大般涅槃經集解 59.62

59.62

Sengliang comments: If the mind resting upon an object without distraction constitutes samādhi, then in thought after thought when grasping objects, none is distracted. From 'the mind being in a single realm' down to 'it is not named samādhi', if the mind continuously abides in a single realm, it is called samādhi. As for 'if it is not samādhi, it is not sarvajñā (all-knowledge)', if it grasps the four [truths], it is not samādhi. The reason they refute each other reciprocally is that cultivating samādhi and prajñā is done for the sake of sarvajñā. Sarvajñā is named sarvajñā because there is no phenomenon it does not know. If true certainty is termed jñāna, one entity possesses both; without possessing both, it is not sarvajñā. As for 'if it is not sarvajñā, how could it be called samādhi?', if it does not grasp other conditions and does not know all, then it not only loses all, it also loses knowledge, because their functions differ. 'Samādhi and prajñā are also like this' means that non-samādhi also refutes prajñā, and non-prajñā refutes samādhi. Baoliang comments: Once these three terms were proclaimed, the assembly had doubts, and therefore Siṃhanāda posed three objections concerning a single phenomenon. He merely raised samādhi as an instance; prajñā and upekṣā are likewise. This first objection states: Sentient beings inherently possess samādhi; why must it be cultivated? The second objection states: Samādhi essentially collects the mind into a single realm; since the Buddha comprehensively conditions the ten thousand realms, it must not be samādhi. The third objection states: If one attains samādhi through a single practice, then among the six pāramitās, only dhyāna would be it, and the other five would not. If samādhi cannot generate wisdom, it is also not samādhi.