大般涅槃經集解 64
English (machine translation) 64
- Language
- English
64.1
Extensive explanation of controversies, twenty headings in all: First, explaining the teaching of immeasurable names for a single named phenomenon, immeasurable names for a single meaning, immeasurable names for immeasurable meanings, down to explaining conventional truth within the ultimate truth, etc.; not preaching five kinds of Dharma for five kinds of persons, namely not praising giving to the stingy, etc.; extensive explanation of the circumstance of telling the Demon King that he would enter nirvāṇa after three months; second, explaining the controversy over self and non-self; third, explaining whether there is an intermediate existence or no intermediate existence; fourth, explaining the controversy over whether there is regression or no regression; fifth, explaining whether the Tathāgata is conditioned or unconditioned.
64.2
Chapter on Kāśyapa, Part Two
64.3
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha: "World-Honoured One, [if the Buddha knows the faculties of past sentient beings,] he also knows the faculties of future sentient beings." [down to]
64.4
Sengliang comments: This is the third section, on controversies. Above it was said that possessing the four virtues leads to advancement, while lacking them leads to regression. But good friends do not surpass the Buddha, and the true Dharma does not surpass the Buddha's preaching. If later people were to generate disputes over what the Buddha preached, they would not reflect properly and therefore would not practice in accord with the Dharma. That the four virtues are not possessed is entirely due to the Buddha's preaching not being fixed, as if the Tathāgata's preaching did not accord with the capacity of beings; hence he asks the question. Sengzong says: Fifth, this extensively clarifies controversies. There are three turns: first, presenting controversies to reproach the Buddha; second, the Tathāgata's extensive explanation to dispel attachment; third, explaining the controversies. From here below is the first, listing twenty-one controversies to reproach the Buddha. Baoliang says: Wishing to explain the controversies, he raises an objection in anticipation, saying: Since the Buddha knows the differences between sharp and dull faculties among sentient beings across the three times, why did he not speak definitively, instead causing beings to dispute? Zhixiu says: In distinguishing controversies there are only two exchanges of question and answer: first Kāśyapa raises difficulties through controversies, and later the Buddha explains them.
64.5
"Such sentient beings, after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, [will give rise to doubts and disputes regarding the Dharma;] why do you not speak definitively today?" [down to]
64.6
Baoliang comments: In total he lists twenty pairs and forty parties to the dispute, asking the Buddha to explain them. Daohui's records state: In Kāśyapa's question there are forty controversies in all; paired together two by two they make twenty, though within the chapter headings there are actually forty-two. In combining the chapter headings, the two clauses of the nineteenth state: "either explaining that the buddhadhātu exists immediately in sentient beings, or that it exists apart from sentient beings; or explaining that those who commit the four gravest offenses, the five heinous deeds, or are icchantikas all possess the buddhadhātu, or explaining that they do not." Combining these two clauses makes forty.
64.7
The Buddha told Kāśyapa: "Good son! Such a meaning [is not what can be known by the six consciousnesses;] it can only be known by wisdom." [down to]
64.8
Sengliang comments: The meaning explained by the Buddha contains the provisional and the real. The nature of consciousness is attachment; failing to penetrate the two meanings, it clings one-sidedly and gives rise to dispute. Wisdom can penetrate them, neither clinging nor disputing.
64.9
"If there is a wise person, toward this person I [do not make definitive statements; and those who lack wisdom] also say that I make non-definitive statements." [down to]
64.10
Sengliang comments: The wise perceive phenomena, and the principle of phenomena is non-dual; they consider the Buddha to preach the real and not the provisional. Because the unwise do not perceive phenomena, when the Buddha preaches the provisional path, they think the path has provisional and real, and that his preaching is not fixed. In saying that I make non-definitive statements, they themselves do not perceive phenomena, yet they claim that the Buddha's preaching has duality; hence controversies arise. Sengzong says: Second, he explains the delusion of clinging to words. How could transforming beings in response to circumstances be known by the six consciousnesses of ordinary beings? It is because they do not understand this intent that they give rise to these controversies. For the wise, the principle returns to unity, and as for his upāya of converting beings, the fundamental and the trace do not contradict each other; therefore it is said to be non-dual. To the foolish who fail to understand, they cling one-sidedly and declare it to be dual. Baoliang says: Wishing to resolve the objection, he first offers a general explanation, saying that such meaning is not known by the six consciousnesses, but is penetrated by the wise. The faculties and natures of sentient beings are not equal, requiring different medicines of Dharma; how could he speak definitively? Therefore, our lineage constantly encourages practitioners: if you fully realize these controversies, this is called penetrating the Buddha's Dharma. The Dharma preached by the Buddha originally provided momentary benefit and established provision for later understanding. One should grasp the purport with flexibility; how could one cling one-sidedly? It is simply that learners themselves deviate from the principle; how could this be the Buddha's fault?
64.11
"Good son! All the wholesome conduct that the Tathāgata possesses [is done for the sake of sentient beings, just as a good physician,] entirely to treat all illnesses and sufferings." [down to]
64.12
Sengliang comments: This means that the foolish and the wise are different and require taming; this is why his preaching cannot be fixed.
64.13
"Good son! The Tathāgata, the World-Honoured One, for the sake of lands [and times, for the sake of others' words, for the sake of persons, and for the sake of faculties,] makes two kinds of explanations among all phenomena." [down to]
64.14
Sengliang comments: He explains instances of non-definitive statements, proving that sentient beings are different. As with the precept on leather goods, it is permitted in cold countries and prohibited in warm lands. "Times" refers to explaining non-self first and self later. "Others' words" refers to the Buddha explaining that the buddhadhātu is seen slightly for the sake of bodhisattvas in their final incarnation, not for his own sake. "For the sake of persons" refers to explaining contemplation of the foul as the path for those with much lust, not for those with much anger. "For the sake of faculties" refers to explaining the essentials of the Dharma briefly for those of sharp faculties, and explaining the essentials of the Dharma at length for those of dull faculties.
64.15
"For a single named phenomenon, immeasurable names are spoken; [for a single meaning, immeasurable names are spoken;] for immeasurable meanings, immeasurable names are spoken." [down to]
64.16
Sengliang comments: "Phenomenon" is the substance of the thing; "name" is the cause of the meaning; "meaning" is the reality of the name. Designations of internal and external each possess general and specific aspects. Sengzong says: This clarifies that the Tathāgata's teaching of the Dharma is not fixed; how could one rely on this to give rise to clinging? Interchanging single names and single meanings, one seeks the explanation below, each preserving its own purport.
64.17
"How does a single name express immeasurable names? [As with nirvāṇa, it is also called non-arising, non-producing, non-doing, asaṃskṛta...;] this is called a single name creating immeasurable names." [down to]
64.18
Sengliang comments: "Parinir" here means "non-" or "not". "Vāṇa" means "arising" or "emerging". The Central Asian sounds contain many meanings; they are all names for emerging from birth and death, and also the meaning of emerging from birth and death: a single name and a single meaning. Sengzong says: "A single name" takes the name of having no result, yet it is variously differentiated. Daohui's records state: Nirvāṇa is a single name; the substance of nirvāṇa is the phenomenon of that single name. Creating various names based on the substance of nirvāṇa is why it is said that for a single named phenomenon, immeasurable names are spoken. Zhixiu says: Grasping a single name to apprehend the phenomenon, one speaks immeasurable names in accordance with the immeasurable aspects of meaning of this named phenomenon; it does not mean that a single name itself creates immeasurable names.
64.19
"How does a single meaning express immeasurable names? [As with the Tathāgata, he is also called the Great Teacher, the Brāhmaṇa, the Pure One, the Great Physician, the Dragon King...;] this is called a single meaning expressing immeasurable names." [down to]
64.20
Sengliang comments: There is no arising or coming forth. Although coming forth and non-existence [differ], both their designations and meanings are distinct; thus limitless [meanings] possess limitless names. 'Just like Śakra Devendra': the meaning of 'Lord of the Second Heaven' indicates that the meaning is one. It is identical with the meaning of nirvāṇa, and is merely adduced as proof by means of a different case. Sengzong comments: 'Expressing limitless names for a single meaning' refers to names grounded in meaning, preserving their names based on their meaning. Daohui's notes state: 'Śakra' is a single meaning. Further establishing various names upon that single meaning is therefore called 'expressing limitless names within a single meaning.'
64.21
"How is it that limitless names are expressed for limitless meanings? […] limitless names are expressed within limitless meanings."
64.22
Sengliang comments: This preserves their distinct meanings.
64.23
"Furthermore, limitless names are expressed for a single meaning […] this is called expressing limitless names for a single meaning."
64.24
Sengliang comments: The aggregate takes accumulation as its meaning. Although it has many names, the meaning of accumulation is one. Sengzong comments: It is also called the path: this is spoken solely with regard to conditions, because the aggregates can give rise to the path.
64.25
"Good son! For the sake of sentient beings, the World-Honoured One […] is therefore called the Tathāgata's power of knowing the faculties [of sentient beings]."
64.26
Sengliang comments: Regarding the ultimate truth, the Hīnayāna takes suffering and origination as ultimate, not emptiness as ultimate; it refers to the body of vimokṣa. What is termed 'cause and effect' divides the three periods into twelve; declaring this as cause and effect is the concise [exposition]; below, the meaning of suffering provides the general and particular characteristics, which is the extensive [exposition]. Both are unfixed matters adapted to the faculties [of beings]. Sengzong comments: Speaking of the ultimate truth as conventional truth refers to the fact that while [he] is truly the dharmakāya, he is described as the sixteen-foot [body], said to undergo birth, aging, sickness, and death. Speaking of conventional truth as the ultimate truth refers to the fact that while Kauṇḍinya is truly a conventional truth, because he understood emptiness, he was designated according to his understanding and named Ājñātakauṇḍinya. Daohui states: What was clarified just now—from expressing limitless names for a single name down to speaking of the conventional truth as the ultimate truth—all clarifies that one must not cling to fixed determinations.
64.27
"Good son! If I were to […] with regard to such meanings, […] fully accomplished in the power of knowing the faculties [of sentient beings]."
64.28
Sengliang comments: The above meanings—expressing limitless names for a single name, extensive and concise, and so forth—preach the Dharma in adaptation to faculties. Even one in a state of merit has not fully comprehended them, how much less anyone else! Sengzong comments: Because the Tathāgata adapts to the varying faculties of different persons at different times, his preaching of the Dharma is also different; this refers to the power of knowing faculties.
64.29
"Therefore, in other sūtras I have preached […] is not known by any śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha."
64.30
Sengliang comments: For one who gives rise to a lack of faith, praising faith is precisely the antidote; only when an inverse remedy is needed can it be preached. Sengzong comments: When there are people for whom the inverse remedy should serve as the medicine, unless one expertly knows the power of faculties, how could one do so?
64.31
"Good son! As you said, after the Buddha enters nirvāṇa […] the Tathāgata is named the Unsurpassed Champion."
64.32
Sengliang comments: The answer to the question proceeds first generally and then specifically. Within the general [exposition] there are two turns: first extensive, then concise; this is the concise division. Above, it was said that beings have ignorance and wisdom, their faculties are not uniform, and the names and meanings of dharmas are not fixed, so the teaching cannot be fixed. Here it is said that the confused people of the later age do not understand the purport of the teaching and spontaneously give rise to disputatious arguments; this is not the Buddha's fault. It is not that he taught the twelve divisions of the canon for just a single disposition; because the dispositions and actions of sentient beings are not uniform, the sūtras comprise twelve divisions, citing all Buddhas as proof. Sengzong comments: From here below is the third section, extensively explaining the disputatious arguments. The fifth, the power of understanding, refers to the power of knowing dispositions among the ten powers.
64.33
"Good son! If it is said that the Tathāgata enters final nirvāṇa […] it was for the Tathāgata's intention that such was spoken."
64.34
Sengliang comments: From here below is the specific answer. The dharmakāya has the true and the responsive: the true body is nitya, while the responsive body is anitya. Confused people, seeing the extinction of the responsive [body], say that the true [body] is also extinguished. Hearing that the true body is nitya, they say that the responsive body is also nitya; this is why dispute arises. Baoliang comments: The Buddha's two teachings each had their own purpose, but those who cling to them deviate from the mean, and thus dispute arose. This explains the first disputatious argument.
64.35
"Good son! In the Gandhamādana Mountains there were various ṛṣis […] immediately attained arhatship."
64.36
Sengxiu comments: Below, five matters are adduced; this is the second, the condition for awakening to the path.
64.37
"Good son! In the city of Kuśinagara there were various wrestlers […] all gave rise to the aspiration for bodhi."
64.38
Zhixiu comments: This is the second, the condition for generating the aspiration for bodhi.
64.39
"Good son! In the city of Kuśi there was an artisan […] 'You may go and inform Cunda, letting him know.'"
64.40
Zhixiu comments: The third, the condition for fulfilling the dānapāramitā.
64.41
"Good son! In the city of Rājagṛha there was a ṛṣi with five supernatural powers […] having heard it, that person would extinguish all outflows."
64.42
Sengliang comments: The fourth, the condition for uprooting the root of wrong views.
64.43
"Good son! King Bimbisāra of Rājagṛha […] the Tathāgata definitely declared final nirvāṇa."
64.44
Sengliang comments: The fifth, the condition for extinguishing sins.
64.45
"Good son! There are two kinds of bodhisattvas: first, of true meaning […] ultimately does not enter nirvāṇa."
64.46
Sengliang comments: Beginners do not yet possess true knowledge and vision; they are nominal bodhisattvas who have not mastered the method of upāya, deeming the sixteen-foot [body] to be the true one. If they heard it is anitya, they would generate a mind of regress. For their sake, it was taught that the sixteen-foot [body] has no change or mutation. Sengzong comments: 'Nominal bodhisattvas' refers to ordinary persons who merely receive this name; hence they give rise to attachment and are not noble ones. For the sake of these nominal bodhisattvas, it is said that the Tathāgata is permanently abiding and unchanging. There are ordinary persons who do not understand and say that he ultimately undergoes no mutation and never enters nirvāṇa, thereby violating the responsive extinction; thus dispute arose. Baoliang comments: The Buddha proclaimed his entry into nirvāṇa in order to cause those who ought to hear the profound Dharma to come quickly; hence this teaching was given. 'Not ultimately [entering nirvāṇa]' was spoken for those progressing in learning to enter the five faculties headed by faith; hence permanence was proclaimed. If one wishes to conclude the errors of the two camps: for those who hear of the entry into nirvāṇa, it is treated like reducing the body to ashes; for those who hear that it is not ultimate, they say the Buddha is permanently like the phenomenal image. However, sought through the Middle Path meaning, proclaiming entry is upāya and not ultimate, while saying he enters means being serene and markless. Zhixiu comments: Pointing out the persons who attain benefit upon hearing the method of upāya.
64.47
"Good son! There are sentient beings who give rise to the view of annihilation […] there truly is an experiencer of the karmic retribution of good and evil."
64.48
Sengliang comments: Regarding the self, there is the true and the conventional: conventional, hence spoken of as existent; true, hence spoken of as non-existent. Speaking of the conventional counters annihilation; speaking of the true counters permanence. Yet confused people, hearing that the conventional exists, say the true also exists; hearing that the true does not exist, say the conventional also does not exist; thus disputatious arguments arise. Sengzong comments: The second disputatious argument. In order to eliminate the view of annihilation, the Tathāgata taught that there truly is an experiencer of the karma of good and evil. Since one passes through rebirths to receive the fruit, the intent lies in continuity. A single practitioner, a single conscious spirit, continuously expresses function and is nominally called a self. Failing to master this purport, they mistakenly reckon that there is a real, unperishing conscious self, receiving rebirth in various places. Baoliang comments: Refuting their view of annihilation, he spoke of continuity and a nominal self-function; yet those who mistakenly cling to it then say there is a spirit. If they hear the teaching that refutes and negates a spiritual self, they then think the eight masteries are also non-existent. Because their two attachments differ, dispute arose. If spoken from the Middle Path, King Sudarśana being precisely my body was spoken only for people holding the view of annihilation. The statement 'there is no self' was spoken on account of the reckoning of a spiritual self; it is not that the self of the eight masteries does not exist. Therefore one may say that it both exists and does not exist.
64.49
"How is it known to exist? Good son! In past ages […] definitely declared that there is a self and what belongs to a self."
64.50
Sengliang comments: 'Self' is a general designation for the sentient spirit. 'Sentient being' and 'living soul' are distinct names commonly used. There are sixteen names, yet the meaning speaks of the three periods, synthesizing past, future, and present, nominally making them one; therefore, it is precisely my body. Yet confused people think that the Buddha distinctly taught an independent self that remains unchanged from past to present from beginning to end; hence dispute arose.
64.51
"Furthermore, at one time I said to sentient beings, 'The self is precisely nature.'"
64.52
Sengliang comments: Being formed through accumulated habit, it is therefore spoken of as nature.
64.53
"Namely, internal and external conditions and the twelve links of dependent origination […] proclaiming, 'The Tathāgata definitely declared that there is a self.'"
64.54
Sengliang comments: Listing the habits that form affairs.
64.55
"Good son! Furthermore, at another time there was a monk […] saying, 'Monk, there is no self or what belongs to a self.'"
64.56
Sengliang comments: Because the monk posed his question while clinging to a fixed self, the answer was that there is no fixed self. The monk's three questions were all attachments: the first asked about the name, the second asked about the reality, and the third asked about the conditions. Therefore the Tathāgata negated his reckoning of reality, saying there is no self or what belongs to a self.
64.57
"The eye is originally non-existent and now exists […] there is no one who abandons the aggregates or receives the aggregates."
64.58
Sengliang comments: Those who reckon a self say that consciousness is the self; now [the Buddha] distinguishes it right within consciousness.
64.59
"As you asked, 'What is the self?' The self is expectation."
64.60
Sengliang comments: The convergence of cause and effect is called expectation. Why? Good must meet with the response of blessing, and evil must meet with the response of calamity, unfailingly without deviation. This clarifies that karma and fruit are uninterrupted. It answers the question about the name.
64.61
"Who is the self? It is precisely karma."
64.62
Sengliang comments: Incurring the fruit without deviation is the power of karma. This answers the question about reality.
64.63
"Due to what condition is there a self? It is precisely craving."
64.64
Sengliang comments: The power of karma receives the fruit, and due to grasping, one undergoes rebirth. This answers the question about conditions.
64.65
"Monk! Just as when two hands clap together […] due to these three conditions, it is named 'self.'"
64.66
Sengliang comments: Taking birth in various places is named 'sentient being.' Due to the unceasing operation of the three things—conditions, karma, and craving—it is named 'self.' This explains the origin of the self for those sentient beings who reckon annihilation.
64.67
"Monk! For all sentient beings, form is not the self […] proclaiming, 'The Tathāgata definitely declared that there is no self.'"
64.68
Sengliang comments: Having already stated that the meaning of the self is formed by conditions, he then refutes a fixed self. Not being separate from a single fruit, the preceding phrase refutes identity, and the following phrase refutes difference. Adducing what non-Buddhists see, he doubly refutes the attachments to identity and difference: first explaining non-difference, and later explaining non-identity.
64.69
"Good son! In the sūtras I have also made this statement […] proclaiming, 'The Buddha said there is definitely no intermediate existence.'"
64.70
Sengliang comments: The Buddha taught that those whose karma is weak and retribution is slow have an intermediate existence, while those whose karma is strong and retribution is swift have no intermediate existence. Yet confused people, hearing that it exists, say it exists for all; hearing that it does not exist, say it does not exist for all; hence dispute arose. Sengzong comments: The third disputatious argument. The Buddha's speaking of intermediate existence as the aggregate of birth is an upāya. If discussed, down to Avīci and up to the four formless realms, there is strictly no intermediate existence. In between, it may exist or may not exist; this is the correct principle. Baoliang comments: Speaking of existence or non-existence is not necessarily a rigid demarcation. Karma is simply either determinate or indeterminate: if determinate, it exists; if indeterminate, it does not exist. If discussed from the Middle Path, it both exists and does not exist.
64.71
"Good son! In the sūtras I have also taught that there is regression […] because of giving rise to afflictions, one then regresses."
64.72
Sengliang comments: There are two kinds of defilements: first, those that cause rebirth; second, those that obstruct meditative absorption (dhyāna). Because defilements causing rebirth are heavy, one cultivates the undefiled [path] to sever them; once severed, they do not arise again. Because defilements obstructing meditative absorption are light, one does not cultivate the undefiled [path to sever them], and when encountering conditions, they arise again. Therefore, when meditative absorption regresses, defilements that obstruct meditative absorption arise. Since the undefiled is not regressed from, defilements causing rebirth do not arise. Although rebirth defilements do not arise, meditative absorption does regress, and thus the undefiled does not become manifest. For example, if there is a poisonous snake in a room, it is seen on account of a lamp; even though the lamp goes out and it cannot be seen, one still never enters the room. The emptiness of the nature of all dharmas is seen on account of meditative absorption; even though one regresses from meditative absorption and cannot see it, defilements do not arise. Those who are confused, hearing that meditative absorption regresses, say that the undefiled also regresses; hearing that the undefiled does not regress, they say that meditative absorption also does not regress. Sengzong says: This is the fourth disputed thesis. Below the four applications of mindfulness, where correct faith is not yet attained, there are times when regression occurs. Once one enters the stage of warmth (ūṣmagata), regression never occurs, up to arhatship. If it is undefiled, there is no regression; if it is defiled, there may be regression. The dull-rooted regress, while the sharp-rooted do not regress. The undefiled nature is born of illuminating the true principle; once attained, it is never lost; it is merely that when defiled meditative absorption regresses, the undefiled does not become manifest. Baoliang says: The faculties of arhats have sharp and dull distinctions. From the sixth abhirūḍha-bhūmi onward, defilements obstructing meditative absorption are all suppressed or severed, and defilements causing rebirth no longer arise, just as scorched charcoal can never again become wood; it is only ignorance obstructing meditative absorption [that remains]. Since it is merely suppressed and severed, if one is of sharp faculties, upon emerging from the undefiled contemplation, whenever wishing to re-enter, one can enter immediately. If one is of dull faculties, upon emerging from contemplation, when wishing to re-enter, it is difficult, and one must apply the mind again before being able to enter; hence it is called regression. The confused say that when an arhat regresses, he gives rise to desire-realm cogitation and becomes a srotāpanna. Those who say there is no regression maintain that meditative absorption also does not regress; thus a dispute is formed. [The sūtra continues:] 'Furthermore, there was a monk named Godhika...' up to '... proclaim that the Tathāgata definitively stated that there is no regression.' Sengliang comments: Godhika was an anāgāmin; six times he regressed from meditative absorption and could not exhaust his defilements. Cultivating and attaining it for the seventh time, fearing he would lose it, he killed himself; before his life was extinguished, his defilements were completely exhausted. The Demon King thought he had died as a learner (śaikṣa) and circled his corpse searching for his consciousness. Being unable to find it, he addressed the Buddha: 'Your disciple died without exhausting his defilements.' The Buddha answered: 'This person has permanently uprooted the root of rebirth and has already entered nirvāṇa.' The six types of arhats cite the category of regression as proof. Sengzong says: Those who establish the thesis of regression from the undefiled cite this as their basis, asserting that at the stage of arhatship, everything—both defiled and undefiled—regresses.
64.73
"Good son! In the sūtras, I have spoken of the Tathāgata's body..." up to "... definitively state that the Buddha's body is an unconditioned dharma (asaṃskṛta)."
64.74
Sengliang comments: The explanation is that both are nirvāṇa, differing only in being moment-by-moment arising and ceasing, or not arising and not ceasing. As for 'neither learner', taking the adamantine [concentration] as a learner, the initial arising of all-knowledge is called non-learner (aśaikṣa). The dharmakāya neither arises nor ceases, having no dual characteristics. The statement that whether Buddhas appear in the world or do not appear, it is permanently abiding and immovable, means: taking the responsive manifestation as appearing, when there is no responsive manifestation, it does not appear. Yet the responsive manifestation is fundamentally neither arising nor ceasing. Those who do not understand my intention assert that it is definitively saṃskṛta or definitively asaṃskṛta; that if it is asaṃskṛta it is permanent, and if it is saṃskṛta it is impermanent. Sengzong says: This is the fifth disputed thesis. Hearing the teaching of cessation, they say there is no dharmakāya; hearing that the dharmakāya does not cease, they say the responsive traces are also permanent. The previous discussion of self and no-self was formulated across separate bodies; this is formulated on the basis of the present. Baoliang says: Hearing that the response body is impermanent, they say there is no dharmakāya; if they hear that it permanently abides, they become identical with non-Buddhist views. The two explanations are as far apart as heaven, hence a dispute is formed.
64.75
Collected Commentaries on the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, Fascicle 64
Linked texts (1)
- 大般涅槃經集解 — Classical Chinese