大般涅槃經集解 53

English (machine translation) 53

Language: English

53.1

Distinguishing faith; distinguishing the straightforward mind; distinguishing precepts; distinguishing good spiritual friends; distinguishing extensive learning; discussing the meaning of an icchantika possessing the buddhadhātu; explaining the name icchantika; explaining why bodhisattvas on the ninth bhūmi see phenomena as having a nature and therefore do not see the buddhadhātu; explaining that the Dharma Buddha has two kinds of exposition: first, having a nature, and second, having no nature—for the sake of sentient beings it is spoken of as dharmatā, while for the noble sages it is spoken of as having no dharmatā; distinguishing how the bodhisattva's absence of seeing is itself all phenomena; distinguishing the emptiness of mahānirvāṇa; citing the case of Ānanda not seeing emptiness; distinguishing the characteristics of faith and non-faith.

53.2

Chapter on Bodhisattva King of Virtue, the Ninth

53.3

"Furthermore, good sons! How does a bodhisattva [...] fourth, being close to good spiritual friends; fifth, extensive learning."

53.4

Sengliang comments: This is the merit of the ninth, the practice of illness. The practice of illness explains the beginning of the five practices. Faith is the head of all practices, hence it is explained first. 'Straightforward' means that believing in evil one does not perform it, and believing in good one diligently practices it; thus the straightforward mind is explained next. The evils of body and speech require precepts, thus precepts are explained next. Practicing good requires a teacher, thus good spiritual friends are explained next. Approaching good spiritual friends, one hears the Dharma, thus extensive learning is explained next. Sengzong says: Since it broadly communicates the previous three practices, and following this clarifies where precepts and concentration share common ground, it interweaves and broadens the above meanings. Baoliang says: Taking these dharmas as the essence, it starts from the mind of faith and extends up to extensive learning.

53.5

"What is faith? A bodhisattva-mahāsattva [...] practicing mahānirvāṇa, accomplishes the first matter."

53.6

Sengliang comments: Having faith in the Three Jewels means knowing the place of refuge. However, taking refuge inevitably requires practice: taking giving as the beginning of practice, giving is explained next. Practice is itself the vehicle; vehicles have the real and the provisional, so next the two truths are explained. Since the One Vehicle is the ultimate truth and the two vehicles are worldly truth, the text below explains that one quickly attains liberation: the small vehicle is slow, but now it is said to be quick; relative to the lesser it is quick, for if one did not speak of the lesser vehicle, beings would eternally remain in birth-and-death. Because preaching it enables them to leave, it is called 'quick'. The nature of the noble ones is indestructible faith. Baoliang says: Faith has three grades. From the external ordinary worldling up to those in the wisdom of hearing, all are generally termed 'faith'. Although faith has myriad stages, because one resides in an indeterminate rank, it counts as the lower grade. If the five faculties headed by faith are established up to the worldly supreme dharmas, it is called medium-grade faith. Receiving and attaining the true understanding of anutpāda and progressing up to the ninth bhūmi is generally termed upper-grade faith. However, what is clarified here takes faith at the medium grade. Why is this? Because this faith having been established, supported by it one enters emptiness and ascends to the path of seeing the truths. Before this, lower-grade faith is not without its distant contribution, but it is not yet firm. Since the stage is not yet determinate, it is not recorded here. If one relies on it from afar along the path, by principle one forgets words. However, in entering the ocean of the Buddhadharma, faith must necessarily come first. Once this mind is established, the treasures within the Buddhadharma naturally arise in succession. Therefore, now it first marks taking refuge in the Three Jewels as the beginning, showing the inception of the establishment of faith. Even though one has faith in the Three Jewels, if one does not believe there are causes that practice the six perfections, those practices will not be accomplished either; therefore, the sūtra text broadly lists the objects of faith. However, in setting forth the spheres of faith here, it presents two kinds of ultimate truth. First, having faith in the two truths means believing that birth-and-death is falsely existent, yet its essence is devoid of intrinsic nature; this relies on the opening of the two gates of emptiness and existence since the *Dapin* [Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra]. Later it goes on to speak of having faith in the ultimate truth: this is believing in the ultimate reality of the wondrous essence of spiritual illumination, which is true suchness. Thus we know that the truth clarified in the present teaching is not the emptiness of inherent nature of the former teachings. Once this faith is established, one recognizes that birth-and-death is illusory and unreal; and relying on the tathāgatagarbha, one cultivates the path to sever folly, eliminating the causes and destroying the results, thereby revealing the nirvāṇa of dharmatā.

53.7

"What is the straightforward mind? A bodhisattva-mahāsattva [...] if afflictions arise, they fall into the evil destinies."

53.8

Sengliang comments: First, the straightforward mind is distinguished in terms of transforming beings; thereafter, it is clarified with reference to affairs: as long as it concerns the principle, regardless of whether it is perverse or correct, it is called 'straightforward'.

53.9

"If such a bodhisattva sees sentient beings [...] generates the mind of anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi."

53.10

Sengliang comments: 'Never speaks of it' means that speaking of evil increases two offenses, while praising good nurtures two merits. As for 'what is good, namely the buddhadhātu': that which is the least among the good belongs solely to the icchantika. Baoliang says: This refers to the direct-cause nature. Only this is the true good, and is not something generated within conditions. If one clarifies it in terms of its function, that which can obtain the good fruit is also called 'good'. Telling beings that within their bodies is the buddhadhātu causes their hearts to rejoice, so that they generate the resolve to practice the path.

53.11

"Then, [Bodhisattva] Radiance All-Pervading [...] generates the mind of anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi."

53.12

Sengliang comments: The objection means: If an icchantika hearing praise of the buddhadhātu quickly generates the resolve, then the earlier statement that they are incurable would be wrong. It cites the text at the beginning of the five practices above that icchantikas cannot be cured. This is the first objection. Sengzong says: The first point regarding the three types of sick persons objects to the straightforward mind, saying that one should not praise the buddhadhātu to generate the bodhi mind. Why is this so? Above it was said that among the three kinds, some naturally recover and some are definitively curable; if one recovers naturally, there is no need to praise the nature; knowing that another will surely die, what benefit is there even if one praises it? Although three persons are cited, the intent is to take two persons to raise the objection. Baoliang says: The King of Virtue then sets forth five objections. The reason for proclaiming at the outset that if one accomplishes the initial five matters, all can be achieved, is that if these five matters are accomplished, one can eliminate illness; if they are not accomplished, one cannot treat illness. Now going forward, it again clarifies the three types of sick persons, so we know it broadly elaborates on the practice of illness. The first objection states: The Tathāgata spoke above of three types of sick persons, where the third person, whether hearing the Dharma or not hearing the Dharma, naturally attains Buddhahood. Why do you now say that praising the buddhadhātu causes sentient beings to only then generate the resolve?"

53.13

"World-Honoured One! If meeting good spiritual friends, the Buddhas [...] because of attaining anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi."

53.14

Sengliang comments: This is the second objection. Sengzong says: The second objection says that their inability to generate the resolve is also incorrect; if it is said that they possess the nature, they will inevitably attain Buddhahood. Baoliang says: The second objection states: If the first person, whether hearing the Dharma or not hearing the Dharma, is entirely incapable of generating the resolve, this is also not correct. This person possesses the buddhadhātu, and the buddhadhātu is good and can of itself lead toward Buddhahood. Why did the Buddha say that they are entirely incapable of generating the resolve?"

53.15

"World-Honoured One! As the Buddha has taught, what is called [...] why did the Buddha say that all kuśalamūlas are severed?"

53.16

Sengliang comments: This is the third objection. Sengzong says: The third objection says they cannot be cured. If whether meeting [a physician] or not, they equally cannot be cured: evil does not exceed that of an icchantika, yet since this person possesses the buddhadhātu, which cannot be severed, one must know that the statement about severing the good is not the true principle. As when the Buddha formerly spoke in the twelve divisions of the canon that there are two kinds of good—this sub-clause of the third argument says: Since the buddhadhātu is not severed, the nature remains within the body. Since it remains within the body, it should block hell. This raises an objection based on manifestation and function. Baoliang says: The third objection is that they should not receive the name icchantika. Within this objection, it opens into two parts: If an icchantika possesses the buddhadhātu, and the buddhadhātu is good, why is it said that severing all kuśalamūlas is called an icchantika? The latter part states: As the Buddha formerly taught in the twelve divisions of the canon, there are two kinds of good: the permanent and the impermanent. The intent of the objection takes the good of the direct-cause nature as permanent, and the good of the conditioning causes as impermanent. If so, the good generated within conditions is empty and powerless, and indeed cannot block hell; but the direct-cause nature is permanent, and its power and function should be strong—why does it not block the icchantika from entering hell?"

53.17

"As the Buddha of old taught in the twelve divisions of the canon [...] speaks in this way, calling them an icchantika."

53.18

Sengliang comments: This is the fourth objection.

53.19

"World-Honoured One! If, due to the buddhadhātu, one generates the anuttarā [...] samyaksaṃbodhi, there is no such possibility."

53.20

Sengliang comments: This is the fourth objection. Sengzong says: The fourth objection says that by reason of the buddhadhātu one naturally attains Buddhahood, without relying on broadly preaching the twelve divisions of the canon. Baoliang says: In the fourth objection, from 'If, due to the buddhadhātu, one generates the mind of the unexcelled path' downward, it clarifies that the power of the buddhadhātu is strong and one should naturally attain Buddhahood; why is it necessary to broadly preach the twelve divisions of the canon to encourage people to practice? Below it then cites two parables to help construct the objection, using parables to illustrate that the power of the direct cause should naturally bring one to Buddhahood."

53.21

"World-Honoured One! The Buddhas, the Tathāgatas, explain that the nature of cause and effect [...] how can such a meaning be consistent?"

53.22

Sengliang comments: This is the sixth objection. Sengzong says: The fifth objection grasps that the buddhadhātu already exists within the cause, and therefore one can attain Buddhahood. Baoliang says: The fifth objection states that saying the nature of cause and effect is neither existent nor non-existent is also incorrect. If there is no fruit within the cause, how can it generate the Buddha's bodhi-tree? Precisely because it exists, it can generate it."

53.23

"Then the World-Honoured One praised him, saying: 'Excellent, excellent! [...] can destroy the banner of victory raised by Pāpīmān."

53.24

Sengliang comments: Wishing to answer the questions, he first praises him. Sengzong says: Among the answers, he first answers the second, next answers the third, and next answers the sub-clause of the third. Because of answering the sub-clause, the momentum of the argument seems to answer the first and fourth, and separately answers the fifth. Baoliang says: Wishing to answer the objections, he first praises him. Clarifying that the questions were timely, master and disciple praise each other."

53.25

"Good sons! As I spoke above of the three types of sick persons [...] if they do not meet with [a physician], they cannot be cured."

53.26

Baoliang comments: Explaining the persons of the two vehicles. Why is this? These persons have nine causes and conditions by which they cannot proceed; if they are free of these nine matters, they will proceed. What are the nine? First, knowing that a food is unwholesome and yet eating it: persons of the two vehicles know that the fruit they have obtained is inferior to that of others, yet stubbornly cling to it as correct. Second, overeating: because the intent of the persons of the two vehicles to seek the fruit is impatient, they cannot attain the Buddha fruit from afar. Third, eating again before the previous meal is digested: the four inversions among the defiled are subdued but not yet severed, yet now they further give rise to the four inversions concerning the Buddha. Fourth, bowel and urinary evacuations not being done at proper times: their clinging to marks is firm, and they do not sever the fetters through principle. Fifth, when ill, failing to follow the physician's instructions: they do not practice the conversion of the bodhisattva's Great Vehicle. Sixth, failing to follow the attendant's instructions: they do not follow good spiritual friends. Seventh, stubbornly holding back and not vomiting: stubbornly clinging to the fruit of the two vehicles as correct, not abandoning the small to follow the great. Eighth, walking at night: having much ignorant mind. Ninth, excessive sexual misconduct: desiring the bliss of quickly extinguishing this body in non-remainder. Because they have these nine sicknesses, if they hear the Dharma, they turn their minds and proceed; if they do not turn, it is difficult to enlighten and transform them."

53.27

"Good sons! As I spoke above, whether meeting or not meeting [...] if they do not encounter [them], they cannot generate [the resolve]."

53.28

Sengliang comments: Answering the first objection. Sengzong says: First citing the three types of sick persons, this is not yet the answer. Baoliang says: First explaining the third person who definitively proceeds: this person has planted causes for a long time, and is naturally able to turn toward the Buddha, not relying on hearing the Dharma.

53.29

"As I spoke above: if they meet with good spiritual friends, Buddhas, and bodhisattvas [...] Why is this? Because their life is exhausted."

53.30

Sengliang states: This answers the second and third objections. Sengzong states: This answers the second objection. His objection stated: 'Since whether he meets or does not meet [a good friend] he is completely unable to generate [the bodhi mind], [does] this person [ever] attain bodhi?' Now the reply states: When he is an icchantika, he severs his kuśalamūlas; but when later he generates goodness, he is no longer an icchantika. Whether this person meets or does not meet [a good friend], he is never free of the icchantika mind, and therefore it is said that he cannot be cured; it is not said that his future nature is severed. Baoliang states: This answers the second objection. The objection stated: 'If an icchantika has buddhadhātu and is definitely unable to recover, then this too is not good.' The Buddha's intended reply says: 'When I said that he cannot recover, this was spoken only of the time when he possesses the icchantika mind; it was not said that after discarding the icchantika mind he is likewise unable to recover.' When he has not yet discarded the icchantika stage, although he has buddhadhātu, it is not good; if after discarding this mind he is no longer an icchantika, why could he not recover?

53.31

"Good son! 'Iccan' means faith, and 'tika' means incomplete […] [because he is incomplete in all] good dharmas, he is called an icchantika."

53.32

Sengliang states: This answers the fourth objection. Sengzong states: This answers the third objection. His objection stated: 'If the Buddha-dharma is not severed, why is it said that he severs his kuśalamūlas?' Now the reply states: 'Iccan' means faith, and 'tika' means incomplete. Because he is incomplete in faith, he is called an icchantika. How could he be called an icchantika on account of lacking the unconditioned buddhadhātu? Baoliang states: Next, this answers the third objection. The objection stated: 'If an icchantika has buddhadhātu, why is he said to sever kuśalamūlas?' The Buddha now answers, saying: 'Because he is incomplete in faith, he is called an icchantika.' This clarifies that buddhadhātu is not faith, nor is goodness produced from the instrument [of the five aggregates]. The five aggregates of sentient beings are the instruments for generating the faithful mind. Since the primary cause (kāraṇa-hetu) buddhadhātu is neither good nor produced from the instrument of the five aggregates, how could it be severed? If the primary cause buddhadhātu were produced from the instrument of the five aggregates, then the five aggregates of sentient beings would be the instruments that produce buddhadhātu, and the sūtra should not have said that buddhadhātu is not faith and sentient beings are not the instruments. Deducing from this principle, one should know that the five aggregates of sentient beings exist in dependence upon the primary cause nature; it is not that the primary cause nature exists in dependence upon the five aggregates. Investigating this here, it is identical in meaning with the explanation in the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra that saṃsāra exists in dependence upon the tathāgatagarbha, not that the tathāgatagarbha exists in dependence upon saṃsāra. Thus one knows the text's meaning is subtle, and its verification of the principle is luminous. In the subsequent passages, the conceptual paradigms are also like this. Buddhadhātu is merely not a good produced among conditions, nor is it an evil. Why is this? Since the nature of the primary cause is not attained through upāya, how could it be severed? Yet it can attain good fruits, and furthermore is not evil. The icchantika merely severs that which is produced among conditions; therefore he receives the name of icchantika.

53.33

"Good son! As you have said […] he immediately falls into the three evil destinies; therefore he is called an icchantika."

53.34

Sengliang states: This answers the fifth objection. Sengzong states: This answers the third sub-clause. Because it will exist in the future, it is said to exist; since it does not already exist, how can one demand that it be able to ward off hell? As in the parable of the king hearing the sound of the harp (vīṇā), this completes the preceding answer. It means that if one wishes to hear its sound, one must use upāya; it cannot be sought directly. Buddhadhātu is also like this: it must depend on method. By means of this, he concurrently answers the first and fourth objections. The fourth stated: 'If there is buddhadhātu, it should naturally be accomplished by principle; why is it necessary to speak the twelve divisions of the canon?' Now the reply states: 'Although there is a nature, it must be spoken, just like the sound of the harp.' The first objection stated: 'If it definitely cannot be cured, then there is no need to treat it.' Now the reply states: 'Although it cannot be cured, since buddhadhātu is not severed, if one hears the preaching of the twelve divisions of the canon, that will provide the benefit of external conditions.' Baoliang states: Bringing forward the final juncture of the third objection, he concurrently answers the fourth objection, saying: An icchantika truly lacks the fruit-nature. If he were to have the goodness of the conditioning cause (pratyaya-hetu), it could protect him from entering hell; since he currently lacks the goodness of the conditioning cause, how could it protect him? He then immediately cites a parable, clarifying that ordinary people are foolish and devoid of wisdom. Hearing the Buddha say that the bodies of sentient beings possess buddhadhātu, they claim that this body of the five aggregates immediately already possesses the knowledge of all aspects (sarvākārajñatā), the ten powers, and the fearlessnesses, and without relying on cultivation will accomplish it spontaneously while lying on the ground. Demanding of the Buddha that it exist present in this way is surely an improper application of the mind. Sentient beings' bodies presently possess only the primary cause; they must accumulate virtue and cultivate the path, extinguishing the obstacles of ignorance so that the darkness is completely exhausted, and only then does buddhadhātu become manifest. When the conditions are complete, only then is it functional. This matter is like a harp: it requires the completeness of many conditions before the sound emerges. Now the icchantika has severed precisely the faithful mind, and therefore falls into the three evil destinies.

53.35

"Good son! As you have said, if milk lacks curd […] and does not complain of another's defects is called a straightforward mind."

53.36

Sengliang states: This answers the sixth objection. Sengzong states: This answers the fifth objection. It is now said that it cannot be said to already exist unconditionally; because it will exist in the future, it is said to exist. For example, if milk is left lying for up to a month, curd will still not be produced. But if one adds a single drop of sap from the poqiu tree, it immediately turns into curd, because its conditions are fully present. If there were already curd in the milk, why would it need to wait for conditions? Regarding 'being able to do what is difficult to do': it means that precisely because one is endowed with these five matters such as the straightforward mind, one is able to perform these things that are difficult to endure, even not sparing body and life, because one deeply understands the characteristic of emptiness. Baoliang states: This answers the fifth objection that clung to the effect existing within the cause. Now it is explained that the myriad dharmas arise from conditions and have no svabhāva; when conditions assemble, they exist, and when they have not assembled, they do not exist. How could it allow that the effect already exists within the cause? If the effect already existed, why would it need multiple conditions? Because there is no fixed nature, one is able to become a Buddha. Having finished answering the objection, he again brings up the previous concluding sentence: by this principle, the bodhisattva always praises others' goodness, and therefore it is called a straightforward mind. After the concluding sentence, he specifically turns to the bodhisattva's mind in relation to affairs to explain the straightforward mind.

53.37

"Furthermore, good son! How does a bodhisattva have a straightforward [mind] […] this is called a bodhisattva's straightforward mind."

53.38

Sengliang states: Previously, the explanation was not yet comprehensive, which gave rise to questions and objections. Now that the answers are finished, he further cultivates the former thesis. Baoliang states: Having finished answering the objections, he raises the former to conclude the main import.

53.39

"How does a bodhisattva cultivate the precepts […] cultivating mahānirvāṇa is the third precept."

53.40

Sengliang states: 'Śīlapāramitā' is the designation for lacking the supreme four evils and being able to cross over the ocean of suffering. Baoliang states: Precepts arise from faith; since the mind of the path is correct, the precepts generated do not see the characteristics of precepts, and that is pāramitā.

53.41

"How does a bodhisattva draw close to good friends […] he is endowed with the fourth, true good friend."

53.42

Sengliang states: One is a washerman: because he knows defilement and purity, one should teach him the contemplation of impurity. One is a goldsmith: because he knows the airs of wind and fire, one should teach him the counting of breaths. Baoliang states: The true good friends are only the Buddhas. Now the text names and cites bodhisattvas because, endowed with the above three minds, they are able to draw close to good friends and can further act as good friends to others. Because [the disciples] were not yet fully endowed, he cites affairs as verification.

53.43

"How is a bodhisattva endowed with broad learning […] he accomplishes the fifth, being endowed with broad learning."

53.44

Sengliang states: Broad learning originally serves to quench suffering; it does not necessarily depend on wide text and many matters, but lies solely in deep principle eliminating delusion. Baoliang states: As for the fifth, being endowed with broad learning: if one takes it according to the words, it is only wisdom derived from hearing (śrutamayī prajñā), and does not extend to reflection and cultivation. However, the explanatory intention here probably integrates all three wisdoms. In distinguishing broad learning now, there are six stages, from shallow to deep, leaving nothing unincluded. First, broad learning is explained in terms of the Hīnayāna twelve divisions. Second, setting aside eleven divisions, taking only the vaipulya sūtras is also called being endowed with broad learning. Third, excluding the sūtras prior to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra, upholding only the twelve divisions of the present Nirvāṇa Sūtra is broad learning. Fourth, in terms of a single four-line gāthā, as spoken regarding the Bodhisattva of the Snowy Mountains (Himavat). Fifth, directly relying on the two characters 'permanent' and 'abiding'. Sixth, exclusively discussing the marvelous essence of dharmatā as Suchness (tathatā), which eternally does not preach the Dharma and transcends words and characteristics, as broad learning. If one can thus commune with the ultimate principle, this is the foremost, supreme broad learning.

53.45

"Good son! If there is a good man or good woman […] difficult to endure and difficult to give are also like this."

53.46

Sengliang states: Regarding 'being able to give what is difficult to give': the sense of 'acting' is general, while the sense of 'giving' is specific. How so? When external affairs arrive unexpectedly, being able to remain at peace is patience; giving arises from within, and being able to remain at peace is giving.

53.47

"Good son! For example, parents having only one son […] Why is this? Because he cultivates the samādhi of emptiness."

53.48

Sengliang states: He raises two matters: first, compassion; second, understanding emptiness. By means of these two matters, he does not see their difficulty, and therefore can perform difficult deeds. Baoliang states: Next, from 'being able to do what is difficult to do' onward, he opens it into three matters to praise the person who accomplishes the five dharmas above. Precisely relying on the understanding above, he awakens to the falsity and unreality of the myriad dharmas. Whatever he undertakes, he does not distinguish between self and other, having no further discrimination. If the slightest thing were retained, it would contravene principle. Why is this so? Precisely because of gathering the power of the wisdom of emptiness, throughout the day he acts for the sake of beings, yet ultimately does nothing.

53.49

At that time, Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva Guangming Pianzhao Gaogui Dewang […] although one cultivates emptiness, one cannot cause them to be empty."

53.50

Sengliang states: Wishing to clarify the benefit of cultivating emptiness, he sets up an objection to reveal it. Sengzong states: 'All dharmas are inherently empty by nature' follows the previous words to pose an objection. The previous statement said that by skillfully knowing emptiness, one can perform what is difficult to endure. Now, asking about the purport of knowing emptiness, he sets up two objections. If they are inherently empty by nature, then being empty, there is no seeing; if they are not empty by nature, although one cultivates it, what benefit is there? Sengliang states: The assembly at that time constantly generated a mind of fear toward this principle of emptiness, being unable to suddenly forget it; therefore Dewang accordingly sets up two objections to eliminate beings' clinging to existence. The Buddha said above that cultivating the samādhi of emptiness leaves no more anger or joy. Now, about to open two barriers, he first determines: are all dharmas inherently empty in their essential nature, or are the myriad dharmas not empty, and the bodhisattva's wisdom cultivating concentration forcefully makes them empty? He then concludes the first objection, saying: 'If they are inherently empty by nature, why is it necessary to cultivate emptiness?' The second objection says: 'If they are inherently not empty by nature, how could cultivating emptiness cause them to be empty?'

53.51

"Good son! All dharmas are originally empty by nature […] all Buddhas and bodhisattvas would be the retinue of Māra."

53.52

Sengliang states: As for '[it is] neither earth, water, fire, nor wind, yet not separate from earth, water, fire, and wind,' the five sense faculties are provisional matter. Thus, while the faculty is one, the great elements are four. Therefore, the supreme-meaning emptiness is not separate from the four [elements], and [the sūtra] speaks of conventional-truth emptiness. Because conventional truth is empty, there is no grasping of the one and four as [substantial], which is emptiness. 'Neither blue nor yellow' also refutes substantial matter in the same way. 'Neither existent nor non-existent' is fully endowed with the emptiness of the threefold Middle Way. Because of continuous similarity, it resembles permanence; ordinary beings do not understand, and speak of existence and permanence. Baoliang states: Proceeding with the Buddha's reply below, he first dispels the second objection. He says: 'The nature of all phenomena is fundamentally empty of itself.' If the myriad existents could be non-empty, existence would ultimately have nothing to exist—how could it possibly be found to exist? Since it cannot be found, we know that from the very beginning it is not different from emptiness; it is merely existent for the diseased, and constantly non-existent for the awakened. Therefore, as our school cites, like flowers in the sky, for one without disease they have never existed. Although they are existent for the diseased and non-existent for the non-diseased, the one without disease is also not unaware of the diseased person's delusional perception. Thus, when the sage examines it, the two knowledges are never deficient. For this reason, it is said in the 'Pure Conduct' [Chapter]: 'All conventional truths are entirely supreme-meaning truth for the Tathāgata.' From 'the nature of matter cannot be found' onwards, it is further explained in terms of phenomena. First, refuting provisional nominal matter as not being the four great elements clarifies that earth, water, fire, and wind are fundamentally empty in their nature, without intrinsic substantiality. This clarifies the ultimate truth. 'Not separate from earth, water, fire, and wind' means not separate from the function of the four great elements; this is falsely constructed through causes and conditions, possessing only name and function, which clarifies conventional truth. 'Neither blue, yellow, red, nor white' next refutes real-entity matter, clarifying that colors such as blue and yellow fundamentally do not exist; this is the ultimate truth. 'Not separate from blue, yellow, and so forth' is likewise falsely constructed through causes and conditions and delusively existent, having only name and function; this clarifies conventional truth. Existence ultimately does not exist, nor is there any existence that can exist; non-existence ultimately does not non-exist, nor is there any non-existence that can be non-existent. Since the characteristics of phenomena are like this, how could they not be empty? It is precisely because the bodhisattva is fully endowed with the above five things and sees the myriad phenomena as empty that there is no longer anger or joy.

53.53

'Good son! The nature of all phenomena is fundamentally empty of itself […] sees that the nature of all phenomena is entirely empty and quiescent.'

53.54

Sengliang states: Next, he raises the first question to reply. Although phenomena are of themselves empty, if one does not cultivate emptiness, one will not recognize that conditioned phenomena are non-existent. One must realize existence in order to merge with emptiness; therefore, he immediately uses a simile below to explain it. Just as all phenomena, because of their impermanence, are capable of being destroyed by cessation—it is not that there is a separate phenomenon of cessation capable of destroying them: rather, when the substance of a phenomenon arises, it is designated as 'nature', and when the substance of a phenomenon ceases, it is termed 'cessation'. This clarifies that the myriad phenomena are likewise simply empty in their essential nature. Therefore, when one cultivates emptiness and sees emptiness, there is also no separate phenomenon of emptiness that comes to empty this emptiness. Although he adduces a simile to prove that the substantial characteristics are empty, the minds of people might generate doubt regarding the preceding simile. Now, he temporarily speaks in terms of the earlier pagoda simile.

53.55

Bodhisattva Omnipresent Radiance High and Virtuous King […] Emptiness is the absence of phenomena; what is there to be seen?'

53.56

Sengliang states: One who takes it as empty immediately relies on what was heard to raise an objection about something being fundamentally devoid of that quality. Objecting that a salty substance fundamentally lacks a salty nature, yet is made salty—if it is not empty, it is an inversion. If it is purely empty, there is again nothing to be seen, which further constitutes the previous objection.

53.57

'Good son! This samādhi of emptiness sees non-empty phenomena […] seeing the night as the characteristic of night, how could that be an inversion?'

53.58

Sengliang states: 'Because phenomena are impermanent, cessation can destroy them' is like wood being impermanent, so fire can burn it. 'Production can produce them' is like a sprout having the characteristic of production, so water and grain can produce it. 'Good son, seeing non-empty phenomena' answers his first objection. He does not say that their nature cannot be empty; he refers to the conventional-truth provisional function seen by the minds of sentient beings as non-empty. Now, recognizing it in accordance with the provisional is precisely illuminating emptiness; hence it is not an inversion. Just as greed and the like exist merely in terms of conventional truth, leading to evil retributions, so too it is with the nature of matter. If an ordinary person resolutely grasps them as real, that can be made out to be an inversion; but this clarifies that bodhisattvas do not form this understanding, and thus it is not an inversion. Taking night to be day would be an inversion; this clarifies that knowing according to the provisional and recognizing according to emptiness—how could that be an inversion?

53.59

'Good son! All bodhisattvas abiding on the nine stages […] because of not seeing, they therefore see the buddhadhātu.'

53.60

Sengliang states: 'Seeing phenomena as having a nature' means that seeing emptiness is seeing permanence. Those on the nine stages do not see permanence because they do not see emptiness; therefore, those on the tenth stage only see it partially. Baoliang states: The sūtra text is precisely like this, so we know that up through the nine stages, they only see the emptiness of non-self, which is not the true principle of signlessness. Since what they contemplate are conditioned matters, it is not the emptiness of the true self; hence it says 'seeing phenomena as having characteristics.' It is not that they grasp a nature and see existence, but precisely because they cultivate non-self so much, they have not yet been able to see the buddhadhātu.

53.61

'Buddhas and bodhisattvas have two kinds of teachings […] for this reason, one cultivates emptiness and sees emptiness.'

53.62

Sengliang states: Although the gradual teaching speaks of existence, its ultimate aim is emptiness; because they see the emptiness of phenomena, they cultivate the samādhi of emptiness to cause them to attain the seeing of emptiness. 'Having no phenomenal nature' is also because of cultivating emptiness. For this reason, cultivating emptiness leads to seeing emptiness. Baoliang states: 'Having a phenomenal nature' means having conventional-truth function. 'Having no phenomenal nature' clarifies that fundamentally it is empty. It is precisely because they do not see emptiness that he causes them to cultivate emptiness in order to attain emptiness; therefore, they cultivate the samādhi of emptiness. It is also because of cultivating emptiness that they see all phenomena as empty.

53.63

'Good son! As you said, seeing emptiness, emptiness is the absence of phenomena […] seeing that the nature of all phenomena is non-existent.'

53.64

Sengliang states: The nature of phenomena is non-existent, so the bodhisattva has nothing to see. Merging with the principle of phenomena is provisionally called 'seeing', but in reality it is not seeing. Baoliang states: Next, he answers the latter barrier. It is truly as you asked: if one posits an object of vision, it cannot be called seeing. What the bodhisattva sees is therefore seeing the buddhadhātu.

53.65

'Good son! Bodhisattvas do not only, by virtue of seeing samādhi […] see that all phenomena are entirely empty.'

53.66

Sengliang states: Not only does samādhi see emptiness, but the six perfections are also empty. Baoliang states: Universally traversing the six perfections and myriad practices, he clarifies the absence of natures and characteristics.

53.67

'Therefore, when I was in the city of Kapilavastu […] fully accomplished and perfected the ninth virtue.'

53.68

Sengliang states: He adduces events to provide verification and explanation.

53.69

'Good son! How does a bodhisattva cultivate the Great Nirvāṇa […] enter the Great Nirvāṇa of permanence, bliss, self, and purity?'

53.70

Sengliang states: Taking one's own nirvāṇa and further being able to teach others so as to cause them to attain nirvāṇa as the essence. Here he first speaks of one's own attainment. Sengzong states: The tenth virtue takes the thirty-seven factors [of awakening] as its essence; these thirty-seven factors contain morality, concentration, and wisdom, which can broaden what came before. Wherever there is an explanation of morality, concentration, and wisdom within the three practices, all can be broadened. As for 'what sentient beings do not give rise to faith in this sūtra', it means that if one gives rise to faith in the sūtra, one will be able to practice the thirty-seven factors and ultimately achieve buddhahood; if one does not give rise to faith, one will sink forever in saṃsāra. This clarifies that now that the ten virtues are concluded, an unspoken admonition is given for the future: how could one not engender respect and faith?

Linked texts (1)

大般涅槃經集解 — Classical Chinese