大般涅槃經義記 10.70

10.70

下次辨異。文別有四：第一迦葉徵喻同法，令空是有；二佛為辨異；第三迦葉舉喻類空，令空是有；四佛重辨異。初中，「如來佛性涅槃非三世攝而名為有」舉法類空。「虛空亦非三世所攝，何故非有」徵空同法。下佛為辨，明涅槃等有處無故，對無說有；虛空之體無處不有，是故不得對無名有。於中，初先辨法異空。「為非涅槃名為涅槃，為非如來名為如來，為非佛性名為佛性」略以標舉。下廣釋之。先解涅槃，初問、後釋。一切煩惱有為生死非是涅槃，為破如來有為煩惱非涅槃故，宣說涅槃以此為有。次釋如來，先牒、後解。闡提乃至辟支佛等非是如來，為破此等非如來故，宣說如來以之為有。下解佛性，先牒、後釋。牆壁瓦石無情之物非是佛性，為簡此等非佛性故說性為有。性有二種：一能知性，謂真識心。此真識心眾生有之，外法即無，故上說言夫佛性者謂眾生也。又妄心處有此真心，無妄心處即無真心，故上說言凡有心者悉有佛性。二所知性，所謂有無非有無等一切法門，此通內外不唯在內。今此所論約初言耳。「一切世間無非虛空對於虛空」辨空異法。一切世間無有一處而無虛空，知復對何說空為有？

Next is distinguishing the differences. In the text there are four distinct parts: first, Kāśyapa brings up the metaphor as identical with the phenomenon, seeking to make space existent; second, the Buddha distinguishes the difference; third, Kāśyapa presents an analogy to assimilate it to space, seeking to make space existent; fourth, the Buddha distinguishes the difference again. In the first part, "The Tathāgata, the buddha-nature, and nirvāṇa are not subsumed under the three periods of time and yet are termed existent" presents the phenomenon to assimilate it to space. "Space is also not subsumed under the three periods of time; why is it not existent?" questions space as identical with the phenomenon. Below, the Buddha distinguishes it for him, clarifying that nirvāṇa and so forth are spoken of as existent in contrast to non-existence because there are places where they do not exist; the substance of space is not non-existent anywhere, and therefore cannot be termed existent in contrast to non-existence. Within this, it first distinguishes the phenomenon as different from space. "Because of that which is not nirvāṇa, it is named nirvāṇa; because of that which is not the Tathāgata, it is named the Tathāgata; because of that which is not the buddha-nature, it is named the buddha-nature" briefly presents the headings. Below it broadly explains them. First it explains nirvāṇa, first asking and then explaining. All afflictions, conditioned states, and birth-and-death are not nirvāṇa; to refute the Tathāgata's [supposed] conditioned afflictions that are not nirvāṇa, nirvāṇa is expounded and thereby taken as existent. Next it explains the Tathāgata, first citing the term and then explaining. An icchantika up through a pratyekabuddha and so forth are not the Tathāgata; to refute these non-Tathāgatas, the Tathāgata is expounded and thereby taken as existent. Below it explains the buddha-nature, first citing the term and then explaining. Walls, tiles, and stones, which are insentient objects, are not the buddha-nature; to exclude these that are not the buddha-nature, the nature is spoken of as existent. The nature has two kinds: first, the nature that can cognize, which refers to the true consciousness-mind. Sentient beings possess this true consciousness-mind, while external dharmas lack it; therefore it was said above that the so-called buddha-nature refers to sentient beings. Furthermore, where there is a deluded mind there is this true mind, and where there is no deluded mind there is no true mind; therefore it was said above that all who have a mind possess the buddha-nature. Second, the nature that is cognized, namely all dharma-gates such as existence, non-existence, neither-existence-nor-non-existence, and so forth; this encompasses both internal and external and is not solely internal. What is discussed here is spoken only in terms of the former. "In all the world there is nothing that is not space to contrast with space" distinguishes space as different from the phenomenon. In all the world there is no single place where space is absent; against what non-existence, then, could space be spoken of as existent?