大般涅槃經集解 70

English (machine translation) 70

Language: English

70.1

Explaining the Cessation of Impermanent Form and the Attainment of Permanent Form; Refuting the Treatises of Non-Buddhists: Jātiśroṇa the First, Vāsiṣṭha the Second, Śeṇika the Third, Kāśyapa the Fourth, Pūrṇa the Fifth

70.2

Chapter Twenty-Five: Kauṇḍinya

70.3

Sengliang states: "Fourth is the section on transmission and propagation. Kauṇḍinya is the senior among the disciples; having earlier attained partial awakening, now he attains complete understanding. Entrusting him with the transmission and propagation—is this not truly fitting?" Fayao states: "As the preaching of the sūtra drew to a close, those among the non-Buddhists who attained awakening were numerous. Because these people were the last to receive awakening, [the Dharma] was entrusted to the one who was the very first to awaken. Furthermore, no person lacks a beginning, but few are able to see it through to the end; those who possess both a beginning and a conclusion—are they not exclusively the sages? Kauṇḍinya at the very beginning heard that the five aggregates are impermanent, and now at the very end he hears of permanence and awakens." Sengzong states: "Cause, fruition, the buddhadhātu, and the Middle Way have all been fully presented above; therefore he called upon Kauṇḍinya to further settle cause and fruition, stating that the five aggregates of saṃsāra are impermanent and the Buddha-fruition is permanent." Baoliang states: "Above, the threefold discourse has already been concluded. Now this fourth [part] next explains the entrustment and propagation. Examining the matter of entrustment, it is unlike other sūtras. Having already turned to inquire of Ānanda and also expounded his own virtues, its substance functions as propagation, which is why the chapter is titled thus. First, he discusses the five assemblies with Kauṇḍinya, wishing to ensure that the assembly's comportment, monastic precepts, and disciplinary regulations are entrusted to proper hands. Furthermore, he entrusts the phrasing, sentences, and the entire treasury of sūtras to Ānanda, entrusting the profound principle to [one who can] broadly disseminate it." Zhixiu states: "This is the second division within the extensive clarification of the meaning. Reiterating the discourse and entrusting it to those who transmit the Dharma is termed 'the discourse of entrustment'. Examining the text below, the transmission of the sūtra did not conclude entirely. How do we know this to be so? The text itself is proof. Originally intending to make an entrustment, he ordered that Ānanda be sought out. When Ānanda arrived, he then had him deliver Subhadra, and the words of entrustment were subsequently [omitted]. Deducing from principle, the meaning may be known. In general, two matters were entrusted: first, persons; second, the Dharma. As for persons, these are the ten non-Buddhists who were delivered. Because Kauṇḍinya was advanced in years and exalted in virtue, capable of being a model teacher, he was entrusted [with them]. Because Ānanda was broad in dissemination and had affinities for transmitting the transformation, the seeds of the discourse were entrusted to him. Within this single chapter there are four imports: first, explaining the dharmas of permanence and impermanence; second, clarifying that non-Buddhists lack the qualities of a śramaṇa; third, enumerating the non-Buddhists coming to approach the Buddha's Dharma; fourth, directly refuting the non-Buddhists." The Record of Daohui states: "Because Kauṇḍinya occupied the highest seat, and also had previously been an adherent of non-Buddhist traditions who had subdued the non-Buddhists ever since leaving home, he was called upon for the entrustment."

70.4

At that time the World-Honoured One told Kauṇḍinya, [...] "Feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness are also like this."

70.5

Sengliang states: "Stating that form is indeed bondage explains the fault of the conditioned." Zhixiu states: "The first import briefly explains the permanence and impermanence of cause and fruition."

70.6

"Kauṇḍinya! If there is a person who can know like this [...] they roar the lion's roar in the great assembly."

70.7

Sengliang states: "The two appellations 'śramaṇa' and 'brāhmaṇa' are both designations of tranquility. The principle of the Dharma is ever-calm; not knowing it brings turmoil, while knowing it brings eternal tranquility. If one can know permanence and impermanence, one is endowed with both dharmas. If one departs from the Buddha's Dharma, unbiased persons and [true practitioners] are completely absent." Zhixiu states: "This is the second import."

70.8

At that time among the non-Buddhists there were immeasurable people [...] 'If I defeat him, he shall serve me.'"

70.9

Sengliang states: "Where there is no dharma of tranquility, in the end there are no tranquil persons. The actions of body and speech are all provisional designations; thus they gathered and debated to dispute the path."

70.10

At that time there were many immeasurable non-Buddhists [...] The Buddha told the king, 'Hold for now; I myself know the proper time.'"

70.11

Sengliang states: "By the custom of foreign lands, when wishing to hold a great debate, one first informs the sovereign of the state." Zhixiu states: "The third import lists the arrival of the non-Buddhists."

70.12

At that time in the assembly there was a brāhmaṇa [...] 'the nirvāṇa attained should also be impermanent.'"

70.13

Sengliang states: "The non-Buddhists explain the dharma of nirvāṇa differently, claiming it is not produced from causes, and therefore challenge the Buddha: 'If it is produced from causes, it should not be permanent.'" Sengzong states: "The intent of the objection is that because the cause is impermanent, the fruition cannot be uniquely permanent." Baoliang states: "These ten non-Buddhist teachers simply accommodated those with affinities to be converted, manifesting their submission in order to demonstrate the supreme source of principle. In general, regarding the method of back-and-forth debate with non-Buddhists, one must not directly open one's chest; one must first soften their minds within phenomenal matters, and only afterwards discuss the principle. This particular non-Buddhist posits twenty-five principles (tattvas). His statement that 'nature is permanent' refers to the primordial nature (prakṛti) that he posits. From here downward is the direct refutation of the non-Buddhists."

70.14

"Gautama! You also state that it is produced from causes [...] how can one who attains vimokṣa speak of permanence?"

70.15

Sengliang states: "He draws an analogy using the two paths. This is the second objection."

70.16

"Gautama also states that form arises from conditions [...] is permanent, is one, and pervades all places."

70.17

Sengliang states: "Nirvāṇa is an aggregate; it is an impermanent dharma. Being apart from the aggregates is true [permanence]; it is not produced from causes, for an uncaused [state] produces nirvāṇa. This is the third objection."

70.18

"Gautama also states that what is produced from causes [...] nirvāṇa is precisely permanence, bliss, self, and purity."

70.19

Sengliang states: "He universally challenges the four definitions. This is the fourth objection."

70.20

"If Gautama states that it is both permanent and impermanent [...] the Buddha is precisely my own body. What is the meaning of this?"

70.21

Sengliang states: "He challenges the title of 'Buddha'. He means that for dharmas arising from conditions, there are the two statements of permanent and impermanent, which is not what the Buddha originally proclaimed. What then is the meaning of 'Buddha'? This is the fifth objection."

70.22

The Buddha said: "Brāhmaṇa! As you have said [...] is it the cause of dharmas?" "It is so, Gautama."

70.23

Sengliang states: "This refers to primordial nature, also called the primal darkness. Internally it is sentient beings, externally it is non-sentient beings; the cause is permanent while the fruitions are impermanent."

70.24

The Buddha said: "Brāhmaṇa! How does it act as a cause?" "Gautama! From nature arises the great; from the great arises egoism (ahaṃkāra)."

70.25

Sengliang states: "Regarding 'from nature arises the great, and from the great arises egoism', the great of the five elements and egoism constitute consciousness. First expounding these two dharmas does not yet complete the enumeration of principles; it clarifies that the twenty-four dharmas are material and non-material. In the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, form and egoism subsume the non-material; mutually generating one another, all are impermanent; nature, however, is not like this. The *Śataśāstra* says, 'From primal darkness arises intellect (buddhi); this explains the meaning of the eleven faculties.' Next, its nature is roughly explained from here; although the meaning is not in strict sequence, the general import is the same. Intellect there and egoism here are alternating expressions." Sengzong states: "Primal darkness means that beyond eighty thousand kalpas it is dark and unseen; because this does not alter, it is called nature. Egoism is precisely the self-mind; merely grasping at a self, it gives rise to conceit before other persons." Baoliang states: "'From nature arises the great' refers to intellect. Because it perceives the ten thousand dharmas, it is called 'great'. 'From the great arises egoism' means that from intellect the self-mind arises."

70.26

"From egoism sixteen dharmas arise, namely earth, water [...] if the fruition is permanent, what fault is there?"

70.27

Sengliang states: "Previously it was said that the great produces egoism; this refers to the mutual arising between egoism and the great. Next should be color and scent; this is merely spoken roughly. 'Arising from five dharmas' speaks of their sequence: visible form produces fire, sound produces space, scent produces earth, taste produces water, and touch produces wind. Or it is said that one subtle element (tanmātra) produces one, or that five subtle elements produce them together, with one subtle element predominating. The five cognitive faculties: fire produces the eye, space produces the ear, earth produces the nose, water produces the tongue, and wind produces the body; the body perceives tangible objects, which is here called touch. Or it is said that one great element produces them, or that the five great elements produce them together, with one great element predominating. Next, the five motor faculties and the mind arise together from the five great elements; their arising together from the five great elements is the general view, though a few also state that the mental faculty is a material dharma. The twenty-one dharmas are distinctions of form, with three at the root. The three are distinctions of egoism; that 'all arise from nature' is somewhat concealed, and should properly speak of twenty-four dharmas. 'What fault is there?' means: if your fruition is without fault, what fault does my fruition have? This answers the first objection." Baoliang states: "'Produces sixteen dharmas' means that from the self-mind the five subtle elements arise, from the subtle elements the five great elements arise, and from the five great elements the eleven faculties arise. These twenty-five principles all arise due to primordial nature."

70.28

"Brāhmaṇa! In your doctrine are there two kinds of causes or not? [...] A revealing cause is like a lamp illuminating an object."

70.29

Sengliang states: "Producing a fruition is generative; not producing is revealing."

70.30

The Buddha said: "Is the causal nature of these two kinds of causes one [...] then is it identical with revealing?" "No, Gautama."

70.31

Sengliang states: "Generative is proximate, revealing is remote. The characteristics of causes are fixed: the proximate cannot be remote, and the remote cannot be proximate. 'Is this the characteristic of a cause?' Remote [causes] do not generate fruitions; although unable to generate fruitions, the meaning of a remote cause functions as revealing. 'No, Gautama!' As to whether cause and fruition have identical or different characteristics: with a generative cause they are identical, but with a revealing cause they are different." Baoliang states: "Judging by this, it is not concerned with debating principle, but simply aims to confound and refute him."

70.32

The Buddha said: "Although in my Dharma [it arises] from impermanence [...] and up to the mind and mental dharmas are also like this."

70.33

Sengliang states: "Dharmas arising from causes are both permanent and impermanent, which is termed 'two'. 'Two statements are non-dual' means that the permanent is real, and the impermanent is also real; because both are real, they are non-dual. From 'previously from past traditions' downward, it explains that all Buddhas have no disparate words, being identically termed non-dual; it does not refer to a single Buddha. 'Although named two statements, they reveal one statement' means speaking of existence, non-existence, and emptiness. Above it says that regarding existence one identically speaks of existence, and regarding non-existence one identically speaks of non-existence; conventional truth distinguishes characteristics into two statements, while ultimate truth regards the three characteristics as one statement. In order to reveal it, he directly speaks conventionally, for the conventional has no fixed characteristics. 'How do two statements reveal one statement?' explains that conventional existence is nominal existence and conventional non-existence is nominal non-existence, which are two; ultimate truth is neither existence nor non-existence, which is one." Baoliang states: "The Buddhas of the three periods of time also state that what is obtained through a generative cause is impermanent, while what is obtained through a revealing cause is permanent."

70.34

The brāhmaṇa said: "Gautama is well able to distinguish [...]" The Buddha said: "Excellent! You have understood."

70.35

Sengliang states: "'The meaning of such words' refers to the meaning of cause being two and fruition being one. 'I now do not understand' means he understood [the meaning], but had not yet understood the simile. Having expounded the four noble truths, they are also two and also one; explaining the causes and fruitions of all dharmas, cause and fruition have no fixed nature: clinging to characteristics they are two, but the three characteristics are one." Baoliang states: "His mind having submitted, he returned to requesting that the Buddha preach the Dharma. The Buddha directly explained that the four truths are both two and one; he immediately comprehended and said: 'Ordinary beings see existence, suffering from this and that, and therefore speak of two; the sage observes suffering as empty, without the difference between this and that. Knowing that oneness is not one, the mind accords with equanimity.'"

70.36

The brāhmaṇa said: "World-Honoured One! Having heard the Dharma now [...]" Right at his seat, he attained the fruition of an arhat.

70.37

Sengliang states: "Since it is said that the principle allows no partial awakening, and now he has simultaneously understood both permanence and impermanence, he should have become a bodhisattva; why does it still say he attained the way of an arhat? In assemblies there are never lacking those of the Small Vehicle, of small virtue and small wisdom; the sacred teachings have the necessity of guiding the lower and foolish from beginning to end, hence provisionally displaying the small path to cause people's minds to gradually open. Thus the ten masters all attained an immediate awakening."

70.38

There was another mendicant (brahmacārin) of the Vāsiṣṭha clan [...] 'Is the absence of defilements nirvāṇa?' 'It is so, mendicant.'"

70.39

Sengliang states: "Nirvāṇa is named cessation (nirodha). Cessation has two kinds: essential cessation and continuous cessation. Essential cessation is the non-existence of cessation, hence he says 'It is so.'" Baoliang states: "He also has nothing he grasps onto, but merely seizes upon permanence and impermanence to question the Buddha."

70.40

Vāsiṣṭha said: "Gautama! In the world there are four kinds [...] how can it be said to possess permanence, bliss, self, and purity?"

70.41

Sengliang states: "The non-existence of eliminating defilements is identical to the non-existence of what has already ceased. What has already ceased is not permanent; how can it be uniquely designated as permanent?"

70.42

The Buddha said: "Good son! Such nirvāṇa [...] therefore it is named mutual non-existence of distinct entities."

70.43

Sengliang states: "Within nirvāṇa there is ultimately no cessation, nor is it the non-existence of cessation." Baoliang states: "It is not the three kinds of non-existence, but shares the mutual non-existence of existing portions. If nirvāṇa exists, how could it be impermanent?"

70.44

Vāsiṣṭha said: "Gautama! If [you take] mutual non-existence […] to say that nirvāṇa is permanent, blissful, self, and pure."

70.45

Sengliang states: The intent of the objection means: if you take the absence of defilements as non-existence, yet nirvāṇa is not non-existent. A cow's form and a horse's are different; without the cow, there is also the absence of the three [others], and all non-existences are impermanent.

70.46

The Buddha said: "Good son! It is as you have said […] Therefore it can be called permanent, blissful, self, and pure."

70.47

Sengliang states: The mutual non-existence of cow and horse means that the absence of their nature is impermanent; it does not counteract impermanence, so it cannot be called permanent. Nirvāṇa is used as an analogy to counter affliction.

70.48

Vāsiṣṭha said: "World-Honoured One! If the Tathāgata for my sake […] will also surpass that śramaṇa Gautama."

70.49

Sengliang states: 'How is it impermanent?' means that not yet knowing the dharma of impermanence and not understanding the meaning of counteracting [it], he therefore requests an explanation.

70.50

At that time, there was another brahmacārin in the assembly […] also asked like this, and the Buddha remained silent to all of them.

70.51

Sengliang states: Regarding questions based on conventional designation without fixed adherence, [the Buddha] always set aside the answers. Baoliang states: Because he wished to have him first establish his thesis, he therefore remained silent.

70.52

Śreṇika said: "Gautama! If all sentient beings […] why does Gautama remain silent and not answer?"

70.53

Sengliang states: He established a thesis asserting definite existence, so it was not appropriate to answer. 'It is one, it is all-pervading, it is the agent'—these use three meanings to prove its existence. 'Agent' is the fundamental intent of establishing the thesis, while 'all-pervading' and 'one' merely prove permanence. Why is this? If it were not all-pervading, it would have parts; if it were not one, it would have number. For things to have parts and number is impermanence.

70.54

The Buddha said: "Śreṇika! You say that this ātman […] all omniscient persons also speak thus."

70.55

Sengliang states: When knowledge is shared, they speak of existence; if they speak of non-existence, it is clearly not knowledge.

70.56

The Buddha said: "Good son! If the ātman were all-pervading […] cultivate good dharmas to receive a heavenly body?"

70.57

Sengliang states: The cause and effect of saṃsāra are created by the mind and experienced by the mind. Sentient beings all possess the karma of the five destinies, but a single mind does not arise simultaneously [in all], nor does it experience [them] at the same time. You claim that the ātman acts and the ātman receives, and that the ātman pervades the five destinies; then it should experience the retributions simultaneously. Baoliang states: If there is retribution in the five destinies, why cultivate the good to eliminate the evil?

70.58

Śreṇika said: "Gautama! In my teaching, the ātman […] cultivates good dharmas and is born in heaven."

70.59

Sengliang states: When he later says 'before attaining the path,' it is acting; when attaining the path, it is permanent. Because bodies are two, he merely says the ātman is two; the ātman is not two.

70.60

The Buddha said: "Good son! As you have said […] if the created body is non-existent, how can you say it is all-pervading?"

70.61

Sengliang states: 'All-pervading' means pervading the three periods of time. If it is first impermanent and later permanent, then when creating a body there is a body, and when the ātman ceases there is no body.

70.62

"Gautama! The ātman that I establish is also within creation […] Therefore my ātman is both all-pervading and permanent."

70.63

Sengliang states: He means that being within creation it does not lose its pervasiveness, and being within cessation it does not lose its permanence. He uses a house to illustrate the body and the master of the house to illustrate the ātman. When the house burns, the master comes out; the master is permanent and the house is impermanent. What fault is there? Baoliang states: Using worldly proverbs as evidence, worldly people also say 'the house is burning,' not 'the master is burning.'

70.64

The Buddha said: "Good son! As you say that the ātman […] this contradicts worldly and transworldly dharmas."

70.65

Sengliang states: In the world, space is all-pervading; permanent and impermanent, form and non-form all have space. If this were true of the ātman, it should pervade the permanent, the impermanent, form, and non-form. How could one use a person and a house, which are not all-pervading, as an analogy?

70.66

Śreṇika said: "I do not say that all sentient beings […] but say that each single person has one ātman."

70.67

Sengliang states: The non-Buddhists calculate two kinds of ātman: one claims it is shared, the other claims it is all-pervading. Śreṇika does not calculate it as shared, yet speaks of it as all-pervading, taking its unchanging nature from beginning to end to be 'one.' Baoliang states: The intent of defending his thesis is that each having one ātman does not impair its pervasiveness.

70.68

The Buddha said: "Good son! If you say that a single person […] if it is not all-pervading, then it is impermanent."

70.69

Sengliang states: If each has an autonomous master, seeing and hearing should be identical. If it were made all-pervading, grass and trees should also see and hear.

70.70

Śreṇika said: "Gautama! All sentient beings […] when the Buddha can hear, Devadatta should also hear."

70.71

Sengliang states: Defending his thesis, he says that when the ātman encounters the Dharma it is good, and when it encounters non-dharma it is evil, so they cannot be equal.

70.72

The Buddha said: "Good son! Are dharma and non-dharma […] Why? Because karma is equal."

70.73

Baoliang states: Intending to pose an objection, he first determines whether its dharmas are karma or not karma. He replies: 'They are produced by karma.' [The Buddha] means that if they are produced by karma, they are of the same dharma; how can you say they are different?

70.74

Śreṇika said: "Gautama! For example, in a single room […] its light is without distinction, illustrating the ātman of sentient beings."

70.75

Sengliang states: Defending his thesis, he says that when a hundred lamps share a room, the light is all-pervading while the wicks are not all-pervading. One cannot, because the light is all-pervading, demand that the wicks should also be all-pervading. A hundred persons have a hundred ātmans; although the ātman is all-pervading, dharma and non-dharma are not all-pervading.

70.76

The Buddha said: "Good son! You say that the lamp's light […] how can you again use the wick and light as an analogy?"

70.77

Sengliang states: The wick is the light; apart from the wick there is no light. What you call dharma and non-dharma are not like this; how can you use one to illustrate difference?

70.78

"Good son! If your thought is that the wick and the light […] the three things—dharma, non-dharma, and ātman—would be one."

70.79

Sengliang states: Above, he accepted that light is different from the wick; now he explains that light is not different from the wick. For you it is not an analogy, but for me it is an analogy. Why? A wick is a conventional designation, having form and touch as its substance; form is light, and light is not different from the wick. The ātman is a conventional designation, having the two dharmas as its substance; the ātman is not different from the two dharmas. Baoliang states: He objects by appealing to actual facts. If one says that wick and light are unrelated, we currently observe that when the wick is large, the light is bright; apart from the wick there is no light.

70.80

Śreṇika said: "Gautama! You cited the analogy of the lamp […] for me it is auspicious, but for you it is not auspicious."

70.81

Sengliang states: Non-Buddhists hold that dharmas have a fixed nature: if auspicious, they are definitely auspicious; if not auspicious, all are not auspicious. The Buddha refutes him, saying: 'I have no fixed grasp; I teach you to abandon grasping.'

70.82

Śreṇika said: "Gautama! You previously reproached me […] deducing from this, it is truly unequal."

70.83

Sengliang states: He counter-objects that if the Buddha takes grasping to be wrong and non-retribution to be right, that is unequal.

70.84

The Buddha said: "Good son! If my inequality […] because in common with all sages they attain equality."

70.85

Sengliang states: In saṃsāra, grasping and attachment are burdens; I take having no retribution as right, and you take having no grasping as wrong. Now, refuting your wrong is auspicious for both; how is it unequal?

70.86

Śreṇika said: "Gautama! My ātman is always equal […] how can you say that my ātman is unequal?"

70.87

Sengliang states: He takes the pervasiveness calculated by himself to be equality.

70.88

"Good son! You also say that one will receive hell […] for what cause and condition do you say the ātman creates it?"

70.89

Sengliang states: The ātman takes autonomy as its meaning; why would it create evil and not create good?

70.90

"Good son! The suffering and pleasure of sentient beings truly arise from causes and conditions […] up to the body faculty it is also like this."

70.91

Sengliang states: Creating comes from the ātman, and the ātman that is the agent is then impermanent.

70.92

"If your thought is that although the ātman can see […] your establishment of the ātman seeing is also like this."

70.93

Sengliang states: Fire burns by depending on the spark, not that the spark burns. Consciousness sees by depending on the eye, not that the eye sees.

70.94

Śreṇika said: "Gautama! Just as a person holding a sickle […] all defilements should also be like this."

70.95

Sengliang states: The sickle and the person are each different, yet they are able to perform an action. Apart from the eye there is no ātman, as can be verified in present facts.

70.96

Śreṇika said: "Gautama! The ātman has two kinds […] once destroyed, it ultimately will not arise again."

70.97

Sengliang states: He further establishes the ātman of suffering and pleasure as the creating ātman. When lacking knowledge, it creates defilements and experiences suffering; when having knowledge, it cultivates the path and severs the fetters.

70.98

The Buddha said: "Good son! As for what is called knowing […] why do all animals not attain it?"

70.99

Sengliang states: The ātman would be fundamentally pure and not bound by suffering; it should not cultivate good dharmas for the sake of pleasure to seek liberation. If one claims it does not arise from causes and conditions, animals should also attain it.

70.100

Śreṇika said: "Gautama! If there is no ātman […] and there is 'what belongs to an ātman,' 'the ātman creates,' and 'the ātman experiences.'"

70.101

Sengliang states: Śreṇika uses three things to prove the meaning of the ātman; this is the furthest it can be established.

70.102

Śreṇika said: "Gautama! If you speak of no ātman and no what belongs to an ātman, on what grounds do you also speak of permanence, bliss, self, and purity?"

70.103

Sengliang states: He reaches the point of inquiring about what he doubts.

70.104

The Buddha said: "Good son! Neither do I say [that...] (down to) I now proclaim permanence, bliss, self, and purity."

70.105

Sengliang remarks: Śreṇika's mind delighted in the four dharmas, taking the self to be permanent and blissful. If the self is spoken of in terms of inverted views, both inner and outer are nonexistent; hence he asked: 'Gautama, on what grounds do you again speak of permanence?' Now the Buddha answers: 'Extinguishing the inner and outer sense bases is termed purity; it is not seeking impermanence. Because you take the inner and outer sense bases to be permanent, you are inverted.'"

70.106

Śreṇika said: "World-Honoured One! I only pray that out of great compassion... (down to) to [eradicate] all afflictions, one should first abandon pride."

70.107

Sengliang remarks: Śreṇika's pride was heavy; the Buddha first causes him to abandon what is heavy, so that what is light will be extinguished of itself."

70.108

Śreṇika said: "World-Honoured One! So it is, so it is... (down to) practicing the pure brahmacarya, he realized arhatship."

70.109

Sengliang remarks: Although he had abandoned the various views, within the aggregates his loving attachment was not yet exhausted, and he gave rise to the notion of a sentient being. Now, contemplating that the aggregates have no intrinsic nature and no other-nature, because his attachment to dharmas was extinguished, the notion of a sentient being was extinguished."

70.110

Among the crowd of non-Buddhists there was another brahmacārin [named Kāśyapa]... (down to) Why does Gautama remain silent and not answer?"

70.111

Baoliang remarks: Kāśyapa postulated that the body is different from the life-principle, and the life-principle is different from the body. Although the body is impermanent, its life-principle is permanent. Because the life-principle is permanent, therefore it is not cut off in the intermediate state."

70.112

The Buddha said: "Good son! I say that both body and life-principle arise from causes and conditions... (down to) categorically say that the body is different and the life-principle is different."

70.113

Sengliang remarks: All things arise from conditions and are impermanent dharmas. The reason for saying 'they are identical' is that there is no life-principle apart from the body, nor is there any body apart from the life-principle. As for 'the body is different and the life-principle is different,' the body corresponds to the substance of dharmas, while the life-principle speaks of beginning and end in this way."

70.114

The brahmacārin said: "World-Honoured One! I only pray that for my sake... (down to) after five days had passed, he attained arhatship."

70.115

Sengliang remarks: Hearing the Dharma, he turned back from delusion, awakened to the Path, and attained realization."

70.116

Among the crowd of non-Buddhists there was another brahmacārin named Pūrṇa... (down to) neither such-gone nor not such-gone."

70.117

Baoliang remarks: Pūrṇa postulated the sixty-two views. Based on the five aggregates, he formed four propositions for each aggregate, four times five making twenty in all. 'Such-gone' and 'not such-gone' are also like this, corresponding to three sets of dharmas to make sixty. These deluded postulations all have annihilation and permanence as their basis, which is why they constitute the sixty-two views."

70.118

The Buddha said: "Pūrṇa! I do not say that the world is unreal or real... (down to) one cannot speak of east, west, south, or north."

70.119

Baoliang remarks: If one empties one's mind regarding the ten thousand dharmas, one clearly recognizes the four noble truths and is freed from the bondage of birth and death."

70.120

Pūrṇa said: "I beg to state a parable; I only pray you will deign to hear it... (down to) his outflows exhausted, he realized arhatship."

70.121

Baoliang remarks: Then he was enlightened. The great village exemplifies the four noble truths; the grove of śāla trees exemplifies the birth and death of the twenty-five states of existence. Now, birth and death are phenomena outside the principle, hence they are compared to what is outside. The single tree within exemplifies the Buddha in the past when he was an ordinary person. That which was born before the forest exemplifies the past sentient beings of the twenty-five states of existence later cultivating the uncorrupted dharmas of the ten stages. 'Fully one hundred years' refers to the practices of the ten stages. 'At that time the master of the forest irrigated it with water' refers to past Buddhas acting as his external conditions, advancing and generating his good roots, or bestowing upon him distinct prophecies. The tree becoming rotten below exemplifies the Buddha exhausting and cutting off the obstacle of afflictions. 'Only the genuine and solid remained' means that once the false and deceptive birth-and-death five aggregates were exhausted, only the wondrous fundamental nature of the spiritual illumination, the asaṃskṛta dharmatā, the true Dharma, remained. When a non-Buddhist sets forth a parable and grasps the realization like this, how much more should practitioners revere and believe it!"

70.122

Collected Commentaries on the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, Fascicle 70

Linked texts (1)

大般涅槃經集解 — Classical Chinese