大般涅槃經集解 38
English (machine translation) 38
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38.1
Explaining the meaning of the stage of supreme love for an only child; clarifying that the Buddha does not act as a cause or condition for the defilements of sentient beings; clarifying that Śākya killed a brāhmaṇa to attain the stage of the only child; clarifying that the brāhmaṇa entered hell and gave rise to three thoughts; clarifying that killing an icchantika incurs no sin; setting forth the origin of the wilderness spirit; revealing the traces of Devadatta; concluding the fruit of cultivating the mind of equanimity as the stage of empty equality; extensively explaining the meaning of the eleven emptinesses.
38.2
Chapter on Pure Practices, Part Three
38.3
'Furthermore, good sons! A bodhisattva-mahāsattva [...] attains abiding in the stage of supreme love for an only child.'
38.4
Sengliang comments: Below, five similes are used to explain the name of this stage. Sengzong says: The fourth concludes the fruits of the three immeasurables. 'Supreme love for an only child' refers to the seventh stage. When it says that a bodhisattva of the seventh stage sees sentient beings in suffering, even to the point of blood flowing and sprinkling the ground, this love is profound and superior to what came before. From the eighth stage onward, one mind is endowed with the myriad practices, and the dual characteristics of emptiness and existence are pacified; therefore, the designation of 'love' is submerged, and it is called 'equality in suffering.' Below there are five similes: the first illustrates 'supreme love'; the four similes from the second onward illustrate 'the only child,' clarifying the equal benevolence upon ascending this stage.
38.5
'Good sons! Why is this stage called supreme love? [...] Therefore this stage is called supreme love.'
38.6
Sengliang comments: The first simile clarifies that seeing good brings joy. Sengzong says: This simile illustrates the immeasurable joy.
38.7
'Good sons! Just as parents, seeing their child afflicted with illness [...] Therefore this stage is called the only child.'
38.8
Sengliang comments: The second simile clarifies that seeing evil brings sorrow. Sengzong says: The four similes below clarify the suffering of illness. Suffering has degrees of lightness and heaviness; by rational deduction, benevolence and compassion may be present, but equanimity is lacking.
38.9
'Good sons! Just as when a child picks up clods of earth [...] Therefore this stage is again called the only child.'
38.10
Sengliang comments: The third simile clarifies teaching the practice of wholesome dharmas. Sengzong says: Grasping the head with the left hand illustrates true wisdom; picking it out with the right hand illustrates expedient wisdom.
38.11
'Good sons! Just as parents' beloved child [...] Therefore this stage is again called the only child.'
38.12
Sengliang comments: The fourth simile illustrates entering hell for the sake of sentient beings.
38.13
'Good sons! Just as parents with only one child [...] Therefore this stage is again called the only child.'
38.14
Sengliang comments: The fifth simile clarifies not becoming angry when evil is inflicted upon oneself. If one became angry when evil was inflicted, that would be useless suffering, which a bodhisattva does not undertake. Concluding equanimity has its own distinct stage; here only three [immeasurables] are discussed.
38.15
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: 'World-Honoured One! [...] for what cause and condition did you not fall into hell?'
38.16
Sengliang comments: Having heard the five similes above explaining the name of the stage, he now asks the Buddha: when you were a bodhisattva, you severed a person's life-faculty, which did not correspond to the meaning of this stage, yet you did not fall into hell; thus the resolution of moving forward or stepping back remains unclear.
38.17
'If you look upon all sentient beings equally [...] how can this not conflict with that principle?'
38.18
Sengzong comments: Previously, killing the brāhmaṇa was cited to challenge physical karma at the causal stage; now, scolding Devadatta is cited to challenge verbal karma at the resultant stage. If body and speech are like this, mental karma may naturally be known. Baoliang says: Kāśyapa raised two objections with four barriers, relying on the beginning and drawing upon the end, leaving nothing out. Therefore, below he further cites facts to examine why the Buddha should not have acted in this way.
38.19
'World-Honoured One! Subhūti, who abides in the stage of empty space [...] causing sentient beings to give rise to gravely evil minds.'
38.20
Sengliang comments: Even a śrāvaka protects their minds, how much more so should a Buddha or bodhisattva [refrain from] causing gravely evil minds to arise?
38.21
The Buddha said to Kāśyapa: 'You should not [...] would never create causes and conditions for defilement for them.'
38.22
Sengliang comments: Approaching the direct response, he first employs a hypothetical simile to clarify that he does not create causes and conditions for defilement for sentient beings. There are two meanings: first, clarifying that the Buddha truly does not create them; second, clarifying that one should not say so. When khadira wood is made into charcoal, a single burning takes six days to extinguish, and its hardness and sharpness injure people.
38.23
'Good sons! As you have said, in the past the Tathāgata [...] never deprived any sentient being of life.'
38.24
Sengliang comments: In the direct answer there are three points. This first point reviews the six perfections, clarifying that he actually bestowed life—how could he be said to have taken life? If he would not uselessly kill even an ant, how much less a brāhmaṇa? By citing the first perfection, he shows that there was immediate benefit in the present; by subsequently citing the other five perfections, he shows benefit across both lifetimes. Sengzong says: Below is the answer to the first barrier of the initial objection. In the bodhisattva's practice of the Dharma, he would not intentionally kill even an ant, much less a brāhmaṇa. However, even if this person had not been killed, he would still have fallen into hell; the sage now created the conditions for him, thereby causing his delusion to be reversed quickly. If he had not created an external condition for him, his falling would have been endless. This was precisely creating the cause and condition for liberation, not what is called killing. Then, by extensively displaying empirical evidence, he clarifies that what the bodhisattva practices constantly bestows lifespan upon sentient beings—how can you challenge him by saying he severed their lives? Furthermore, the long life the bodhisattva bestows on sentient beings is the life of the Buddha-fruit's unconditioned dharmatā and the bliss free of suffering; how could it be compared to the life of the three types of feeling of birth and death for those sentient beings? Therefore, we know that the principle is necessarily so. At that time, having already attained this stage, he killed solely out of a benevolent mind, not an evil mind. He sets forth a simile to reveal this: he severed his life precisely to protect the Dharma and cause wholesome thoughts to arise. Bodhisattvas constantly generate this thought: whenever there is a sentient being in whom wholesome dharmas can arise, regardless of whether the action is good or bad, they must certainly perform it. Therefore, after the brāhmaṇas' lives ended, they immediately generated three thoughts: having abandoned their human retribution and received heavy suffering in hell, they instantly realized that what they had done was despicable; moreover, gaining knowledge of past lives, they knew they had come from the human realm. Knowing that their place of rebirth was hell, they realized the condition of slandering the sūtra was grave, which brought about this retribution. Knowing their sinful karma was like this, they formed a resolve of faith and reverence, repented of what they had done in the past, and immediately destroyed their fundamental karma and were reborn in the human and heavenly realms. Therefore, we know that giving rise to faith in the eternal principle unfailingly brings a response at the very first approach. Some provide an explanation: 'Those born in Avīci suffer uninterrupted pain, so they should not be able to generate the three thoughts.' Our school's interpretation does not fear this as an obstacle: they may be born in Avīci and be unable to give rise to pleasant feelings, but how could they be completely unable to generate a thought or harbor recollections amid their conscious awareness of suffering? Therefore, we know this statement poses no problem.
38.25
'Good sons! Regarding what you just asked about killing the brāhmaṇas [...] severing their life-faculty was not done with an evil mind.'
38.26
Sengzong comments: This is the second point. It means that because he attained this stage and because the three thoughts yielded benefit, the killing was without sin.
38.27
'Good sons! Just as parents with only one child [...] wishing to make them reform the past and diligently cultivate wholesome dharmas.'
38.28
Sengliang comments: This simply takes the killing out of benevolence as an analogy, without drawing an exact correspondence on every point.
38.29
'A bodhisattva always thinks in this way [...] according to expedient means, they must certainly do it.'
38.30
Sengliang comments: Provided it is a beneficial matter, it does not matter whether it appears good or evil.
38.31
'After the lives of those brāhmaṇas ended [...] a lifespan of ten kalpas, how can this be called killing?'
38.32
Sengliang comments: By means of killing he bestowed life, without giving rise to their defilements, thereby corroborating the meaning of the stage.
38.33
'Good sons! If a person digs the earth, mows grass, cuts down trees [...] although they deprive them of life, it is not done with an evil mind.'
38.34
Sengliang comments: This answers the objection above regarding not entering hell. Above it was said that killing with a wholesome mind incurs no sin, which seemed to imply that if parents killed with a wholesome mind they would also be without sin; hence it must be clarified. Here it is said: I had no evil mind, and the field [of the recipient] also brought no sin, so I did not fall into hell. Incurring the sin of killing occurs in three ways: first, incurring sin due to the mind, such as when a person with an evil mind kills an icchantika; second, incurring sin due to the field, such as when a person with a wholesome mind kills a good person; third, incurring sin due to both mind and field, such as when a person with an unwholesome mind kills a good person. Sengzong says: This proves that without an evil mind, although one kills, there is no sin. Baoliang says: This answers the second barrier of the first objection. Because there was no intention to kill, he did not fall into hell. Since the brāhmaṇas were all icchantikas, there was no notion of harming a field [of merit]. Thus we know that incurring the sin of killing requires that one has an evil mind and harms that field of merit.
38.35
'Good sons! According to the brāhmaṇical code, if one kills an ant [...] in hell for countless thousands of years.'
38.36
Sengliang comments: He is about to clarify that in killing brāhmaṇas, there is no sense of incurring guilt on account of the field. First he cites what the non-Buddhists say—that there is killing without incurring guilt—and that this assertion is erroneous.
38.37
"Good son! The Buddhas and bodhisattvas know that killing is of three kinds […] Therefore, even though they kill, they do not fall into hell."
38.38
Sengliang comments: It means that those within these three incur guilt on account of the field. If one does not fall into these three, an icchantika has severed their kuśalamūla; hence, there is no sense of incurring guilt on account of the field. Sengzong says: The third point proves why killing incurs no guilt. It means that among the three kinds, if one who is killed necessarily brings benefit through that killing, there is still no guilt—how much less can there be guilt if it does not fall into the three kinds of killing?
38.39
"Good son! As to what you said above about why the Tathāgata […] because the Samyaksambuddha knows upāya."
38.40
Sengliang comments: From here on, it answers the objection concerning fault of speech in the fruition [stage]. It clarifies that because he knows upāya, regardless of whether words are coarse or refined, he speaks whenever there is benefit, and does not when there is no benefit; this is not something the two vehicles can understand. Sengzong says: There are three points in this answer; this first one clarifies that through skillful discernment of what is suitable for the faculties, every action necessarily brings benefit. Baoliang says: This answers the second objection. It clarifies that the reason he uttered these words was solely to ensure that this time and this teaching would necessarily bring benefit; how could the Buddhas utter words in vain?
38.41
"Good son! Just as once, when I was wandering in that wilderness […] therefore I manifested such various upāya."
38.42
Sengzong comments: This is the second point, clarifying that as long as it is certain to bring benefit, he would even subject sentient beings to physical suffering—how much more so coarse words?
38.43
"Good son! At that time I truly did not revile […] you should not give rise to a net of doubts like this."
38.44
Sengliang comments: The third point clears away the traces, clarifying that Devadatta was not an ordinary, real person. Baoliang says: This answers the later part of the objection. Devadatta is not something that petty sentiments can fathom; how could he fall into this hell?
38.45
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One! […] the so-called stage of supreme love as for an only child."
38.46
Sengzong comments: Previously, the first section established the names and numbers of the four immeasurables; the second clarified their depth and shallowness; the third clarified that loving-kindness has actual benefit; the fourth concluded the fruition of three immeasurables; this fifth praises what the Buddha taught.
38.47
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One! […] the stage of empty equanimity like Subhūti."
38.48
Sengliang comments: Using the lesser to illustrate the greater, he proves that the ground of principle must be equal. Sengzong says: Previously, the fourth section concluded the fruition of three immeasurables, the fifth continued by praising the Buddha, and this sixth concludes the fruition of equanimity. Herein are eight layers of meaning clarified: First, it clarifies that due to cultivating the mind of equanimity, one attains the stage of empty equanimity, which means skillfully knowing the eleven kinds of emptiness as its fruit. Second, it clarifies that not only does one know emptiness, but one can also deeply illuminate conventional truth, giving rise to the eight kinds of knowing, seeing, and perception. Third, having understood both emptiness and existence, one then attains the four unhindered knowledges to benefit beings. Fourth, given the traces of benefit, adhering schools might suppose that four are attainable; hence, he speaks of ten non-existences to dispel adherence. Fifth, Mañjuśrī raises the verse on 'originally non-existent and now existent' with the intent of abiding in non-grasping and non-attachment, in order to prove non-attachment; though clarifying non-existence dispels existence, yet attachment to non-existence might still be taken as superior, so sixth, he clarifies paradoxical teachings to eliminate both errors; if even paradoxical teachings are made to bring immediate benefit, how could teachings of existence and non-existence fail to be of benefit? Thereupon, sentient beings' feelings become bewildered and confused with nowhere to place their minds, so seventh, he clarifies that although there is nothing attained, for one who embodies principle it is ultimately called having attainment; thus it is said that the bodhisattva attains the ultimate truth. What is called 'ultimate truth' is none other than nirvāṇa. Eighth, he cites those who already possess sight to prove that there is attainment. As for 'like Subhūti', since he was foremost in contemplating emptiness among the śrāvakas and was known to the people of the time, he borrows the shallow to illuminate the deep. Baoliang says: The fifth section concludes the fruition of equanimity. This also resides in the first stage. The practices of the four immeasurables are intrinsically interrelated and cannot be separated from one another; now, saying that one attains the equal stage means that on the day of ascending the first stage, one attains true undefiledness and sees that the substance of phenomena is empty; hence it is named 'empty equanimity'. The reason it is concluded separately is to lead people to delight in this dharma of emptiness and practice it. Zhixiu says: From here on is the second section. It has three topics: first, asking in what stage the fruit resides; second, asking what emptiness this emptiness is; third, speaking of those who attain benefit. This answers his first question, properly distinguishing the fruit of equanimity and clarifying that when this fruit is in the mind, it can skillfully illuminate emptiness; taking its name from what is illuminated, the stage attained is called 'empty equanimity'."
38.49
"Good son! Bodhisattva-mahāsattvas […] because they are skillfully able to cultivate and accumulate all empty dharmas."
38.50
Sengliang comments: He explains the meaning of empty equanimity to clarify the characteristics and name of the stage. 'Just as space' explains why it is empty. 'Taking equanimity as the stage' is because of skillfully cultivating the emptiness of all dharmas. Zhixiu says: This clarifies that its original nature is intrinsically empty and thus there is nothing seen, not that one is incapable of seeing dharmas.
38.51
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One! What is called emptiness? […] this is called internal and external both being empty."
38.52
Sengliang comments: The internal mental sphere is called 'internal'. It is contemplated through two kinds of emptiness. First, mutual emptiness (anyonyābhāva): just as there is no horse in a cow, or self lacks other dharmas, this is called emptiness. Second, emptiness termed through mutual relativity: because there is no external, there is no internal. Why is this? Parents are external, but they are not inherently external; they are external because of the internal. Because they do not exist within the internal, the external cannot be found; because the external cannot be found, there is no internal. Sentient beings, life-span, permanence, bliss, self, and purity—the false imputation of these seven dharmas is also called external. The Pañcaviṃśati states, 'Within the two truths there are no sentient beings,' by which we know that sentient beings and the like are false imputations. Although there is nature, because these seven dharmas are arbitrary imputations, they can be non-existent. Buddhadhātu is not an arbitrary imputation, so it must be clarified. Internal dharmas and external dharmas are particulars; dependent on the particulars there is a universal, and its emptiness is also the same as above. 'Not in the two emptinesses' means that the two emptinesses of internal and external are not within relative emptiness. In speaking only of the two: since they do not exist within the particulars, it is known that they are not within the universal. Sengzong says: The eleven emptinesses are merely the provisional teaching of this sūtra at this time. In the Pañcaviṃśati and other sūtras there are eighteen emptinesses. One should know that emptiness has no greater or lesser number; it is only because dispelling delusion has breadth and narrowness that the teaching approaches differ. Among the eleven approaches, the first five emptinesses dispel the errors of the school of the six categories (Vaiśeṣika). In the Śataśāstra it is said: Non-Buddhists impute that there is a single universal existing entity (sattā) conjoined with all dharmas. Now the first five emptinesses dispel this belief in a universal entity, stating that within the internal there is no external, and within the external there is no internal; conditioned and unconditioned are also like this. How could there be a universal dharma conjoined with dharmas? The sixth, beginningless [emptiness], dispels the imputation of the school of the twenty-five principles (Sāṃkhya). The preceding five emptinesses concern confusion regarding the fruit; this primordial principle (pradhāna) concerns confusion regarding the cause. Human sentiments think that emptiness only arises once the aforementioned arbitrary imputations have been dispelled; now it is said that it does not depend on dispelling arbitrary imputations, but its essential nature is inherently empty. As for the emptiness of non-possession: although nature-emptiness was mentioned earlier, how is it discerned? Now, examining it with wisdom, there is absolutely nothing possessed, verifying why it is empty. As for the emptiness of the ultimate truth: existence is a place where attachment arises; previously non-existence was borrowed to dispel existence. This non-existence with respect to existence is superior in principle; it is the ultimate, and its name is received through praise. As for the emptiness of emptiness: grasping arises in human minds, thinking that dispelling existence and merging with emptiness is the utmost principle, grasping it as superior, which turns into an illness again. It says that emptiness was originally spoken to dispel existence; how could there be an emptiness to be attained? As for great emptiness: previously the objective field was dispelled; now wisdom is also dispelled; when both the objective field and wisdom are forgotten, only then is it 'great'. Because there are no external dharmas within internal dharmas, how could there be a single universal existence pervading all places? When not yet attained, it is the nature; when already attained, it is the Three Jewels. 'Neither internal nor external' is because sentient beings are conditioned and the buddhadhātu is unconditioned. Because it is unconditioned, it is said to be 'not internal'; because the nature does not exist apart from sentient beings, it is said to be 'not external'. As for internal and external emptiness: in the above two emptinesses, the mind was weak and could not contemplate both together; now the power of the mind has become superior, so it can contemplate both. How could the mind on the eighth stage have strength and weakness? It merely shows that the approaches to emptiness have a progression. 'Only the buddhadhātu is not in the two emptinesses': although the two dharmas, when contemplated together, still have the distinction of internal and external, they are identical in being existent. But the Tathāgata, buddhadhātu, and the Three Jewels are not existent dharmas; although contemplated together, the internal and external do not encompass these four dharmas. Now when reaching the simultaneous contemplation, it does not say that there are no parents, but only that there are no Three Jewels and the like; this is because parents never leave the internal and external from beginning to end, so they are not mentioned again, while the Three Jewels are neither internal nor external, so they are mentioned. Baoliang says: This is the sixth section. Advancing further on the fruit of the first bhūmi to cultivate the eleven emptinesses, up to attaining the fruit of the tenth bhūmi. It is also like completing the first abhimukhi in holy conduct and further cultivating the twenty-five samādhis, up to the tenth bhūmi. Those who interpret the meaning of these eleven emptinesses differ. Some interpret it as mutual non-existence, but I fear this is not what is contemplated on the first bhūmi. My present explanation is that these eleven emptinesses are all proximate gateways to approaching the Path, essential routes to seizing the ultimate fruit. The first nine emptinesses belong to nine types of people, each seizing one emptiness to enter the Path, up to the ninth bhūmi. Why is this? It clarifies that the first nine emptinesses do not themselves discern differences in depth; only when reaching the tenth and eleventh are they discerned. Therefore one knows that each follows what they previously cultivated, took pleasure in, and found convenient to enter the Path. Now, discussing it: if one attains the first emptiness, in principle all the rest are attained. It is merely according to what they practiced that they exist; thus the preceding four emptinesses mutually verify one another, the next two emptinesses use the latter to verify the former, another emptiness uses the provisional to verify the real, and the rest all discern their meanings according to their respective stages. For instance, when contemplating internal emptiness, if one sees that all is empty, one knows that the internal contemplation is perfected; otherwise it is not perfected. Contemplating internal emptiness means directly contemplating one's own five aggregates as internal. When one sees one's own five aggregates and also sees external enemies, relatives, and neutral persons as entirely empty, one knows that internal emptiness is perfected. Apart from permanence, bliss, and self, material wealth is entirely empty. Why is this? The dharmas of the fruition state are neither the internal five aggregates nor the external five aggregates, so they are excluded. Another explanation: when performing internal contemplation, the four dharmas of the Buddha and the like, as well as material wealth and so forth, all belong to the external and are not my primary contemplation. As for the buddhadhātu being neither internal nor external: the nature of the direct cause is the understanding that avoids suffering and seeks bliss. When one follows this understanding, its function is never non-existent. Although it is within the five aggregates, the five aggregates can be eradicated, whereas this understanding cannot be lost and ultimately reaches buddhahood. Therefore, recording this constant function from beginning to end, this dharma without rising or falling, as the direct cause, one makes the internal and external contemplation. Because it is my primary contemplation within internal dharmas, it is distinguished and excluded. 'Permanently abiding and unchanging': it is not a tranquil permanence, but simply that this understanding has never failed to exist; thus it is called permanent. As for external emptiness: it is also like this, non-existent. As for internal dharmas: when someone directly contemplates external emptiness and also does not see the internal five aggregates as different from external dharmas, one knows that the external contemplation is perfected. Here it is also like this: the four dharmas of the Buddha and the nature of the direct cause are also distinguished and excluded. As for internal and external emptiness: this person sets out by contemplating both internal and external simultaneously; dharmas do not exceed internal and external; contemplating both as completely empty, there is nothing verified and perfected. 'Only the Tathāgata, the Dharma, the Saṅgha, and buddhadhātu are not within the two emptinesses of internal and external': these are again distinguished and excluded. Originally, one was merely contemplating the two dharmas of internal and external saṃsāra; the Three Jewels and the like are not saṃsāric dharmas, so they are excluded. Zhixiu says: Below this answers the second question, listing the names of the emptinesses and explaining the methods of contemplation. First, listing the names of the emptinesses: there are eleven emptinesses, which is the teaching method of one region. In truth, emptiness does not have eleven; because of dispelling beings' illnesses and distinguishing according to dharmas, there are eleven. Next, explaining the method of contemplation: because non-Buddhists impute a single great self pervading all places, identical with the portions of existence, the first five emptinesses are used, through the principle of mutual non-existence, to clarify that internal and external dharmas cannot possess one another, in order to shatter beings' attachments. First, contemplating internal dharmas: this is one's own body; investigating this body, it lacks all external dharmas, meaning the internal is empty. Further excluding the buddhadhātu: because although the buddhadhātu is tied to sentient beings, it is not fixed as internal or external, so it is excluded as appropriate. Contemplating internal dharmas as lacking life-span means lacking the life-span of external sentient beings. Contemplating conditioned emptiness as lacking life-span means the abiding life of the future fruit. Contemplating unconditioned emptiness as lacking self: this takes the conditioned five aggregates, whose dharma-substance lacks sovereign power, as non-self; this is not the non-self of the ultimate truth's emptiness. Contemplating beginningless emptiness shatters the non-Buddhists' imputation of a beginning eighty thousand kalpas ago, which is what they do not know, calling it the primordial principle (pradhāna) and taking it as permanent. Now, contemplating that all dharmas within this are in flux and impermanent directly shatters their attachment; therefore, bliss, purity, and the other phrases follow and are contemplated together. What is called 'life-span' here is still the permanent life of the future fruit. Contemplating nature-emptiness: this shatters the illness of imputing that all dharmas have an inherent nature. Contemplating the emptiness of non-possession: this shatters the illness of imputing that there are unconditioned dharmas bound by the cord of attainment (prāpti). Inquiring into the ten thousand existents, they do not exist; they are provisionally imputed as empty. There are sentient beings who follow names and falsely grasp: hearing it said that dharmas are empty, they think that this dharma of emptiness exists. Tenth, next contemplating the emptiness of emptiness shatters this illness of theirs. Saying 'this is existent' means the emptiness that was grasped; 'this is non-existent' clarifies that this emptiness is non-existent. Having heard that this emptiness is emptied, they again think this contemplation is right; next it is shattered again, saying 'this is right'. 'This is right' presents what they take as right; 'not right' clarifies that what is taken as right is also non-existent. Ninth, the emptiness of the ultimate truth directly contemplates the principle of non-arising. Eleventh, great emptiness contemplates that the substance of this wisdom capable of contemplating cannot be attained. These two emptinesses are both the principle of non-arising; the remaining nine emptinesses all shatter illnesses according to specific circumstances, so they are said not to be the principle of non-arising.
38.53
"Good son! As for conditioned emptiness, conditioned dharmas […] this is called a bodhisattva contemplating unconditioned emptiness."
38.54
Sengliang comments: Arising and ceasing are conditioned; non-arising and non-ceasing are unconditioned. Now, explaining non-existence within existence, the meaning of lacking existence is the same as internal and external. Sengzong says: It is also mutual non-existence. Conditioned dharmas are produced by conditions; what can be said to be non-existent is non-existent with respect to emptiness. Speaking of internal and external emptiness and so forth: citing the emptiness of these dharmas clarifies that conditioned dharmas are provisionally existent and lack these dharmas. Baoliang says: Conditioned dharmas are also not [unconditioned]; the Three Jewels and the like are unconditioned dharmas. If, contemplating conditioned dharmas as empty, one does not see them as distinct from the unconditioned, then one knows that the conditioned contemplation is perfected; it merely cites unconditioned dharmas to verify and perfect it. As for unconditioned emptiness: there is a person who, from the very beginning, performs the contemplation of the three unconditioned states, contemplating nirvāṇa with remainder as analytical cessation (pratisaṃkhyānirodha), and nirvāṇa without remainder as non-analytical cessation (apratisaṃkhyānirodha). Contemplating in this way, not seeing the conditioned as distinct from the unconditioned, the conditioned is also empty; this is the perfection of the unconditioned contemplation, so the conditioned is cited to verify and perfect it. It also distinguishes and excludes dharmas such as the Three Jewels as not being the same as the conditioned and unconditioned; if the conscious spirit lacked this wondrous foundation, why would the nature of the direct cause be distinguished and excluded again upon reaching unconditioned emptiness?
38.55
"How does a bodhisattva-mahāsattva contemplate beginningless emptiness? […] This is called a bodhisattva contemplating beginningless emptiness."
38.56
Sengliang comments: Non-Buddhists claim that both conditioned and unconditioned are beginningless, hence it is called beginningless emptiness. Sengzong says: It dispels the imputation of the real principle (tattva/pradhāna). Within the Buddha's teaching, all is caused by ignorance and karmic formations producing the suffering of saṃsāra; how could there be a real principle as the beginning? Now, illuminating and knowing beginninglessness with an understanding mind clarifies that what they impute is empty.
38.57
"How does a bodhisattva contemplate nature-emptiness? […] This is called a bodhisattva-mahāsattva contemplating nature-emptiness."
38.58
Sengliang comments: Dharmas are obtained through conditions; because they lack nature, they are called empty. The conditioned is obtained through conditions, and the unconditioned is seen through conditions; both lack nature. Sengzong says: This means that the essential nature of all dharmas is empty; how could it rely on dispelling illnesses? The reason permanence and impermanence are cited together is that impermanence is empty, so it is not discussed. Now discussing permanence and bliss, they can indeed be wondrous existence in conventional truth. However, since these dharmas arise in mutual relativity, relativity is provisional, and therefore they are mutually empty. Baoliang says: Beginningless emptiness and nature-emptiness both take their names from eliminating imputations. The bodhisattva contemplates all dharmas as fundamentally beginningless, and even saṃsāra, the Three Jewels, and buddhadhātu as entirely empty; this uses the latter to verify the former. Having no nature is also like this; how could there be a primordial worldly nature (prakṛti)?
38.59
"How does a bodhisattva-mahāsattva […] a bodhisattva-mahāsattva contemplates the emptiness of non-possession."
38.60
Sengliang comments: This emptiness is originally stated in terms of persons. Sengzong says: This is verifying emptiness through wisdom. It does not take being childless as a simile; rather, it takes a poor person speaking of all things being empty as its simile. Baoliang says: This is habitual contemplation. In contemplating emptiness, there is nothing to prove or realize; one directly sees that the essential nature of all ten thousand phenomena is empty. This is precisely what is explained in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra.
38.61
"How does a bodhisattva-mahāsattva [...] This is called the bodhisattva-mahāsattva's contemplation of the emptiness of ultimate truth."
38.62
Sengliang comments: There being no eye in the present is the emptiness of the conditioned. Sengzong says: It cites the two phenomena—nominal designations and real entities—as being empty. The eye and so forth are empty. The eye and so forth being the real agent, having karma is a nominal designation. These two classes are without arising; they are superior to the conditioned, and therefore receive [the name of] 'ultimate truth'. Emptiness is fundamentally without nominal designation or reality; it is merely explained with reference to nominal designation and reality. Baoliang says: This is the emptiness of real entities. Why do we say this? Because they come from nowhere and go nowhere, one therefore knows that real entities are empty. The reason an agent is cited is to use the emptiness of nominal designations to establish the emptiness of real entities. If one does not see a difference between nominal designation and reality, one therefore knows that the emptiness of real entities is established.
38.63
"How does a bodhisattva-mahāsattva contemplate the emptiness of emptiness? [...] This is called the bodhisattva's contemplation of the emptiness of emptiness."
38.64
Sengliang comments: Regarding 'is being, is non-being, this is called the emptiness of emptiness': this means that the emptiness of being is also empty, and the emptiness of non-being is also empty. Because a subsequent emptiness empties the prior emptiness, the 'emptiness of emptiness' is established in order to shatter the fixations of those who grasp at marks. Regarding 'is true, is not true, this is called the emptiness of emptiness': the first 'is' affirms the preceding line; the second 'is' negates both; and the next is the concluding phrase. Why is this? Wishing to eliminate the subsequent emptiness, one cannot but trace back to what it emptied; hence one negates both and then concludes the phrase. Sengzong says: The nine emptinesses are meant to eliminate being. It is only with this emptiness that human sentiment gives rise to attachment, thinking that this emptiness exists and can be attained; therefore it is eliminated. 'Is being, is non-being' means that both the 'being' eliminated by the preceding nine emptinesses and the 'non-being' capable of eliminating it—even this non-being does not exist. Non-being is spoken of in order to eliminate being; how could there be a non-being to depend upon? Thus both being and non-being are empty, hence it says 'the emptiness of emptiness'. Regarding 'is true, is not true, this is called the emptiness of emptiness': human sentiment progressively gives rise to affliction in the midst of eliminating attachment, saying: 'Previously one used emptiness to eliminate being; this obtained its name in relative terms, and so properly could not be grasped.' Now, supposing both attachments are abandoned, this mind is considered superior; yet wishing to preserve this abandoning mind is again an affliction. 'Is true' points to the core import within the circle. If one takes this as ultimate, this too does not exist. Thus both mind and principle are unattainable; this is called 'the emptiness of emptiness'. Baoliang says: This is what is attained on the stage of the Dharma Cloud. There are two kinds of emptiness of emptiness. For instance, in the past the Śrāvakayāna contemplated all beings as empty and became attached to this emptiness; therefore, saying that this emptiness is itself empty is also called 'the emptiness of emptiness'. Furthermore, there is another kind: contemplating all beings as a single emptiness, this wisdom that contemplates emptiness is itself empty in its essence; this too is 'the emptiness of emptiness'. The emptiness spoken of now is entirely different from the two kinds of emptiness of emptiness above. Why? From the ninth stage down to the five faculties headed by faith, it is not that there are no characteristics; they faithfully know the eightfold sovereign self-emptiness. Yet up through the ninth stage, they all perform the contemplation of no-self; riding on this contemplation of no-self emptiness to reach the tenth stage, they partially see the eightfold sovereign self-emptiness. Because one obtains emptiness by riding on emptiness, it is called the emptiness of emptiness, and it is also the samādhi of emptiness. As for 'the place where the two vehicles sink in confusion': this praises this principle of emptiness as subtle, not something cognized by their minds. 'Is being, is non-being' provides names for two dharmas. 'Is being' refers to the no-self emptiness obtained up through the ninth stage. This no-self emptiness is due to the emptiness of annihilation. Moreover, since this is a dharma of concrete phenomena, it is therefore still spoken of as having being. 'Is non-being' refers to the eightfold sovereign self-emptiness. When one obtains this emptiness, minds of being and non-being both cease to function. If one grasps at being, it cannot be attained; if one grasps at non-being, it cannot be attained. When the two minds of being and non-being cease to function, this is the understanding of the middle way; hence it says 'is non-being'. Having designated the names for the two dharmas, it then concludes by saying 'this is called the emptiness of emptiness'. 'Is true' understands and accords with this import, referring to a sense of calm determination; it is still the former ninth [stage's understanding]. It is the concrete emptiness of no-self that was attained. Since concrete phenomena are existent dharmas, it therefore says 'is true'. 'Is not true' again negates the practitioner of the ninth stage. Taking the understanding of emptiness attained up through the ninth stage as ultimate is, in fact, not ultimate. If by riding on no-self emptiness one obtains the eightfold sovereign self-emptiness, one can say that it is not the emptiness previously obtained on the ninth stage; hence it says 'is not true'. Therefore the text says: 'Even the tenth stage only penetrates a small portion of it; how much less could those on the ninth stage and below attain it?' If one does not make this interpretation, one will not accord with the sūtra's meaning.
38.65
"Noble son! How does a bodhisattva-mahāsattva [...] then dwell on the stage equal to space?"
38.66
Sengliang comments: Because it is empty together with all being, it is called prajñā. Because it also completely empties all marks, it is called the great emptiness. Sengzong says: It means that the essence of wisdom is also empty. The two similes below both praise the understanding of equanimity. Baoliang says: When the tenth stage is fulfilled, this is the adamantine [samādhi]. The adamantine mind illuminating all ten thousand phenomena completely is called the stage of learning. Omniscience, fully possessing the five eyes of a Buddha, is called the fulfillment of the wisdom of prajñāpāramitā.
38.67
Collected Commentaries on the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, Fascicle 38
Linked texts (1)
- 大般涅槃經集解 — Classical Chinese