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大般涅槃經義記 10.190

大般涅槃經義記 10.190

Language
Classical Chinese

10.190

自下第三破我作者。文別有二:一佛難先尼,先尼救義,如來對破;二先尼難佛,如來釋通。前中有四:一難破我作。二「汝意若謂身作」已下,難破先尼身作我受。三「若言不是身作」已下,破無作受。四「先尼言我有二」下,難破先尼我知我脫。初中先牒,總非「不然」。「何以故」下廣顯其非,有七復次:一以造作苦事難破。「我是默法,何由作苦」,初先正破;「若言是苦非我作」下,遮苦無因。二「眾生苦樂實從緣」下,舉苦樂等不定難破。三「汝說」已下,舉其十時變異難破。四「亦有盛」下,舉共盛衰不定難破。五「云何一人有利鈍」下,舉其利鈍不定難破。一人身中信等五根利鈍不定,明知無我。六「云何說」下,以其口說無我難破。七「汝意若謂離眼見」下,約見難破。於中有三:一破我能見。初牒直非,「何以」下釋。「若離眼已別有我見,何須此眼」,餘根亦爾。二破因眼見。「汝意若謂我雖能見,要因於眼,是亦不然」牒以總非。「何以」下釋,舉喻類顯。「如須曼那能燒大村」舉其喻事。須曼人名。「云何能燒?因火能燒」定其喻相。下約顯法,「見亦如是」。雖言我見,見實是眼。三因先尼立喻救義,隨之轉破。句別有四:一辨喻異法難破我作。喻中人鎌各別有體,故人執鎌能有所作;根外無我,云何說言我因根作。二就手有無難破我作。先定有無,下就設難。若我有手,何不自執?若我無手,不能執鎌,云何我作?三辨刈是鎌難破我作。若我能刈,何故因鎌?四明人鎌作業各別難破我作。先辨人業,次辨鎌業,下約顯法。「眾生見法亦復如是」總約顯法。「眼能見」下別約顯法,眼如鎌也。「若從緣」下,舉理結呵。此初段竟。

From here below, third, refuting the self as the agent. The text has two distinct parts: first, the Buddha challenges Śreṇika, Śreṇika defends his position, and the Tathāgata refutes it in response; second, Śreṇika challenges the Buddha, and the Tathāgata explains and resolves it. Within the former there are four: first, challenging and refuting the self as agent. Second, from "If your thought holds that the body acts..." onward, challenging and refuting Śreṇika's [claim that] the body acts and the self experiences [the fruit]. Third, from "If it is said that it is not the body that acts..." onward, refuting that non-acting receives [the fruit]. Fourth, from "Śreṇika said: My self has two [kinds]..." onward, challenging and refuting Śreṇika's [claim that] the self knows and the self is liberated. In the first [part], first restating and generally negating: "Not so." From "For what reason?" onward, he extensively reveals its error, having seven successive arguments: First, challenging and refuting by means of the creation of painful matters. "The self is a silent dharma; by what means could it create suffering?"—first directly refuting; from "If it is said that this suffering is not made by the self" onward, blocking [the idea that] suffering has no cause. Second, from "The suffering and pleasure of sentient beings truly arise from conditions" onward, challenging and refuting by adducing the indeterminateness of suffering, pleasure, and so forth. Third, from "You say..." onward, challenging and refuting by adducing the variations among its ten periods. Fourth, from "There are also flourishing..." onward, challenging and refuting by adducing the indeterminateness of mutual flourishing and decline. Fifth, from "How could one person have sharpness and dullness?" onward, challenging and refuting by adducing the indeterminateness of sharpness and dullness. Within one person's body, the five faculties of faith and so forth are indeterminate in sharpness and dullness, making it clearly known that there is no self. Sixth, from "How is it said..." onward, challenging and refuting by means of his verbal statement that there is no self. Seventh, from "If your thought holds that seeing is apart from the eye..." onward, challenging and refuting with respect to seeing. Within this there are three [points]: First, refuting the self's capacity to see. First restating and directly negating, and explaining from "Why?" onward: "If apart from the eye there were separately a self that sees, why would this eye be needed?" The other faculties are also like this. Second, refuting seeing on the basis of the eye: "If your thought holds that although the self is capable of seeing, it must depend on the eye, this too is not so"—restating to generally negate. Explaining from "Why?" onward, he adduces an analogy to reveal it by comparison: "Just as Sumanā can burn a great village" adduces the event of the analogy; Sumanā is a person's name. "How is he able to burn? He is able to burn on the basis of fire" determines the character of the analogy. Below, applying it to reveal the dharma: "Seeing is also like this." Although it is called the self seeing, the seeing is truly the eye. Third, because Śreṇika sets up an analogy to defend his position, [the Buddha] sequentially shifts to refute it. There are four distinct clauses: 1. Distinguishing that the analogy differs from the dharma to challenge and refute the self as agent. In the analogy, the person and the sickle each have a distinct substance, hence the person grasping the sickle is able to perform an action; outside the faculties there is no self, so how can it be said that the self acts on the basis of the faculties? 2. Challenging and refuting the self as agent with respect to whether there is a hand. First determining existence or non-existence, and below posing a challenge based on that: if the self has hands, why does it not hold it itself? If the self has no hands, it cannot hold the sickle; how could the self act? 3. Distinguishing that reaping belongs to the sickle to challenge and refute the self as agent: if the self can reap, why does it depend on the sickle? 4. Clarifying that the actions of the person and the sickle are distinct to challenge and refute the self as agent: first distinguishing the person's action, next distinguishing the sickle's action, and below applying it to reveal the dharma. "Sentient beings' seeing of dharmas is also like this" generally applies it to reveal the dharma. From "The eye can see" onward, specially applying it to reveal the dharma: the eye is like the sickle. From "If arising from conditions..." onward, adducing the principle to conclude and scold. This concludes the first section.

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