大般涅槃經集解 4.55

4.55

Daosheng comments: At first glance it was said to be equal, but not yet understanding why, it was necessary to pose objections based on facts before discerning it. Sengliang says: If the Buddha's wisdom is complete, his stage pure, and his function superior, causing the giver to obtain permanence, then the former is inferior to the latter. If the latter does not make use of it while the former does, then the latter is inferior to the former. Among these five objections, the first four clarify that the stage is not pure, while the last one clarifies that the Buddha does not make use of it. Fayao says: Just before, it was merely stated that they are equal, without knowing why. Now, using the objection that they are unequal, he wishes to clarify that the two traces are equally provisional and not real. If the bodhisattva were truly real and not provisional, then the Buddha would also share in that nature. Why is this? Since they share one body, how could the Buddha alone be permanent while the bodhisattva is not? Now, basing this on the Buddha being permanent actually serves to reveal that the bodhisattva is provisional. Sengzong, as recorded by Jingyi, says: The intent of the objection provisionally clings to the past teaching, consistently making the former inferior and the latter superior. If the meaning of inequality is established, then the meaning of permanence is undone. Although he grants that the latter is superior, it actually implies it is not superior. Why? If he was formerly impermanent, how could he become permanent in just a short time? The first raises an objection based on whether merit and wisdom are complete or incomplete; the second contrasts sentient beings with non-sentient beings; the third contrasts retribution with non-retribution; the fourth contrasts practice with non-practice; the fifth contrasts using with not using. Sengzong, as recorded by Falian, says: The five objections challenge the practice so as to make them unequal, and the fruits also differ. It is observed that the practice of giving to a bodhisattva is inferior to giving to a Buddha, so the practice is superior. Baoliang says: Cunda's intention is also difficult to perceive, and commentators explain it in many ways. Now let us first examine the Buddha's teaching. If the Buddha was originally a permanent body of the dharmakāya and is so today as well, what objection could there be? If both past and present were impermanent, the two times would again be equal; he should properly infer from the birth in the royal palace to frame his objection. Why? In past teachings, the Buddha attained under the Bodhi tree was taken as real; until the Śūraṅgama Sūtra says, 'A lifespan of seven hundred asaṃkhyeyas is the true, while the sixteen-foot body is the manifestation.' Yet both principles are wondrous and beyond my knowledge; one merely sees the body of afflictions born in the royal palace first becoming a Buddha, just as Maitreya questioned in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra. If speaking from the deduction of principle: karma and afflictions can produce an impermanent, suffering retribution; now that afflictions and karma are exhausted, the retribution should also be gone, so how can these five aggregates still exist? However, it may also be a transformation, which is beyond my knowledge. But today the practice of the ten stages is fulfilled and the uncontaminated is perfected; the karmic retribution obtained should in principle be permanent. If so, at the time of previously receiving the offering he had not yet attained buddhahood, so it should be impermanent, whereas today it is permanent; how could the retributions of the two offerings be said to be equal? Tan'ai says: Below, this second section has two parts: first, the objection; second, the reply.