大般涅槃經義記 7.104

7.104

下重顯中，德王先難，如來次答，「德王白佛誠如聖」下德王領解。就初難中，難辭有二：一難破向前罪人有性；二「犯四重禁名不定」下難破向前佛有常樂我淨之義，顯成如來不畢竟滅。就難性中，句別有三：一約墮地獄難破有性，「若犯重等，有佛性者」，性是善法，應遮地獄，此等云何復墮地獄？以墮地獄明知無性。二約無常等難破有性，「若使此等有佛性者」，性是常、樂、我、淨之法，云何此等無常、無樂、無我、不淨？以無常等明知無性。三約斷善難破有性，於中三句：一約相徵性，「若使此等有佛性者」，性是善法，一闡提人、斷善根人所有佛性云何不斷？二從相徵性，「佛性若斷」，云何復言常、樂、我、淨？三約性徵相，「若性不斷」即是有善，云何得名一闡提耶？此之三句下文別答，宜審記知。此初難竟。

In the re-elucidation below, King of Virtue first raises objections, the Tathāgata next answers, and from 'King of Virtue addressed the Buddha: Truly it is as the Holy One [says]' onward, King of Virtue receives and understands. Within the initial objections, the words of objection are twofold: first, objecting to and refuting that the aforementioned transgressors have the [buddha-]nature; second, from 'Committing the four grave prohibitions is called indeterminate' onward, objecting to and refuting the aforementioned meaning that the Buddha possesses permanence, joy, self, and purity, and demonstrating that the Tathāgata does not undergo ultimate extinction. In objecting to the nature, the phrases are divided into three: First, objecting to and refuting having the nature by referring to falling into hell: 'If those who commit grave offenses and so forth possess buddha-nature,' since the nature is a wholesome dharma, it should avert hell; how could these [people] still fall into hell? By their falling into hell, it is clearly known that they lack the nature. Second, objecting to and refuting having the nature by referring to impermanence and so forth: 'If these [people] were to have buddha-nature,' since the nature is a dharma of permanence, joy, self, and purity, how could these [people] be impermanent, without joy, without self, and impure? By their impermanence and so forth, it is clearly known that they lack the nature. Third, objecting to and refuting having the nature by referring to the severance of wholesome [roots], within which there are three phrases: 1. Inquiring about the nature on the basis of marks: 'If these [people] were to possess buddha-nature,' since the nature is a wholesome dharma, how could the buddha-nature possessed by icchantikas, persons who have severed wholesome roots, not be severed? 2. Inquiring about the nature following from marks: 'If the buddha-nature were severed,' how could one still speak of permanence, joy, self, and purity? 3. Inquiring about marks on the basis of the nature: 'If the nature is not severed,' that is, they possess goodness, how could they be called icchantikas? These three phrases are answered separately in the text below, which should be carefully noted and remembered. This concludes the first objection.