houses (and so on down to) you should know that in reality they are not permanent."

33.34

Sengliang comments: He who proves that it is not seen is called a speaker of false speech. Regarding 'all saṃskṛta dharmas are impermanent,' this proceeds directly from saṃskṛta dharmas to explain the meaning of impermanence, further contrasting existence and non-existence.
Sengzong says: He brings up the seventh statement among their assertions of permanence, which speaks of an antecedent and a subsequent continuing in similarity; yet its substance arises and perishes from thought-moment to thought-moment—how could it be permanent?
Baoliang says: They reckon, 'Having formerly seen a vase, clothing, and so forth, one also recognizes it later; hence one should know that there is a spiritual ātman that is permanent, and therefore it is permanent.' It is because of this [that the refutation follows]. Below there are only two refutations. The first says: 'If your mind were permanent, it should be identical with the Buddha's sarvajñatā, and its functioning, being permanent, would naturally have no shifts. When the eye-consciousness confronts a sensory object, it ought alone to apprehend all dharmas. Yet now it is not so: it arises and perishes from thought-moment to thought-moment, apprehending this and abandoning that; therefore we know that the mind is impermanent.' The second refutation determines [the nature of] the mind by using the object. If the mind truly arose from conditions and yet were permanent, it ought constantly to hold to a single dharma and not be able to alter its mind and change its conditions. Why so? Since the mind would be permanent, it should constantly contemplate impermanence and not be able further to cognize emptiness and non-self. Yet now the mind universally cognizes all objects; therefore we know it is impermanent.

33.35

"Good son! All saṃskṛta dharmas are impermanent […] asaṃskṛta dharmas are permanent."

33.36

Sengliang comments: This proceeds directly from saṃskṛta dharmas to explain the meaning of impermanence, further contrasting existence and non-existence.

33.37

"Good son! Saṃskṛta dharmas generally are of two kinds […] material dharmas are earth, water, fire, and wind."

33.38

Sengzong says: Previously he only spoke of impermanence; now he presents its dharmas, which do not go beyond matter and mind.

33.39

"Good son! Mind is called impermanent […] up to the difference of mental consciousness being likewise."

33.40

Sengliang comments: Mind arises by grasping at objects; antecedent and subsequent correspond to each other and together discern a single condition. This is the general explanation; below is the specific explanation. 'The eye-consciousness's nature is different' means that the eye-consciousness cognizes the present, while the mental consciousness cognizes the past and future; below, the correspondence with the sensory objects is also like this. 'The eye-consciousness should alone cognize all' means that if the eye-consciousness did not perish, it would operate within all sense faculties, and when present in the ear it should also see form, because the nature of consciousness would not be different. If that were so, it should cognize all dharmas. That it is not so now means that ordinary beings invertedly reckon it to be permanent.

33.41

"Furthermore, good son! Because of the cause and condition of destroying formations […] all dharmas that are recollected should not be forgotten."

33.42

Sengliang comments: He explains that uncontaminated practices are distinct from uncontaminated [results], and can eliminate all formations. Regarding 'the so-called difference in the mental nature of the śrāvaka, up to the mind of non-Buddhists,' the above elucidated suffering, pleasure, and afflictions, speaking of the Buddha's disciples; here he speaks of non-Buddhists who cannot distinguish between various forms, taking mere discerning as mind: when discerning blue one cannot discern yellow, so the eye-consciousness cannot grasp forms in their entirety.

Linked texts (1)

大般涅槃經集解 — Classical Chinese